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Preface 
Fall, 2009 –A municipality in the Netherlands  
 
It is two a.m., and the phone rings. The mayor and his wife wake up. He grabs 
his phone. It is a police officer informing him about a violent incident that had 
taken place an hour before. An inhabitant had seriously molested his wife that 
night. Their 14-year-old daughter managed to call 112, and when the police 
arrived at their house, it was clear that immediate crisis intervention was 
necessary. The mayor gives his permission for the police to implement a home 
restriction order. Consequently, the husband is not allowed to be at home, or 
to contact his immediate family for the next ten days. The mayor hangs up the 
phone and goes back to bed, hoping to get some sleep before another busy day. 
 
Temporary home restrictions for perpetrators of domestic violence is just one 
example of the many new powers that have been given to Dutch mayors in the 
past 15 years. These powers are meant to address a wide range of new public 
safety problems that have arisen in the last two to three decades. This book 
describes a four-year research project focusing on Dutch mayors in public 
safety governance. Because mayors are responsible for providing order and 
safety in local society, all eyes generally turn to them when a new safety 
problem arises in Dutch society, and these have affected the position and role 
of Dutch mayors profoundly. 
Studying the way Dutch mayors are addressing local safety problems 
is important for several reasons. First, in the last two decades, Dutch citizens 
have become increasingly worried about a wide variety of public safety 
problems (van den Brink, 2002; Pieterman, 2008). Second, a new policy 
domain regarding local public safety has emerged and established itself in the 
Netherlands in the past 15 years. Public expenditure on local safety have 
grown from 552 million euros in 1997, to 1347 million euros in 2007 (CBS, 
2008). Third, Dutch mayors hold a prominent position within this policy 
domain. They were assigned the task of coordinating the entire policy process, 
and the national government has granted them various powers to ensure this. 
However, not all sections of Dutch society are happy with these powers, and a 
public debate was triggered in which the Dutch mayors were accused of 
behaving more like local sheriffs, and less in accordance with their traditional 
role of shepherd
1
 of local community.  
This book describes a research project combining local and national 
studies on the position and role of Dutch mayors in local safety governance in 
the Netherlands between the years 1990 and 2010. The overall finding is that 
an ever growing trend of securitizing local issues has fostered an expansion of 
the mayor’s formal position, as well as his practical actions in public safety 
governance.  
 
 
                                                 
1   In Dutch: Burgervader.  
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Part I – Introduction and context 
The first part of the book provides a general introduction to the research 
project. Chapter one introduces the research problem, its implications for 
theory and practice, and it provides a general outline of the book. Chapter two 
provides a detailed description of the research domain of local safety 
governance in the Netherlands, which came into place and has been 
continually professionalized since the early 1990s. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1 Providing local order and safety: a mayor’s responsibility  
Dutch Mayors have been responsible for ensuring local safety and order since 
the introduction of the first Local Government Act in 1851 (Local Government 
Act, Section 172). Taking care of public safety and order is a mayor’s core 
task, alongside that of enhancing the quality of local government, and  
representing their municipality (Local Government Act, Section 170). During 
the past twenty years, the societal, administrative and political environment in 
which the Dutch mayors’ address local order and safety has changed 
drastically. 
Although Dutch mayors used to react to local manifestations of crime 
and disorder more or less individually, things have changed dramatically in 
recent years, and they now coordinate local safety policy processes and 
cooperate with various actors from the public and private sector on a daily 
basis. A policy domain regarding public safety at the municipal level has 
developed in the Netherlands in the past twenty years (Cachet and Ringeling, 
2004). A so called ‘integral policy approach’ has become the dominant policy 
strategy for public safety governance. Core aspects of this policy approach are 
that it targets a wide variety of safety problems (objective and subjective risk, 
social problems, physical dangers), and that it addresses them at the local 
administrative level of cities and municipalities with administrative, societal 
and private actors collaborating in ‘local safety networks’ (Prins and Cachet, 
2011). Local governments – especially mayors with a formal responsibility for 
local order and safety – are made responsible for coordinating the effort to 
design, implement and evaluate integral approaches to public safety. 
In the past 15 years, Dutch mayors received multiple new powers to 
address specific local safety problems (Mein, 2010; Sackers 2010a/b). These 
include the power to temporarily hold specific groups and individuals in 
custody if they are considered a threat to public safety and order (implemented 
in2000 under the Local Government Act, Sections 154a and 176a). Another 
power granted in 2002 gave police the right to carry out preventive body 
searches in specific public areas to weed out the possibility of weapon related 
crimes (Local Government Act, Section 151b). Another new power granted in 
2008 was that of restricting committers of domestic violence from returning 
home for period of ten days after the assault (Law on Temporary Home 
Restrictions). Two final examples of new laws enacted are that granting the 
mayor the right to temporarily hold specific persons and groups in custody for 
preventative purposes, and the right to issue reporting duties to individuals 
causing the nuisance introduced in 2010 (Local Government Act, 173 a, b). 
These new powers have been both welcomed and criticized, with 
mayors themselves being roughly divided into two groups. The mayors of 
large cities were mostly welcoming of the new powers. Some took a key role 
in their initiation in order to address what they saw as highly complex public 
safety problems, and a need to meet the societal demand for public safety. 
Others were more reluctant and spoke up against the infringements of privacy 
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and warned of a poor understanding of the long term outcomes of these far 
reaching powers (Bandell In van der Zwan, 2007 , van Rehwinkel in De 
Volkskrant, 2010). Moreover, the Dutch mayors’ traditional role of shepherd 
would be overshadowed by their new role of local sheriff or ‘superman’ in 
their push to get tough on crime and quell any other threats to public order and 
safety (c.f. Sackers, 2010A).  
2 A changing perspective on public safety 
The new policies emerged against the background of changing perspectives on 
public safety, both in and outside of the Netherlands. A number of factors 
including modernization, the end of the Cold War, secularization, 
individualization and terrorist attacks led to increasing societal and political 
attention to issues of safety and security. Nowadays, citizens, politicians and 
governments in many Western- European counties feel that their societies are 
being challenged by persistent problems of safety (c.f. Cachet, de Kimpe, 
Ponsaers and Ringeling, 2008). However, public safety issues have not always 
been given as much attention as they are due. It was more common in the past 
for victims of crime and the larger society to accepted their fate and regard the 
risk of something untoward happening as a fact of life, or an act of God. 
Society’s attitude towards risk and safety problems changed, and in this 
process, matters of public safety became problems of public safety (c.f. Dery, 
1984). This problem-oriented perspective on public safety required a collective 
response from various levels of government.  
Between the end of the Second World War and the 1960s, local 
governments in the Netherlands were able to respond relatively effectively to 
public safety problems as they faced relatively low crime rates, and saw 
mainly minor disturbances of public order. Formal policies regarding public 
safety were non-existent (Cachet and Ringeling, 2004) at the time, but this 
started to shift in the 1960s and 1970s when crime rates rose rapidly and new 
public safety problems manifested themselves in Dutch society. Examples of 
the latter are traffic accidents, riots caused by squatter movements, 
disturbances of public order by demonstrations (such as that held against the 
Vietnam War), and the hostage takings by South Moluccan activists. 
Consequently, Dutch citizens started to pay more attention to public safety 
issues, and they developed increasingly greater expectations of the Dutch 
governments (van de Brink, 2002; Pieterman, 2008). 
By the late 1980s, it became apparent that a formal and hierarchically 
coordinated policy would be necessary to tackle the undesired phenomena 
(Cachet in Cachet et al., 2008) and meet citizen’s demands. Consequently, a 
substantial policy domain for addressing local, regional and national public 
safety problems emerged in the past twenty years. Every city in the 
Netherlands has a policy aimed specifically at improving the public safety 
situation. The number of laws, regulations, policies, programs and instruments 
addressing public safety has increased substantially, and is still growing. 
While formal policy responses to public safety problems became a 
daily reality for local governments in the 1990s and 2000s, the nature of issues 
considered to be public safety problems changed (Residohardjo, 2011; 
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Resodiahrdjo and Kors-Walraven 2012; Timmermans, Breeman and Dalfsen 
2011). Traditional public safety problems, such as theft and riots were soon 
complemented by newer concerns.  A quick look at local public safety related 
policy documents reveals new safety problems, such noise, drugs, litter on the 
streets, the illegal transportation of chemicals, the influx of people from 
specific ethnic backgrounds, and the religious radicalization of specific citizen 
groups. Consequently, local safety problems have become highly complex, 
unpredictable (van Asselt, 2007), and technological (Perrow, 1984). Although 
the labels ‘safety’ and ‘security’ are widely used, what they refer to has 
changed, and the contemporary safety governance issues are dynamic, fuzzy, 
and variable (Cachet et. al., 2008). Society’s perspective on public safety 
problems has changed drastically, and public safety has became a container 
concept (c.f. Boutellier’s ‘semantic net’, 2005). As a result, the mayors’ 
traditional responsibility for local order and safety now extends to a much 
wider variety of local safety problems. 
3 Securitization and the power of problem definition   
The range of issues on the current public safety governance agenda shows a 
trend of defining societal phenomena in terms of (threats to) public safety (van 
Dijk en Hoogewoning, 2009). In the mid 1990s, several scholars gathered at 
the Copenhagen School described this trend as one of increasing 
‘securitization’. They defined securitization as a “process of social 
construction involving those who carry out the speech act (‘securitizing 
actors’) to articulate an existential threat to a referent object” (Buzan, Waever, 
de Wilde, 1998: 23-24). The introduction of the concept of securitization 
highlighted the widening of the concept of public safety. The so-called referent 
object could be anything from a person, country or an event. Moreover, the 
concept of securitization demonstrated the power of labeling something as a 
safety threat. By presenting an issue as a threat to public safety and order, it 
becomes justifiable to call upon the use of specific instruments and mobilize 
certain actors from the safety domain. A successful act of securitization thus 
opens the doors to a wide range of potential security measures taken by actors 
such as the police and the military (Buzan et al., 1998). 
More in general, defining something as a public problem is to 
explicitly make a case for (governmental) action. This points at the power of 
problem definitions as richly described in the literature on agenda setting and 
governance dynamics. Problem definitions can be seen as “descriptions or 
constructions of the world sustaining some patterns of social action and 
excluding others” (Burr, 2003:5). This literature views policy making as a 
“constant struggle over the criteria for classification, the boundaries of 
categories, and the definition of ideas that guide the way people behave” 
(Stone, 2002:11). Problem definitions not only point to a certain perspective 
on the problem itself, they also promote a certain course of action and 
legitimize certain actors as ‘fixers’ of the problem, giving them new authority, 
power, and resources (Stone, 2002:209).  
How one defines a policy problem thus affects the selection of 
suitable solutions and influences who is responsible for taking remedial action. 
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The research problem describes in the next section strongly relies on the 
theoretical assumption that problem definitions have significant consequences 
for actors’ positions and roles in the policy process (c.f. Gusfield, 1981; Weis, 
1989; Cobb and Elder,1993; Stone, 2002).  This assumption places the 
mayor’s position and role in local safety governance in the past two decades 
against the background of a changing perspective on public safety in the 
Netherlands. Such a changing perspective on local safety has brought about 
new definitions of safety problems which are expected to affect the position 
and role of the Dutch mayor.  
4 Research questions and scope  
The objective of this study is to describe, analyze and understand how the 
position and role of mayors within local safety governance has been affected 
by shifting definitions of local public safety problems between 1990 and 2010 
in the Netherlands. This span of twenty years covers both the emergence and 
development of a comprehensive policy domain surrounding local public 
safety governance in the Netherlands. This period is also characterized by a 
shifting perspective on public safety problems, as well as by fundamental 
changes in the mayor’s position within the policy domain. The central question 
of the research project is as follows:  
 
How have definitions of local safety problems changed and how, to what 
extent and why has this affected the position and role of mayors in local safety 
governance in the Netherlands between 1990 and 2010? 
 
The central question is followed up by five sub-questions:  
 
1 - How did the policy domain regarding local public safety evolve between 
1990 and 2010 in the Netherlands, and what has been the mayor’s formal 
position in it?  
 
To begin answering our research question, the empirical context of the 
research project needed to be introduced first. The first sub question thus 
addresses the domain of local safety governance, which is understood as a 
collection of policies, practices and actors coordinated by local authorities in 
order to tackle threats, risks and actual problems endangering local order and 
safety within the boundaries of a municipality. The first sub question facilitates 
a general description of the emergence  of local safety governance, and the key 
developments to take place between 1990 and 2010. Special attention was paid 
to the development of the mayor’s formal position within this policy domain. 
The latter is understood as the formal status in a governance network 
characterized by formal tasks, powers and responsibilities which come along 
with a certain position in a given social structure (Merton, 1957; Kuper and 
Kuper, 2010).  
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2 - What is the expected role of problem definitions during policy processes, 
and how are these expected to affect the position and role of individual actors 
in a policy network?  
 
This second question addresses the need to review theoretical knowledge in 
order to understand in which way, and to what extent definitions of local safety 
problems potentially affected the mayors’ position and role. The power of 
problem definitions as documented in the literature on problem definitions, 
policy dynamics, framing and governance networks are explored, and a 
conceptual model is created to map out how new or shifting problem 
definitions are expected to affect actor’s positions and roles in governance 
networks.  
 
3 - Which problems have been listed for local safety governance in the 
Netherlands, and what shifts have taken place between 1990 and 2010? 
 
Sub question three is answered by an effort to gather empirical data on the 
definitions of local safety problems and changes therein. Data providing 
insight into definitions of local public safety problems were gathered and 
analyzed. Special attention was paid to the so called ‘dominant definitions’ of 
local public safety problems since these definitions were most likely to be 
subject to local policy interventions by the mayor and his safety partners.  
 
4 -  How have new local safety problems been framed in local policy processes 
and how and to what extent and why did they affect the position and role of 
mayors in the practice of local safety governance? 
 
A second round of data collection and analysis was conducted to address this 
question and to clarify if and how dominant definitions of public safety 
problems actually influenced the mayor’s role and position. Although the 
formal position and role of the mayor in local safety governance is prescribed 
by the national law which applies equally to every mayor, in reality, each 
mayor’s practice is expected to differ across time and place. Therefore 
multiple case studies had to be conducted to examine the mayor’s role in 
practice through the lens of several dominant problem definitions. The 
mayor’s role in practice was defined as the actions he/she
2
 had and had not 
actually undertaken in order to address a public problem. These actions may or 
may not have been in line with behaviors expected from the formal definition 
of their tasks, powers and responsibilities (as indicated by answering sub 
question 1).  
The final sub question read as follows: 
 
5 - Which factors of the local, regional and national policy arena affected the 
course, content and outcome of local framing processes, as well as the 
mayor’s position and role in the practice of local safety governance?  
                                                 
2
  Please read for he/him she/her as well. Almost 20% of Dutch mayors are female  
(Van Bennekom 2010). 
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A look beyond the municipal boundaries was needed to fully grasp the course 
and content of local policy processes around new problems, and the mayors’ 
role in addressing these. Although the current project explicitly focuses on 
Dutch mayors and their local practices, these practices are closely connected to 
the policy dynamics of the wider regional, national and even those dominant in 
the international policy arena. As further explained in the next chapter, in the 
past two decades, actors from the supra local administrative levels have 
become  more and more involved with public safety problems located at the 
municipal level (Cachet and Prins, 2009). The national government, for 
example, indirectly addresses local public safety problems by setting local 
priorities and by giving mayors formal powers to address these. The fact that 
the research domain is called local public safety governance does not imply 
that only local actors and resources are involved. Therefore sub question five 
focuses on the interplay between factors from the local as well as the external 
policy arena on local governance processes during which dominant problem 
definitions are created, and the mayor takes up a specific role.  
5 Relevance for theory  
The study takes its cues from four branches of literature, and it is hoped that 
the findings will contribute in return to each of these areas. First of all, we aim 
to contribute to the securitization literature (Buzan et al., 1998; William, 2003; 
Balzaq, 2005). Securitization is a concept that is embedded in the field of 
Security Studies, which is in turn part of the larger field of International 
Relations. Both bodies of knowledge focus on war and within-state conflicts, 
and they study the dynamics of safety and security governance at the nation 
state level as well as more macro levels above (c.f. Grey, 2009). Since the 
1980s, the field of Securities Studies has broadened its scope considerably as 
multiple scholars attempt to move beyond this state centered focus and push 
the focus toward a wider range of threats (c.f. Grey, 2009). Scholars from this 
field united in the Copenhagen School where they introduced securitization as 
a new framework of analysis that would move the focus beyond the primacy of 
states and military interventions in conceptualizing security (Buzan et al., 
1998). The authors explicitly mentioned that  securitization was open to any 
level of analysis ranging from local, to regional, to global (ibid). However, 
even now, the concept of securitization is still mostly applied to the 
governance dynamics around national and international safety threats. These 
threats include those related to the availability of fresh water (Stetter, 
Herschinger,  Teichler and M. Albert, 2011) and energy  (Phillips, 2013), 
issues of migration (Huysmans, 2000; Weaver, 1996; Loader, 2002), and the 
policies of foreign powers that can sometimes endanger nation states. The 
examples above point to securitization as a concept used by scholars to unravel 
‘supra local security dynamics’. Nevertheless, securitization as a mechanism 
of labeling something as a safety problem, calling for safety measures, and 
mobilizing actors can be observed closer to home. This research project aims 
to identify which issues were successfully labeled as threats to local safety at 
the Dutch municipal level, and to observe the changes that took place between  
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1990 and 2010. In doing so, the current study will connect the concept of 
securitization from security studies with local governance practices by 
exploring the potential empirical manifestation of a local variant of 
securitization at the most local level of governance in the Netherlands.   
Secondly, this study is built on the theoretical assumption that 
problem definitions have clear consequences for policy design as well as 
practice. The power of problem definition is widely described in the literature 
on agenda setting and policy dynamics. Scholars in this field provide multiple 
models of how problem definitions rise and fall on the policy agendas 
(Parsons, 1995; Cobb and Elder, 1972; Kingdon, 1984; Cohen, March and 
Olson, 1972), and how definitions of public problems compete with each other 
and change with time (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Baumgartner and 
Jones, 2009). More importantly, they all stressed that a certain problem 
definition impacts the choice of strategies, tools, actors and practices adopted 
in the implementation of a particular policy. This research project builds upon 
agenda setting literature by presenting a conceptual model mapping out how 
problem definitions structure strategies and actor roles during the policy 
development and implementation processes. Applying this conceptual model 
to real life cases of local safety governance will provide further insight into the 
empirical manifestation of the power of problem definitions.  
 Thirdly, the concept of framing is adopted in this conceptual model in 
an attempt to better understand the power of problem definitions at a deeper, or 
more fundamental level. The framing literature points to frames as images of 
reality that color perceptions and link them to appropriate actions (Goffman, 
1974; Snow and Benford, 1988). Whereas the psychological strand of the 
framing literature studies how frames structure our cognitive attempts to 
understand reality, the sociological strand of the framing literature looks at the 
impact of frames on the interaction between individuals, and on the impact of 
frames on the collective processes of policy making and implementation. The 
latter strand in the framing literature is most closely related to public 
administration, and contains multiple studies on how policy frames steer 
perceptions of local policy alternatives (Hajer, 1989), and target groups of 
social policies (Schneider and Ingram, 1993). How and to what extent policy 
frames can be linked to the actions of policy actors in practice is crucial to our 
understanding of the power of problem definition in the collective setting of 
policy making and implementation. This study appeals to this body of 
knowledge and aims to further our understanding of how policy frames affect 
the behaviour of individual policy actors in the collective setting of policy 
networks. The application of the conceptual model to the practical role of 
Dutch mayors in the local governance networks will show us to what extent, 
under which conditions and how their actions were structured by these policy 
frames. 
 Fourthly, the role of state actors in multi-level networks is a 
highly debated topic in both the public administration literature and the safety 
and security studies literature. The fact that contemporary governance settings 
are characterized by public, private and civil actors from various 
administrative levels pooling resources and aligning actions leads scholars to 
wonder what happened to the previously dominant position held by state actors 
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who were the traditional providers of governance. Do state actors still hold 
extraordinary positions in governance settings? This fundamental question was 
raised frequently in both the literature on fragmented network governance 
(Peters and Pierre, 1998; Rhodes, 1996), and in that related to the pluralization 
of policing (Dupont, 2004; Rhodes, 1996; Crawford and Lister, 2005). The 
multiple case studies conducted as part of this study provide an empirical basis 
by which to answer the question as it pertains to Dutch mayors involved in 
rather horizontal, multi-actor safety networks. Does the mayor (as the number 
one representative of the state and the traditional provider of the classical state 
task) hold an extraordinary position, or does he simply become one of many 
mutually dependent providers of local safety?  
6 Relevance for practice  
Alongside the theoretical implications outlined above, the current study 
contributes to the body of knowledge on local safety governance in the 
Netherlands. The research project’s historical perspective on local safety 
problems offers a detailed, empirical overview of the emergence of safety as 
an encompassing policy concept (Resodihardjo and Prins, 2014). Research 
findings will indicate which types of issues were successfully securitized over 
the years, and which issues dominated the overall agenda for local safety 
governance. Combining this knowledge with our case studies of the 
governance processes in local safety networks will generate important insights 
into how the government large cities have been dealing with and have been 
affected by new safety problems in local society.  
 A second contribution of the case studies would be the insights they 
provide as to how Dutch mayors operate in their practice of public safety 
governance. Existing knowledge of Dutch mayors focuses strongly on the 
institutional characteristics of the mayors’ position in local governance, and 
has only roughly outlined the actual workings of the mayors and other actors 
involved (Muller, Rogier, Kummeling, Dammen, Bron, Woltjer and 
Kalkhoven, 2007; Sackers 2010A; Mein, 2010). This study aims to show both 
whether and how shifts in the institutional and formal characteristics of local 
leadership altered the Dutch mayors’ role in policy and practice. This will be 
done by studying whether and how new formal powers were adopted by the 
mayors in our case studies, and how these affected their role in local safety 
governance.  
 A third area in which the current study aims to make contributions is 
the unresolved question of whether Dutch mayors behave like local sheriffs. 
As the mayor’s task of overseeing local safety and order became more 
prominent, an active public debate emerged in which mayors, administrators 
and scholars expressed their wishes and worries in this regard. The expansion 
of the mayors’ powers in local safety governance triggered mainly critical 
remarks, and both practitioners and scholars feared that Dutch mayors would 
become local sheriffs implementing repressive powers in reaction to each and 
every threat to local order and safety (Sackers 2010a). Moreover, the mayors’ 
new role in relation to local order and safety appears incompatible with their 
traditionally softer role of father figure (Sackers, 2010B).  This research 
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project aims to contribute to these discussions by providing a historical 
analysis of the mayors’ role in local safety governance, both as it is outlined on 
paper and what occurs in practice. Empirical analysis will be employed to shed 
light on whether new local safety problems affect local mayors, and whether 
new powers actually matter in practice. Other pertinent questions include 
whether they implemented the new policies, and if so, whether these policies 
then changed the mayors’ role and position in the governance networks. 
Finally, we address the pertinent question of whether Dutch mayors actually 
behave like local sheriffs. 
7 Structure of the book 
This book consists of five parts. The first part provides an overall introduction 
to the research project. The central questions, and the project’s implications for 
theory and practice were presented in this first chapter. The second chapter 
explains the empirical context of the study by providing a description of the 
emergence of the local policy domain and the mayor’s formal position within 
it in the years between 1990 and 2010. 
The second part of the book deals with the theoretical context of the 
research project by exploring the literature on problem definitions, policy 
dynamics, framing and governance networks. These  theoretical concepts are 
discussed and used in combination as building blocks of the conceptual model 
that is presented in part three of the book.  
Part three builds upon the literature review by presenting a conceptual 
model that maps out the power of problem definitions on actors’ roles and 
positions in governance networks. This part focuses on the link between theory 
and practice, and the concepts and variables of the model are operationalized 
into researchable indicators. The research design is presented thereafter, and it 
is characterized by a realistic view of the processes of social constructivism. 
This design combines desk research and case study methods. The reasons for 
choosing this form of design will be provided in the chapter.  
The fourth part of the book provides a description and analysis of the 
empirical data. First, the findings from our analysis of long-term data on the 
shifting definitions of local safety problems in the Netherlands are discussed. 
This is followed by multiple in depth case study reports on mayors’ roles and 
actions when addressing several new public safety problems. Insights are 
gleaned from both sources of data and compared to produce overall research 
findings.  
In the fifth and final part of the book, the central research question is 
answered before  conclusions are drawn. Implications for theory and practice 
are discussed thereafter.  
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Chapter 2: Local safety governance and the Dutch mayor between 1990 
and 2010
3
  
1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the empirical context of the research project. It starts 
with a detailed description of the research domain of local safety governance. 
Based on relevant literature and policy documents, a description will be given 
on what public safety governance entails and how it evolved during the past 
two decades. This is followed by a discussion of the mayor’s position in local 
governance in general, which is strongly characterized by his responsibility for 
maintaining local safety and order. Special attention will go out to the mayor’s 
formal position regarding local safety and order as described in laws and 
policies in order to sketch the formal context in which every Dutch mayor 
operates. Together, this provides an answer to the second sub question of the 
research project: How did the policy domain regarding local public safety 
evolve between 1990 and 2010 in the Netherlands and what has been the 
mayor’s formal position in it?  
2 Local safety governance in the Netherlands  
Local safety governance is understood as a collection of policies, practices and 
actors coordinated by local authorities in order to tackle threats, risks and 
actual problems endangering local order and safety within the boundaries of a 
municipality. Before exploring the characteristics of local safety governance, 
we have to explain what is actually meant by the term ‘local’. The Dutch 
system of public administration is characterized by three layers of government: 
national, provincial and local government. The local government is the main 
unit of analysis in this research project It consists of the over  400 
municipalities and cities which are considered the most basic level of 
governance in the Netherlands, and the level closest to the Dutch citizens 
(CBS, 2010). Local government knows three independent governing bodies, 
                                                 
3
 This chapter is strongly based on several publications: 
- Cachet, A. and R.S. Prins (2012) Ontwikkeling van het lokaal veiligheidsbeleid. 
In: E. Muller (Ed.), Veiligheid en veiligheidsbeleid in Nederland (pp. 477-495). 
Deventer: Kluwer. 
- Prins, R.S., A. cachet, P. Ponsaers and G. Hughes (2012) Fragmentation and 
Interconnection in Public Safety Governance in The Netherlands, Belgium and 
England. In: Fenger, M. and V. Bekkers Beyond Fragmentation and 
interconnectivity. Public governance and the search of connective capacity.IOS 
Press. 
- Prins, R.S., C. Van der Linden, A. Cachet, T. Tudsjman, V. Bekkers (2012). 
Nationale wetten versus lokale besluiten: Een spanningsveld voor burgemeesters . 
Onderzoeksrapport in opdracht van het  Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en 
Koninkrijksrelaties. Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam. 
- Resodihardjo , S. and R.S. Prins (2014)  ‘Surrounded by Safety: Safety as an 
encompassing policy concept in the Netherlands’ European Journal of Policing 
Studies.  1(3), 225-248. 
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namely the local council (representative), the board of mayor and aldermen 
(executive) and the mayor (Neelen, Rutgers and Tuurenhout, 2003). 
Traditionally, actors at both the local and national level were involved with 
public safety governance. The provinces have never been crucial players in the 
field of societal safety governance since they never held formal tasks or 
powers regarding crime and other social threats to order and safety.
4
 
Nevertheless, the regional policy level did gain importance in the practice of 
public safety governance as regional collaboration arrangements between 
multiple municipalities became more popular over the years (Cachet and Prins, 
2009).   
During the past twenty years, a policy domain has developed through 
which local governments and other parties address a wide variety of safety 
problems that have emerged. Nowadays, each municipality in the Netherlands 
has something of a formal policy aimed at improving the local safety situation. 
The next section discusses the triggers, defining characteristics and policy 
history of local public safety governance in the Netherlands. Through this 
exploration, it becomes clear that although local government is fully and 
formally responsible for local safety and order, local safety governance is 
considered a multi-level governance practice (Cachet and Prins, 2009). All 
three separate, though strongly connected governance levels in the Netherlands 
affect the way in which local safety problems are defined and addressed. 
2.1 A short history of local safety governance in the Netherlands 
Half a century ago, local safety governance in the Netherlands was a simple 
and almost invisibly enacted task.
5
 Policy or politics had no significance on the 
governance of public safety. The number of actors involved was small, and 
political or societal debate about local safety was almost non-existent. How 
different is today’s picture. Safety and security occupy prominent places on the 
local and national political and societal agenda, and public safety has become a 
highly politicized issue. At the local level, a large number of different actors is 
involved in keeping peace and controlling disorder or crime. This section 
chronologically summarizes significant local level happenings of the past 
decade, and how things have evolved today. 
 
2.1.1 Societal changes fuelling the need for policy and collaboration 
Crime and disorder have not historically been issues of high importance in 
local governance. Local Dutch authorities, specifically the mayor, public 
prosecutor and police, appeared to easily cope with the extent of  crime and 
disorder they encountered. Safety governance was neither an issue in politics 
nor in policy. Full enforcement was the rule. Both the police and the system of 
criminal justice did what they had to do and nobody worried about it. Rather 
unexpectedly and suddenly however, Dutch society begun to change in the 
                                                 
4   The regional level gained some importance since the introduction of the Law on   
Safety Regions which formalized the regional administrative structures for crisis  
preparation and response.  
5   This is in line with 19th century Dutch liberal statesman’s Thorbecke’s dictum  
that: ‘we want a police that comes to our attention as little as possible’. 
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second half of the 1960s. The usual problems of safety increased in magnitude, 
and new threats came to the fore. This changing society altered the perspective 
of citizens, politicians and civil servants, including those at the local level. As 
a result, politicians and policy makers at all levels started to pay more attention 
to public safety. Local authorities were so greatly affected by the societal 
changes, they were eventually granted new powers that gave them an 
important role in safeguarding local society. The following section describes 
the societal changes that fuelled the need for policy changes and greater 
governmental collaboration in the Netherlands. 
As in many Western European countries, the attention to safety and 
security increased against the background of several intertwined 
developments. Firstly, the industrialized society brought about a rather 
pessimistic view of technology and science. Modern life became inherently 
connected to matters of risk and safety. People no longer accepted a certain 
degree of risk as a fact of life, and the (possible) risks of modern life were in 
greater focus than any of the opportunities it had to offer (Beck, 1992). 
Secondly, several key events altered ‘the landscape of security’ drastically 
(Zedner, 2003:153). These events included the end of the cold war, which led 
to a shift in attention from military and nuclear threats to more domestic 
threats to safety and order (ibid). The terrorist attacks of 9/11 further eroded 
the distinction between internal and external threats (ibid). Thirdly, our 
perspective of safety and security changed tremendously because of various 
societal developments. The safety once offered by political, religious and 
societal movements faded in the postmodern, globalized and individualized 
societies (Boutellier, 2005). Both our focus on risks and our growing demand 
for safety resulted in an ongoing effort to prevent us from any kind of harm 
(Wildavsky, 1988; Pieterman, 2008). Fourthly, Dutch police statistics showed 
that the number of registered crimes had increased from roughly 132.000 in 
1960 to 1,3 million in 1999 in the Netherlands (Bruinsma, van de Bunt and 
Haen Marshall, 2001). Further, physical safetyrelated risks increased and 
became less predictable as a result of the increasing mobility of people, and the 
rise of high tech industries.
6
 
Problems of law and order grew quickly in the 1970s and again in the 
early 1990s, making the fast rising crime rate among the most urgent problems 
in the Netherlands. While safety problems expanded in terms of numbers and 
severity, citizens had high expectations of their government to safeguard them 
from various potential harms (Pieterman, 2008). As a result, the formerly 
stable societal order of the heavily ‘pillarized’ Dutch society (Lijphart, 1966; 
Goudsblom, 1967) was contested in the Netherlands. Traditional keepers of 
peace, law, and order were not able to adequately meet the new challenges, 
and the rising tide of crime effectively put an end to the fiction of full 
enforcement.  
                                                 
6   Ira Helsoot defined physical safety as “threats to health and goods caused by  
accidents” which contrasts with social safety which is about “threats to health and 
goods caused by intentional actions” (2007: 11).  Physical safety is a term often 
used in the Netherlands for describing management structures for crisis 
management. 
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By the late 1980s, Dutch authorities realized they would never be able 
to effectively handle the growing problems. From that point on, authorities 
decided that they had to choose what to enforce and sanction, and what not to. 
This was a revolutionary change, starting first in the juridical sphere with the 
introduction of the ‘positive opportunity principle’ (’t Hart, 1994). Under this 
principle, enforcement and prosecution would take place only if the public 
interest was involved, and if there was a reasonable chance of success. The 
revolution continued in the policy making arena when it became necessary to 
be clear on which local safety problems were to be addressed, by whom and 
how (Commissie Peper, 1981). This led to of a long sequence of policy 
projects, plans and programs which shaped and structured local policy 
ambitions and practices (see Section 2.2 on policy history). 
While these societal changes challenged local authorities by bringing 
about new threats to local order and safety, they not only fuelled the need for 
policy planning, they fostered collaboration between multiple actors in and 
outside of governmental spheres as well. The government’s monopoly (if ever 
it had one) on the provision of safety broke down as the traditional 
governmental representatives were no longer independently able to 
successfully address (new) threats to local order and safety. Many other actors 
became involved, such as housing corporations, schools, neighbourhood 
organizations, storekeepers, welfare workers and citizens. Today, more or less 
horizontal relations between public, private and societal actors dominate the 
governance of the local public safety scene (Hoogenboom, 2009). 
 
2.1.2 The entrance of multiple new providers of local safety 
While the police traditionally had something of a monopoly on law 
enforcement in relation to any threats to local order and public safety, this was 
no longer feasible as crime rates rose rapidly and new public safety problems 
entered the scene. This problematic situation became more pressing in the 
early 1980s and after, eventually leading to a public debate about the police’s 
‘core tasks’. In this debate, the police argued that they should be able to share 
the law enforcement burden with parties other than members of the criminal 
justice system. The police felt they should focus on their core tasks, and that 
the responsibility for public safety should be more broadly deployed (van der 
Torre, J. Kuppens , H.B. Ferwerda, and V. J. van Bolhuis, 2007). In the first 
instance, local governments were encouraged to take greater responsibility for 
local safety and order (Commission Roethof, 1984).  
Traditionally, a mayor and public prosecutor would seek to maintain 
peace and order with the help of the police and the criminal justice system. As 
part of the local administration, the fire brigade would also play a role, as did 
building inspectorates and a small number of other specialized offices within 
the administration. The system had a largely chain-like character: the mayor 
gave instructions to the police, the police brought offenders to the public 
prosecutor, and the public prosecutor brought it to court. Non-governmental 
actors did not play a role at all in this old chain of command. However, the 
scene quickly changed from a closed and rather orderly affair, and morphed 
into an open and often very complex network. In an attempt to increase their 
problem solving capacity, local authorities started to invite multiple so called 
  
 
 
33 
 
‘partners’ from different backgrounds into the discussion, and this fostered a 
trend of multi actor public safety governance and policing since the 1990s. 
Consequently, the practice of governing local order and safety 
gradually expanded to encompass many governmental, quasi-governmental 
and non-governmental actors. Scholars mention the entrance of citizens (van 
Caem, 2008; van Steden, 2009; Terpstra, 2010), private security companies 
(van Steden, 2007), new forms of public police auxiliaries employed by 
municipalities and other non-police bodies (Jones, van Steden, and Boutellier, 
2009) and many ‘societal actors’ in the local safety networks. Shopkeepers 
were forced to protect their premises, football stadiums had to create their own 
safety provisions, and private citizens were invited, for example, to make their 
homes burglar-proof. This trend was described by criminologist David Garland 
as the ‘reponsibilization strategy,’ (2001). From a governance perspective, we 
saw new actors and organizations entering into stable cooperative relations 
with the police in order to ensure safety in business parks, to bring youthful 
offenders back on the right path, to prevent the deterioration of neighborhoods, 
or to solve conflicts between neighbors.  
 
2.1.3 The need for policy planning 
The fast rising demand for order maintenance and crime control made public 
safety governance a political activity (cf. Reiner, 1985). Choices had to be 
made about what to do and what not to do, and this burden of choice could no 
longer be left to the operational executive police officers. Much that was left 
implicit in the past now had to become explicit, and political administrators 
now had to be accountable for the choices that were made. This need for 
explicit and accountable choices led to the rise of an elaborate system of police 
and safety planning or policy formation in the Netherlands.  
The notion of police and safety policy was introduced during the 
second half of the 1900s (Commissie Peper, 1981). Police planning was 
stimulated by the 1994 police reform that introduced regional police forces. 
From the early 1990s, the national government also begun to help local 
governments to develop local safety policies of their own.
7
 Gradually many 
local governments introduced local safety policy plans, also known as 
integrated safety policy plans, with the  with the large cities moving more 
quickly in this regard than smaller cities and villages  (SGBO, 2000). At the 
same time, the national government began to introduce policy programs to 
strengthen its own steering of the police and (local) safety. As a result, the 
overall amount of planning and steering increased drastically. Tensions 
between national and local steering and control bodies increased in the 
Netherlands, as well as in other Western-European countries (Cachet, Van 
Sluis, Jochoms, Sey and Ringeling, 2009; Cachet and Prins, 2010).  
 
In sum, local safety governance emerged from the late 1980s and onwards. 
The practice of local safety governance is characterized by local governments 
attempting to tackle a wide variety of threats to local order and safety in close 
                                                 
7   Amongst which: Integral Safety Report, 1993 (Ministry of Internal Affairs, 1993)  
and Public Safety Policy, 1995-1998 (Ministry of Internal Affairs, 1995).  
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collaboration with many others from different governmental levels and sectors. 
In the next section, a detailed description is provided of the local policy 
ambitions of the ‘integral approach’.  
2.2 Towards local safety policies: a series of policy plans 
The emergence of the policy domain of local safety governance is strongly 
defined by the introduction and further professionalization of the ‘integral 
approach’. This was an inclusive approach in which local authorities and the 
mayor are granted a prominent role. A formal and coordinated policy approach 
was deemed necessary to tackle the undesired phenomena (Cachet in Cachet, 
de Kimpe, Ponsaers and Ringeling, 2008). This was one of countless steps in a 
long process of meeting citizen’s demands and responding to the government’s 
view and that of many others’ that it was increasingly necessary to invest in 
tackling safety problems. The policy path of local safety governance thus 
knows a long history of policy projects, plans and programs which shaped and 
structured local policy ambitions and practices. In this section, we will discuss 
the chronological development of the most important policy documents. It is 
striking that most of these were introduced by the national government.
 
In fact, 
it will become clear in the next section that the policy history of local safety 
governance is strongly affected by national policy ambitions. 
   
Figure 1: Overview of key policy documents on the governance of local public 
safety in the Netherlands between 1990 and 2010 
1984
Roethof 
Committee
1985
Society & Crime
Integral Safety 
Report 1993
Safety Policy 
1998-1998 2002
Towards a 
Safer Society
1999
Integral Safety 
Program
2007
Safety Starts 
With Prevention
1980 2010
1994: Step by Step 
Plan Integral Safety
1994:Integral 
Safety Report
 
1984: The Roethof Comittee 
The emergence of a policy domain around local safety issues started with the 
installation of the so called ‘Roethof committee’ as a response to the rapid 
increase in small crimes, and the less rapid increase of heavy crime in the 
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Netherlands. 
8
 In the committee’s interim report (1984), it was concluded that 
the Dutch government was limited in her capacity to effectively address 
rapidly increasing crime rates, and therefore needed to actively seek out 
collaborative partnerships.  
 
1985: Society and Crime 
The ruling coalition responded to the findings of the Roethof committee with 
the program ’Society and Crime’ in 1985. Both petty and organized crime 
were prioritized highly for government intervention. Petty crimes were to be 
tackled by the so called ’administrative, preventive approach’ in which the 
police worked in close cooperation with the public prosecutor, municipalities, 
private organizations, societal organizations and citizens.
 9
  
 
1993: Integral Safety Report  
The integral approach to public safety was initiated by the Integral Safety 
Report of 1993. Although this report presented facts and figures regarding 
public safety and crime, it could be best characterized as an action program 
introducing and structuring the integral policy approach to public safety. 
Raising awareness for public safety amongst local authorities was its key 
ambition. The integral policy strategy aimed for a less compartmentalized 
approach to public safety that would work in part by increasing cooperation 
between multiple parties, especially at the local level. The police and public 
prosecutor no longer would have to feel like they were facing the rapidly rising 
crime rates on their own. Besides new alliances among providers of public 
safety, this integral approach sought a combination of administrative and 
technical interventions. It conceptualizing safety as an encompassing policy 
concept, and established a cross sectorial approach to safety chain 
management. See Section 2.3 for a detailed explanation of all five key 
components of the integral approach).   
 
1994: Step by Step Plan for Integral Safety 
Under this plan, the integral policy ambitions as introduced in 1993 were 
operationalized and tested in a few pilot municipalities including Nijmegen, 
Eindhoven, Velsen and Rotterdam. 
 
1994: Integral Safety Report 
The second Integral Safety Report was published in the same year. While the 
first such report was rather thin and had the main purpose of outlining the facts 
and figures of public safety in the Netherlands, it was followed by multiple 
reports looking at public safety trends and the progress of municipal policies in 
                                                 
8    Committee was named after its president: Hein Roethof. 
9   In Dutch ‘Bestuurlijke Preventie’. This is the predecessor of what was named the  
‘integral safety strategy’ in the mid 1990s. The administrative, preventive 
approach solely addressed social types of public safety problems. The integral 
approach aimed for a boarder perspective on public safety as explained in Section 
2.3. 
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this regard (Integral Safety Reports, Police monitors, National  Integral Safety 
Monitor) . 
 
1995: Pubic Safety Policy 1995-1998 
The very first official policy documents regarding public safety appeared in 
the Netherlands in 1995. This policy marks the institutionalization of the 
integral approach because it explicitly formulated it as “a concrete problem 
focused approach coordinated by public administrators with attention for each 
and every link of the safety chain” (Min BZK, 1995: 10 - translation RP). The 
policy perceived public safety not only in terms of objective facts such as 
crime rates, it also incorporated risks and subjective feelings of safety as well. 
The policy listed ambitions and instruments relating to five priorities: 
youngsters, drugs, the living environment, risk management and surveillance. 
Responsibility for creating integral policies was granted to local authorities 
who were given the freedom to make political-administrative choices which 
best suited their local needs. The policy document triggered a series of four-
year public safety policy plans that corresponded to the term of office of each 
ruling coalition.  
 
1999: Integral Safety Program 
The national coalition ruled by Prime Minister Kok presented a public safety 
policy plan using the slogan ‘The Netherlands must become safer’.
  
Continuing 
the integral philosophy, this plan argued that public safety governance was a 
matter of collaboration among multiple partners. It sought specifically to 
address existing priorities in relation to youth, and the drug-related nuisance. 
Again, the policy provided a long list of responsibilities and tasks for each 
‘partner’ in safety governance. What was new however, was the strong 
emphasis on collaboration between public and private providers of safety, the 
attention paid to law enforcement by administrative actors
10
, and the policy 
instruments implemented to support these goals.  Although the coalition 
attempted to introduce the topic of physical safety, attention for more social 
types of safety concerns dominated the policy ambitions. 
 
2002: Towards a Safer Society 
The policy plan was produced by the first Balkenende Administration 
composed of the Christian Democrats (CDA), the Liberal Party (VVD) and the 
List Pim Fortuyn (LPF). It was called, ‘Towards a Safer Society’.  The policy 
continued the trend of centrally steering local safety and police policies. 
Except for a move towards more prevention instead of repression in 
governmental intervention, the administration’s policy ambitions did not differ 
much from that of its predecessors in terms of priorities, goals and instruments. 
Moreover, the policy goals were formulated in terms of measurable units, and 
these again led to a long lists of interventions to be carried out by various 
actors. Again, core responsibility for most forms of public safety was granted 
to local authorities. The central government aimed to facilitate and stimulate 
them in the local policy process. ‘Towards a Safer Society‘ was published in 
                                                 
10 In Dutch: Bestuurlijke handhaving 
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2002 and served as the central public safety policy for the first, second and 
third administration of prime minister Balkenende, even though each of his 
terms composed of a different coalition of political parties.  
 
2007: Safety Starts With Prevention 
In 2007, the fourth Balkenende Administration composed of the Christian 
Democrats (CDA), the Labor party (PvdA) and the Christian Party (CU) 
introduced a new central public safety policy named ‘Safety Starts With 
Prevention’. The overall ambition of this policy was to reduce crime and 
nuisance by 25% against the rate reported in 2002. Six topics were prioritized: 
aggression and violence, theft, crime against enterprises, nuisances leading to 
the deterioration
11
 of public spaces, a personal approach to at-risk youth and 
repeated offenders, and severe crimes. Prevention was put forward as an 
important way of going about public safety governance. Again, the local 
authorities were granted an important role.  
 
2.2.1 Central government initiating and steering local public safety 
governance 
The policy path just described mirrors that of the central government which 
aimed to initiate and steer local authorities to address local safety and order 
concerns by adopting an integral policy strategy.
12
 The central government 
sometimes used more coercive methods of steering by prioritizing safety issues 
which were to be addressed by local authorities. More frequently, a wide 
variety of facilitative policy instruments for local authorities was developed by 
the central government. These were less coercive, and local authorities were 
free to either adopt them or not adopt them. Examples of the latter were the 
multiple new powers granted to mayors, as well as the models or samples of 
integral safety policies, certification methods to address safety in effect 
reports, and programs for initiating the administrative approach to organized 
crime. 
2.3 The integral policy ambition   
Overall, the central government succeeded in stimulating local authorities to 
address local order and safety. The large number of central reports and 
instruments seems to have had a positive effect on the creation of local, 
integral safety polities. Nowadays, managing public safety is part and parcel of 
the daily business of running a municipality, and each municipality has its own 
tailor-made integrated public safety policy (Terpstra, 2010). The emergence of 
the policy domain of local safety governance became strongly defined by its 
structural attempts to create and implement a so called ‘integral safety 
strategy’ to public safety problems. The integrated policy ambition is an 
ambitious one which can be broken down into at least five different policy 
objectives (Prins and Cachet 2011) as outlined below: 
 
 
                                                 
11  In Dutch: Verloedering 
12  Read Cachet and Ringeling (2004) for a detailed description of national influences  
on local public safety governance through the years.  
  
 
 
38 
 
Combining technical and administrative approaches: Traditionally, 
professionals such as the police and ire department were responsible for safety. 
Their approach to safety was to simply deal with actual safety issues as they 
occurred. The idea behind an integrated safety approach is to actively involve 
other actors who can bring a more holistic, administrative approach to the 
table. Involving local government would add a structural policy strategy in 
which safety issues are constantly managed, or even prevented rather than 
merely reacted to (Cachet, Van Geest, Koppenjan, Mesu, Ringeling, and  Smit, 
1995). 
Safety as an encompassing policy concept: An integrated perspective 
on public safety goes beyond traditional public safety issues such as recorded 
crime and disorderly behavior. Integrated safety policy deals with matters of 
objective and subjective safety, and would require the consideration, for 
example, of whether citizens actually feel safe in the context of the efforts 
being made to ensure their safety. In this view, problems of safety can result 
from both human behaviors, and natural events such as floods (Ministry of 
Internal Affairs 1993; Cachet et al., 1995). This mirrors the semantic flexibility 
of the concept of safety, which makes it possible to label a wide variety of 
problems from terrorism to littering as concerns of safety (c.f. Boutellier’s 
‘semantic net’, 2005). 
Cross-sectoral approach: The integrated safety approach is broader 
than the traditional focus of the police and the public prosecutor’s office, and 
policy sectors such as the environment, transportation, education, and social 
welfare are also included (Cachet et al., 1995). The integrated safety approach 
combines policy efforts within these various sectors in order to improve local 
safety. Educational programs at secondary schools, for example, have a clear 
role in securing a safer local society. Those that inform students of the tactics 
of lover boys (young pimps who charm and then force vulnerable girls into 
prostitution) serve to reduce the potential number of victims of sexual 
violence. Considering the many policy sectors involved, fragmentation 
becomes a real risk. It is avoided to an extent by the combination and 
coordination of various safety measures into a single integrated safety 
approach. 
Governing safety by chain management:  Under this approach, the 
management of safety is understood as requiring attention to be paid to all the 
following interconnected links: pro-action, prevention, preparation, reaction, 
and recovery (Integral Safety Report, 1996).
13
 Each link represents a particular 
phase in the processes of safety management, and the integrated approach 
requires that equal attention be paid to all phases.  
New alliances among providers of public safety: An integrated 
approach also requires cooperation and the forming of partnerships between 
various actors (Cachet et al., 1995). Within the local safety networks, 
(non)governmental actors, including the police, members of the judiciary, local 
authorities, security companies, schools, citizens, shop owners, and housing 
corporations are brought together. Terpstra (2010) identified a number of 
                                                 
13
  This type of chain management was created by the American Federal Emergency  
Management Agency as a process approach for disaster management. 
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distinct types of safety networks, ranging from institutional networks in which 
more or less formal and professional organizations participate, to networks 
which incorporate the participation of citizens as well. These networks either 
aim to prevent public safety problems from happening, or they take a more 
reactive approach.  
Taken together, the integrated safety policy strategy as initiated by the 
‘Integral Safety Report’ in 1993 is a complex, ambitious, and encompassing 
one. The complexity arises not just in terms of issues involved, but also 
because of the numbers of actors participating in the policy. Most importantly 
however, it made the ambition of fostering cooperation between various actors 
from both inside and outside government a reality (Prins and Cachet, 2011). 
The resulting landscape is comprised of horizontally linked, more or less 
autonomous organizations, or networks encompassing many different types of 
organizations where hierarchy or hierarchical steering is almost always lacking 
(Terpstra and Kouwenhoven, 2004), and in which traditional modes of steering 
give way to more networked forms of governance (Koppenjan and Klijn, 
2004). 
Scholars have labeled these collective approaches in multiple ways. 
They have been called the multi-agency approach, plural policing (Crawford 
and Lister, 2005), policing assemblages (van Steden, Wood, Schearing and 
Boutellier, 2013) and third party policing (Mazerolle and Ranseley, 2005) and  
have even been compared to soccer teams as well as orchestras (Boutellier, 
2011).  However, a major controversy in the international body of knowledge 
on these multi-actor arrangements is the position of state actors and their 
steering capacities (Dupont, 2004; Rhodes, 1996). In such a multi-agency 
safety arrangement, do the police or the government still hold a monopoly on 
policing, or have the final say? The next section seeks to address this question 
by exploring the coordination of local safety governance. 
2.4 Local government’s coordination of local safety governance 
That different levels of governmental organizations are involved in the 
development and execution of local safety policies is clear, along with the 
involvement of many semi-governmental, even non-governmental and private 
actors. Bringing them all together and steering and coordinating their actions 
in accordance with agreed upon safety policies is probably the biggest 
challenge facing contemporary local safety governance. Local governments 
can no longer depend exclusively on the traditional method of command and 
control as many of the organizations involved in local safety networks are 
autonomous vis-à-vis the local government. 
Both the design and implementation of public safety policies show 
features of complex decision making (Muller, 1990). There is a network of 
multiple actors who have to work in alignment in order to effectively solve 
safety problems (Terpstra en Kouwenhoven, 2004). Local authorities play a 
difficult, but highly important role in this network, as they are both politically 
and administratively responsible for ensuring local order and safety. Local 
administrators, including the mayor, are held accountable by the local city 
council (Local Government Act, Section 169). 
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   This coordinating task is made more challenging for local authorities 
by the lack of direct control over their multiple partners. Such horizontal forms 
of collaboration are characterized by non-hierarchical relationships between 
actors. Where previously they issued commands and assumed control, the local 
government now has to bring the many different actors together by softer 
means of persuasion and seduction (c.f. Pröpper, Litjens and Weststeijn, 
2004). The coordinating role of local governments proved naturally to be a 
complicated task (AEF, 2005; AEF, 2006; Algemene Rekenkamer, 2007; 
Terpstra and Krommendijk, 2010; Broekhuizen, van Steden and Boutellier, 
2010). The lack of a formal law has meant that the local authorities today 
continue to attempt to coordinate safety governance without formal control 
over others. Although the Balkenende IV administration put together a law to 
formalize the coordinating role of local authorities in public safety governance 
(Ministry of Internal Affairs, 2010, a and b; Raad van State, 2010), this law 
was never realized and was eventually cancelled in 2013 (Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, 2013).  
In the Netherlands, like in many other countries, citizens demand 
strong and decisive leadership from their local government, particularly the 
mayor. They take a harsh view, particularly of standstills and deadlocks 
(Cachet, Karsten and Schaap, 2010). The role of the Dutch mayor has evolved 
significantly in this context, and the next paragraph provides a detailed 
description of the position of the Dutch mayor in local safety governance.  
3 Dutch mayors and local safety 
The traditional position of the Dutch mayor in local governance is formally 
described as follows by the Dutch Local Government act: Together with the 
city council and the board of mayor and aldermen, the mayor is one of the 
three administrative bodies of the local government. Dutch mayors are 
responsible by law for the quality of the local government, and of local 
policies (Local Government Act, Section 170). They chair the municipal 
legislative body (city council) and the municipal executive body (board of 
mayor and aldermen) and are the representatives of the city as well (Local 
Government Act, Sections 9 and 34). Dutch mayors are meant to be neutral or 
apolitical actors, and so they are appointed by the Crown for a six year period 
(Cachet and Schaap, 2006). Their term stands in contrast to city council 
members who have to be elected every four years, and their appointment 
varies dramatically from that of mayors’ in many other western European 
countries where mayors are elected directly by the citizens. One of the main 
arguments for the mayor being appointed by the Crown instead of directly by 
the people is that public policy on local order and safety should be neutral and 
de-politicized, and therefore kept at arm’s length from the political arena (van 
Sluis, Cachet, Noppe, Schaap and Ringeling, 2003).  
The following Section provides a short discussion of the position of 
Dutch mayors in local governance, a detailed description of their formal 
position in the local policy domain around order and safety issues, the changes 
in their formal powers that occurred between 1990 and 2010, and the public 
debate that was triggered by these changes.  
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3.1 A short history of the mayor’s role in local governance  
Traditionally, Dutch mayors were regents from aristocratic families and later 
on ‘technocratic administrators’. Over time, they became more and more 
grounded in local society, policy and politics (Korsten, Schoenmaker, 
Boumans and Resoort, 2012). Where they once sought to make sure local 
decisions and laws did not conflict with national ones, being the ‘keeper of 
national laws and regulations’ is no longer manageable today because of the 
dramatic expansion of national laws, policies and jurisdictions (ibid). Despite 
several attempts to have Dutch mayors publicly elected (Tweede Kamer, 
2002/3) Dutch mayors today continue to be appointed by the Crown. Although 
not democratically elected, the function of mayors gained greater democratic 
accountability over time, as the city council became more influential in the 
mayors’ appointments and resignations (Prins et al., 2012). This embedded the 
mayors’ functions even further in the local governance level.  Contemporary 
mayors are balancing multiple roles. They have been described as shepherds in 
the mornings, keepers of local order in the afternoons, and process managers 
or administrative team leaders in the evening (Korsten et al., 2012). Also 
referring to the different roles mayors play on a daily basis, Cachet et al. 
(2009) categorized the mayors’ domains of work as follows: local government, 
local society and external as summarized in table 1.  
 
Table 1: Typology of the roles of Dutch mayors (Cachet, Schaap and Karsten, 
2009) 
In the research period spanning between 1990 and 2010, Dutch mayors were 
observed to be juggling between these rather broad sets of potential roles 
(Cachet et al., 2009).  Moreover, the selection of particular roles by the mayor 
is expected to be highly situational and contingent on personal, institutional, 
societal and political factors. The literature on local leadership mentions a 
wide variety of factors as shaping the way in which local leaders operate, 
including their personality, their personal capabilities, the institutional design 
of the local government, and the broader political context including the 
specific political constellations in local society (Greasley and Stroker, 2008; 
 Local government Local society External 
Relation to 
city council 
Relation to 
the  board of 
mayors and 
aldermen 
Positive Negative 
 
 
Strong 
 
President Boss 
 
Leader Law  
enforcer 
Demander  
  Sheppard / 
father figure 
Sherriff   
Weak 
 
Chairman 
 
Primus inter 
pares 
Ombudsman Manager of 
complaints 
Networker 
Coach  
 
Administrator   Connector 
Keeper of 
quality 
Process 
keeper 
Symbol  Facilitator 
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Steyvers, Bergström, Bäck, Boogers, Riano de la Fuente and Schaap, 2008; 
Karsten, Schaap and Verheul, 2010). 
3.2 The mayors’ contemporary playing field 
The selection of the mayor’s role and his fulfillment of it is shaped largely by 
the complex playing field in which Dutch mayors have been operating in the 
past two decades. We will briefly outline this context, dividing it into the 
categories of larger societal trends, trends in local governance and 
developments in the mayor’s function.  
 
3.2.1 Trends in local society 
Mayors are confronted by the societal unrest caused by a wide range of 
contemporary public safety problems and risks. Modern citizens are 
demanding of their governments (Boutellier, 2005; Van den Brink, 2002). 
They have more than once been described as having ‘a limited tolerance of  
risk,’ and as wanting the government to ’fiercely pull the strings‘ (Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, 2009 - translation RP). Pieterman (2008) described this 
societal trend as a ‘prevention culture’ that creates high expectations of the 
government that are often unrealistic (c.f. Cachet and Schaap, 2006). 
Consequently, mayors are not only held responsible for their personal efforts 
to safeguard local society, they also have to defend the decisions of the 
council, board and the policies of the local government as a whole. In the 
worst cases, unmet expectations have led to personal and physical threats to 
the mayors’ own safety (Bovenkerk, 2005; Van den Tillaart et al., 2012).   
As well as operating under the critical eye of his citizens, Dutch 
mayors have increasingly had to operate under the spotlights of the media. As 
the media becomes a fundamental pillar of contemporary society, the daily 
functions of public administration gets more and more affected by the logic 
and demands of the media (Cook, 2005). On the one hand, local authorities 
and the mayor have to operate under close inspection of the old and new media 
which can have a catalyzing effect on public issues and challenge the 
relationship between political and administrative actors. On the other hand, the 
new media offers administrators and politicians new opportunities, including 
that of communicating directly with citizens during times of crisis (ROB, 
2012), gathering real time information about threats to local order by 
monitoring the social media updates of known hooligans, and enhancing 
transparency in the daily business of local governance through the personal 
blogs an the mayors’ twitter feed for example.  
 
3.2.2 Trends in local government 
A first trend is that of the increasingly networked character of contemporary 
governance. As described in the theoretical framework of this book, local 
safety networks have been conceptualized as thematic manifestations of policy 
networks. This implies that Dutch mayors operate in local governance 
networks that increase their dependency on other actors to effectively solve 
local problems (Prins and Cachet, 2011), and that call for greater efforts at 
coordination (Terpstra and Krommendijk, 2010). In the case of local safety 
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governance, such public private partnerships do not limit themselves solely to 
participants at the local level. Motivated by a lack of individual effectiveness 
and a need for greater efficiency, local governments are increasingly involved 
in inter-municipal or supra local collaboration initiatives (Cachet, 2009, 
Cachet and Prins, 2009). Examples of the practice of local safety governance 
are Regional Information and Expertise Centers (RIEC) which pool 
information and resources to address severe forms of crime as well as safety 
regulations addressing physical challenges to local safety.  
A second trend challenging local administrators is the increasing 
manifestation of populist parties and rhetoric in local society (Van Ostaijen 
and Scholten, 2012; Uitermark, Oudenampsen, Van Heerikhuizen en Van 
Reekum, 2012). Dutch mayors have seen populist political parties entering 
local councils and boards, and they have had to function within the context of 
a rising societal movement of individuals objecting to the ruling elite, and 
other groups that promote traditional Dutch or local identities as supreme. In 
this context, the Dutch mayors again had to take the role of ‘shepherd’ and 
maintain the unity of the local government and the society. They had also to 
protect the local society from the effects of their increasing distrust of 
government, citizen’s feelings of alienation, and the tensions that arise 
between groups of citizens as a result of populism (Leterme and 
Burgmeesterslezing, 2009).   
 
3.2.3 Trends regarding the mayor’s function 
Since 2001, the city council has had the role of recommending who they feel 
should be appointed as mayor to the Minister of Internal Affairs (Local 
Government Act, Section 61). This role has proven to be of great importance 
as appointments of the Crown were previously often followed by resignations. 
The city council gained influence over the mayor’s position, and the ‘rule of 
trust’ that applies in the case of ministers and parliament is now applicable to 
mayors as well. One could even argue that a mayor now takes the role of an 
aldermen who acts on the basis of the trust placed in him by the city council 
(Korsten and Aardema, 2006). A consequence of the increased influence of the 
city council is that the mayor’s position has become more vulnerable as his 
actions and non-actions are widely discussed and criticized by members of the 
council (Cachet, Schaap and Karsten, 2009).   
The mayor’s position has become increasingly politicized over the 
years, and this politicization has extended especially to the policy domain of 
public safety and order. Part of the reason for the growing political interest in 
their role is the fact that mayors were granted multiple new powers to address 
specific safety problems (NGB, 2010; Mein, 2010; Sackers, 2010A). Their 
implementation of these powers was sometimes controversial. For example, 
they could involve interventions in the private lives of citizens in case of home 
restrictions for domestic violence, or they could deal with sensitive topics such 
as communicating the return of known pedophiles to local society. The 
mayor’s actions are therefore political, both in case of intervention and non-
intervention. These political risks were compounded as well by a number of 
new juridical challenges that mayors’ could personally face. For example, if a 
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mayor is accused of “unjust decisions” he runs the risk of being sued almost 
immediately (Engels In Burgemeestersblad, 2008).  
Alongside the political and judicial consequences, the mayors’ greater 
powers also came with a number of implications for the mayor as a private 
person. The call for governmental action on a broad range of public problems 
invites mayors to profile themselves as strong and capable (Cachet et al., 
2009). More than ever, this puts the mayor into the spotlight, even when 
multiple actors are involved and mayors are directly and personally held 
responsible for local governance. Mayors experience a ‘psychologisation’ of 
their function
14
 which implies that the administrator has to keep in mind that 
his words, decisions and non-decisions being judged. Whether or not he 
demonstrates sufficient empathy, whether he shows his emotions, and how he 
appears to the public and explains his actions is also fodder for public 
judgment (Korsten, Schoenmaker, Bouwmans and Resoort, 2012). This holds 
for processional as well as private actions. In the most negative sense, these 
judgments can bring about the risk of personal threats and aggression 
(Bovenkerk, 2005; Van den Tillaart et al., 2012). The increasing influence of 
the city council and the personalization of the mayor would lead one to expect 
that the position of Dutch mayor has become increasingly vulnerable. 
Nevertheless, studies have indicated that despite these challenges relatively 
few mayors actually fail in their role and have to step down (Korsten and 
Aardema, 2006; Korsten, 2010).  
3.3 The mayor’s formal powers and responsibilities for local order and 
safety 
This section describes the mayor’s formal powers and responsibilities in the 
realm of local order and safety. Being an independent administrative authority, 
the mayor individually holds the responsibility for maintaining public order 
and safety (Local Government Act, Section 172). This is the only policy 
domain in which the mayor takes individual responsibility, as all other policy 
domains in the Netherlands are covered by aldermen. In order to carry out their 
responsibilities to local order and safety, Dutch mayors hold authority over the 
police and issue instructions accordingly (Police Act 1994, Section 12).
15
 
During the past two decades the mayors’ traditional responsibility of 
maintaining local order and safety has become more important. This was 
subscribed by central government who formalized several new, sometimes far 
reaching powers regarding specific safety problems between the years 2002 
and 2010. Examples of such powers include designating specific public areas 
at which the police are entitled to preventively search individuals, closing 
                                                 
14   In Dutch: psychologisering van het ambt 
15  Formally, the mayor’s responsibility is solely for the maintenance of public  
order. Legally speaking, order is a mayor’s individual responsibility, whereas 
public safety can be handled by other administrators, such as an aldermen. This 
has been the practice in a few Dutch municipalities for a long time. However, in 
recent years, public safety has become closely associated with, and related to 
governing local order and both are therefore now addressed by the mayor in 
almost all municipalities in the Netherlands. 
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buildings known to house illegal drug related activity, allowing for the 
installation of surveillance cameras in public areas, imposing temporary home 
restrictions for perpetrators of domestic violence and imposing a curfew on 
youngsters found to be causing severe forms of nuisance. Table 2 provides an 
overview of the most important new powers to address local order and safety 
formalized between 1990 and 2010
16
. Some of these powers are to be enforced 
by the mayor himself whereas others should be implemented in close 
collaboration between the mayor and the city council, public prosecutor or  
police.  
 
Table 2: Tasks, powers and responsibilities of Dutch mayors formalized 
between 1990 and 2010  
                                                 
16  According to the scope of the research project this overview excluded the mayor’s  
powers for managing physical safety and crises. 
Year Law  Task and or responsibility for Dutch 
mayor 
1997 
 
Local Government Act,  
Section 174a  
(Wet Victoria) 
Closing houses in case of (grounded fear of) 
disruption of local order caused by behavior 
in and around the house 
1999 
 
Opium Law,  
Section 13b 
(Wet Damocles) 
Closing buildings open to the public and 
houses (since 2007) in case of drugs and/or 
drugs trade   
 
2000 Local Government Act,  
Sections 154a and 176a   
Holding groups of people (potentially) 
disturbing local order by temporary in 
custody (mayor needs approval of city 
council beforehand) 
2002  
 
Local Government Act,  
Section 151b 
Appointing a risk area where the public 
prosecutor can allow the police to carry out 
preventative body searches (mayor needs 
approval of city council beforehand) 
2002 Law on Enhancing Integrity 
Assessments by Public 
Administration (BIBOB) 
Declining a request for a permit of subsidy 
and withdrawal of those already in place 
when these (might be) used for illegal 
activities or criminal offences (power for 
mayor as well of board of mayor and 
aldermen) 
2006 
 
Local Government Act, 
Section 151c 
 
Installing surveillance cameras in public 
spaces in order to safeguard local order and 
safety (mayor needs approval of city council 
beforehand) 
2008  
 
Law on Temporary Home 
Restrictions 
Issuing temporary home restrictions to a  
person posing significant danger to his or her 
fellow residents  
2009 Local Government Act,  
Section 154b  
 
Administrative  fine for small annoyances 
and nuisance in public space mentioned in 
Municipal Law (council formalizes power, 
power is implemented by board of mayor and 
aldermen and in some cases by mayor 
individually) 
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3.4 The public debate: From shepherd to local sheriff?  
While the local safety policy domain evolved and matured between 1990 and 
2010, the substantive expansion of the mayors’ formal powers in this regard 
did not remain without criticism. Several scholars warned, first of all, against 
mixing interventions based on administrative and criminal law into a sort of 
‘administrative sanction law’
17
 (Sackers, 2010a; Muller, Rogier, Kummeling, 
Dammen, Bron, Woltjer and Kalkhoven, 2007). A second related concern was 
that the mayors’ powers had an increasingly punitive flavor, such as the power 
to issue home restrictions and refusing to give out permits. The implication 
was that the mayors’ role in local safety governance would no longer be a 
purely preventative one, and the mayor would ‘defriend’ in record tempo 
(Sackers In Burgemeestersblad, 2010). Thirdly, the implementation of the new 
powers would transform mayors into local sheriffs, a role seen by some as 
being incompatible with their symbolic and ‘softer’ role as shepherd or father 
figure, and representative of the local community (Sackers, 2010a/b). More 
generally, scholars pointed at the negative effects the new administrative 
instruments would have on the basic principles of legality and legal certainty.
18
 
These instruments included the bans on meetings, area restrictions, and home 
restrictions put in place to combat nuisance, deprived living conditions and 
disturbances of local order in problematic neighborhoods (Schilder, 2009).  
Practitioners, such as the Dutch Association of Mayors (NGB) also 
recognized the increased emphasis on the mayors’ role of ‘law enforcer,’ and 
the toll this might take on the mayors’ focus on other roles and responsibilities 
(Bandell In van der Zwan, 2007; Sackers, 2010a). However, they also 
recognized that shifting between various roles is a defining feature of  mayors, 
but appeared more worried about  potentially endangering the mayors’ ‘natural 
authority’ by granting them more and more formal powers (Bandell, 2008). 
More generally, the Dutch Association for Municipalities (VNG) warned of 
the need to be cautious about the accumulation of mayors’ powers particularly 
when these powers are created in an incident‐driven fashion (Centrum voor 
Criminaliteit en Veiligheid, 2010).  
 Mayor’s themselves seem to hold different opinions of their new 
powers and can be roughly divided into two groups. On the one hand, there are 
those (mainly mayors working in the larger cities) who claim that the new 
powers are necessary to address today’s highly complex problems of public 
safety, and to meet societies’ demand for public safety. These individuals are 
explicitly asking for more powers to address public safety problems and want 
to, for example, be informed about the return of former child sex abusers into 
                                                 
17  In Dutch: adminstratief sanctierecht 
 
2010  
 
Local Government Act, 
Sections 172a,b 
 
Several tools for addressing disruption of 
local order by football hooligans and 
youngsters:  Area restrictions, group 
restrictions, reporting duties, the imposition 
of curfews and the supervision of minors in 
cases of (or fear of) serious nuisance. 
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the local society (Van den Tillaard, Schreijenberg and Homburg, 2010). Others 
do not see the necessity of the new powers, and instead highlight their far 
reaching implications for both mayors and citizens. A mayor would no longer 
only address public safety at the general level of street, neighbourhood and the 
municipality, but they can now intervene in the lives of individuals in ways 
that restrict personal information and privacy related rights (Rehwinkel In De 
Volkskrant, 2010).  
4 Summary 
This chapter described the context of the research project in order to answer 
sub question two: How did the policy domain regarding local public safety 
evolve between 1990 and 2010 in the Netherlands and what has been the 
mayor’s formal position in it? The policy domain surrounding local order and 
safety in the Netherlands was triggered by the fast rising crime rates and the 
introduction of new threats to public safety fueling the need for policy 
planning in the late 1980s. Between 1990 and 2010, the policy domain around 
local order and safety emerged and evolved, and was structured by the so 
called ‘integral policy ambition’. This policy ambition promoted a broad 
perspective on public safety including risks, social safety crises and physical 
safety. These problems were to be addressed using a cross-sectoral approach, 
aligning actors from various backgrounds in local safety networks, and ideally 
paying attention to all phases of safety management ranging from prevention 
to recovery. Local authorities, more precisely, Dutch mayors, were assigned 
the task of coordinating this all-encompassing tasks of local safety governance. 
This brought us to the formal position of Dutch mayors who were traditionally 
responsible by law for safeguarding local order by means of their authority 
over the police. This traditional task is mentioned in Dutch municipal laws 
dating back to 1851, and was formalized in the first decade of the 21
st
 century 
with the expansion of the powers of Dutch mayors to address specific 
problems endangering local order and safety. Examples of such powers 
include that of conducting preventive body searches in cases of suspected 
weapon concealment, and temporary home restrictions in case of domestic 
violence. The expansion of the mayors’ powers was not welcomed by all 
mayors, or by scholars, and a public debate emerged around the question of 
whether or not Dutch mayors had changed their dominant role from that of a 
shepherd or father figure to a local sheriff. 
 At this point, the research questions and empirical context of the 
project have been described in chapters 1 and 2. The next part of the book 
provides the theoretical background for analyzing how new definitions of local 
safety problems affected Dutch mayors. A literature review is conducted to 
explore agenda setting, policy dynamics, framing and network governance, 
and the information used to guide the selection of the building blocks of a 
conceptual model that maps out how problem definitions affect the position 
and role of individual actors in policy networks.  
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Part II - Theory 
 
The second part of this book deals with the theoretical context of the research 
project. The following two chapters provide a theoretical lens through which to 
understand how the shifting definition of local safety problems may have 
affected the mayor’s position and role. Chapter3 deals with problem 
definitions and their role in the policy process. Chapter 4 conceptualizes the 
mayor’s position and role in the governance networks. Together these chapters 
provide a knowledge base from the literature and an identification of the 
building blocks of a conceptual model that will in turn be the basis of the 
empirical analysis that will be conducted in the third part of this book. 
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Chapter 3: The Power of problem definition 
1 Introduction 
A basic assumption of the current project is that problem definitions have 
important consequences for key aspects of the policy process. This chapter 
aims to present the theoretical background of this assumption by exploring the 
literature on problem definition and framing. In doing so, an answer the first 
part of the second sub question is given: What is the expected role of problem 
definitions in policy processes, and how are these definitions expected to affect 
the position and role of individual actors in a policy network?  
2 Problem definition 
Citizens, civil servants and politicians encounter an enormous number of 
issues both in their private and professional lives which they define as 
problematic. Once an issue is labeled as such, it often becomes a public 
problem that is in need of public intervention (Stone, 1989). Problem 
definition is the transformation of real-world conditions into solvable problems 
(Blumer, 1971, 1996) which affect social behavior once they become 
institutionalized into social facts (Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Durkheim, 
1964). Consequently, a problem definition is the description of a situation, 
person, location or anything else as an undesired phenomenon. The next 
sections explore key aspects of the definition of public problems by describing 
the process by which such problems are socially constructed.   
2.1 From conditions to problems 
Sociologists have long debated the nature of social problems. The rationality 
perspective on troubling social conditions described social problems as: 
“reflections of objectively measurable conditions” (c.f. Dery, 1984; Rochefort 
and Cobb, 1993). This rational or functional perspective was criticized by 
multiple scholars who argued that social problems are very much social 
constructions (Blumer, 1971; Kitsuse and Spektor, 1973; Schneider 1985; 
Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988). They stressed that there is a key difference 
between objectively measurable conditions, and our subjective perceptions of 
what is problematic in society (c.f. Bulmer 1971; Schneider, 1985). According 
to this social constructionist perspective, problems are subjective displays and 
interpretations of reality. Problems do not randomly exist out there, or as Dery 
noted a long time ago: “Problems do not come with a tag identifying them as 
such” (Dery, 1984:62). Actors attach this socially created tag to an undesired 
phenomenon during the processes of problem definition. It is through this 
process that conditions about which little can/has been done are transformed 
into problems to be addressed (Brikland, 2001).  
 Following the sociologist perspective, problem definitions can be 
characterized as social constructions of collective sentiments, rather than 
objective measurements of societal conditions (c.f. Bulmer 1971). Qualifying 
social problems as social constructions hints at a level of flexibility in problem 
definition. In other words, definitions of public issues are malleable to a large 
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extent, as they are open to both competing interpretations and factual 
distortions (Cobb and Elder, 1983:55). According to Dery’s idea of qualified 
relativism, many problem definitions are possible, as long as they meet a few 
basic criteria – namely that they set a problem and provide an intervention 
perspective that readies them for the policy making processes (1983:21). This 
implies that a single situation can potentially generate a number of different 
problem definitions. The definitions that resonate with the wider context of 
policy processes are most likely to gain significance in politics and policy, or 
as Birkland stated: “The social construction of a problem is linked to the 
existing social, political, and ideological structures of time” (2001:122).  
In the case of public policy, conditions have to be successfully 
described as problematic by a person or group in order to become amenable to 
public intervention. The age of an individual shopping at the liquor store, for 
example can be objectively ‘measured’, and is not problematic in itself.  
“Problem definitions are not objective statements” said Portz (1996:372), and 
in this case, it is only when interest groups or government actors recognize 
youngsters buying alcohol as an undesired phenomenon that it becomes a 
public problem requiring public intervention. In fact, the struggle to define 
public problems in a way of one’s choosing lies at the heart of policy 
processes. Actors vie to gain political and policy attention for their particular 
perspective of the problem. According to Portz, “Problem definitions and the 
competition among definitions plays a critical role in shaping politics and the 
policy process” (1996:82).  
2.2 From problem definition to social ‘facts’  
The process through which socially constructed problem definitions go from 
being general conditions to social facts that will potentially shape policy can 
be understood as a process of institutionalization. Sociologists Berger and 
Luckmann (1967) conceptualized the social construction of reality in 
collective settings as having three phases of institutionalization. The three 
dialectic moments during which our knowledge of reality is socially 
constructed and institutionalized into social facts are:  externalization, 
objectification and internalization. 
The first dialectic moment is externalization which refers to the 
subjective process of making sense of everyday reality. This takes place 
typically during face to face interactions between individuals who implicitly 
negotiate their typifications of external reality. The sum of these typifications 
forms our schemes and categories for understanding everyday life. These 
subjective typifications often become objective, social facts when transmitted 
to a wider audience, and this occurs during the objectification phase. When 
removed from the analysis of the mind, knowledge of everyday life is 
experienced as objective reality. Social structure becomes objective in the 
sense that it is “objectively available beyond the expression of subjective 
intentions, here and now” (Berger and Luckmann, 1976: 51). The third 
moment is internalization. The process of institutionalization perfects itself 
when the structures of objective reality (as produced through externalizations 
and objectivations) become embedded in the structures of the subjective 
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consciousness (i.e. internalized). This occurs through a process of socialization 
(ibid).   
This process of institutionalization explains how problem definitions 
shape policy actions during the policy process. Once socially constructed 
problem definitions become institutionalized in the policy agenda and in policy 
practices, they begin to function like nonmaterial social facts such as values, 
norms and other conceptual beliefs (Durkheim, 1964). They exist beyond the 
individual perceptions of politicians and civil servants, and shape both their 
thoughts and their actions (ibid). From a public administration perspective, 
such institutionalized problem definitions are expected to affect key aspects of 
the policy process. Kirp (1982) summarized it as such: “The way in which a 
problem gets defined says a great deal about how it will be resolved” 
(1982:137 cited by Baumgartner and Jones, 2009). What aspects of public 
policy problems these definitions are expected to influence will be discussed in 
Section 3.4. Several models of agenda setting will be first discussed in order to 
understand how definitions of public problems may end up on the public 
policy agenda. 
3 Agenda setting 
19
 
From a public administration perspective, socially constructed problem 
definitions vie for the attention of politicians and policy makers. As political 
attention is fluid and government resources are scarce, no public 
administration is able to address all possible problems in all possible ways (c.f. 
Birkland, 2001). Consequently, not every problem defined by citizens, 
politicians and civil servants is transformed into public policies. Some issues 
are deliberately moved from the public agenda by (elite) groups and placed 
into the category of the taboo (c.f. non decision making, Bachratz and Baratz, 
1963). In its broadest sense, agenda setting can be defined as “the process by 
which problems and alternative solutions gain or lose attention” (Birkland, 
2001:106). 
The fact that some issues are subject to political decision making and 
public policy, and others not, points to a certain bias in the agenda setting 
process. In fact, according to Schattschneider, agenda setting can be described 
as the mobilization of bias. “Some issues are organized into politics, and others 
are organized out” (1960:71, Bekkers, 2007). Which bias is dominant during 
the agenda setting process depends on the outcome of the competition, and the 
strategic behavior of groups of stakeholders. After all, in contemporary 
western democracies, no single actor is able to single handedly set all political 
agendas and policy plans. Elite groups holding varying bases of power 
compete with each other to generate attention for their perceptions of public 
problems, and they compete also to present their favored solutions in the 
agenda setting processes (c. f. Dahl, 1961).   
Before discussing classical models of agenda setting, we will first 
explain what constitutes an agenda itself. Cobb and Elder (1983) distinguished 
                                                 
19  This discussion of agenda setting literature is strongly built upon Bekkers’ chapter  
on ‘Policy problems and agenda setting,’  (2007: 123-152). 
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between multiple forms of interrelated agendas in the public sphere. The 
agenda universe covers a wide range of issues which could be brought to the 
table by multiple actors convinced that these issue merit political attention. 
Birkland described the agenda universe as: “All ideas that could possibly be 
brought up and discussed in a society or political system” (2001: 107). Some 
issues are more likely to receive political attention than others. Some may not 
sit well with public values, and others may conflict with the constitutional law 
or other fundamental conventions (Bekkers, 2007). The systemic agenda 
consists of “all issues that are commonly perceived as meriting public attention 
and as involving matters within the legitimate jurisdiction of existing 
governmental authority” (Cobb and Elder, 1983: 85). The institutional agenda 
unites those issues seriously considered as potential objects of public decision-
making. This agenda is a political one reflecting issues filtered from the 
systemic agenda by politicians and administrators (Cobb and Elder, 1983). 
Finally, the decision agenda covers all issues on which political and 
administrative stakeholders agree should be the subject of public policies and 
government interventions.  
Following Cobb and Elder’s (1983) distinction of agendas, it is clear 
that issues have to make it to the decision agenda in order to become priorities 
for public policy. However, a place on the decision making agenda does not 
immediately imply that an issue has indeed become an object of public policy. 
Because the current project focuses solely on problem definitions and safety 
problems that have actually influenced local safety policies, the policy agenda 
was added to the typification of agendas (c.f. Bekkers, 2007). The policy 
agenda represents those issues that end up in formal policy plans describing 
their causes, characteristics as well as a plan of attack. Once a socially 
constructed problem ends up on the policy agenda, it becomes institutionalized 
into public policy and is expected to shape the thought and behavior of 
politicians and civil servants (c.f. Berger and Luckmann, 1967).  
 
Figure 2: Agendas in public policy processes (combination of Birkland, 2001 
and Bekkers, 2007)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Systemic agenda 
 
Institutional agenda 
 
Decision agenda 
Policy  
agenda 
Agenda universe 
 
  
 
 
55 
 
Figure 2 presents the interrelation of public agendas, ranging from the macro 
to the micro level. During the agenda setting processes, issues are moved back 
and forward between the various agendas. These dynamics can be analytically 
divided into moves from the outside in, and those from the inside out 
(Bekkers, 2007). The outside in movement follows a classical perspective on 
agenda setting during which publicly debated issues are subjected to political 
decision making, and they make their way onto the policy agenda. The 
converse inside out dynamic refers to cases in which policy makers pose issues 
which require political attention and merit public debate. This model aside, the 
overall process of agenda setting has been given many different shapes and 
forms in the public administration and political science literature. Such models 
can be divided into those that portray agenda setting as a linear process, and 
those that stress the rather chaotic character of the agenda setting process.    
3.1 Agenda setting as a linear process 
Classic conceptions of agenda setting in public administration and political 
science portray a rather linear process through which issues move from the 
political agenda to the policy agenda (Van der Eijk and Kok 1975; Parsons, 
1995; Bekkers, 2007). These so called ‘barrier’ or ‘phase’ models describe a 
sequential set of steps through which an undesired phenomenon or issue makes 
its way into the public policy agenda. Crucial factors or barriers along the way 
are the level of attention a potential agenda item receives from the public and 
the media, as well as the level of access proponents of the agenda have to 
politicians and policy makers. Other barriers include the specific 
characteristics of the issue such as its societal impact, and the level expert 
knowledge required to understand the issue (Van der Eijk and Kok 1975; 
Parsons, 1995). 
Multiple aspects of this initial conception of agenda setting have been 
criticized (Bekkers, 2007). The predominant focus on linearity and historical 
sequentiality in the movement of individual issues from the agenda universe to 
the policy agenda underplays key characteristics of agenda setting as it takes 
place in real life (Bekkers, 2007). The possibility of multiple issues competing 
for policy attention is neglected by the focus on the movement of a single 
issues from one stage to another. Furthermore, barrier models tend to view the 
agenda setting as a one way process, and as something initiated from the 
outside (i.e. from societal worries) and moved into the public policy arena, 
when  it could well take place the other way around (c.f. outside versus inside 
initiation model Howlett and Ramish, 1995). Finally, the model’s focus on 
problems with a predefined image rules out the possibility of solutions instead 
of problems being the starting point of the agenda setting process. 
3.2 Agenda setting as a chaotic process 
The second stream of agenda setting models view the agenda setting process as 
messy and contingent on multiple factors. Kingdon (1984) introduced the 
stream model which characterized the agenda setting process as one in which 
ad hoc connections are made amongst problem perceptions, policy ideas, and 
the political events floating in and around organizations. A policy window is 
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created when political events bring problem perceptions, policy solutions and 
actors together in a so called package deal. By stressing the role of policy 
entrepreneurs who play an important part in creating these policy windows and 
composing package deals, this model demonstrates an explicit appreciation of 
the strategic behavior of individual actors in the agenda-setting processes. 
Kingdon’s stream model was inspired by the work of scholars Cohen, March 
and Olson, who compared  organizations to ’garbage cans‘filled with potential 
decisions, stakeholders, problem perceptions and potential solutions (Cohen, 
March and Olson, 1972). They saw organizations as organized anarchies in 
which trial and error and random connections between ideas, people and 
events characterize daily business more than rational decision making.  
Just as the barrier models were criticized, models portraying agenda 
setting as a rather chaotic process have also been criticized mainly for their 
outside oriented focus of the agenda setting process. Such open models of 
agenda setting tend to attribute all agenda dynamics to contingencies and 
random influences, and thereby overlook the role of formal rules, institutions 
and conventions of the policy arena (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009). This 
institutional perspective of policy processes is further explained in Section 3.5 
on policy dynamics.  
 
The main difference between the barrier model and the stream model is that 
the first points to the circumstances under which an issue fails to become a 
policy object, while the latter focuses on how issues end up actually affecting 
public polices (Bekkers, 2007). Nevertheless, both models make it clear that 
agenda setting is about gaining scarce attention for particular conceptions of a 
problem, and particular solutions. One way or the other, agenda setting is 
about actors struggling over the composition of the policy agenda in order to 
gain scarce attention for their often normative and manipulated problem 
definitions, and for their preferred course of action (Stone, 1989; Baumgartner 
and Jones, 2009, Portz, 1996). Symbols and rhetoric play an important role in 
such an agenda setting processes. Actors attempt to make a strong and 
convincing case by using metaphors, causal stories, numbers, and images 
(Stone, 2002). In fact, according to Stone, the essence of policy making is in 
fact this struggle over ideas (2002: 11). The concept of frames is included in 
this theoretical framework as a perspective by which to understand this 
struggle over ideas in a subsequent section, but first, we will look at problem 
definitions themselves and how they structure public policy. 
4 How problem definitions structure public policy 
Agenda setting processes determine which problem definitions survive and 
become seen as being most politically relevant. At this point, socially 
constructed problem definitions would have found a place in the policy 
agenda, and be embedded in policy programs. They would no longer just be 
socially constructed definitions of public problems. They became social facts 
with real life consequences for policy design and implementation. The 
following sections describe the way in which these definitions shape further 
policy actions.  
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According to Weiss (1989: 97-98), “A problem definition at the outset 
of a policy process has implications for later stages: which kinds of evidence 
bear of the problem, which solutions are considered effective and feasible, 
who participates in the decision process, how policies are implemented, and by 
which criteria they are assessed”. In order to understand the power of problem 
definitions, we will take a closer look at the ‘anatomy’ of a problem 
description as conceptualized by Cobb and Elder (1993). A problem definition 
consists of five dimensions of a problem.  Firstly, it sheds light on the cause of 
the problem. A problem definition includes a statement about its origin (Cobb 
and Elder, 1983). By pointing out what or whom caused a problem, 
responsibility is assigned to a group, individual or technology assumed to 
trigger the problem (ibid). Secondly, a problem definition somehow qualifies 
the nature of the problem, affecting its chance of being subjected to public 
intervention, and influences the form of the policy design. The nature of the 
problem can be expressed along many dimensions, such as severity, incidence, 
novelty, proximity or crisis (ibid). Thirdly, problem definitions sketch the 
characteristics of the problem population. The perception of the problem 
shapes the usage of policy tools (ibid). Social constructions of target groups, 
for example, whether they are deemed worthy or unworthy, affects the 
selection of policy tools as well as the rationale that legitimatizes policy 
choices (Schneider and Ingram, 1993). Fourthly, problem definitions contain 
the means-ends orientation of the problem definer. As problem definitions are 
subjective interpretations of reality, they capture the preferences of the 
‘definer’ about the means and or ends of the problem. Fifthly, the nature of the 
solution is greatly influenced by the definition of the problem. Only when 
political agreement is reached on the qualities of the solution does  
governmental action become possible. A problem description somehow 
mirrors opinions about the feasibility of a solution, its acceptability in terms of 
existing codes of behavior, as well as it affordability (ibid).  
The anatomy of problem descriptions leads to two specific 
expectations about its power: First, problem definitions shape the policy 
strategy in terms of its goals, design and the selection of policy tools. 
Definitions of policy problems are expected to point at a specific policy 
strategy including a specific objective, type of solution and the instruments 
considered most effective (Stone, 2002). Second, problem definitions are 
assumed to affect the division of responsibility in the policy process. Problem 
definitions are attributed with the power of allocating ownership and blame, 
thereby legitimatizing and empowering certain actors as fixers of the problem 
(Weis, 1989; Stone 1989/2002). In other words, the perspective of a problem 
serves to legitimize the choice of actors. Further, problem definitions are 
malleable (Cobb and Elder, 1993) and shift over time, giving them the 
potential to trigger high impact changes, including shifts in strategy, and in the 
roles and positions of actors.  
5  Stability and change in problem definitions  
Once institutionalized into social facts in policy programs, problem definitions 
are assumed to be rather stable perspectives on reality. Nevertheless, even 
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institutionalized definitions laid out in policy plans change as the policy 
evolves. Such a shift in problem definition may hold huge consequences for 
the design of the policy strategy, and the selection of responsible actors. This 
paragraph discusses several models of policy dynamics in order to understand 
stability and change in the policy process.  
5.1 Self-enforcing policy paths  
Stability in policy processes can be explained by means of the concept of path 
dependency. Pierson conceptualized path dependency as a “social process 
grounded in the dynamic of ‘increasing returns’” (2000: 251). Increasing 
returns refer to the relative benefits of a current activity in relation to an 
optional other activity (ibid). The concept of path dependency was originally 
introduced in the field of economics and later on applied to address political 
decision making and policy processes (Pierson, 2000; Pollit, 2008). According 
to Pierson (2000), the mechanism of increasing returns is applicable to politics 
and it explains why a chosen policy direction is relatively stable, and how it 
guides future policy decisions.   
 Stability in the policy processes can be explained by the concept of 
path dependency as follows. 
Public policies are designed, implemented and revised within a context of 
historically developed routines, procedures, decisions, traditions and systems. 
They constitute important rules of the game (Kay, 2005:557) limiting the 
freedom of choice (c.f. bounded rationality: Simon, 1961) as well as providing 
opportunities for learning during policy processes (c.f. Hall, 1993). 
Historically developed institutional structures influence the interaction 
between policy actors, decision making processes as well as formulation and 
implementation of policy (Kay, 2005). Even past policy decisions are seen as 
institutions in terms of current policy decisions, as “they can act as structures 
that can limit or shape current policy options” (Kay, 2005: 557).  
In this research project, the concept of path dependency is adopted to 
understand why the specific problem definition – once firmly embedded in the 
policy strategy – is able to structure the perspective of both the problem and 
the solution for a certain amount of time. As Kay stated: “A process is path 
dependent if initial moves in one direction elicit further moves in that same 
direction; in other words the order in which things happen affects how they 
happen; the trajectory of change up to a certain point constrains the trajectory 
after that point” (Kay, 2005: 553).  
5.2 Policy change  
Seen through the lens of path-dependency and the power of institutions, policy 
processes are relatively static or self-enforcing. However, even long term 
policy stability can be disturbed and changed dramatically. As Weiss noted: 
“Problem definitions cannot be definitively settled and locked in at the 
beginning  [...] as the policy process unfolds, problem definitions may remain 
open to question”  (Weiss: 1989:98).
20
 Dominant, institutionalized problem 
                                                 
20  According to Weiss, problem definitions have several powers which may reoccur  
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definitions may indeed shift, and thereby alter fundamental aspects of the 
policy approach. According to the agenda dynamics literature, policy change 
may be brought about by several factors. 
First and foremost, external triggers are assumed to break the self-
enforcing policy process. Since policy processes are built on internal self-
enforcing mechanisms, a shift in policy has to be brought about by external 
actors or factors. In this respect, Sabatier and Jenkins Smith (1993) pointed to 
changes in economic conditions, public opinion and external events that affect 
interaction and policy making in the policy subsystem. Other scholars point at 
focusing events as triggers for the processes of reformulation or even policy 
change. Sudden, external events, such as terrorist attacks or technological 
innovations, put forward new types of policy problems, or make previously 
unsuitable solutions preferable. These external triggers create a window of 
opportunity to connect formerly distanced problem perceptions and potential 
solutions (Kingdon, 1984; Bekkers).  
Second, interactions between groups of policy actors may lead to 
policy-related learning, which is assumed to foster incremental policy change 
(Sabatier and Jenkins Smith, 1993). Sabatier and Jenkins Smith pointed out 
that groups of actors, so called advocacy coalitions, are the driving force 
behind policy change. Advocacy coalitions consist of actors from different 
backgrounds sharing a belief system. The latter is characterized as a set of 
value priorities and causal assumptions regarding public policy consisting of  
three layers: 1) a deep core of fundamental, normative beliefs and axiom’s, and 
2) a near policy core holding strategies and preferences regarding policies 
based on the deep core and 3) a secondary system of instrumental decisions 
and research to implement policy. Mediated by policy brokers, these coalitions 
interact while seeking to influence governmental decisions in a policy arena, 
also called the policy subsystem. Policy change occurs as a results of changes 
in the belief system of the advocacy coalition. Interaction fosters policy 
learning, and actors alter either their perceptions of the problem, or its cause. 
Actors may also experience shifts in their political values or the understanding 
of the effects of policy solutions. They change their policies both 
incrementally, as well as fundamentally as a result of this (Bekkers, 2007 
discusses ACF Sabatier). However, most frequently it is the strategic positions 
and secondary systems that change, rather than the more entrenched deep core. 
For the deep core to change, such a change has to be triggered by external 
events rather than internal cognitions. 
Thirdly, strategic communication, interaction and power play can 
foster a sudden and fundamental change after a long period of policy stability. 
Inspired by evolutionary biology in which ecosystems are said to show severe 
shifts after long periods of stability, Baumgartner and Jones posited that long 
term policy stability can be fundamentally broken down by sudden shifts in 
basic policy (1993). A policy equilibrium is the result of an incremental 
process of agenda setting. Although it is vulnerable, it can be longstanding. A 
group of powerful actors form a so called iron triangle of experts and 
stakeholders safeguarding existing policy practices by means of a powerful 
                                                                                                                
through the policy process: overture, weapon and outcome  (1989:118). 
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idea. It is this carefully constructed paradigm that legitimizes their dominant 
position in the political and policy process for a long time. However, a sudden 
negative event can, due to bounded rationality, gain momentum and alter the 
long term policy paradigm. Views or information contrasting with the current 
paradigm can be picked up by other actors from specific individuals or the 
media, and this can have a snowball effect that suddenly challenges the 
existing policy paradigm and break down the policy monopoly held by the iron 
triangle. A long-term period of stability can thus be altered by a sudden, 
fundamental policy change.  Once such a change triggers a shift in problem 
definition, huge consequences arise for actors in the policy process. 
Baumgartner and Jones demonstrated that shifts in the policy image can 
dramatically alter the composition of the policy venue, iron triangle and 
advocacy coalition that unite institutions and groups with the authority to make 
decisions (1993).  This points to an important connection between the policy 
image (aka the problem definition) and the policy venue (selection of actors 
holding responsibility and power). Policy change is the outcome of 
interactions between policy images and policy venues (Princen, 2010), and a 
shift in the image alters the policy venue. Therefore, actors show strategic 
behavior and competition called venue shopping. By portraying another image 
of the problem, they hope to move an issue into a new policy arena, to be 
addressed by new actors, institutions and rules (Pralle, 2006).  
 
In summary, shifts in public policies can be brought along by multiple factors 
and actors both in and outside of the policy arena. These can be roughly 
divided into external triggers and cognitive aspects internal to the actors 
interacting in the policy arena. Both the Advocacy Coalition Framework and 
the Punctuated Equilibrium model point out that strategic interactions between 
groups of policy actors as well as their underlying ideas, beliefs, perspectives, 
paradigms and images are of great importance to the stability of policies. A 
shift in the policy image would potentially be of great consequence to the 
policy strategy and the distribution of responsibility. A shift in the problem 
definition – whether is it is the introduction of a completely new definition, or 
the alteration of an existing one – is also likely to have great consequences for 
design of policy strategy and selection of policy actors.  The question that 
remains unanswered then is how do problem definitions promote specific 
actions and actors whilst downplaying others? The remaining paragraphs 
explain the value of framing theory in fostering a deeper understanding of the 
power of problem definitions.  
6 Why framing theory? 
The fact that a single issue can be translated into multiple problem definitions, 
which can be redefined again in time (Weiss 1989; Baumgartner and Jones, 
2009; Rochefort and Cobb, 1993) points toward the subjectivity and 
contingency inherent in socially constructed problem definitions. For example, 
individuals suffering from what we nowadays refer to as ‘psychological 
disorders’ have been described as being raised improperly, being crazy, having 
neuro-biological problems, or simply having dark drives. Each image of the 
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problem points towards a completely different solution, as well as to potential 
policy tools and actors from the medical, psychiatric or psychosocial domain. 
The key to understanding the power of problem definitions thus lies in the 
image a definition portrays of the issue at hand. It is this image that makes 
certain solutions more likely than others (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009; Stone, 
1989).  
In order to fully understand how and why certain definitions make 
way for specific solutions and actors while excluding others, we need to take a 
closer look at the image of the problem that is put forward by the definition. 
Such an image represents a deeper understanding of reality that can be 
conceptualized as a frame. Several scholars acknowledged the importance of 
frames in defining problems. Dery stated that “problems are […] the product 
of imposing certain frames of reference on reality” (Dery, 1984: 4). According 
to Portz, “Framing original questions is what problem definitions are all about” 
(1996: 382). Weiss emphasized that it is the frame which grants a problem 
definition its directive power: “By the frame imposed on circumstances, a 
problem definition highlights some aspects of the situation while throwing 
other aspects into the shadows” (1989: 97).  
Problem definitions thus derive from a policy frame their normative 
perspective on a societal issue and the way it has to be dealt with. In other 
words, it is the frame that colors the problem definition. The concept of frames 
is adopted to better illuminate the power of problem definitions in the policy 
process. The following paragraphs we will discuss what frames are, how 
framing processes evolve, the importance of frame shifts, and how framing 
and reframing is affected by contextual aspects. Finally, the specific activity of 
framing problems in terms of safety will be introduced; securitization.  
7 Framing: making sense of reality 
The term ‘frame’ was originally introduced by Bateson (1955) “to explain how 
individuals exchange signals that allow them to agree upon the level of 
abstraction at which any message is intended” (Tannen, 1993:18). The concept 
of framing was further developed to understand processes of social interaction 
and communication in various disciplines such, as organizational behavior, 
political science, psychology, and sociology (Hallahan and Donsback, 2008; 
Hajer and Laws, 2006). Using the analogy of the picture frame, a frame can be 
seen as a boundary in the way a picture frame fixes our attention and tells us 
what to disregard (Hajer and Laws, 2006: 257). Apart from structuring our 
perception of reality, frames promote a course of action by, “providing a sense 
of what the problem is, and what should be done about it” (Ibid).  
7.1 What is a frame?  
Frames are can be described as social constructions that reflect normal and 
desired actions. They provide a general, broad and normative perspective on 
what the problem and course of action should be. Just like problem definitions, 
frames are by no means neutral, factual or objective displays of reality. Rather, 
they are interpretative schemes for making sense of reality (Goffman, 1974). 
They enable people “to locate, perceive, identify and label a seemingly infinite 
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number of occurrences” in their real life situation and context (Snow et al., 
1986: 464 cite Goffman, 1974). In terms of public policy, frames are ordering 
devices or schema for interpretation for public officials, policy analysts, 
researchers and stakeholders through which they make sense of an ambivalent 
reality. Frames are a useful concept for studying how policy actors make sense 
of reality as they are the “conceptual tools that analysts use to capture how 
policy actors deal with ambiguity and allocate particular significance to 
specific social of physical events” (Hajer and Laws, 2006: 252). In policy 
settings, framing is about labeling problems in a specific way: “A frame is an 
account for ordering that makes sense in the domain of policy and that 
describes the move from diffuse worries to actionable beliefs” (Hajer and 
Laws, 2006: 256). 
7.2 Two core functions of frames: diagnostic and prognostic messages 
The way in which actors in social settings make meaning of a certain issue or 
situation can be studied through the concept of framing (Goffman, 1974). 
Frames have various functions which can be roughly divided into those related 
to understanding what is going on, and those related to deciding what to do. 
Firstly, the ‘diagnostic message’ of a frame makes sense of social reality by 
identifying what is problematic (Snow and Benford, 1988). The first function 
of a frame is to identify what is going on, and to diagnose an event or aspect of 
social life as problematic and requiring change (Snow and Benford, 1988). 
This is about focusing or changing one’s attention by articulating a specific 
perspective on reality. Policy actors use various techniques to do this, such as 
naming, categorizing, assigning attributes, telling casual stories, classifying 
and presenting statistics (Stone, 2002, 1989).  
Secondly, the ‘prognostic message’ of a frame promotes a certain 
course of action. It stipulates specific remedies and goals as well as means and 
tactics for addressing the problem (ibid). In that sense, the prognostic message 
maps out a ‘plan of attack’ by articulating a proposed solution to the problem 
(ibid). It is this prognostic message that characterizes the positions of actors in 
a given policy domain, and that prescribes a certain course of action. Actors 
responsible for dealing with the issue are selected through the second function 
of the frame. Together, these two core functions of framing summarize the 
relevant dimensions of the autonomy of a problem definition as set out by 
Cobb and Elder (1993). 
7.3 Two faces of framing: individual and collective 
 The concept of framing parses the process of making sense of external reality, 
and selecting appropriate solutions. Such a framing process can take place both 
inside the minds of individuals as well as in collective settings. The first level 
refers to the psychological aspects of framing. This psychological strand of the 
framing literature highlights the cognitive aspect of framing. It sheds light on 
the underlying subjective images and normative ideas structuring an 
individual’s interpretation of reality. It is not possible for individuals to 
understand the world objectively or completely, so life experiences are 
interpreted according to the lens of previous experiences or beliefs. It is 
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assumed that individuals hold a certain frame of reference in order to make 
sense of reality.  Entman (1993:53) described these frames as “mentally stored 
clusters of ideas that guide an individual’s processing of information”. 
A second strand in the framing literature is the symbolic interactionist 
strand. Goffman (1974) saw frames as products of interpersonal, face-to-face, 
social interactions. In his view, frames are the outcomes of social interactions, 
and they function like symbolic, interactional units with social meaning that 
are shared within certain groups in society. Once produced, these frames of 
reference or primary frameworks get entrenched and become broad schemes 
for interpretation by which individuals determine what is going. Scholars using 
the work of Goffman scaled up his interactionist perspective on frames and 
applied it to the collective setting of policy making (Hajer and Laws, 2006). In 
this respect, Baumgartner and Mahoney (2008) stated that framing can also we 
take place on a more collective level of issue definition, for example amongst 
various competing actors involved in the policy process.   
 
Processes of sense making could thus be analyzed at two levels:  the individual 
and the collective. Since this research project aims to study framing during the 
policy processes, the focus lies on the collective level. Such a collective 
perspective on framing during the policy processes allows to grasp the 
strategic interaction between actors striving to gain support for certain frames 
over others. 
8 Framing public problems in collective settings 
Public problems are framed during interactions between policy actors. Groups 
of actors often hold different perspectives on an issue. Through their 
interactions, their different frames meet, and get strengthened, adapted or even 
ruled out. The following sections outline the roles of discourse coalitions, 
frame alignment, frame shifts and contextual factors in the framing of public 
problems in collective settings.  
8.1 Frame alignment  
Frame alignment is the process through which multiple frames meet, interact 
and converge into a common frame (Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford, 
1986). Frame alignment results in a shared interpretation of a problem, and 
shared guidelines for addressing it. The process of frame alignment can take 
multiple shapes and forms. Snow et al. (1968), introduced several mechanisms 
through which frames are linked, and alignment is created. The first type is 
frame bridging, in which formerly separate but ideologically compatible 
frames align. The linked frame links two or more previously unconnected but 
congruent frames. The second is frame amplification, which occurs when 
existing frames are communicated and strengthened. In this process, the 
individual frame is invigorated or strengthened into the collective frame. The 
third is frame extension which is about expanding a frame in order to make it 
more attractive for individual actors who did not previously align themselves 
with it. The collective frame is an extension of individual frames, and 
maintains a link between individual frames. Fourth, during frame 
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transformation, the content or meaning of a frame can be altered deliberately. 
During this type of frame alignment, individual frames are transformed into a 
collective frame with completely new content.  
Regardless of which form it takes, frame alignment is expected to 
result in a common shared frame which structurally influences the collective 
perspective of reality (diagnostic message) and the course of action that has to 
follow (prognostic message).  Such a policy frame forms the basis for 
governance actions, and sets the boundaries for the policy approach since 
dominant frames are assumed to affect the distribution of influence and 
resources (Hajer and Laws, 2006) 
8.2 Discourse coalitions 
The course and outcome of problem framing processes is best understood by 
looking at the various groups of actors who promote particular policy 
problems and solutions. Actors tend somehow to gather around specific 
interpretations of reality, and in the competitive political environment, they 
attempt to impose their vision on others (Hajer, 1989). The formation and 
interaction of so called discourse coalitions affects the extent to which certain 
interpretations of reality gain popularity, and may affect politics and policy 
(ibid). Therefore the concept of discourse coalitions is a suitable analytical tool 
by which to map out the metal mental maps or frames that arise in the world of 
policy and politics.  
When defining public problems, actors seek support from each other, 
and form what is known as discourse coalitions. A discourse coalition is “the 
ensemble of a set of storylines, the actors that utter these storylines, and the 
practices that conform to these storylines, all organized around a discourse” 
(Hajer, 1993:47). In order to dominate their playing field, a discourse coalition 
has to meet two conditions. First, all policy actors have to accept the power of 
the discourse, and second, this discourse has to be reflected in the institutional 
practices of the policy process (Hajer, 1993: 48). In doing so, these coalitions 
are involved in processes of social construction or framing during which 
various actors strive for their definition and solution to find favor. These actors 
align themselves into discourse coalition sometimes explicitly, but more often 
implicitly. Interactions between discourse coalitions eventually result in a 
shared frame which is embraced by a majority of the policy actors in a process 
called discourse structuration (ibid). This shared frame influences policy 
formation and implementation, which Hajer names discourse 
institutionalization (ibid).  
Discourse coalitions are the mechanisms that mobilize and promote a 
specific view (frame) of a policy problem, and the preferable policy solution. 
As explained in Paragraph 3.5, interactions between groups of actors -and their 
policy frames- influences the outcome of policy formulation and change 
(Sabatier and Jenkins Smith, 1999; Baumganters and Jones, 2009). This 
research project embraces the idea of discourse coalitions as a means of 
understanding how certain policy frames come about. Their actions, 
interactions and storylines reveal their individual frames, and speak to the 
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collective framing process that takes place. This will be further outlined in 
Chapter 5. 
8.3 Frame shifts 
Both individual and shared policy frames can change over time, bringing about 
a frame shift. Frames shifts may occur for many reasons. Existing frames 
might lose their utility and basis for action, creating a need for a new frame 
(Rein and Schön, 1977). A frame shift can also be the result of power play and 
strategic attempts to reframe an issue (Van Hulst and Yanov, 2008). Whether 
or not fundamental frame shifts are indeed possible is debatable. On the one 
hand, Miller (1985) stated that it is impossible to move completely beyond 
existing frames. Schön (1979/93) on the other hand, forwarded the idea of re-
framing as something that occurs when completely new views on reality, or 
perspectives that go beyond existing views of reality become established. 
Because frames tend to reflect deeper beliefs and grounded perspectives, frame 
shifts are assumed to be difficult to bring about. However, once an existing 
policy frame is altered, it is likely to influence the policy approach greatly by 
bringing about a new perspective on reality (diagnostic message) and course of 
action for addressing it (prognostic message). Furthermore, because the 
diagnostic and prognostic messages are tightly related (ibid), a shift in the 
diagnostic message (what is a public safety problem?) will alter the prognostic 
message of the frame (how should this problem be addressed and by whom?). 
8.4 Context matters 
Not every frame owes its roots solely to the collective framing processes. 
Various contextual factors are part of the structural setting in which discourse 
coalitions interact: “The framing of a policy issue always takes part within a 
nested context. Policy issues arise in connection with governmental programs, 
which exist in some policy environments, which is part of a broader political 
and economic setting, which is located, in turn, within a historical era” (Rein 
and Schon, 1994: 154). This implies that framing of policy issues is responsive 
to (accumulating) shifts in (particular parts of) the larger context of policy and 
governance (Scholten, 2007: 154). Contextual factors affect which problem 
frames as promoted by discourse coalitions and influence which are more 
likely to come about than others. 
In their literature review on framing processes and social movements, 
Snow and Benford (2000) argue that various contextual factors constrain and 
facilitate framing processes. Although many factors might be of influence, 
they state that three factors are of particular importance. The political 
opportunity structure created by the institutional structure and/or the informal 
relations of a political system influence which frames are likely come about, to 
change, to resonate with a wider audience and which are not. The same holds 
for the cultural context in which framing processes are embedded. Since 
frames are grounded in cultural values and myths and “framing processes 
typically reflect wider cultural values and changes” (ibid: 629). The audience 
to which framing processes are targeted also play a part in deciding which 
frame is likely to become widely adopted, which frames are changed, and 
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which fall to the way side. To sum up, multiple contextual factors surrounding 
the collective process of framing will therefore affect how actors frame an 
issue, which actors are conferred legitimacy as participants, and what role they 
take up (Scholten, 2007).   
9 Framing safety problems: securitization  
Having explored the dynamics of the framing of public problems in general, 
we now turn to the concept of securitization. Securitization refers to “the 
process through which particular issues become constituted as security issues, 
and are seen as amenable to security solution” (Grey, 2009:307). In this 
project, securitization is viewed as a specific form of framing as it activates the 
public safety frame and puts forward safety actors and tools. Loader described 
the link between framing and securitization as “a process that entails ‘framing’ 
selected social problems […] in ways that dramatize the threat they pose […] 
and criminal-justice-centered responses are made to seem both urgent and 
inevitable” (2002:135).  
The concept of securitization was introduced by The Copenhagen 
School of scholars with roots in International Relations. In their book, 
'Security: a frameworks for analysis” (1998), Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 
introduced the concept of securitization, which they defined as: “The process 
of social construction involving those who carry out the speech act 
(securitizing actors) to articulate an existential threat to a referent object” 
(Buzan et al., 1998:23-24). Successful efforts at securitization result in an 
inter-subjective understanding of what is a public safety problem. Qualifying 
something as a matter of public safety has strong implications for the selection 
of policy solutions and actors, or as Lucia Zedner once wrote: “security 
licenses” (2003:176). More specifically, a ‘safety label’ does not license any 
public instrument or actor. It merely legitimizes those extraordinary ones 
belonging to the policy domain of public policing. Framing public issues as a 
matter of safety and security makes a strong and powerful statement since it 
“takes politics beyond the established rules of the game, and frames the issue 
either as a special kind of politics or as above politics” (Buzan et al., 
1998:23).
21
 
The most important aspects of securitization are the referent object, 
the securitizing actor and the functional actors (ibid). Referent objects are 
“things that are seen to be existentially threatened, and that have a legitimate 
claim to survival” (Buzan et al., 1998: 36). In principle, any issue that 
demands survival could be securitized (Waever, 1996). During times of war, 
for example, the referent object is likely to be the sovereign nation state. 
Securitizing actors are those actors “who securitize issues by declaring 
something – a referent object – as being existentially threatened” (Buzan et al., 
1998). Various actors can make a securitizing move, such as state actors, 
politicians, bureaucracies, lobbyists and pressure groups (Buzan et al., 1998). 
Functional actors are those players who affect the dynamics and decisions in 
                                                 
21 Buzan et al. make a clear distinction between politicization and securitization. 
Securitization is a further intensification of politicization since it takes the issue out of the 
sphere of ‘normal’ politics’ (Buzan et al., 1998). 
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the field of security and safety without actually being the referent object or 
securitizing actor (ibid). Without the audience accepting that a referent object 
is existentially threatened, one cannot claim that a speech act of securitization 
has been successful (ibid).  
The Copenhagen School explicitly adopted a social constructionist 
perspective, stating that processes of securitization are by no means based on 
objective facts.
22
 Communicated threats to referent objects are predictions of 
future public safety problems that are highly subjective. In other words, safety 
is a political construction which is open for exploitation, ‟given the open 
textured nature of the concept‟ (Zedner, 2003:158). Moreover, the so called 
referent object in processes of securitization could be of any kind, ranging 
from a person, to a country, or an event. In adopting this broad and open 
perspective, the Copenhagen School widened the traditionally military and 
state centered perspective of security studies and distinguished five sectors in 
which the processes of securitization could occur: the military, politics, 
economics, society and the environment. Other scholars have pointed to 
securitization in other arenas, such as migration threatening European society, 
Asia’s energy consumption threatening regional stability (Philips, 2013), and 
national development policies in the UK that threaten homeland security  
(Pugh, Gabay, and Williams, 2013). 
Regardless of the context, the concept of securitization points directly 
at the strategic component of problem framing. Attempts at securitization are 
motivated by the advantage this confers, such as gaining attention for a 
particular issues, mobilizing power, gaining endorsement for special measures, 
and skipping a rule that would otherwise apply to the securing actor (Buzan et 
al., 1998; Loader, 2002: 143). For this reason, scholars have described the 
safety frame a dangerous one, pointing out that all too often, an issue can be 
handled without democratic control, and without constraints by means of 
successful securitization (Buzal et al., 1998: 29). For example, labeling groups 
of people in terms of the potential security threats they pose may justify their 
subsequent exclusion (Huysmans, 2000). Some have even criticized the 
Copenhagen School for not adequately recognizing the ethical dimension of 
securitization enough, and for overlooking its location within an a broader 
setting of discursive legitimatization and the practical ethics of dialogue: “In 
presenting security as a speech act, the Copenhagen School is doing more than 
developing a sociological thesis: it is presenting a political ethic” (Williams, 
2003).  
In general, it can be argued that the introduction of the concept of 
securitization brought attention to the widening concerns of public safety, 
which forms the heart of this research project. While the body of knowledge 
on securitization is closely related to the field of security studies and 
                                                 
22   This distinction was strongly opposed by Knudsen 2001, who disagreed with the  
idea that security is a politically constructed concept. Knudsen argued that 
attention must be paid to the ‘reality of security’ by making sure that the concept 
of threat is based on an objective, empirical foundation. Also Balzaq similarly 
argued that the objective context in which security agents are located is often 
overlooked by the Copenhagen School (2005).  
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international relations which holds a supra local perspective, the current 
research project aims to shed light on the local dynamics of securitization by 
studying which issues have successfully been framed as threats to local order 
and safety. This study adopts the general mechanism of securitization, which is 
that framing something as a safety matter promotes the taking of specific 
safety measures and the activation of safety actors. Securitization is thus 
adopted as a specific way of thematically framing an issue that consequently 
legitimizing actions and actors in the domain of public policing. 
10 Summary  
This chapter answered the first part of the second sub question:  What is the 
expected role of problem definitions in the policy process? Problem definitions 
are fundamental aspects of public policies that shape key aspects of the overall 
policy strategy, and that affect the distribution of responsibility among actors. 
The power of problem definitions can be understood through the concept of 
frames. Frames highlight the normative image of the cause, features and 
potential solutions associated with problem descriptions that form the heart of 
a specific policy program.  
 This chapters posed three theoretical expectations regarding the role of 
problem definitions that will be used as building blocks for our conceptual 
model. The first expectation is that problem definitions are socially 
constructed, and therefore subjective displays of reality putting forward a 
specific cause and solution for issues considered undesirable. Second, the 
concept of frames maps out the perspective imposed by the problem definition 
on both the problem (diagnostic message) and the solution (prognostic 
message). Third, the conceptualization of shared policy frames is the outcome 
of negotiated interactions between discourse coalitions during the agenda 
setting processes.  
Studying the way in which definitions of safety problems affect the 
position and role of the mayor requires an understanding of both the position 
and role of individual actors in policy networks.  Chapter 4 puts forward 
networked governance and the role of stat) actors as a second step towards the 
construction of our conceptual model. The conceptual model will be presented 
in Chapter 5, and will map out how problem definitions shape actors’ positions 
and roles.    
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Chapter 4: The position and role of state actors in policy networks 
1 Introduction 
The previous chapter argued that problem frames structure key aspects of the 
policy strategy, including the distribution of tasks, responsibilities and powers 
amongst actors. Problem frames thus indirectly shape the position and role of 
actors in policy processes. Before providing a detailed model of the expected 
interrelation between problem definitions and positions and roles, we seek first 
to define the concept of positions and roles in governance networks. This 
chapter introduces the perspective of networked governance for two reasons. 
First, in order to define what is actually meant by positions and roles in policy 
settings, and second, as a means of understanding how the composition of 
actors’ positions and roles is shaped by both internal and extern dynamics of 
policy networks. In doing so, we outline the theoretical building blocks that 
will assist us in answering the second part of sub question two: What is the 
expected role of problem definitions during policy processes and how are 
these expected to affect the position and role of individual actors in a policy 
network? 
2 A short history of the concept of governance   
From a public administration perspective, speaking about governance implies 
talking about the activity of steering society and addressing public issues. In 
the broadest sense of the word, governance thus refers to a model of social 
coordination (Hoppe, 2010). More specially, contemporary usage of the term 
governance is closely related to the rise of a new paradigm in public 
administration, focusing on the horizontal and multi-actor characteristics of 
steering (post)modern society. This paragraph provides a short history of the 
concept of governance in the public administration literature. 
2.1 Defining governance  
Harlan Cleveland is thought to have first introduced the term governance in the 
1990s, using it in place of the more commonly used term, ‘public 
administration’ (c.f. Friedrichson, 2005; Fenger and Bekkers, 2007). The term 
entered the scene just as the classical ‘Weberian’ model of national 
government steering society in a rather neutral, technocratic and hierarchical 
manner ran out of fashion. The term governance is strongly related to the 
introduction of a new perspective on public administration and focused on 
pluri-centric rather than uni-centric collectivities uniting autonomous yet 
interdependent actors in their efforts to steer society (Kersbergen and van 
Waarden, 2004). Governance no longer solely refers to central or top-down 
steering by the national government, but to multiple descriptions of a new 
process of governing as well (Rhodes, 1997). As Friedrichson said, “Instead of 
governance replacing public administration, governance is a kind of public 
administration” (2005:295). More specifically, governance is characterized by 
more horizontally structured collaboration arrangements between public, 
private and societal actors.  
  
 
 
70 
 
2.2 The shift from government to governance 
The so called shift ‘from government to governance’ refers to the breakdown 
in the 1990s of the previously dominant perspective of top-down, hierarchical 
governments, and the rise of horizontal, multi-actor models of government. 
The rationale for this shift can be found in the recognition that there are limits 
to the controlling capacity of the nation state. The old model of public 
administration was seen as having delivered disappointing results, and was 
suffering from an identity crisis (Peters, 1996; Friedrichson, 2005).  
A confluence of events made modern society appear far less 
controllable than in previous periods, and this resulted in a fundamental 
rethinking of the traditional models of governance in the years between 1980 
and 1990 (Peters, 2001). Fenger and Bekkers (2007: 19) grouped various 
economic, societal and historical events into five crises of state which 
highlighted the limits of the steering capacity of the welfare state: 1) a 
financial crisis in the mid-1980s led to the withdrawal of government from 
expensive welfare systems, 2) a regulatory crisis in the same period 
demonstrated the inability of governmental command and control mechanisms 
to influence key societal developments, 3) a rationality crisis that demonstrated 
that not every consequence of policy interventions is knowable), 4) an 
implementation crisis that showed the implementation of policy to be far more 
than the simple activation of the governmental machinery,  and  therefore also 
far from being politically neutral or technocratic, and 5) a complexity crisis in 
which the modernization processes that took place in the twentieth century led 
to a fragmented domain of specialized processes and organizations and new, 
complex societal problems. Together, these crises forced “a shift in the 
dominant steering paradigm of the welfare state […] and resulted in the 
emergence of specific governance arrangements” (Fenger and Bekkers, 2007: 
19). 
2.3 Multiple models of governance  
It became widely recognized that the old model of public administration had 
floundered. The old model was characterized by an institutionalized and 
apolitical civil service, organizational and hierarchical rules, a preoccupation 
with permanence and stability, and a breadth of internal regulations (Peters, 
1996). But what exactly happened to the old steering paradigm? The answer 
can be summarized as a combination of efforts at less government, and 
converse efforts at more governance. Governance moved ‘upwards’ from 
nation states towards international public institutions such as the European 
Union or the World Trade Organization. At the same time, it moved 
‘downwards’ from the national level to regional and local levels. ‘Horizontal’ 
changes were also made in which responsibility was shifted towards other 
governmental actors, (semi)public organizations, private organizations and/or 
civil society (van Kersbergen and Van Waarden, 2004, Fenger and Bekkers, 
2007).  
This diversion of the loci of power has taken place in a variety of 
ways. Bekkers and Fenger (2007) describe five modes of governance (Bekkers 
and Fenger, 2007). The first is the governance at a distance model which is 
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strongly based on steering on parameters such as input and output. The 
national government transfers specific tasks to organizations that enjoy a 
certain amount of freedom to develop and implement their policies, while still 
being hierarchically steered by the nation state. Secondly, the model of multi-
level governance is about “cooperative rather than hierarchical relations 
between governmental units attached to different territorial levels” 
(Papadopoulos, 2003:473). The national government shares problem solving 
responsibilities and capacities with governmental actors from other levels. 
There can be a shift upwards to the international level, or downwards to actors 
from the regional and local levels. Thirdly, the market model introduces 
classical market mechanisms of supply and demand into public policy. 
Fourthly, under the societal self-governance model, the government facilitates 
and enables policy initiatives developed and implemented within local 
communities. This model is strongly characterized by the notion of self-
regulation in policy networks, and stresses the self-regulating capacity of 
societal, public and even private actors (Fenger and Bekkers, 2007). Finally, 
there is the model of networked governance referring to “sustainment, co-
ordination and coherence among a wide variety of actors with different 
purposes and objectives, such as political actors and institutions, corporate 
interests, civil society, and transnational governments” (Pierre 2000: 3–4). 
Although they act fairly autonomously, the various actors develop and 
implement policy together. This model strongly relies on the co-operation of 
actors from different backgrounds, and those who holding dramatically 
different perspectives, powers and goals.  
 
This short history of the concept of governance points to the many shapes and 
forms that the concept can take. What these various models have in common is 
that the government is no longer a single entity, but a conglomerate of actors 
representing the government, market, society and citizens who co-produce 
public policy (Bekkers et al., 2007). Governance models stress a level of 
horizontal collaboration between actors from different backgrounds. The 
current study strongly relies on this networked aspect of governance, and 
embraces governance as a joint venture of actors of different sectors (public, 
private, and hybrid organizations) who are forced to blend their recourses 
(Peters and Pierre, 1998) in order to address public problems effectively.  
3. What do new forms of governance mean for the government? 
What does the shift from government to governance mean for state actors as 
classical providers of governmental steering? The most general answer is that 
public policy is a joint action by public, semi- public and private actors, but 
and the exact role of state actors in governance networks is highly debated in 
the public administration literature. The next section points to the implications 
of more or less horizontal forms of governance for state actors. This is of great 
importance given the objective of the current study to study local governance 
networks with a specific focus on mayors as the first representatives of 
government.  
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3.1 State actors in networked governance  
Hope (2010) defined governance as “patterns of interaction in which political 
and traditional hierarchical governing and societal self-organization are 
complementary” (2010:14). This definition has important implications for the 
distribution of “responsibility and accountability for interventions” (Hoppe, 
2010:14). Some scholars argue that as a result of the paradigm shift from 
government to governance, state actors lost their ability to steer society. They 
complain of a hollowing out of the state, and speak of governance without 
government as a consequence of privatization, contracting out and public-
private partnerships (Rhodes, Peters and Pierre, 1998). In such a paradigm, 
state actors become just one of many mutually dependent actors. 
These claims were criticized by other scholars, who argued instead 
that government actors are “important actors among many others” (c.f. 
Kersbergen and van Waarden 2004:152). Although upwards, downward and 
horizontal shifts in steering activities and power have caused national 
governments to lose their monopoly in defining society interests, allocating 
public value, and implementing policy, national governments remain 
importantly unique players in the public domain by the fact that they possess 
important resources such as legitimacy and authority backed up by formal 
laws, constitutions, taxation and the ability to use physical force (Hoppe, 
2010). Despite losing some of their direct controls, state actors still hold a 
central position because of their exclusive powers and resources (Peters and 
Pierre, 1998; Rhodes, 1997). 
Either way, questions of legitimacy are raised when a nation state 
shares or even transfers its problem solving capacity to other actors. The shift 
from government to governance could result in networks with little 
transparency and no clear loci of power, decision making and responsibility. In 
this respect, “the blurring of the distinctions between public and private 
organizations” in governance settings triggers questions of individual 
accountability (Friedrichson 2005:283) as traditional checks and balances on 
power and accountability become less effective (Kersbergen and Van 
Waarden, 2004). Papadopoulos (2003) describes the democratic deficits of the 
governance approach, both in terms of responsiveness (where policymaking in 
governance collective settings is not sensitive enough to the people’s demands) 
as well as accountability (referring to the legitimacy of the process of policy 
formation and democratic control).  
3.2 The call for leadership in local governance networks  
When it comes to local governance the shift towards governance has often 
been associated in Western Europe with a trend toward the establishment of 
stronger local leaders (Borraz and John, 2004; Steyvers et al., 2008; Alonso 
and Mendieta, 2010). In order to be able to formulate and implement public 
policies in contemporary governance settings, local authorities must engage in 
inter organization, inter-governmental relations as well as actively address 
civil society (Alonso and Mendieta, 2010). Strong local leadership would 
provide the most logical answer to such a fragmented picture of governance 
and society (Steyvers et al., 2008). In fact, political leadership was labeled as 
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one of the most principal elements of urban governance in such a fragmented 
context (Alonso and Menieta, 2010). Strong local leadership would manifest 
itself in both institutional as well as personal aspects (Steyvers et al., 2008). 
The former refers to the personalization of leadership by direct election, and 
the provision of the individual leaders with executive powers. The latter refers 
to taking the lead in partnerships by fostering collective modes of decision 
making.   
If leadership is placed on a continuum, ranging from a directive, 
decisive and individual mode of decision making on the one hand, to 
participative, collective and facilitative ways on the other (Karsten, 2013), 
‘strong’ leadership in horizontal, multi actors governance settings would 
clearly to be found in the latter corner. Strength describes the ability of ‘urban 
leaders’ to “to make sense of the complexity and bring together a disparate set 
of potential participants” (John and Cole, 1999:99). The fragmented character 
of contemporary local governance would call for plural forms of leadership 
(Borraz and John, 2004) which focus on bringing it all together. Strong leaders 
should function as synthesizers or political brokers providing a vision and 
empowering collectivities to act on it (Steyvers et al., 2008). In this respect, 
John and Cole (2008) speak of local leaders as consensual facilitators valuing 
partnerships and networks. This implies that they have to be responsive to 
stakeholders from the local and national level, and generate governance 
capacity by persuasion and finding the best in others. Greasley and Stroker 
argue that a facilitative leadership style is central to modern urban governance, 
because of its demanding and complex environment. It would require a 
facilitative style of local, political leadership that is visible, outward looking, 
open and less partisan than more established forms” (2008: 723-724). 
Facilitative leadership is characterized by regime building across institutional 
boundaries, pulling together a fragmented set of partners around a shared 
vision and blending resources to achieve common purposes (ibid). 
4 Roles and positions in networked governance 
An actor’s ability to steer society is thus inherently related to his position and 
role in a governance network. Before turning to the mayor’s role in local safety 
governance, the position and role of actors in governance networks has first to 
be explored. This section argues that the research object of local safety 
governance can be seen as a thematic manifestation of policy networks as 
described in the public administration literature. Such networks gather around 
specific policy problems which require orchestrated action because of their 
complex nature-. It is within such networks that individual actors such as the 
mayor take on their position and role. These roles are defined according to the 
sociological perspective on policy networks as social structures guiding actors’ 
behaviors.   
4.1 Tackling public problems in policy networks 
Contemporary policy problems, including public safety problems, are often 
characterized by their wickedness of and complexity (Rittel and Webber, 
1973). Consequently, policy makers are challenged with limited knowledge 
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regarding their causes and policy actors are in discontent about the norms and 
values at stake (c.f. untamed problems, Hoppe, 1989). Networked governance 
can be seen as a response to such complexity (Hoppe 2010:13). Since 
contemporary public problems “cut across the jurisdictions of organizations 
and cross the traditional boundaries between the private and the public sector” 
a wide variety of actors have to align their interests, poers and resources in 
governance networks (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004: 1).  
Governance networks focusing on specific public problems are called 
‘policy networks’. A policy network can be seen as a “web of on-going 
relationships which mobilize dispersed resources so that collective (or parallel) 
action can be orchestrated toward the solution of a common policy problem” 
(Kennis and Schneider, 1991: 36). Mutual resource dependency between 
actors (Rhodes, 1997) creates the need for interaction and cooperation in a 
governance network (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004). Governance in such policy 
networks creates “mutual leveraging of resources and the blending of public 
and private attributes in ways that might not be possible in more conventional 
structural arrangements” and enables “the use of a wider repertoire of 
instruments” (Peters and Pierre, 1998:226/227).  
Besides getting policy actors to align their structural arrangements, 
mutual resource dependency leads to specific power relations between actors 
in policy networks (c.f. Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). Relationships in policy 
networks are strongly characterized by the ownership of or ability to control 
resources (Bekkers, 2007:171; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003:262). Actors holding 
exclusive powers have powerful positions in governance networks (Pieters and 
Piere, 1998) and are assumed to have a strong say in the collective definition 
of policy objectives, and in the selection of policy measures. This implies that 
the position and role an actor holds within a policy network is strongly 
characterized by his possession of powers and resources, and by the level of 
dependency on others that these assets confer.   
4.2 Positions and roles in social structures 
From a sociological perspective, a policy network is a social structure 
consisting of positions and roles. According to Merton, “contemporary 
sociological theorists are largely at one in adopting the premise that social 
statuses [c.f. position RP] and social roles comprise major building blocks of 
social structure”(1957:110). A social structure is thus a collectivity of 
interpersonal interactions and relations in which individuals have a certain 
status or position. Positions within a social structure can range from the 
informal, such as a friend or a soul mate, to the more recognized, such as the 
position of a judge or policeman. All positions are accompanied by a 
description of expected behaviors, which constitute a role in the societal 
structure. The concept of positions and role are thus closely related. It is a 
“long recognized and basic fact that each person in society inevitably occupies 
multiple statuses and that each of these statuses is accompanied by an 
associated role” (Merton, 1957:110 describes Linton). Any role taken up in 
society is thus characterized by the expected behavior associated with the 
social position (Kuper and Kuper, 2010:891; Macionis and Plummer, 2008). 
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Just as a teacher is expected to educate a student, a president is expected to 
lead a nation, and a parent is expected to raise a child.  
A social role can thus be defined as “a comprehensive pattern of 
behaviors and attitudes constituting a strategy for coping with a recurrent set of 
situations” (Turner, 1990: 87). An individual can hold multiple roles at the 
same time. First, a person can have various roles associated with different 
statuses or positions. One can have the role of a mother, ex-wife, lawyer, 
volunteer at the local fire brigade, and member of the labor party, all at the 
same time. Second, a complex variety of roles can be linked to a single social 
position (Merton, 1957). Sociologist Merton describes this as a role set, by 
which he means the “complement of role-relationships in which persons are 
involved by virtue of occupying a particular social status” (1957:110). He 
describes the example of a medical student (position) who holds multiple role-
relationships with his teachers, roles relating him to fellow students, and roles 
relating him to the medical technicians. The multiple roles associated with 
one’s various positions in society, or even the many behaviors demanded by a 
single role may be compatible or conflicting. The former is described as an 
external role conflict (Van Doorn and Lammers, 1976) while the latter can be 
seen as internal role conflict (ibid), or role strain (Merton, 1957).  
Turner (1990) distinguishes four types of social roles: basic, 
structural, functional, and value roles. Basic roles can be distinguished based 
on the individual’s gender and age, such as being female, a teenager, or 
elderly. Structural status roles tend to be attached to an individual’s position in 
particular organizational or family settings, such as being a lawyer, a CEO, or 
the grandfather in a family. Functional group roles are not attached to formal 
group positions and take on more of an informal and cultural flavor. Such roles 
include that of a mediator and devil’s advocate. These are comparable to value 
roles such as that of the hero and criminal.  
More in general, each role comes along with a certain set of tasks, 
powers, and responsibilities, highlighting the expected behaviors of someone 
from a certain position in society (van Doorn and Lammers, 1976). These 
norms and expectations of the personal behavior of individuals in certain 
societal positions can be formally described in laws as well as shaped by 
expectations of individuals in practice (ibid). In whatever form, expectations 
about behavior clarify and structure social interactions and the concept of role 
therefore “supplies a major basis for identifying and placing persons in a 
group, organization or society” (Turner, 1990: 87). Roles elucidate a certain 
pattern of behavior, thereby representing social relations in a social structure 
(Kuper and Kuper, 2010).  
4.3 Conceptualizing roles and position in policy networks 
Following this line of reasoning, a general description of roles and positions in 
governance networks can be formulated as follows: In policy networks, 
individual actors engage in multiple interactions and relationships in order to 
address public problems. This leads to a policy network around a certain 
policy problem. This more or less formalized governance structure resembles a 
social structure in which individual actors take particular positions and roles. 
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The roles actors have in a governance structure are often associated with the 
formal status of their organizational or occupational background (c.f. structural 
status role; Turner, 1990). An actor’s position can be described as his or her 
formal status in a governance network, as characterized by their formal tasks, 
powers and responsibilities. Consequentially an actor’s role can be described 
as the behavior of a person holding that position.  
5 The benefits of a networked perspective on local governance 
Adopting a network perspective on policy processes does not only allow one to 
conceptualize and indicate the position and role of actors in the network. As 
explained earlier in this section, it enables us to fully grasp the contextual 
dynamics affecting the content and course of local policy processes both 
‘internally’ (in terms of the rules of the game inside a local policy network), as 
well as ‘externally’ (in terms of the larger policy context).  
5.1 Local policy networks: a framework for action 
Local safety governance has been described as a manifestation of a policy 
network in which actors occupy certain positions and roles. It is the interaction 
between actors who pool resources in such policy networks that enables the 
collective processes of policy making and implementation. The position and 
role that an actor such as the mayor holds is affected by both individual and 
collective aspects of the policy network. As explained in the previous section, 
an actor’s individual ownership of resources, or his ability to control them 
characterizes his position in a local policy network (Bekkers, 2007; Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 2003). On a more collective level, an actor’s behavior is guided by a 
set of historically developed rules for conduct within the policy network. 
Structural interaction between actors within policy networks leads to the 
creation and maintenance of a so called ‘institutional frameworks for action’ 
which form the rules of the game. Such a framework “facilitates and constrains 
(political) interaction and thus affects the production of the outputs and 
outcomes of governance networks” (Sorensen and Torfing, 2007: 25). This 
framework for action brings along regulative standards (rules, roles, 
procedures), normative codes (norms, values, standards) and cognitive 
understandings (codes, concepts and specialized knowledge) that shape the 
perception of problems, influence the selection of appropriate actions, foster 
the development of identities, and builds the capacities of actors in governance 
networks (ibid). Such institutional frameworks are by no means static, or 
purely external structures. They are created and revised during the ongoing 
interactions between actors during the policy processes (ibid). Together, they 
form the institutional aspects of the policy network, shaping the actors’ 
behavior within it. Studying this network regime explains how decisions and 
roles in policy processes are shaped by a set of historically grown formal and 
informal institutions described as “cognitive, normative and regulative 
structures that provide stability and meaning to social behavior” (Scott, 1995: 
33). 
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5.2 Supra local institutional arrangements  
Local policy networks are relatively open forms of governance which are 
assumed to be affected by the larger institutional environment in which they 
are embedded. From a new institutionalism perspective, governance processes 
in local policy networks are affected by macro environmental influences 
(Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 1995). This perspective stresses that the 
context matters greatly for the outcome: “Environments, in this view, are more 
subtle in their influence; rather than being co-opted by organizations, they 
penetrate the organization, creating the lenses through which actors view the 
world and the very categories of structure, action, and thought” (Powell and 
DiMaggio, 1991:13). The so called ‘institutional context’ is of importance 
when studying local policy processes since actors participating in this process 
anticipate their choice of actions from the rules that predominate the context 
(Bekkers, 2007).  
 In the case of local safety governance in the Netherlands, this 
institutional context is provided on the regional and national public safety 
policy arena through the supra local rules that manifest themselves in the local 
game, and in the form of formal laws, regulations and policy programs, as well 
as informal policy practices and policy frames. These formal and informal 
institutions are assumed to be ‘omnipresent’ throughout the entire policy 
process. They order reality, reduce variability, and structure action (Powell and 
DiMaggio, 1991). This implies that they are expected to affect the processes of 
problem framing, policy design, and implementation as well. In relation to 
problem framing, existing policy programs and policy ideas in the local and 
supra local policy arenas partially shape which problems are subjected to 
public interventions, and how they are framed in the local policy networks. 
This assumption that is supported by the literature on both problem definitions 
and framing stresses that context matters during the social construction of 
public problems (Birkland, 2001; Benford and Snow, 2000). Local policy on 
paper and in practice are assumed to be structured by formal powers, budgets 
and laws as present in local government, as well as in the larger policy domain 
of public safety in the Netherlands. Taken together, institutional arrangements 
present in the larger policy domain set the boundaries for local safety 
governance. 
6 Summary  
Chapter 4 detailed the concept of network governance, and the role of state 
actors within the network as a crucial step towards the construction of a 
conceptual model. In doing so, this chapter conceptualized the second part of 
the sub question:  What is the expected role of problem definitions during 
policy processes and how are they expected to affect the position and role of 
individual actors in a policy network? We concluded that actors from various 
backgrounds gather around public problems in contemporary horizontal and 
networked forms of governance. It is within such interrelational policy 
networks that actors take in a certain positions and role. What this position and 
role looks like depends on an actor’s possession of resources and powers, and 
on the boundaries set by the institutional framework for action in the local 
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policy network, as well as on the wider institutional arrangements present in 
supra local policy arenas.  
In respect to the conceptual model, this chapter indicated three 
theoretical lessons that will be incorporated in the conceptual model. Firstly, 
the concept of policy networks is adopted as a thematic manifestation of a 
social structure in which actors hold a certain position and role. This concept 
fits the ‘integral policy strategy’ which, as explained in chapter two, 
characterizes local policy processes regarding safety problem, fostering the 
formation of safety networks in which actors form various backgrounds joined 
forces between 1990 and 2010. Secondly, a little side step into the realm of 
sociology resulted in a clear cut definition of positions and roles in local policy 
networks. An actor’s position is understood as his formal status in a 
governance network as characterized by formal tasks, powers and 
responsibilities. Consequentially an actor’s role is described as the generally 
expected behavior of a person holding that position. Thirdly, network 
perspectives of local governance processes were explicitly taken on board to 
understand what kind of settings local policy problems are framed within, and 
in what context actors take on their positions and roles. This allows us to 
illuminate the institutional arrangements at the local and supra local level that 
affect the content, course and outcome of policy processes in policy networks.  
The next chapter presents, explains and operationalizes a conceptual 
model mapping out how problem definitions are expected to shape actors’ 
positions and roles in governance networks. This is followed by a detailed 
description of the overall research design.  
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Part III - Research Design 
 
The literature on problem definition, framing and governance networks has 
been discussed in the previous part of this book. These theoretical concepts 
come together as the building blocks of a conceptual model that will be 
presented in chapter 5. The model maps out the power of problem frames in 
shaping actors’ roles and positions in governance networks. Chapter 6 presents 
the research design. The study takes a realistic perspective of the processes of 
social construction, and combines research strategies of historical desk 
research and case study. 
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Chapter 5: Towards a conceptual model 
1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to present a conceptual model for studying how new 
definitions of safety problems are framed, and how this local framing process 
affects the mayors’ role and position in local governance networks. In doing 
so, the second sub question of the research project will be answered: What is 
the expected role of problem definitions in policy processes, and how are these 
expected to influence the position and role of individual actors in a policy 
network? This chapter is structured as follows. Section two revisits the 
theoretical building blocks of the conceptual model. Section three stresses the 
interrelation between these concepts and presents the conceptual model. 
Section four operationalizes key aspects of the model into researchable 
indicators in order to enable data collection and analysis. The design of the 
research effort which will be presented in Chapter 6.  
2 Building blocks  
The theoretical concepts derived from the previous two chapters are briefly 
revisited in this section, looking specifically at the role of mayors in local 
safety governance in the Netherlands between the years 1990 and 2010. The 
interrelations between the building blocks is explained by the presentation of 
the conceptual model.  
2.1 Problem definition 
The power of problem definitions lies at the heart of this research project. In 
Chapter 4, problem definitions were conceptualized as socially constructed and 
subjective displays of reality qualifying a person, group or any other issue as 
problematic and therefore in need of intervention (Dery, 1984 Schneider, 
1985; Bulmer, 1971). Once a problem definition is institutionalized into a 
social fact on the public policy agenda (Berger and Luckmann, 1976), it holds 
the power to shape certain key aspects of the policy approach, such as the 
selection of policy tools and responsible actors (Cobb and Elder, 1993; Weiss, 
1989; Schneider and Ingram, 1993; Baumgartner and Jones, 2009). 
 In this research project, the power of definitions of local safety 
problems is studied. Local safety problems are considered a threat to the order 
and safety of society. Labeling certain issues as safety problems serves to 
securitize them, and this act of securitization is potent in that it calls for and 
justifies the strong action of powerful figures such as the police, the mayor and 
the public prosecutor (Buzan et al., 1998).  
2.2 Framing 
In order to fully understand how and why certain definitions lead to specific 
solutions, and why certain definitions involve certain actors while excluding 
others, we need to take a closer look at the image of the problem that is put 
forward by the definition. In Chapter 4, such images were conceptualized as 
frames, or “descriptions or constructions of the world” which “sustain some 
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patterns of social action and exclude others” (Burr, 1993:5). Frames are 
subjective displays of reality which structure a problem definition by stressing 
two important messages: The diagnostic message of a frame makes sense of 
social reality by identifying what is problematic, and the prognostic message 
stipulates specific remedies and goals as well as means of addressing the 
problem (Snow and Benford, 1988).  
 The concept of framing helps to explain the power of securitization at 
a deeper level. Studying the frames of local safety problem definitions helps us 
to understand how these shape the position and role of the mayor in local 
safety governance. The social construction of local safety problems is 
mediated by frames which provide a perspective on the problem and a course 
of action to address it. As this frame changes over time, the policy approach 
alters as well.  
2.3 Policy networks 
A network perspective is adopted in order to capture the specific dynamics of 
the framing of public safety problems, and the processes of local safety 
governance in general. As argued in Chapter Four, contemporary forms of 
governance around complex and wicked problems such as public safety take 
the form of a horizontal assemblage of actors of various backgrounds who 
align their activities and resources(Rhodes, 1996). Following from this, 
contemporary practices of integrated safety governance are conceptualized as 
policy networks. Policy networks are social systems in which mutually 
dependent actors (Rhodes, 1997) develop patterns of interaction and 
communication aimed at governing a certain policy problem, carrying out a 
policy program or implementing a set of policy instruments (Kennis and 
Schneider, 1991). Mutual resource dependency is created by the fact that 
policy resources and powers are dispersed amongst multiple actors, including 
representatives of the government, the private sector and civil society. This 
forces them to communicate and collaborate (Rhodes; 1997; Kenis and 
Schneider, 1991), and leads to strategic interaction between (groups) of actors 
holding distinct interests, powers, and resources. 
The conceptual model adopts a network perspective of the process of 
problem and role structuration for several reasons. Firstly, such a perspectives 
allows us to look at the composition of a local policy network, to identify the 
actors who participated in the policy process, outline their belief frames, as 
well as look at how they eventually aligned themselves in the discourse 
coalitions. Secondly, a network perspective helps uncover the often hidden 
institutional frameworks for action which serve to guide both the perceptions 
and actions of local policy actors and coalitions (Sorensen and Torfing, 2007). 
2.4 Discourse coalitions 
Policy networks unite actors from multiple backgrounds who engage in 
strategic interactions throughout the policy process. Their definitions of public 
problems are debated, negotiated and selected for policy interventions during 
the agenda setting process (Parsons, 1995; Cobb and Elder, 1972; Kingdon, 
1984; Cohen, March and Olson, 1972). This implies that the course and 
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outcome of problem framing processes in policy networks are structured by 
groups of actors united by a specific belief system (Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith, 1993), who promote a certain policy image, and who push forward a 
specific problem definition and its related solutions (Baumgartner and Jones, 
2009). The concept of discourse coalitions was introduced in chapter four to 
conceptualize such collective and interactive processes of problem framing. A 
discourse coalition is a group of actors united by a shared problem frame 
attempting to mobilize support for their specific frame, and their preferred 
policy solution (Hajer, 1993). Interaction between discourse coalitions 
eventually results in a specific frame that is embraced by the multiple policy 
actors (discourse structuration), and that consequently influences policy 
formation and implementation (discourse institutionalization) (ibid). In order 
to understand how certain policy frames come about, we focus on the 
discourse coalitions attempting to affect the policy decisions and practices. 
An important advantage of the concept of discourse coalitions is that 
“it illuminates how different actors and organizational practices help to 
reproduce or fight a given bias without necessarily orchestrating or 
coordinating their actions, or without necessarily sharing deep value” (Hajer, 
1993:48). In the current project, discourse coalitions are conceptualized as 
collectivities of individuals connected through their shared perspectives of a 
public problem and/or solution as revealed by their individual 
communications, and their interactions with others during policy debates. 
Policy discourses will be analyzed in order to indicate how local safety issues 
were framed, and by whom. We will look also at which frames disappeared, 
which frames were aligned with others, and which eventually dominated the 
local policy strategy. Our analysis will focus also on the coalition’s interests 
and the distribution of power and resources within its members as these are 
likely to explain the extent to which coalitions are successful in affecting the 
course and outcome of agenda setting processes. 
2.5 Roles and positions 
The concept of positions and roles in governance settings follows the 
sociological concept of social structure. Policy networks have been defined 
here as social structures in which actors take on certain positions and roles.  A 
position in such a structure is indicated by an actor’s formal tasks, powers and 
responsibilities as determined by the actor’s organizational or occupational 
background (c.f. structural status role; Turner, 1990). Consequently, an actor’s 
role is the actual behavior of a person holding that position.  
Studying the mayor’s position and role in local safety governance 
requires looking at several formal and practical aspects of his behavior. Tasks, 
powers and responsibilities as stated in formal laws and regulations constitute 
the formal position of the safety network. Given the fact that written policies 
may differ dramatically from how they materialize in practice, the mayor’s 
role can be further divided into his expected role and his role in practice An 
actor’s role in practice is thus described by the actions he or she actually 
undertakes, the actions he does not undertake, and how he goes about these 
choices. This may or may not be aligned with the behaviors expected of him 
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based on formal tasks, powers and responsibilities. In studying the mayor’s 
role, we look at both what is expected according to his position in the local 
safety policy strategy, as well as what actions he took in practice.  
2.6 Institutional context 
In order to fully grasp their course and content, attention should be paid to the 
institutional context in which local policy processes are embedded. Structural 
interaction between actors within policy networks leads to the creation and 
revision of a so called ‘institutional framework for action’ that brings about 
regulative, normative and cognitive rules (Sorensen and Torfing, 2007: 25). 
These rules guide the perception of problems, the selection of actions, and the 
development of both the identities and capacities of actors in the governance 
networks (ibid). Moreover, local policy networks are embedded within the 
wider institutional context of a policy domain, and the nation state ((Powell 
and DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 1995). This implies that national laws and 
regulations affect local safety governance as well as the existing policy 
ambitions, values and practices of actors in the Dutch safety related policy 
domain. In order to understand the dynamics of local safety networks, such 
institutional arrangements as located at the regional and national policy arena 
should be taken into account as well.  
In sum, institutional arrangements both inside and outside of the 
policy network set the boundaries for the processes of problem framing and 
role structuration. Together, they form the contextual structure in which 
discourse coalitions interact, local safety problems are problematized, and 
mayors’ take on their specific position and role.  
3 Conceptual model 
In this section, the conceptual model is presented. The conceptual model maps 
out how new and shifting definitions of safety problems are expected to shape 
mayors’ positions and roles in governance networks. As indicated by the 
literature review, such processes of problem and role structuration could be 
understood by studying both the cognitive aspects of problem framing by 
discourse coalitions, as well as the institutional context in which these 
processes take place (c.f.Singer, 1990). Both conditions are illuminated in the 
case studies, and efforts are made to understand the changes in the mayors’ 
position and role in relation to the efforts of discourse coalitions to frame their 
policy agendas, and in relation to the larger policy context.  
The conceptual model describes the process in which problem and 
role structuration take place. The process goes through three phases: First, a 
local policy debate takes place, during which local safety problems are framed 
and placed on the safety-related policy agenda. Second, share problem frames 
that emerge from the debate get institutionalization as official public policies. 
Third, these policies are implemented by the mayor and his partners. Each 
phase is discussed separately in the following sections. It is important to note 
here that the model allows for an alternative sequence of these phases than the 
one presented below, and this flexibility will be discussed at the end.  
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Phase A: Framing safety problems in local policy networks 
The framing of local safety problems in local policy networks eventually 
results in shared definitions of local safety problems that serve to shape the 
policy agenda. Actors strategically align themselves into discourse coalitions 
and strive for their favorable definition and solution to be widely accepted 
through the local policy debates. Each coalition is assumed to hold an implicit 
or explicit problem frame. The process through which these frames meet and 
connect in order to create a collective frame is called frame alignment (Snow, 
Rochford, Worden and Benford, 1986) or discourse structuration (Hajer, 
1993). Frame alignment results in a common frame being embraced by key 
actors in the policy domain. Figure 3 illustrates the policy debate that occurs in 
local networks during which the policy agenda is set.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Local policy debate 
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Phase B: The institutionalization of shared problem frames into public policy 
The diagnostic and prognostic messages of the problem frame that eventually 
becomes dominant amongst key players in the policy network structure the 
policy strategy. But first, the shared problem frame has to be formalized in the 
local safety policy documents and reach the status of a ‘social fact’ (Durkheim, 
1964). This process is called discourse institutionalization (Hajer, 1993). Once 
a shared policy frame has been institutionalized into a formal policy strategy, 
the formal policy frame stresses a specific perspective of the policy problem 
and prescribes a policy solution which in turn characterizes the expected role 
of policy actors, including that of the mayor. The latter consist of the mayors’ 
tasks, responsibilities and instruments as described in the policy plan. Figure 4 
illustrates this process of discourse institutionalization. 
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Figure 4: Discourse gets institutionalized into public policy 
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Phase C: Enactment by mayor and partners during the process of policy 
implementation 
The policy strategy forms the starting point for the policy practice. Although, 
the formal policy strategy describes the mayor’s expected role, policy on paper 
and in practice are not always in line with each other. The mayor’s role in 
practice is constituted by the actions he actually does and does not undertake 
during the process of policy preparation and implementation. The level of 
frame enactment indicates to what extent his policy actions are in line with 
what is expected of him from the formal policy frame. Figure 5 summarizes 
the process of problem and role structuration in a local governance network.  
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Figure 5: Problem framing and role structuration in a local governance 
network 
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Including the supra local policy context 
Thus far, the model has focused on the process of problem framing and role 
structuration in local policy networks. However, networked forms of 
governance have relatively open and strong connections with the wider context 
within which they exist. Supra local policy contexts are expected to affect 
local processes of problem and role structuration. The model’s network 
perspective allows one to zoom out from the local policy dynamics and look at 
the larger regional and national policy arena. This implies taking into account 
the formal and informal institutional arrangements present at the regional,  
national  and even international policy domain of public safety governance that 
potentially shape public safety governance in local policy networks. In sum, 
the conceptual model maps out how formal institutions such as laws, policies 
and regulation as well as informal institutions such as alternative policy ideas 
and former policy practices that exist both at the local and  supra local policy 
arena affect each other, and thereby affect the local process of problem 
framing and role structuration.  
The following conceptual model summarizes the expected relationship 
between problem definitions, frames, discourse coalitions, governance 
networks, actors’ roles, positions and prevailing institutional arrangements 
(Figure 6). 
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Figure 6: Conceptual model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 A flexible model   
Although initially presented in linear order in the three phases of (A) problem 
framing, (B) institutionalization into policy and (C) frame enactment these 
phases are not expected to necessarily manifest themselves in this strict order.  
Following from current conceptualizations of agenda setting and policy 
processes as being ad hoc, contingent and competitive, problem frames would 
not necessarily be the starting point of local policy processes (Kingdon, 1984; 
Cohen, March and Olson, 1972). Policy processes in networked settings 
instead evolve in an iterative and messy way. This implies for example, that 
policy practices guided by new conceptions of safety problems may come into 
place before such a new policy frame is formally institutionalized in the policy 
documents. In order to capture this flexibility, the conceptual model functions 
like ‘rotator,’ or is said to assume a ‘patchwork’ model in which the policy 
phases can be repositioned according to their empirical manifestation. This 
implies that the ‘basic’ model presented as figure 6 may take different forms 
and shapes according to the empirical dynamics of local public safety 
governance. Figure 7 clarifies the flexibility of the conceptual model by 
Supra local policy arenas 
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displaying several potential compositions of the model pointing out a variable 
interrelation between the multiple phases of problem definition and role 
structuration.  
 
Figure 7: A flexible model 
Policy in 
pr act ice
Policy in 
pr act ice
Policy in 
pr act ice
 
This conceptual model will be applied to both the initial framing process when 
a specific safety problem is first subject to the local policy process, and to 
subsequent frame shifts that follow. The reason for applying the conceptual 
model several times to the same sub case lies in the historical nature of this 
study and the changeable character of policy processes in general. Although 
local actors are expected to embrace and enact a shared policy frame for some 
time, even long term stability is not guaranteed and this stability may be 
affected by incremental or even fundamental policy changes. Existing policy 
strategies and the distribution of responsibility among actors in public safety 
governance is challenged by both cognitive and institutional factors, as 
indicated by the various models explaining policy dynamics. Think for 
example, of coalitions of actors successfully presenting alternative policy 
images (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009), instances of policy learning altering 
the belief systems of key actors (Sabatier and Jenkins Smith, 1993), focusing 
events such as elections or unexpected safety incidents that create a policy 
window (Kingdon, 1984), or shifts in formal institutional arrangements such as 
new laws and regulations in the policy domain. Such factors can cause an 
institutionalized policy frame to no longer be appropriate or adequate, and may 
necessitate the forwarding of an alternative policy perspective. Once this leads 
to a frame shift, it has major consequences for problem definitions, policy 
strategies and the mayor’s role. The ‘flexible model’ aims to provide a 
‘snapshot’ or ‘picture’ is of how new safety problems are framed, and to what 
extent, how and why they affect the position and role of the mayor in curial 
moments of the local policy path.  
3.2 Operationalization 
While the conceptual model presented in this chapter model maps out how the 
local framing process potentially affects the mayor’s role and position in the 
local policy strategy and practice, by no means does the model suggest a 
simple and direct relationship between problem definitions and the mayor’s 
role and position. On the contrary, the model aims to fully capture the richness 
of context, with multiple actors, perceptions, policy ambitions, rules and 
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regulations that affect the dynamics of the local governance networks. As 
argued in the next chapter, in depth case study is a suitable research strategy 
for studying such a rich and complex social processes.  
In order to enable data collection and analysis for case study, the 
conceptual model was operationalized into a number of real world indicators. 
These indicators provide clues as to where to find the empirical data that can 
shed light on important aspects of the model, such as problem definitions, 
frames and actor’s roles and positions. The table 3 provides a detailed 
overview of this operationalization process. 
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Table 3: Operationalization of conceptual model 
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4 Summary 
By presenting a conceptual model, this chapter provided a theoretical answer 
to the sub question: What is the expected role of problem definitions in policy 
processes, and how are they expected to influence the position and role of 
individual actors in a policy network? The conceptual model maps how 
problem definitions are expected to shape actors’ positions and roles through 
three interchangeable policy process phases that occur in the local policy 
networks: discourse coalitions that take sides in the framing of public 
problems during local policy debates, the institutionalization of shared 
problems into formal policy strategies, and frame enactment by the mayor and 
his partners during the process of policy implementation. The content, course 
and outcome of these interrelated processes of problem framing and role 
structuration are affected by several institutional features of the environment, 
both formal and informal. These are the rules, values and norms put forward 
by the institutional framework for action within the local policy network, as 
well as the institutional arrangements present in the supra local policy arena 
for governing safety and order, such as laws, rules, policy ideas and practices. 
The model was operationalized into researchable indicators ready to be applied 
to empirical research. The following chapter presents the overall research 
design, and explains how the conceptual model will be used for data collection 
and analysis. 
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Chapter 6: Research design 
1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the overall design of the research project. The research 
perspective is first discussed, followed by a general outlay of a twofold 
research design that combines desk research with multiple in depth case 
studies. Thereafter, the method of data collection and analysis for both the 
historical data analysis and the case studies is described in detail. Finally, a 
reflection on the main characteristics of the research design is provided in the 
summary. 
2 Research perspective 
As explained in Chapter 3, the current project holds the ontological position 
that problem definitions are social constructs. In line with the realist strand of 
the social construction literature, issues are thought to be present in our 
external reality, but these issues are interpreted and characterized by actors in 
various ways (c. f. Burr, 1995). Consequently, our knowledge of reality is 
socially constructed, as are our problem definitions. According to Parsons: 
“Problems involve perceptions, and perceptions involve constructions” 
(1995:87). In the case of public safety problems, societal issues are not 
objective matters of public safety, but are qualified as such by citizens, 
government or others. Following this line of reason, a problem definition on 
the agenda for public safety is seen in this research project as being the result 
of a process of social construction that takes place among various actors who 
qualify the issue as a problem of public safety. The project thereby builds upon 
the Thomas Theorem, claiming that once an actor defines such problems as 
real, it becomes real in its consequences (Thomas, 1966). This implies that 
socially constructed problem definitions can generate real life consequences 
that affect the course and content of local policy processes, including the 
position and role of Dutch mayors.   
According to the epistemological perspective of this research project, 
socially constructed problem definitions and their real life consequences are 
observable to the researcher. As Schneider and Ingram argued: “Social 
constructions are matters of empirical analysis,  (Schneider and Ingram, 1993: 
335). This implies that socially constructed definitions of public safety 
problems are assumed to be empirically present on the policy agenda, as well 
as in the institutionalized policies and practice. Moreover, these socially 
constructed definitions of safety problems are created by means of language 
and rhetoric (Rochefort and Cobb, 1993) during the speech act of 
securitization (Buzan et al., 1998). This points to the importance of the 
language and discourse adopted by actors during the process of meaning 
making which can be studied though formalized policy documents, transcripts 
of meetings, and by informational interviews. 
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3 A two-fold research design 
A twofold research design was developed to meet the research objective of 
describing, analyzing and understanding how the mayor’s position and role in 
local safety governance has been affected by shifting definitions of local 
public safety problems. As a first step, a macro study was conducted to 
identify large shifts in the definitions of safety problems in the Netherlands in 
the years between 1990 and 2010. In order to understand and analyze how 
such shifts affected the mayor’s role, we have to look more deeply at the local 
practice of safety governance. Three representative problem definitions were 
selected from the findings of the macro study, and case studies were compiled 
on the process by which these definitions were accepted. The case study 
approach allows for the gathering and presentation of in-depth information on 
the cognitive aspects of framing public problems, as well as more tangible 
information such as the mayor’s actions in local safety governance. Figure 8 
presents the overall research strategy. 
 
Figure 8: Research design  
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years. Long term analysis allows us to demonstrate shifts in socially 
constructed problems and their implications for policy actors as such a 
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in a historical vacuum. They emerge in the context of historical discourses 
which contain knowledge of how similar phenomena were dealt with in the 
past” (Hajer, 1993: 45). This implies that previous policy practices can help 
explain (to an extent) both current and future policy developments (c.f. path 
dependency, Pierson, 2000).  
Before describing the details of the research strategy, it is important to 
discuss the multi-level aspect of the design. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the 
local safety governance policy domain is strongly connected to policy actors, 
ambitions and resources that exist at the supra local policy arena. Therefore 
one has to look beyond the local, municipal level alone in order to fully grasp 
the dynamics of governance processes around local safety problems. The 
current study is thus designed to take into account these supra local elements. 
A data set consisting of national policy documents is analyzed in the macro 
study to indicate which definitions of local safety problems were prioritized 
for local safety governance in each Dutch municipality. These definitions then 
guided the process of data gathering for the case studies in which data on 
policy strategies, actors, resources and policy tools from the local level as well 
as those from national and regional level were collected and analyzed. The 
overall rule of thumb was that data sources would be taken into account 
regardless of level (international, national, regional, local) and background 
(public, private, civil), as long as they were somehow involved in the process 
of local public safety governance.  
4 Macro study design  
The macro study aims to identify shifts in the definitions of local safety 
problems in the Netherlands between 1990 and 2010. Several Dutch scholars 
have made previous attempts to assess the changes in the safety problems on 
the public policy agenda. Such studies described the level of attention paid to 
safety issues by national governments from the end of World War II, 
demonstrating an increase in the level of attention, and a general expansion of 
the concept of safety itself (Resodihardjo, 2011, Resodihardjo and Kors-
Walraven, 2012; Breeman, Timmermans and Dalfsen, 2011). Outside the 
Netherlands, scholars have also pointed to an increasing tendency to label 
various issues as threats to safety and security (c.f. securitization - Buzan et al., 
1998). The macro study focuses specifically on the local agenda for public 
safety governance in order to indicate which problems have been listed for 
local safety governance, and what shifts have taken place between 1990 and 
2010. This will allow us to grasp the dynamics of securitization at the local 
level. The next section provides a detailed description of the research strategy 
and techniques for data collection and analysis adopted in the macro study. 
4.1 Research strategy: desk research 
The policy agenda for local safety policies in the Netherlands was studied by 
means of historical desk research. Information from policy documents and 
newspaper articles (Van Thiel, 2007; Robson, 2005) was analyzed instead of 
primary research data for two important reasons. First, the use of existing 
sources allowed for the collection and analysis of data covering an extended 
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period of time (van Thiel, 2007; Bauer, 2000).  In other words, it allowed for a 
historical analysis of issues prioritized for local safety governance between the 
years 1990 and 2010. Second, the use of desk research freed the data from the 
effects of observation. The use of historical data is an unobtrusive or non-
reactive strategy in that it does not involve direct contact with the research 
object (Robson, 2005; Verschuren, 2005). The removal of the researcher 
minimizes the role of interpretation and the reliance on memories. It also 
reduces the impetus for sources of information such as policy actors to present 
a politically correct, or whitewashed account of the processes. 
4.2 Data collection  
Policy documents outlining the agenda for local safety policies was used as the 
primary data source. Two types of policy documents were gathered, both 
shedding light on the local safety governance agenda. These were explanatory 
memoranda of the annual budgets of the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs as well as national policy documents regarding public safety 
provided by the national administration. It might surprise the reader that policy 
documents produced by the central government were used as a primary data 
source for a study on the local safety governance policy agenda. For practical 
reasons, it was not feasible to analyze twenty years of policy agenda’s 
produced by over 400 local governments in the Netherlands. Given the limited 
time and resources, it was deemed more feasible to analyse national policy 
documents as priorities for local safety policies were set out in these 
documents that were meant for local authorities to take into account. It was 
assumed that a structural analysis of issues prioritized for local safety 
governance by the central government would provide a general overview of 
the agenda for local safety governance in the Netherlands. As explained in 
Chapter 2, the central government sets out overall priorities to be addressed by 
local authorities and their partners in each and every municipality. The central 
government’s policies and budgets mention safety issues to be tackled by 
authorities from the national, regional as well as the local administrative level. 
A distinction can thus be made between the level of the securitized issue 
(local), and the level of the securitizing actor (national government) (Buzan et 
al., 1998). In sum, an analysis of national policy documents allows us to 
discern overall trends in the definition of local safety issues. This in turn 
allows us to select and make a selection of sub cases the subject of in depth 
analysis in the second phase of the research project.  
Explanatory memoranda on the budgets of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and the Ministry of Justice were first collected. The budgets of both 
Ministries set out the government’s ambitions and goals for public safety for 
which money has been reserved, including the priorities for local governance. 
In their annual budgets, the two Ministries dealing with public safety in the 
Netherlands describe which safety problems and strategies will receive 
funding.
 23
 The budgets are published each year and thus provide an annual 
description of the agenda for public safety governance.  
                                                 
23   The Ministry of Justice became the Ministry of Safety and Justice in October  
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However, because public safety is just one of many policy topics 
covered by these budgets, we also include policy documents in our study that 
more directly addressed public safety. These national public safety policy 
documents were collected as a second source of macro data. Public safety 
policies created by the ruling coalition provided insight into the government’s 
priorities and their concrete plans for addressing public safety and order. 
Whereas the budgets only generally address public safety problems, these 
policy documents elaborated on the central government’s policy ambitions for 
the local, regional and national level. Some also alluded to the Netherlands’ 
more internationally oriented safety policy ambitions.  
Together, these two forms of provided a concrete indication of the 
priorities and plans set out for local authorities, as well as guidelines for how 
to implement these. This includes priorities for all municipalities, and for 
every mayor in the Netherlands.  It is important to note here that the 
documents covered different time periods. While the budgets describing safety 
priorities for a single year, the safety guidelines stipulated in policy documents 
could remain valid for a number of years. It is therefore important to consider 
when a document was valid when coding the data within it. Appendix A 
provides an overview of the documents coded for this investigation, along with 
information on when these documents were binding or active.  
4.3 Data analysis 
All documents were analyzed by means of content analysis (Krippendorff and 
Bock, 2009; Bauer, 2000), in which specific codes were used as data labeling 
and retrieval devices (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The codes functioned as 
descriptive summaries of segments of data to which they are attached. The 
coding techniques was inductive, and sought to stay true to the ontological and 
epistemological position of the research project. A computer program for 
qualitative analysis – Atlas.Ti – facilitated the process of drawing findings 
from the large quantity of data accumulated for the study. 
 
Phase 1: Coding the relevant sections 
Since the majority of the documents covered issues outside of local safety 
governance, relevant sections or units of observation had to be identified that 
shed light on the definitions of safety problems to be tackled by local 
authorities. Each document was searched for chapters and specific sections 
addressing public safety at the local level. To make sure that no relevant 
sections were unintendedly left out, the entire content of each document was 
electronically searched using multiple key words selected from the Dutch local 
safety governance jargon.
24
 Once the relevant sections were identified, they 
                                                                                                                
2010.  Full responsibility for public safety, both prevention as well as prosecution, 
is now localized at this ministry, including responsibility over the police. Before 
such an integration, prevention and administrative actions fell under the minister 
of Internal Affairs, and prosecution and criminal justice was the responsibility of 
the Ministry of Justice. To keep the text legible, we use Ministry of Justice 
throughout the article. 
24   Key words in Dutch: veilig, veiligheidsbeleid, veiligheid, lokaal, openbare orde,  
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were assigned the general code of LSP, which stands for ‘Local Safety Policy’. 
This general code helped to indicate all relevant sections that would provide a 
chronological overview of local safety relevant information. 
 
Phase 2: Clustering and counting 
After having narrowed down the relevant sections, the content of these was 
studied to determine which safety problems were mentioned for action by local 
authorities. A list of categorical codes was inductively created to describe the 
various safety issues mentioned. In line with social construction, this process 
of categorizing took a bottom-up approach so that the categorical codes 
remained as close to their empirical manifestation as possible, and were not 
subject to specific pre-defined categories.  
Categories were created and assigned as follows: To determine which 
category or code to assign to a safety issue, we looked at the overall theme of 
the section. If a section, for example, addressed the safety issues surrounding 
prostitution, the category ‘sex’ was assigned to it. This process of 
categorization resulted in the creation of over thirty categories, which together 
reflected the various safety issues covered by the safety policy documents. 
Please note that a single category could potentially cover a variety of safety 
issues. The category of ‘crime’, for example, covers everything from bicycle 
theft to financial crimes. Conversely, a single issue such as youth crime can be 
part of multiple categories, including ‘crime’ and ‘youth’. Its specific 
placement would depend on where and when the issue is addressed in 
government documents. 
The assignment of such categorical codes followed the technique of 
‘clustering’ (Miles and Huberman, 1987). Clustering is a process of forming 
categories and sorting events, actors, processes, and settings into categories 
which are either predefined, or found to be emerging from the empirical data 
(Miles and Huberman, 1987). The technique of clustering local safety 
problems into thematical categories was adopted in this study to move beyond 
the simple listing of all issues prioritized for local safety governance. 
Clustering by means of categorical codes allows us to reach a higher level of 
abstraction in our deduction of the issues that have been defined as local safety 
problems over the years, and it allows us to answer the first part of the third 
sub question: Which problems have been listed for local safety governance 
between the years 1990 and 2010?  
Another technique, counting, was adopted to highlight the main shifts 
in the definitions of local safety problems. Counting is a simple and 
straightforward way of identifying patterns in data (Miles and Huberman 
1987). It helps us to rapidly spot trends within a large volume of data, and 
helps to protect against researcher bias (ibid). Patterns of attention to public 
safety issues in general, as well to specific categories were identified by 
counting the number of references to public safety problems that were made 
each year, as well as the number of references in each category by year.  See 
Appendix B on the macro study protocol for a detailed explanation of the 
counting techniques and related research findings. The technique of counting 
                                                                                                                
gemeente, burgemeester 
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provided an answer to the second part of the third sub question, namely: What 
shift took place in the definition of local safety problems between 1990 and 
2020?   
 
Phase 3: Second round of analysis and reliability check 
As a third step, results of the macro study were checked and validated. 
Multiple rounds of analysis were undertaken, and the analysis from phase one 
and two were repeated several times. Raw coding and analysis took place 
during the first phase, which resulted in the development of a specific coding 
method. The initial coding provided a first impression of the data and its 
potential findings. In the second round, codes and categories were refined and 
outliers were checked in order to generate more feasible results. A second 
coder repeated the data analysis process according to the method laid out in 
phase one and two, and thus assessed the replication level and checked for 
researcher bias.  
Rather than analyzing the securitization process itself, when 
completed, these three phases of the macro study served to identify the 
outcomes of the securitization processes by identifying the issues that were 
successfully labeled as safety issues and institutionalized into public policies. 
The issues that were successfully presented as a threat to local order and safety 
and accepted as such by functional actors in the local safety governance 
successfully ended up on the local policy agenda. The macro study adopts the 
constructivist approach of viewing securitization as a process of social 
construction (Buzan et al., 1998). It identified securitized issues by inductively 
categorizing local safety problems as they appeared in documents, and by 
avoiding pre-defined categories. The implications of successful attempts 
securitization for the dynamic governance process was subsequently analyzed 
through the case studies. 
4.4 Measurers taken to enhance validity and reliability  
Several measures were taken to improve the validity and reliability of the 
macro study findings. Several measures were taken in order to improve the 
reliability of the macro study findings which refers to the quality of the 
measurement methods (Babbie, 2004). A macro study protocol describing how 
to analyze each document in a likewise manner was used during data 
collection and analysis. This protocol described the overall strategy for 
selecting policy documents, and for analyzing their content by coding, 
clustering and counting problem definitions (see Appendix B). In this way, it 
was ensured that each document was analyzed by means of a similar set of 
criteria and techniques. A computer program was adopted to facilitate the 
uniform analysis of all documents.  
  Phase one and two of analysis were carried out twice in order to refine 
the general approach to selecting relevant text parts and codes. Outliers were 
identified and corrected if necessary. Although these steps were taken to 
enhance the quality of the measurements, some contextual knowledge of the 
codes as well as a certain amount of interpretation (for example, to decide 
when something is a local problem of public safety) was necessary. A second 
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coder was recruited in order to check for researcher bias, and to indicate the 
level of replication achievable in the macro study results (Miles and 
Huberman, 1989). There were some minor differences in coding and 
categorization between the two coders, but these were acceptable considering 
the fact that all inductive analysis requires interpretation. The extra coding did 
not yield any new categories or trends. 
Some measures were taken to improve the validity of the macro study 
as well. Valid measurements are those which accurately reflect the concepts 
they intend to measure (Babbie, 2004). In case of the macro study, these are 
definitions of local safety problems. The macro study incorporated two types 
of documents (budgets and safety policies) which enabled a triangulation of 
the information to ensure its validity (construct validity, Yin, 2009). The 
macro study protocol included several criteria for identifying the relevant 
sections of the text, mainly those that described local safety governance and 
definitions of local safety problems. The coding process was guided by several 
operationalized indicators of factors from the conceptual model.  
5 Case study design 
Shifts in the definitions of local safety problems were apparent from the results 
of the macro study. A multiple case study strategy was designed to meet the 
research objective, which was to understand why and how new definitions of 
local safety problems affect the mayor’s role and position in safety 
governance.  Several problem definitions representing dominant shifts in the 
definition of local public safety problems between 1990 and 2010 were 
selected from the macro study findings, and subjected to in-depth case studies 
to map out why and how they affected the role and position of the mayor. 
This section provides a detailed description of why case studies were 
selected as a research strategy for this research project. The case design is 
discussed, followed by how the cases and sub cases were selected. Thereafter, 
a detailed description of the data collection and analysis procedures is 
provided. Finally, the measures used to enhance the reliability, validity and 
generalizability of the case studies are discussed.  
5.1 Research strategy: case studies 
The research strategy of case study has been defined as “an empirical enquiry 
that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth, and within its real life 
context” (Yin, 2009:18). It has also been described as “a research strategy 
which focuses on understanding dynamics present within single settings” 
(Eisenhart, 1989:534). Case studies are the most suitable strategy for meeting 
the research project’s objective of understanding why and how the mayor’s 
position and role in local governance was affected by shifting definitions of 
local safety problems for several reasons.  
First of all, case studies are conducted in order to understand specific 
phenomena. Case studies enable the researcher to study specific real-life 
situations, to pay attention to the wealth of associated details, and to develop a 
nuanced view of human behavior and other aspects of reality (Flyvbjerg, 
2006). This research project aims also to clarify how several individual Dutch 
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mayors in specific local municipalities dealt with three specific types of public 
safety problems selected from a macro study in the time between 1990 at 2010.   
Second, case studies result in in-depth knowledge. Case studies 
involve intense levels of data generation in order to create and in-depth 
knowledge of “several objects or processes that are restricted in time and 
space” (Verschuren and Doorewaard, 2005: 163). Case studies thus aim to 
clarify “the deeper causes behind a given problem and its consequences, rather 
than describe the symptoms of the problem and how frequently they occur” 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006: 229). When looking for such in depth knowledge, studying 
and comparing a few cases intensively is potentially more fruitful than 
studying many cases superficially, for example, by means of statistical analysis 
(Lijphart, 1971:685). This research project calls for such an intensive case 
study in order to understand how frames underlying socially constructed 
problem definitions make way for certain positions and roles in a governance 
settings.  
Third, case studies allow us to take contextual factors into account. 
They do so by (Flyvbjerg, 2006:223) enabling the study of real life phenomena 
in the real world context (van Thiel, 2007; Yin, 2009). When the phenomena 
to be studied are too complex and too context-bound to study quantitatively, 
case studies are often adopted as a more encompassing approach (Ragin, 
1999:1139). As discussed in chapters four and five, local policy processes are 
surrounded by multiple local and supra local aspects which shape their content 
and course. Such factors include national policies, regional collaboration 
practices as well as local political relations and power battles. Knowledge of 
such contextual factors is needed in order to truly understand how a local 
problem is framed, and the specific position and role a mayor is likely to hold 
when addressing it.  
5.2 Case study design: multiple & embedded 
Through our case studies, the conceptual model (that maps out how frames 
underlying problem definitions promote a certain course of action) will be 
applied to the empirical world of local safety governance. The model is based 
on the public administration literature stressing the power of problem 
definitions to shape important aspects of the policy approach, such as the 
selection of policy goals, measures and actors involved (Cobb and Elder, 1993; 
Weiss, 1989; Schneider and Ingram, 1993; Baumgartner and Jones, 2009). 
Despite the wide recognition of the power of problem definition and framing, 
to date, little empirical research has been done on the mechanisms by which 
problem definitions actually influence policy practice (see the section on 
theoretical relevance in Paragraph 5 of Chapter 1). As a first step, this research 
project applies the conceptual model to real life governance processes around 
local safety problems in an exploratory manner. A multiple, embedded case 
study design was developed to this end.  
In order to determine what constitutes a relevant case for this research 
project, we looked at the organizational design of public administration in the 
Netherlands and found municipalities to be the organizational level at which 
local public safety governance is located. Therefore, Dutch municipalities are 
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cases. Within these cases however, we focused specific units of analysis, 
specifically local governance networks that address public safety problems. 
Within the units of analysis lie individual units of observation, which in our 
case, are the definitions of public safety problems, and the mayor’s position 
and role in the governance networks.  
Once the cases and units of analysis were identified, either a case-
oriented or a variable-oriented strategy had to be adopted. The former is 
concerned with the deep understanding of a small number of cases, whereas 
the latter assesses a smaller number of specific factors by drawing upon a large 
number of cases in order document general patterns characterizing a 
population (Ragin, 1999). The case oriented strategy was adopted for this 
research project to meet the case study objective of understanding the 
consequences of changing problem definitions for the mayor’s position and 
role. As mentioned before, an understanding of how socially constructed 
problem definitions influence a single actor’s role can only be acquired by 
means of intensive research which limits the scope to several in-depth case 
studies. As Ragin stated, a case oriented strategy is essential when one aims to 
make the facts of a case or a small number of related cases understandable 
(1999: 1139).  
 Thirdly, multiple case study results provide a stronger base for 
analytical generalization than a single case study (Yin, 2009). The case study 
results of multiple case study designs are regarded as stronger evidence as they 
account for the risk of the single case study being a unique case, or an unusual 
special occurrence. Comparing the results of several interrelated case studies 
allows us to detect similarities and differences across study results (Verschuren 
and Doorewaard, 2005; Lijphart, 1971). In the current context, similarities and 
differences can be identified in how changing problem definitions lead to 
changes in the mayor’s position and role in local public safety governance.  
Fourthly, an embedded or nested case study design implies that 
multiple units of analysis will be studied within each case (Gerring, 2007; 
Swanborn, 2008). Within each municipality, (case) several problem definitions 
(sub cases) are prioritized. Our sub cases present shifts in the problem 
definitions that occurred at the beginning (1990), middle (2000) and end 
(2010) of the research period.  
Given our little knowledge of the empirical process in which policy 
frames influence an actor’s position and role, these processes will be studied 
across a number of similar settings first (c.f. comparable cases strategy, 
Lijphart, 1975). Given this explorative nature of these case studies, we selected 
municipalities (cases) of a similar size, and in which similar public safety 
problems (sub cases) were being addressed.  
5.3 Selection of cases and sub cases 
Case selection took place in two steps, namely the selection of sub cases 
(problem definitions) and the selection of cases (municipalities). This section 
will describe the criteria and outcome of the selection procedure. The selection 
of sub cases is presented first as our selection of cases is partially based on the 
presence of these sub cases.  
  
 
 
105 
 
 
Selection of sub cases  
Sub cases are local safety problem definitions that had undergone a dominant 
shift in our study period. These sub cases were selected from the macro study 
findings according to the following criteria. 
  Firstly, a shift in the definition of public safety problems had to have 
taken place. The macro study pointed to the presence of two types of shifts. 
The first is a new category appearing at a specific point in time, marking a 
change in the definition of public safety problems in general. A change in the 
type of problem belonging to existing categories also indicated shifts in the 
definition of public safety problems as well. Therefore problem definitions that 
belong to a new category in themselves, as well as those that are new within an 
existing category represent major changes in the definition of public safety 
problems, and would qualify as sub cases.   
Secondly, the problem definition selected has to represent a dominant 
shift. A single new or deviant category would be unlikely to influence the role 
and position of actors in governance settings. In order to make sure the 
selected definition represented a major shift, only the problem definitions that 
were most often listed in the various documents were selected.  
Thirdly, a shift in the definition of public safety problems has to be 
present during a specific moment in the time in the years between 1990 and 
2010. Dominant shifts were identified that occurred either at the beginning 
(1990-1995), middle (around 2000) or near the end (towards 2010) of the 
research period.  Nonetheless, it may be some time before these definitions 
manifest themselves in the practice of local safety governance.   
Based on these criteria, we identified the following sub cases: drug-
related nuisance (which emerged as a new category in 1995), domestic 
violence (which represented a shift in the definition of the existing category of 
violence around 2002), and organized crime (which emerged as an entirely 
new category in 2007). Table 4 provides a short summary of the selection 
process. This process is explained in further detail in Chapter Seven which 
presents results of the macro study. 
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Table 4: Selection of sub cases 
 
Case selection 
Aiming to enhance the theoretical generalizability of our case study findings, 
we selected our cases (municipalities) on theoretical grounds (Yin, 2009). 
Selection was closely related to the key concepts of the conceptual model, 
which were 1) governance networks, 2) problem definitions and 3) the role and 
position of the mayor. These concepts had to manifest themselves in a 
municipality in such a way that it was possible to analyze the local policy 
processes during which shifts in problem definitions might appear. These 
shifts were expected to influence the role and position of the mayor in the 
governance network. This led to the following criteria for case selection: 
First a governance network addressing public safety problems had to 
be present in the selected municipalities throughout the research period of 
1990 to 2010.  Such governance networks were most likely to exist in the 
larger municipalities housing over 100,000 inhabitants. Public safety issues 
tend to be more relevant in such municipalities, and the related policies are 
more likely to be adopted (Cachet and Ringeling, 2004). Secondly, these 
governance networks had to address the specific problem definitions 
representing major shifts as selected from the macro study. In other words, the 
governance network present in a municipality had to address a wide range of 
public safety problems in order to be selected. This excluded both the smallest 
as well as the largest municipalities from the case studies as they tended to be 
somewhat atypical in terms of the public safety problems they had to address. 
Smaller municipalities were excluded because they simply did not cover as 
broad a range of public safety problems as larger ones. At the same time, many 
of the biggest municipalities were excluded because they tended to deal with 
more intense or complex public safety problems that are characteristic of 
larger cities, and that are less likely to be present in other municipalities.  To 
summarize, municipalities (cases) which are large (first criterion) though not 
the largest (second criterion) were selected. The selected municipalities house 
    Selection 
criterion 
 
Sub case 
Type of shift Dominance  Period  
Drug-related 
nuisance 
Frequently 
mentioned 
definition in the 
new category 
‘drugs’ 
Category introduced and 
dominant since 1995. Various 
forms of drug-related 
nuisances were frequently 
mentioned within this 
category. 
1990-
1995 
Domestic violence Shift within the 
existing category 
‘violence’ 
 
Category introduced and 
dominant since 1995. 
Problem definition of 
domestic violence frequently 
mentioned since 2002   
1998-
2002 
Organized crime Emergence of  new 
and immediately 
dominant category 
Category introduced and most 
dominant since 2007 
2005-
2010 
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100.000 or more inhabitants, with the exception of the four largest 
municipalities which each house over 300.000 people
25
.  
Thirdly, local authorities, particularly the mayor, had to be accessible 
to the researcher. To be included, local authorities had to give their permission 
and cooperate with the author. The mayors of each municipality had to make 
themselves available as respondents. As a result, only municipalities with a 
low turnover of mayors, and with ex-mayors who were still alive and available 
for interviews were selected. Taken together, this led to the selection of 
Haarlem and Breda as cases as summarized in Table 5. See Appendix C for 
more details of case selection.  
 
Table 5: Selection of cases 
                                                 
25   Statistics Netherlands (CSB) groups municipalities into the following categories: 
- less than 5,000 inhabitants  
- between 5,000 - 20,000 inhabitants 
- between 20,000 - 50,000 inhabitants 
- between 50,000 - 100,000 inhabitants 
- over 100,000 inhabitants 
- over 300,000 [category added by researcher to filter out the biggest cities]  
 
Case 
 
Selection criterion 
Haarlem  Breda 
Number of inhabitants 
100,000 -300,000 between 
1990 and 12010 
+/- 150,000 120,000 (1995) 
170,000 (2010) 
Sub case: drug-related 
nuisance, early 1990s 
 
 
Sub case: domestic violence, 
around 2000 
 
 
Sub case: organized crime, 
late 2000s 
First mentioned in 
local safety policies 
in 1992 
 
First mentioned in 
local safety policies 
in 1997 
 
First mentioned in 
local safety policies 
in 2005 
First mentioned in 
local safety policies in 
1991 
 
 
First mentioned in 
local safety policies in 
2003 
 
 
First mentioned in 
local safety policies in 
2008 
Accessible for research 
purposes 
Permission for 
research (yes) 
Mayor A (not 
accessible) 
Mayor B 
(accessible) 
Mayor C 
(accessible) 
Permission for 
research (yes) 
Mayor D (accessible) 
Mayor E (accessible) 
Mayor F (accessible) 
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5.4 Data collection 
A major advantage of the case study method adopted is that it allows for the 
integration of various sources of information, including interviews, 
questionnaires, archival data and observations (Eisenhart, 1989:534). The case 
studies in this research project are built on two types of data sources, namely 
documents and interviews.   
Various types of documents provided information about the empirical 
practice of local safety governance, and the mayor’s position and role within it. 
Local documents in which the sub cases of drug-related nuisance, domestic 
violence and organized crime were labeled as a safety problem between 1900 
and 2010 were subjected to case study. This implied the collection of local 
policy programs regarding safety in general, specific policy programs 
regarding the sub cases, documents evaluating these policy programs, 
transcripts of council and committee meetings, internal correspondence 
between local authorities and stakeholders as well as policy documents and 
policy evaluations from other actors collaborating with local government 
actors, such as the police and public prosecutor. Together, these documents 
provide information about the frames of the local discourse coalitions as 
expressed in the local policy debates, the frames that came to be commonly 
shared and institutionalized into local public policies and that eventually 
influenced expectations of the mayors’ role, as well as the frames that 
influenced policy practices and the mayor’s actual actions therein.  
Information about the practical aspects of the policy implementation 
phase was gathered by means of interviews.  These interviews provided both 
the mayor’s perspective of his role and position in practice when addressing 
public safety problems, as well as that of his partners. Along with current and 
former mayors, at least one additional representative was selected from all key 
actors involved in the governance network addressing the problem definition 
(sub case). These could be civil servants advising the mayor on public safety 
matters, parties responsible for implementing public safety policies such as the 
local police chief and the public prosecutor, or actors from outside the 
governmental spheres including housing corporations and social workers. 
Appendix D provides a list of all 41 respondents and appendix E entails a list 
of selection criteria. 
 The interviews were semi-structured according to a topic list derived 
from the conceptual model (see appendix E). Such an approach was adopted in 
order to maintain a focus on indicators relevant to the conceptual model, while 
also ensuring a degree of flexibility and openness towards potentially 
important situations and contexts. It is important to note here that the mayors 
and other actors interviewed were not limited to the current governance 
networks. Given the historical nature of the analysis, our interviews covered 
former mayors, police chiefs and council members as well. This created some 
practical difficulties and challenges with construct validity that will be 
described in Section 5.7. 
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5.5 Data analysis  
All data collected were analyzed according to three steps using a hierarchical 
method for multiple case analysis and comparison (Verschuren and 
Doorewaard, 2005). According to this method, individual cases are to be 
studied independently from each other, but preferably using the same pattern. 
This allows for a subsequent higher-order comparison of the case studies. 
Figure 6 summarizes the processes of data analysis.  
 
Table 6: Case analysis 
 
 
Municipality 
 
 
Problem  
definition 
Haarlem Breda  
 
Drug-related 
nuisance 
 
Sub case 
analysis  1 
Sub case 
analysis 4 
Domestic violence 
 
Sub case 
analysis 2 
Sub case 
analysis 5  
Organized crime 
 
Sub case 
analysis 3 
Sub case 
analysis 6 
 
 
Step 1: Individual sub case analysis  
The six sub cases to be analyzed were local governance processes regarding 
the drug-related nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime in both 
Haarlem and Breda. Each sub case was studied individually, resulting in a 
historical overview of how new safety problems were framed and reframed in 
the local governance processes taking place between 1990 and 2010. During 
sub case analysis, relevant documents and interview transcripts were subjected 
to content analysis using a coding scheme corresponding with the 
operationalized indicators of the conceptual model (Miles and Huberman, 
1994; Bauer, 2000). This resulted in insights into the impact of new 
definitions, how they were framed, and how these definitions affected the local 
policy strategy, specifically the mayor’s theoretical role, and his actual 
practice.   
 
Step 2: Within case comparison 
The knowledge gained from each of the six resulting sub cases was compared 
by means of a within case comparison. The differences and similarities in the 
framing process that took place for each of the three new local safety problems 
were discerned, first within the context of each municipality. The same was 
done to determine how these framing processes affected the role and position 
of the mayor. The similarities and differences observed across the sub cases 
were interpreted through the theoretical lens of the conceptual model. This 
Across case comparison 
Within  
case comparison 
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advanced our understanding of how different definitions of local safety 
problems affected the mayor’s role and position in the same municipality. 
 
Step 3: Cross-case comparison 
A cross-case analysis was conducted in order to generate a number of key 
insights. The level of analysis was scaled up from the earlier comparison 
between sub cases, to a comparison of overall findings across the two 
municipalities. This resulted in a general indication of the generalizability of 
our findings, and prompted a number of refinements in the conceptual model. 
It also resulted in the identification of three mechanisms that explain why, how 
and to what extent the framing of public problems shape actors’ roles and 
positions.   
5.6 Measures taken to enhance validity and reliability  
Several measures were taken to improve the reliability and validity of the case 
studies. In order to improve their reliability, a case study protocol was created 
(appendix E), and all data analysis was conducted using a computer program 
(atlas.ti) in the same structured manner. The case study protocol was tested 
during a pilot run in order to refine plans for data collection and analysis 
before these plans were applied to the cases of Haarlem and Breda. This pilot 
study was conducted in the municipality of Nieuwegein in April 2012. A draft 
version of the conceptual model was applied to the coding of a governance 
network around the local safety problem of youngsters hanging around a 
neighborhood causing residents to feel unsafe. This effort to pilot the analysis 
method resulted in refinements in the data collection and analysis strategy, as 
well as adjustments in the conceptual model.  
During this pilot study, the individual frames of policy actors were 
assessed using a questionnaire that was followed by an interview. These 
methods proved to be less than optimal as individual frames could not be 
identified from the limited number of predefined categories included in the 
questionnaire. Further, asking respondents about their perspectives on safety 
generated only a glimpse of their current frame, and prompted a large number 
of socially desirable answers. Rather than in conversation with the researcher, 
it was then hypothesized that the frames structuring policy processes would 
most clearly show themselves in records of how policy actors interacted with 
each othe.  Data capturing this interaction was thought to provide a more 
genuine picture of their frames. This led to a selection of reports from council 
meetings and other forms of correspondence between key actors in the policy 
network. These documents provided an indication of the frames that existed at 
different times in history, and provided a valuable primary data sources for 
frame analysis. 
The conceptual model was also refined as a result of the pilot study. 
The analysis of the pilot case resulted in a straightforward description of how 
the youngsters caused trouble, and how the mayor of Nieuwegein and his 
partners dealt with this menace. However, it did little to explain the course and 
nuances of this local policy process, and how it affected the position and role 
of the mayor. Further, the application of the conceptual model did not provide 
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any explanatory power because it was focused only on the local policy 
process. It was then deduced that the course and content of the local 
governance processes cannot be isolated from the supra local context. A new 
building block called ‘supra local policy arenas’ (Chapter Five, Section 3, 
Figure 6) was added to the conceptual model which previously presented a 
rather isolated process of problem framing and policy implementation in a 
local policy network. With the addition of the supra local factors, the open 
character of the local policy networks was emphasized.  
Finally, various measures were taken to improve the validity of the 
case study results. Valid measurements are those which accurately reflect the 
concepts they intend to measure (Babbie, 2004). Theoretical concepts from the 
model were operationalized as real life indicators to make sure that the 
empirical manifestation of problem definitions, frames and the mayor’s role 
and position were fully captured. The coding scheme and interview protocol 
for data collection and analysis was built upon these indicators (see Appendix 
E) and eacg interview was transcribed in complete detail. Finally, a 
triangulation of data sources was ensured through the examination of a 
combination of policy documents, transcripts of council meetings and 
interview transcripts. Data from these sources were combined and verified for 
construct validity before analytical generalization.  
 
5.7 Generalization of case study findings 
The generalization of case study results can generally be divided into 
theoretical and statistical forms of generalization (Yin, 2009). Statistical 
generalization implies that the results of a particular case study apply to similar 
units of analysis beyond those that have been studied (Ragin, 1999), while 
analytical generalization means that case study findings are “generalizable to 
theoretical propositions, and not generally to populations or universes” (Yin, 
2009: 38).  
Since the units of analysis in case studies are not a representative 
sample of a larger population (all municipalities in The Netherlands), 
statistical generalization is not the aim of this research project. Instead, the aim 
is analytical generalization, as the findings of case studies like the present one 
contribute to theory development. Case study results should provide either 
empirical confirmation or grounds for revising the theoretical expectations 
summarized in the conceptual model. The case study results should thus be 
regarded as either empirical confirmation or ground for revision of the 
theoretical expectations mapping how frames underlying problem definitions 
make way certain roles and positions in networked governance.  
 The external validity of the case study’s findings, in terms of their 
relevance to other Dutch municipalities, is limited. This is because the findings 
are context-bound and therefore do not account for every Dutch municipality. 
This implies that the indicated consequences of changing problem definitions 
for the position and role of mayors in local safety governance accounts for 
those cases actually studied. Nevertheless, since these findings are based on 
multiple case studies, the overall conclusions are most likely to be found in 
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comparable settings, that is, mayors of medium to large sized municipalities 
who have to address drug-related nuisance, domestic violence and organized 
crime. However, whether or not the role and positions of these mayors were 
indeed affected in the same way as in Haarlem and Breda remains an empirical 
issue.  
6 Summary  
This chapter presented a twofold research strategy combining a macro study of 
existing historical policy documents with in-depth case studies. Together, the 
macro study and multiple case studies cover the research objective of 
describing and understanding the consequences of changing problem 
definitions for the role of mayors in local public safety governance between 
1990 and 2010. The macro study provided a general picture of the changes in 
the definitions of local safety problems, from which a few exemplary problems 
which represented the dominant shifts in the definitions of problems of local 
public safety in that time were selected. These were studied more deeply in 
multiple, embedded case studies that shed light on the consequences of new 
and shifting definitions of public safety problems for the position and role of 
mayors in local policy networks. Qualitative methods were employed (van 
Thiel, 2007) to study problem definitions and the positions and roles of actors. 
Ontologically, problem definitions were viewed as social constructions, but 
epistemologically, the material was assumed to be amenable to study in a 
distanced, objective and structured manner. A triangulation of methods 
ensured that research findings were robust. 
The next part of the book describes the findings of our research. 
Chapter7 discusses the results of the macro study, while Chapters 8 and 9 
present the within case study analyses.  
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Part IIII - Research Findings 
The fourth part of the book provides a description and analysis of the empirical 
findings of the research project. The macro study findings are presented and 
discussed in Chapter 7. The macro study is a longitudinal study of policy 
documents chronicling the shifting definitions of local safety problems in the 
Netherlands between 1990 and 2010. Three new safety problems were selected 
based on the results of this macro study. Chapters 8 and 9 present the process 
of policy making that took place in relation to each of these three safety 
problems, and the impact of these new problem definitions on the local policy 
strategy, especially the mayors’ role in paper as well as in practice.  
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Chapter 7: Macro study 
1 Introduction  
This chapter describes the findings of the macro study which represents the 
first phase of data collection and analysis. The macro study aimed to 
empirically study the trend of securitization in the Netherlands between 1990 
and 2010, and thereby answer sub question three: Which safety problems have 
been listed for local safety governance in the Netherlands, and what shifts 
have taken place between 1990 and 2010? Special attention was paid to the 
dominant definitions of local safety problems as these were considered most 
likely to be subject to policy intervention by the mayor and his partners. 
This chapter is structured as follows. The next section discusses 
overall trends in the definition of problems for local safety governance 
between 1990 and 2010. In the subsequent section, three problem definitions 
that represent major shifts on the policy agenda for local safety governance are 
selected for analysis through case studies. The fourth and final section 
summarizes the most important findings of the macro study in order to answer 
sub question three.  
2 Defining local safety problems between 1990 and 2010 
The macro study entailed a content analysis of 47 national policy documents 
representing the policy agenda for local public safety governance between 
1990 and 2010. These national policy documents provided key information on 
the concerns that were labelled as safety problems to be addressed by local 
governments. Three rounds of inductive coding showed that both the number 
and type of issues defined as local safety problems increased tremendously in 
this time. A trend of 'issue expansion’ and ‘issue dominance’ is observable. 
2.1 Issue presence 
The macro study showed a general increase in the number of references to 
local safety in the policy documents published between 1990 and 2010. 
Despite the presence of the occasional decline, figure 9 shows that the absolute 
number of references to local safety problems grew from 4 in 1990, to 175 in 
2010. This points at an overall trend of issue presence, and the fact that a 
growing amount of policy attention was paid to local safety problems, with 
local authorities increasingly being asked to address public safety problems.  
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Figure 9: Absolute number of problem definitions mentioned between 1990 
and 2010 
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2.2 Issue expansion 
In looking both at the issues that were mentioned as public safety problems 
over the years, as well as at the changes that took place therein, a second 
important trend in the definition of local safety problems was indicated, 
namely that of issue expansion. Figure 10 illustrates this expansion. By means 
of an inductive coding strategy, 33 ‘categories’ were identified, each 
representing a type of safety problem. The category ‘sex’ for example, covers 
sex-related issues such as prostitution, rape and lover boys. Overall, the 
number of categories increased from 2 in 1990, to 33 in 2010 as new issues 
were labelled as local safety problems over time. 
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Figure 10: Expansion of the definition of ‘local safety’ concerns between 1990 
and 2010 
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Two categories of safety issues, disaster and crime were prominent at the start, 
although they were not mentioned every year. Disaster refers to disasters, 
accidents, and crises in general, while crime covers issues such as petty crime, 
youth crime, financial crime, cyber-crime and factors potentially resulting in 
criminal behavior. 
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The number of categories started to expand in 1991 when fire was 
added to the mix. In 1993, this expansion continued with the introduction of 
specific target groups and locations. The documents stated that more attention 
needed to be paid to target groups including repeat offenders and young 
individuals from specific ethnic backgrounds with a history of committing 
crimes or causing trouble. Location arose as a category as a result of a focus on 
safety issues arising at specific locations, such as large municipalities, schools 
and homes. 
In 1995, the safety policies expanded even further with the 
introduction of five new safety categories: public nuisance, subjective safety, 
drugs, youth, and theft. The category public nuisance covers problems caused 
by the deterioration of public space as well as by people such as psychiatric 
patients, homeless people, and youngsters hanging around. Subjective safety is 
about citizens feeling safe. Drugs is about drug use and the existence of 
phenomena like coffee shops and drugs tourism. Youth covers a wide range of 
youth related issues, including dropping out of school and youth crime. Theft 
refers to burglaries and the stealing of various items such as cars and bicycles. 
Safety policies expanded further in 1996 by the addition of the 
categories of objective safety and the environment. In contrast to subjective 
safety, objective safety is not about perceptions of safety, but about ways in 
which to objectively measure safety using numbers such as crime rates. 
Environment addresses the need to prevent local environmental mishaps such 
as by collecting garbage and limiting air and ground pollution.  
In 1997, new risks and physical safety concerns were again 
introduced. The category of risks stresses the increasing importance of 
managing possible future threats to local safety that are not already apparent. 
The category of physical safety was mentioned, referring to unintentionally 
caused safety problems that are either accidents, or acts of nature and not 
clearly attributable to the actions of individuals (c.f. Helsloot, 2007). 
In 1999, integrated safety policy substantially increased thanks to the 
introduction of safety problems related to alcohol, traffic, violence, public 
order, small annoyances, and sex. Alcohol relates to safety problems caused 
by, for instance, instances of alcohol abuse and store owners selling alcohol to 
under-aged individuals. Drinking and driving is the most frequently mentioned 
issue when it comes to traffic. Violence covers violence in both public (such as 
on the streets, or in clubs) and private (such as domestic abuse) domain. Public 
order refers to substantial disturbances of the public order, of which 
demonstrations are the most common manifestation. Offences that are subject 
to fines issued by the local authorities, such as double parking, littering, and 
cycling were all placed in the small annoyances category. Sex refers to safety 
issues related to prostitution, rape and lover boys. 
In 2000, another two new categories were mentioned for the first time. The 
category football related mainly to hooliganism, whereas the category of 
integrity reflects the need for governments to screen citizens and companies to 
avoid accidentally supporting illegal activities, for example, by giving permits 
to criminals. 
A further expansion took place in 2002 when social safety, public 
transport, weapons, recreation, and events were added to the safety policies. 
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The category of social safety captures general remarks related to safety 
problems caused by intentional behavior, such as violence and theft (in 
contrast to accidentally caused safety problems). The category of public 
transportation mainly focuses on safety in trains and buses. The category of 
weapons mostly deals with the illegal ownership of weapons, while recreation 
and events point to safety problems that could arise, for example, from 
sporting events and festivals respectively. 
In 2003, social integration was mentioned for the first time. The 
category of social integration includes issues such as the polarization and 
segregation of (ethnic or religious) groups in society. Conviction became part 
of the integrated safety concept in 2006. This category covers perceived safety 
arising from the strong beliefs of individuals, for example, about human rights, 
animal rights or religion. 
In 2007, organized crime, aftercare, and terrorism were introduced. Organized 
crime refers to crimes that include human trafficking and the work of criminal 
organizations. Aftercare deals with the issue of former prisoners returning to 
society. Terrorism was another obviously defined category.  
In the final year of the study period (2010), an interesting new 
category was introduced to the integrated safety policy, namely that of 
integrated problems. After twenty years of professionalizing local safety 
governance, and looking beyond traditional domains of safety concerns,  
national policy documents started to simply use the words ‘integrated safety’. 
This shift demonstrated the wide acceptance of a pillars of the integrated 
policy strategy, which is an encompassing perspective on safety covering 
various forms of safety concerns, resulting in the institutionalization of public 
safety into policy plans.  
2.3 Issue dominance  
The high level of issue expansion, both in terms of amount and variety, came 
about because issues formerly belonging to other policy domains such as city 
planning, transportation and recreation were incorporated to the policy domain 
of local safety and order. 
However, not all types of safety issues were granted the same level of 
attention over the years. Some categories were mentioned more frequently in 
the policy documents, and others less. In order to determine which safety 
issues were more greatly problematized, we studied the number of references 
to the safety categories. The total number of references made to each safety 
problem was counted for each year, together with the total number of 
categories addressed in that year. Based on these numbers, it was possible to 
calculate the average number of references made to each category in every 
year. The average indicates the number of references each category could have 
received in a single year if all categories received the same amount of 
attention. Since attention differed per category, the actual number of references 
made to a category was compared with the average number to determine 
whether a category received more or less attention than it would have received 
if all categories received the same amount of attention. A category qualifies as 
having been dominant in a single year if it received more than the average 
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number of references in that year. A category qualifies as being overall 
dominant if it was dominant in more than 50% of the years since the first time 
the category was mentioned in the policy documents. Table 7 provides 
information on each category on the year in which the category was first 
mentioned, the years in which the category was dominant, and whether the 
category was dominant overall. 
 
Table 7: Overview of categories of local safety problems  
 
Category First 
mentioned 
Dominant in year Overall 
dominance? 
Disaster Before 1990 1990/92/93 
2002/03/04/05 
No 
Crime Before 1990  1991/92/93/96/97/99 
2000/01/02/03/04/05/06/07/08/09 
Yes 
Fire 1991  2006/07/08 No 
Target groups 1993  1993 
2004 
No 
Location 1993  1996/97/98 
2000/01 
No  
Public nuisance 1995  1999 
2000/01/02/03/04/05/06/07/08/09/1
0 
Yes 
Subjective 
safety  
1995 - No 
Drugs 1995 1995/96/97/98 
2002/03/04/05/06/07/08 
Yes 
Youth 1995 1995/96/9/98/99 
2000/01/02/03/04/05/06/07 
Yes 
Theft  1995 1999 
2000/01/02 
No 
Objective 
safety  
1996 - No 
Environment  1996 - No 
Risk 1997 - No 
Physical safety 1997 - No  
Alcohol 1999 2008/09/10 No 
Traffic 1999 - No 
Violence 1999 1999 
2000/01/02/03/04/05/07/08/10 
Yes 
Public order 1999 - No 
Small 
annoyances  
1999 1999 
2000/01/02/03/04/05/06 
Yes 
Sex 1999 - No 
Football 2000 2003/06 No 
Integrity 2000 - No 
Social safety  2002 - No 
Public 
Transportation 
2002 2005 No 
Weapons 2002 - No 
Recreation 2002 - No 
Events 2002 - No 
Social 2003 2010 No 
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integration 
Conviction  2006 2006/10 No 
Organized 
crime 
2007 2007/08/09/10 Yes 
After care 2007 - No 
Terrorism 2007 - No 
Integrated 2010 - No 
 
The macro study pointed to the dominance of seven out of 33 categories in the 
policy discourse, namely crime, nuisance, drugs, youth, violence, small 
annoyances, and organized crime. These categories show a move from the 
traditional (e.g. crime and violence) to the more unconventional. The new 
category of small annoyances came to be dominant because softer issues such 
as that of litter on the streets and noisy neighbors were increasingly considered 
as safety problems. The dominant category of youth demonstrates the 
perceived vulnerability of children from specific ethnic backgrounds. While 
they were traditionally the concern of the social and welfare policy domain of 
local governance, the activities of these youth were increasingly securitized. 
Local authorities were also required to pay attention to completely new 
concerns. The categories of organized crime and terrorism indicate that 
several, supra local problems that used to be the domain of the national 
government and international governmental actors now had to be dealt with by 
local governments as well. Local authorities had to take part in, for example, in 
programs targeting human trafficking, and the increasing radicalization of 
citizens.  
3 From macro to micro: selection of sub cases 
Several problem definitions were selected from the macro study findings. 
These problem definitions were subjected to in-depth case studies in order to 
meet the research objective of studying the impact of new definitions of the 
mayors’ role in local safety governance (Chapters 8 and 9). These problem 
definitions or ‘sub cases’ were selected according to three criteria. First, the 
problem definition has to represent a shift in the definition of local safety 
problems. Second, the new problem definition has to represent dominant in 
that it had to be frequently mentioned in the different policy documents. Third, 
the three definitions had to span the entire research period between 1990 and 
2010. Therefore definitions representing dominant shifts that took place in the 
beginning (1990-1995), middle (1998-2002) and end (towards 2005- 2010) of 
this twenty year period were selected. Table 8 summarizes the selection 
process.  
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Table 8: Summary of selection process of sub cases 
 
Selection  
criterion 
 
 
Sub case 
Type of shift Dominance  Period  
Drug-related 
nuisance 
Frequently 
mentioned definition 
in the new category, 
‘drugs’ 
Category introduced 
and dominant since 
1995.  
Various forms of 
drug-related 
nuisance frequently 
mentioned within 
this category ever 
since. 
1990-1995 
Domestic violence Shift within the 
existing category, 
‘violence’ 
 
 
 
 
Category introduced 
and dominant since 
1995.  
Problem definition of 
domestic violence 
frequently mentioned 
since 2002  
1998-2002 
Organized crime Emergence of a new 
and category that 
became immediately 
dominant 
Category introduced 
and most dominant 
since 2007  
2005-2010 
 
Following the application of the selection criteria, drug-related nuisance, 
domestic violence and organized crime were selected as sub cases representing 
a dominant shift in the definition of local safety problems. The drug-related 
nuisance was a new, dominant problem definition that arose in the early 1990s. 
Domestic violence was frequently mentioned within the category of violence 
between the late 1990s and early 2000s. The new definition reflected the shift 
in the focus from violent behavior in public spaces, to violence in more private 
spheres. The third sub case concerns organized crime, which is an entirely new 
category that first emerged in 2007. Although it is a new safety problem for 
local government actors which has not yet been defined in detail, it has been 
dominant ever since its inception. 
4 Summary 
The macro study provided a longitudinal analysis of problem definitions in 
public safety policies. It demonstrated that perspectives of local safety changed 
drastically between 1990 and 2010. This section summarizes the main shifts in 
the definition of local safety problems, and in doing so, answers sub question 
three: Which safety problems have been listed for local safety governance in 
the Netherlands and what shifts have taken place between 1990 and 2010?  It 
can be concluded that the empirical trend of securitizing local issues is 
characterized by a growing issue presence which points at a growing amount 
of policy attention being paid to local safety problems. Second, securitization 
led to expansion in the variety of issues defined as local safety concerns. The 
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trend of issue expansion demonstrated how traditional local safety problems as 
crime and theft were accompanied by a wide variety of new issues ranging 
from nuisance to terrorism. Finally, the macro study pointed to the dominance 
of categories in the policy discourse, namely crime, nuisance, drugs, youth, 
violence, small annoyances, and organized crime.  
Taken together, the macro study provided clear indication of the 
issues that were successfully securitized as local safety problems between 
1990 and 2010. Three issues representing a shift in the definition of local 
safety problems were selected from the dominant categories, namely drug-
related nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime. The next chapters 
describe in-depth case-studies analyzing how these new definitions affected 
the mayor’s position and role in local safety governance.  
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Chapter 8: Case study findings Haarlem 
1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the first of two case studies building towards an 
explanation of how the mayors' role and position in local safety governance 
have been influenced by shifting definitions of safety problems between 1990 
and 2010. By applying the conceptual model onto the empirical sub cases, we 
answer the fourth sub question: How have new local safety problems been 
framed in local policy processes and why, how, and to what extent did they 
affect the mayor’s position and role in the practice of local safety governance? 
This section addresses also the fifth sub question: Which factors of the local, 
regional and national policy arena affected the course, content and outcome of 
local framing processes, as well as the mayor’s position and role in the 
practice of local safety governance? The following sections provide a 
description of the local framing process, policy strategies and the mayor’s 
actions in relation to the drug-related nuisance, domestic violence and 
organized crime in Haarlem. 
Before turning to these descriptions of the sub cases, some general 
information about the setting of these concerns, namely Haarlem, is provided. 
The municipality of Haarlem is located in the north-western part of the 
Netherlands and its number of inhabitants hovered around 150,000 in the 
period between 1990 and 2010.  Following the case selection criteria, Haarlem 
represents a large city that had t
26
hree mayors in the time between 1990 and 
2010. Mayor A (Labour Party) has been the mayor from 1985 to 1995, Mayor 
B (Labour Party) took over until 2006, after which Mayor C (Labour Party) 
took over as the mayor of Haarlem. As Haarlem is the largest, and most central 
city
27
 in the region of Noord-Holland, its mayors have had command and 
control of the regional police force since the Police Act of 1994. Prior to the 
enactment of this act, Dutch mayors had control and command over their own 
local municipal police force (Police Act, 1957). Table 9 summarizes the extent 
of the policy attention that has been paid to the three identified sub cases in 
Haarlem between 1990 and 2010. It shows that each sub case entered the local 
policy approach at different points in time, and were all framed and reframed 
multiple times.  
                                                 
26
  (CBS – Statline)  
 1990: 149,269 inhabitants 
 2010: 149,579 inhabitants 
27  The Police Act 1994 entailed a regional organization structure for the Dutch  
police and was in place from 1994 until 2011. Within this structure, mayors of the 
largest municipality in each of the 25 largest regional police forces held several 
roles relating to the organizational, policy, financial and personnel aspects of the 
regional police force. A national police force was created by the Police Act of 
2012 and is not covered by the research period of 1990-2010.  
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Table 9:  Overview of policy attention paid to the Haarlem sub cases 
 
Mayor A A A A A A/B B B B B B B B B B B B/C C C C C
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Drugs related nuisance
Domestic violence
Organised crime
initital frame
frame shift
attention for sub case in local policy  
 
The following sub case descriptions provide a detailed account of what these 
framing processes looked like, how the mayors of Haarlem were expected to 
handle the new public safety problems of drug-related nuisance, domestic 
violence and organized crime, as well as what actions the mayors did and did 
not undertake in practice. Each sub case analysis is structured according to the 
key concepts of the conceptual model. Firstly, a general case description is 
provided of the local policy developments, outlining the initial policy frames, 
as well as the shifts in frame that followed between 1990 and 2020. Thereafter, 
the conceptual model is applied as a guide for the gathering of all data relevant 
to the sub cases. This is discussed in the paragraphs that follow. First an 
overview is provided of the framing process including its triggers, context, 
discourse coalitions, processes of frame alignment and institutionalization. 
Thereafter, the mayor’s role on paper as well as in practice is described. This 
entails an indication of the mayor’s expected role as well as the level of frame 
enactment as indicated by his actions or non-action in the practice of local 
safety governance. This is followed by a discussion of the institutional 
arrangements of the local as well as supra local policy arena’s affecting the 
course and outcome of local processes of problem and role structuration. 
Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of the case of Haarlem. The 
information gathered in this chapter forms the basis for the case analysis that 
presents a preliminary answer to sub questions four and five.   
2 Sub Case 1  Drug-related nuisance in Haarlem 
The drug-related nuisances has been the subject of policy interventions in 
Haarlem for over twenty years. The local policy approach to drugs was first 
outlined in 1993 in the first formal policy document called ‘Policy on Coffee 
Shops’ (Gemeente Haarlem, 1993). This policy document listed various forms 
of nuisance related to soft-drugs to be addressed by local government. The 
main objective of the initial policy strategy was to decrease the number of 
coffee shops, and to regulate the usage and trade of soft drugs by 
implementing several national criteria for coffee shops to follow (Gemeente 
Haarlem, 1993). This approach continues to be dominant today, albeit with a 
few minor modifications.  
A few years later, in 1997, the local government mentioned a new 
type of drug-related nuisance in their policy document entitled 'Strategy for 
Drug Buildings'  (Gemeente Haarlem, 1997). This type of nuisance was related 
to the usage and trade of both soft and hard drugs in particular buildings. The 
policy strategy put forward a new power for Dutch mayors, specifically that to 
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close down buildings known to be related to drug-related nuisances (Local 
Government Act, Section 174a). This power was to be implemented in close 
cooperation with other local authorities including the police, public prosecutor 
and housing corporations.  
The initial ‘Policy on Coffee Shops’ dating from 1993 was renewed in 
1999 (Gemeente Haarlem, 1999). This document adopted a new law from the 
national ‘Opium Act,’ allowing mayors to intervene in public building, 
specifically coffee shops in case of drug-related problems (Opium Act, Section 
13B). Again, new actors were mentioned as partners of local government in 
the local policy document, such as the public health case service, agencies 
providing care to addicts and youth care.  
Finally, another policy called the ‘Enforcement
28
 Policy for Coffee 
Shops’ introduced a new regime for controlling and sanctioning coffee shops 
in 2009 (Gemeente Haarlem, 2009). This document communicated a formal 
plan to tighten the existing policy approach to coffee shops, in which the 
mayor and the police were listed as primary actors. Based on this formal 
policy, a so called 'integral team' consisting of local authorities, police, 
juridical actors and the tax agencies had to check several times a year to see 
whether or not shop owners obeyed the rules, and they had the power to 
impose sanctions as necessary.   
The policy path just described shows at least three key moments at 
which the policy frame regarding drug-related nuisances underwent substantial 
change. Table 10 provides a general overview of these policy frames and 
frame shifts. The initial frame of the early 1990s focused strongly on coffee 
shops and soft drugs, and sought address from the local government using 
local and national policy instruments. When Mayor A was the mayor of 
Haarlem, this initial frame underwent at least two frame shifts related to 
changing perspectives on the nature of the problem and the preferable solution. 
First, the diagnostic message of the initial policy frame was expanded in the 
late 1990s with a brief, but strong, focus on nuisances caused by the use and 
trade of hard and soft drugs in homes. This local problem was subsequently 
addressed by Mayor B who rarely used his new powers to address these issues. 
Second, in the late 2000s, the prognostic message of the policy frame was 
altered by the introduction of a tight sanctioning regime that was implemented 
in relation to local coffee shops by the local authorities acting in collaboration 
with many others. This time, Mayor C was the mayor of Haarlem. All framing 
processes will be individually described according to the key concepts of the 
conceptual model in the following three sections.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 In Dutch: handhaving 
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Table 10: Overview of the policy frames related to the drug-related nuisance in 
Haarlem between 1990 and 2010. 
2.1 Coffee shops causing trouble in the early 1990s 
In order to understand local policies regarding soft drugs, one has to be 
acquainted with the ‘Dutch Policy of Tolerance’
29
 towards soft drugs. Since 
the 1970s, the Dutch ‘Opium Act’ has made a distinction between hard drugs 
and soft drugs (Opium Act, 1976). The former were qualified as illegal, while 
the latter were tolerated to an extent. The classification of some drugs as soft 
led to the implication that although trading, production and possession of large 
quantities soft drugs was illegal, their usage was not. The trade of soft drugs in 
coffee shops was tolerated and regulated by means of several formal criteria 
introduced by the Public Prosecutor in 1992 (AHOJ-criteria). These criteria 
provided detailed instructions under which the trade in soft drugs would be 
tolerated, such as the amount that can be sold per costumer, and the customer’s 
minimum age. This created a niche market for many coffee shops in the 
Netherlands, as well as in Haarlem. 
 
2.1.1 Initial framing process 
While the trade and use of drugs was generally tolerated, in 1993, Mayor A 
informed the city council that the number of coffee shops in the city of 
Haarlem had grown to 22, with 13 of these shops running close to the center 
(College van B&W, 1993). This rapid expansion in the number of coffee shops 
triggered a problematization of these coffee shops, and a policy process was 
initiated that eventually subjected them to local policy programs combining 
                                                 
29 In Dutch: gedoogbeleid. 
Time 
period   
Topic policy 
frame 
Policy  frame: diagnostic & prognostic message 
Early 
1990s 
 
 
Coffee shops  
and soft drugs 
Diagnostic message: coffee shops cause various types of 
nuisance which affect local order and safety  
 
Prognostic message: local government should regulate the 
trade of soft drugs and limit the number of coffee shops   
(Policy on Coffee Shops 1993, Gemeente Haarlem) 
Late 
1990s  
 
 
 
 
Houses and hard 
drugs 
 
Diagnostic message: drugs usage and trading in houses 
causes nuisance in local neighborhoods 
 
Prognostic message: the mayor should use his power to close 
public buildings in case of extreme nuisance, when all other 
measures have failed. 
(Strategy for Drug-related Buildings 1997, Gemeente 
Haarlem) 
Late 
2000s  
 
 
Behavior of 
coffee shop 
owners 
 
Diagnostic message: rule violation by coffee shop owners 
 
Prognostic message: tighter regime of control and 
sanctioning  
(Enforcement Policy for Coffee Shops 2009, Gemeente 
Haarlem) 
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national policy guidelines and local policy ambitions. Figure 11 provides a 
general overview of this initial framing process using the conceptual model. 
 
Figure 11: Initial framing of the drug-related nuisance in Haarlem in the early 
1990s 
 
National policy arena
Local policy network
Policy in practice
Mayor involved in 
preparation & closes 
coffee shops
Coalition A
Inhabitants, 
mayor and 
council members
coalition B
single council 
member
Local policy debate 
’ 
National Policy 
of Tolerance 
Criteria Public 
Prosecutor
Policy Strategy
‘Policy on Coffee 
Shops’ 1993
Role mayor: regulating 
coffee shops
 
Discourse coalitions & frame alignment 
The drug-related problems were first discussed in a modest policy debate that 
was carried out in in anticipation of Haarlem’s first official coffee shop related 
policy document (Haarlem, 1993). Transcripts of the local council and 
commission indicate the worries of the mayor and several council members in 
relation to the presence of coffee shops and soft drugs. From the content of 
individual communications, and the interactions between key policy actors in 
the local debates, it is possible to distinguish two local discourse coalitions.  
 
Discourse coalition A: inhabitants, mayor & council members  
The first and largest coalition consisted of Mayor A, local inhabitants and 
various members who saw the nuisance caused by local coffee shops as a 
safety problem. It started with citizens expressing their feeling of being in 
danger to local government, and with complaints registered with the police. 
  
 
 
130 
 
These were eventually used as a justification, or a call for action by Mayor A: 
“Inhabitants experience various forms of nuisance caused by coffee shops. 
Although this nuisance might objectively be qualified as not severe, it causes 
fear and feelings of unsafely among inhabitants. […] a structural approach to 
coffee shops in the entire city is needed” (Mayor A in College B&W, 1993 –
translation RP).  
The mayor as well as various council members described coffee shops 
as a safety problem causing nuisance, feelings of unsafety and endangering the 
local quality of life
30
. They strongly favored local government taking an active 
role in regulating local coffee shops. During a council meeting, the mayor 
proposed to reduce the number of coffee shops in Haarlem in order to “limit 
the nuisance and increase the local quality of life” (Mayor A, Gemeenteraad, 
1993 - translation RP). Council members supported the mayor. One council 
member described the mayor’s proposal as “offering maximal possibility to 
regulate the amount of coffee shops and prevent the soft drugs circuit from 
falling into illegal and criminal spheres [..] this is of outmost importance”  
(Council Member Bakker  Gemeenteraad, 1993  translation RP). His view 
clearly resembled the central government’s policy of tolerance toward coffee 
shops, but strict regulation. Local actors feared that the alternative solution of 
forbidding coffee shops would push soft drugs into illegal and uncontrollable 
spheres. Mayor A clearly stressed the importance of not starting a war on 
coffee shops when regulating their numbers so as not to risk pushing towards 
illegal and criminal activities (Commissie ABZ, 1993). It is this acceptance of 
the existence of coffee shops and the sale of soft drugs that most clearly 
divided the frames of coalitions A and B.  
 
Discourse coalition B: single actor coalition   
A single council member representing the Christian Democratic party (CDA) 
expressed his strong objections to the policy of reducing and regulating coffee 
shops as proposed by coalition A. Similar to the members of this coalition, she 
problematized coffee shops as follows during a council meeting: “The 
constant usage of soft-drugs has negative consequences for physical and 
mental health” (Council Member Elshout, Gemeenteraad 1993 – translation 
RP). She focused keenly on the health problems caused by the use of soft 
drugs, and proposed an alternative approach, namely the adoption of a firm, 
anti-drug policy: “All coffee shops in Haarlem should immediately be closed 
[..] this will decrease crime as well”  (Council Member Elshout, 
Gemeenteraad 1993 – translation  RP). 
 
The initial policy debate shows the process of frame alignment and frame 
bridging that occurred between local members of coalition A, and the more 
national Dutch policy of tolerance. Members of discourse coalition A shared 
the basic assumption that coffee shops cause a nuisance, but that this should be 
addressed by regulation, and not an outright ban. This points at a process of 
frame bridging between compatible, but formerly disconnected national policy 
                                                 
30   In Dutch: leefbaarheid 
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ideas, and a local coalition that had significant agenda setting power. This 
coalition had the majority of votes in the city council, and thus ruled out 
Coalition B, which was effectively that of a single actor.  
 
Local policy frame & discourse institutionalization 
The policy debate as just described was followed by the introduction of 
Haarlem’s first policy plan to address the drug-related nuisance, ‘Policy on 
Coffee Shops’ (Gemeente Haarlem, 1993) which laid out the policy 
perspective on coffee shops, and the way to approach them. The local city 
council approved this policy on the 14
th
 of June, 1993 (Gemeenteraad, 1993). 
The diagnostic message of this policy frame points at the various forms of 
nuisance caused by coffee shops, such as the intimidation of local inhabitants, 
noise, feelings of insecurity amongst local inhabitants, parking related 
nuisances and litter on the streets (Gemeente Haarlem, 1993). As stated in the 
policy document, these types of nuisance are caused specifically by the trade 
of soft drugs, and would endangering the quality of life for those living nearby 
the coffee shops.  
The prognostic message of the policy document was “to restrict the 
number of coffee shops in which soft drugs are sold and used.” The policy 
goal was specifically “to decrease nuisance and increase feelings of safety” 
(Gemeente Haarlem, 1993:1– translation RP). The policy listed multiple 
already existing local administrative and juridical instruments, such as the 
rules set out for hotels, restaurants and bars. It also pointed to a new policy 
strategy to decrease the number of coffee shops from 22 to 15, of which 10 
would be allowed in the city center. This reduction in the number of coffee 
shops was to be carried out by the setting of specific criteria such as a maximal 
amount of stock, and a minimum age for customers. These local criteria for 
regulating coffee shops were inspired by national guidelines for coffee shops 
created by the Ministry of Justice (Gemeente Haarlem, 1993; OM, 1992).  
The diagnostic and prognostic message of the policy frame as just 
described clearly follows discourse coalition A’s perspective on coffee shops. 
It also resembles the national policy ideas. Haarlem’s initial policy strategy 
was thus designed in such a way that it fit into the boundaries set by the 
national ‘policy of tolerance’. This implies that the frame of the mayor, several 
council members and inhabitants, and the national policy ideas became 
institutionalized into the policy frame of Haarlem’s first formal policy on the 
drug-related nuisance.  
 
2.1.2 The mayor’s role on paper and in practice 
Mayor A was granted a role in the first formal policy strategy, and he 
undertook various actions in practice. Although data from the early 1990s is 
limited, the following section presents the clues derived from the policy 
documents of the mayor’s expected role, and her role in practice. 
 
Expected role 
The new policy strategy regarding coffee shops was combined with existing 
policy instruments from policy domains outside of public safety (recreation, 
urban planning). Non-drug related problems that arose in relation to the coffee 
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shops, such as their violation of closing hours, were to be addressed and 
sanctioned by the mayor and civil servants based on other existing policy 
instruments (Gemeente Haarlem, 1993). For example, the set up of a coffee 
shop required a license, and the regulations for receiving this license was 
based on that for hotels, restaurants and bars. Since 1993, nuisances arising 
from the use of soft-drugs was regulated by means of the new policy strategy 
for coffee shops which mentioned the mayor as the central actor whose task it 
is to give out permits, as well as to temporarily or permanently close coffee 
shops when owners flout these rules (Gemeente Haarlem, 1993). 
 
Role in practice: enactment 
The mayor’s role in practice appears from the transcripts of local government 
meetings, internal correspondences and policy reports to be an active one, both 
in the policy design stage, and during implementation. The mayor played a 
central role especially during the policy preparation phase, opening up 
dialogue with both local authorities and the coffees shop owners. Several 
transcripts from both council and commission meetings indicate that she 
chaired large meetings with all these actors, some of whom were members of 
the city council, council commission, police, coffee shop owners and residents 
(Commissie ABZ, 1993; Gemeenteraad, 1993). Although no data was 
available on the mayor’s role in policy implementation, we assume that Mayor 
A was involved directly in closing several shops since the number of coffee 
shops decreased in this period. This was confirmed in interviews with a former 
civil servant from Haarlem (civil servant 1, interview April 2012). It can be 
concluded then that the mayor’s expected role of regulating coffee shops was 
enacted to a high level in practice.  
 
2.1.3 Institutional arrangements  
As briefly summarized, factors from both the local and national policy arena 
played a role in Haarlem’s very fist policy on drug-related nuisances.   
 
Local arena 
At least two local factors played a major role in the initial policy process. First, 
the initial framing process was triggered by local cognitive aspects, more 
specifically, local knowledge of the growing number of coffee shops. Second, 
the frame of discourse coalition A was eventually institutionalized into the 
formal policy strategy ‘Policy Coffee Shops’ partly because of the distribution 
of resources in this local policy network. Coalition’s dominance of the policy 
debate and strategy can be partly explained by the composition of this coalition 
which comprised the local mayor and a majority of the local city council. 
These actors had formal powers to shape the policy agenda and make policy 
decisions. As discussed in the next section, coalition A took advantage of a 
process of frame bridging through which salient ideas in the national arena 
were used to support their policy frame.  
 
National arena 
The content of the local policy debate, and the resulting policy strategy were 
both connected to regulative aspects of the national policy context. Local 
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policy actors referred to the national ‘Policy of Tolerance’ in the local policy 
debates. Only those frames that were compatible with national policy ideas 
made it into the dominant discourse coalition and policy documents. The 
prognostic message of the formal policy document subsequently copied the 
national criteria for coffee shops (OM, 1992), with ‘Policy Coffee Shops’ 
(Gemeente Haarlem, 1993) effectively adopting and implementing national 
policy tools.  
2.2 New powers for the mayor to tackle hard drugs in the late 1990s 
In 1997, a new power was created for Dutch mayors to address drug-related 
nuisances (Local Government Act, Section 174a). Since that time, all Dutch 
mayors can close down buildings when local order is harmed. Examples of 
nuisances that could be classified as harming local order are drug trading and 
prostitution. The mayor is supposed to use this power when all other means of 
addressing nuisance have run out (NGB, 2008). It is the introduction of this 
new power that triggered an expansion of the formal drug policy frame in 
Haarlem. 
 
2.2.1 Frame expansion process  
In the late 1990s, local authorities in Haarlem introduced a new policy 
document to tackle the drug-related nuisance named the ‘Strategy for Drug-
Related Buildings’ (Gemeente Haarlem, 1997). The existing policy frame was 
expanded with the introduction of this new document. The framing process 
surrounding this expansion was triggered by the initial expansion of the formal 
policy frame on paper, which was followed by the initiation of a modest policy 
debate. This policy subsequently saw a low level of enactment by the mayor in 
practice. Figure 12 summarizes this process of frame expansion. The next 
sections present a chronological description of each phase.   
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Figure 12: Frame expansion of the drug-related nuisance in Haarlem in the late 
1990s 
 
Local policy network
Local policy debate
Policy in practice
Mayor hardly uses new 
power
Coalition A
Police, mayor, 
council 
members
Policy strategy
‘Strategy for Drug 
Buildings’ 1997
National arena
Local Government 
Act 174a: Close 
houses
Local policy frame & discourse institutionalization  
The new power for Dutch mayors to address drug houses was soon adopted 
into the local policy document, ‘Strategy for Drug Buildings’ (Haarlem, 1997). 
The goal of the overall policy was to close down buildings in cases of severe 
nuisance threatening local order: “A building in which drugs are used and/or 
sold can cause severe nuisance […] which might disturb local order. The 
objective of this approach is to stop nuisance causing activities in order to 
restore local order. The closing or clearance of a building by the mayor is the 
ultimate way to achieve this goal”  (Gemeente Haarlem, 1997- translation 
RP).  
The diagnostic message of the initial policy frame was expanded in 
relation to the nuisance caused by selling and using hard drugs in public 
buildings. The policy document claimed that “drugs traded in neighborhoods 
frequently bring about severe forms of disturbances of local order, and a 
devaluation of the living environment” (Gemeente Haarlem, 1997 - translation 
RP).  In order to address this nuisance, the new power introduced by the 
national government was adopted in the local policy strategy the same year. 
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Consequently, the prognostic message regarding the drug-related nuisance was 
expanded. However, it was stressed that this was a power that the mayor 
should implement with great restraint and great care:  “The mayor’s power is 
of the last resort, to be wielded when all other means to limit the nuisance 
have run out. This implies as well that once a procedure to close has started 
and the effect has been created, the procedure no longer needs to be 
continued” (ibid).  
In contrast to the initial framing forces, the new power for Dutch 
mayors was adopted by local policy makers without much policy debate. Local 
actors did not attempt to ‘customize’ or ‘shape’ the debate according to their 
desires or particular frames. A local information brochure reported that the 
new policy tool related to the drug-related nuisance in buildings was being 
directly adopted by the local authorities in close cooperation with the police, 
Ministry of Justice and housing corporations (Gemeente Haarlem, 2000). Civil 
servants involved in the policy reflected in individual interviews that these 
powers were likely not discussed by the board of mayor and aldermen, but 
simply adopted as a new local policy tool (civil servant 2, Interview April 
2012). This claim is confirmed by an examination of transcripts of local 
council and commission meetings that took place in 1997, and in which the 
problem of drugs was mentioned. No mention was found to the drug houses, or 
to the mayor's new power to close them down in the data set on Haarlem. This 
implies that the power to close buildings was institutionalized directly into 
Haarlem's local policy plan in the form forwarded by the central government. 
 
Discourse coalitions & frame alignment 
However, after this new policy strategy came into effect, members of a 
discourse coalition (made up of the police, the mayor and a council member) 
were recorded to have commented on the matter, and the formalization of this 
new power into local policy triggered a minor policy debate. A single council 
member briefly mentioned the drug nuisance as it pertained to buildings as a 
safety problem (councillor Nietshoven, Commissie ABZ 1999). The police and 
the mayor made further references to drugs and drug-related buildings once or 
twice as well (Commissie OWSR, 1999). Their individual frames aligned in 
that they all described the drug nuisance related to buildings as a minor, or 
even nonexistent problem at that time (the late 1990s). As Mayor B said in an 
interview, “There were few problems with drugs usage or trading in houses” 
(Mayor B, Interview- August 2012 translation RP). The police confirmed this 
view by stating that “arrangements have been made, and there is no nuisance 
anymore” (Police officer Lodder, Commissie OWSR, 1999). 
` There was no processes of frame alignment between local discourse 
coalitions in Haarlem in the late 1990s. There was only one coalition that ever 
referred to the topic of drugs houses, and this group appeared to downplay the 
problem. Because a substantial policy debate on the use and trade of drugs in 
drug houses appears not to have taken place, we conclude that this was not 
regarded as a major policy problem in Haarlem in the late 1990s. However, 
this does not necessarily mean that the drug-related nuisance did not manifest 
in buildings in the neighborhoods of Haarlem.    
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2.2.2  The mayor’s role on paper and in practice  
An expansion of the prognostic message through the addition of the mayor's 
new power broadened the mayor’s overall scope of potential interventions. In 
this section, we look at both the mayor’s expected role on paper, and his 
actions in practice. 
 
Expected role  
The policy document, ‘Strategy on Drugs Buildings’ (Gemeente Haarlem, 
1997) described a local working group consisting of the police, housing 
corporations and the local government who screened cases that could be 
subject to the enactment of the mayoral power to close the building down 
(Drugspandennota, 1997). The mayor was expected to use this new power in 
close cooperation with the various public actors: “The mayor decides to close 
a house, building […] and the police, public prosecutor and landlord deliver 
evidence to support this procedure” (Gemeente Haarlem, 1997-vertaling RP). 
The mayor also decides on the duration of the closing, with the penalty being 
light in the case of first offenders, and tough when the problems occur more 
frequently (ibid).  
 
Role in practice: low level of frame enactment 
The mayor rarely used his power to close down buildings in practice. There are 
few known cases in which the mayor either warned of such an interventions or 
implemented it as such. Multiple respondents including Mayor B himself 
acknowledged that the power to close down buildings was hardly used (civil 
servant 1, 2, 3 and mayor B, interviews 2012).  The data set collected for this 
case study reflects only a single report of the mayor sending a letter to a citizen 
communicating that he will close his house if the local authorities received 
another report of a drug-related nuisance arising because of him (Gemeente 
Haarlem, 2000). Such a limited use of this power demonstrates a low level of 
frame enactment. The mayor’s actions were in line with the frames of the 
mayor and police who did not recognize drug-related houses as a persistent 
problem in the local society (discourse coalition a) .  
 
2.2.3 Institutional arrangements 
As just described, various factors arising in the local and national policy arena 
played a role in Haarlem’s very fist policy process about the drug-related 
nuisance. In this section, we briefly show that while the national policy context 
tends to structure the form that policies take on paper, it is factors relevant to 
the local arena that play a greater role in shaping the policy in practice.  
 
National arena  
The policy frame adopted by the ‘Strategy for Drug Buildings’ clearly 
mirrored that of the national policy tools. Using the terminology of the 
conceptual model, it can be said that regulative aspects of the national policy 
context triggered a formal frame expansion. The introduction by the national 
government of the new mayoral power to close buildings led to the creation of 
a specific policy document regarding drugs in buildings (Gemeente Haarlem, 
1997) that was strongly based on the national policy strategy as laid down in 
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the Local Government Act (Section 174a). This points at a rather top down 
process in which national policy ideas were directly institutionalized into local 
policy plans, thereby expanding the local policy frame.  
 
Local arena  
Although national acts and policy strategies have influenced the policy frame, 
this expanded frame is hardy enacted in practice. This shows that cognitive 
aspects (frames) in the local policy network structured the practice of policy 
implementation. The fact that the drug nuisance in buildings was not 
recognized as a pressing problem by most of the key policy players (mayor, 
police, civil servants united by their membership in coalition A) explains the 
subsequently low level of frame enactment by the mayor. However, there was 
a higher level of enactment on alternative policy frames in the local policy 
network with which the mayor and key players were more aligned. This shows 
that cognitive aspects, specifically the frames of actors who hold the agenda 
setting power and responsibility for implementation, strongly affects the policy 
in practice. It is this local power that then counterbalances the more formal and 
national policy frames.  
2.3 Towards a regime of tight control and sanctions: the late 2000s 
The local policy frame regarding the drug-related nuisance underwent a third 
shift in the late 2000s.  The national policy towards soft drugs started to 
change slightly at this time as an advisory committee appointed by the 
ministers of public health, as well as of justice and interior affairs concluded 
that the policy of tolerance was in need of revision (Commission Van den 
Donk, 2009). This commission stated that amongst other measures, the usage 
of drugs among youngsters should be addressed more firmly, drug-related 
tourism should be reduced, and organized crime related to the illegal 
production and marketing of soft drugs should be combated in a professional 
and structured manner. This was followed by the introduction of various 
measures by the national government that signaled a move towards more 
restrictive policy interventions towards coffee shops and drugs in general 
(Kabinet Rutte I, 2010). Coffee shops were required in 2012 to be located at 
least 350 meters away from schools (Tweede Kamer, 2011), customers were 
obliged to registers as member of a coffee shops in order to buy soft drugs in 
2012 (only the local Dutch residents could do this). However, this ruling was 
soon abolished by a new government who took control later in 2012. 
Nonetheless, the spirit of these expansions continued as a policy program was 
implemented to address the problem of criminal networks producing and 
trading drugs (Taskforce-see case Breda).   
 
2.3.1 Frame hardening process 
The frame shift began with the mayor undertaking several policy actions in 
practice. These actions triggered a policy debate that eventually resulted in a 
formalization of the policy approach already in practice. A new policy 
document called ‘Enforcement Policy for Coffee Shops’ (Gemeente Haarlem, 
2009) indicated a formal frame shift towards tighter control and sanctioning of 
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the rules for coffee shop owners. This overall process of frame change is 
presented in figure 13. 
 
Figure 13: The shift in the frame for drug-related nuisance that occurred in the 
late 2000s in Haarlem 
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The mayor’s actions in practice - Part 1 
When a new mayor came into office in 2006 he started a tight regime of 
control and sanctioning, or as he explained himself: “You start as the mayor 
and then you want to get an oversight of what is going on in the city. […] 
When controlling coffee shops, we were frequently told of rule violations.  I 
thought: that is not a good thing, we need to strengthen our policy 
interventions. This resulted in quite a number of coffee shops being closed” 
(Mayor C, interview August 2012 - translation RP). Many of the civil servants 
who served as sources for this study explained that shortly after the new mayor 
took office, integral teams were created who visited coffee shops and pointed 
to rule violations (Civil servant 3, interview July 2012). As reported in both 
the reports of council meetings and in interviews with the mayor himself, the 
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mayor actively closed several coffee shops for specific periods in late 2000s 
(Gemeenteraad, 3 april 2008; Mayor C, interview August 2012). The mayor’s 
decision to close down certain coffee shops resulted in the enactment of 
several juridical procedures. This generated both support as well as criticism in 
city council meetings (Gemeenteraad, 2008/9/11, Commissie Bestuur, 2011). 
The introduction of this tight reign on coffee shops eventually led to a policy 
debate in which local authorities and coffee shop owners were clearly divided 
into several discourse coalitions. 
 
Discourse coalitions & frame alignment   
The tightened reign on coffee shops triggered a policy debate in which various 
actors, such as council members, the mayor, as well as coffee shop owners, 
expressed their differing perspectives on the problems (diagnostic message) 
and solutions (prognostic message) relevant to the drug-related nuisance. 
Based on the content of their policy frames as well as their interactions, four 
discourse coalitions can be distinguished. This section discusses their 
appearance in the debate in chronological order.  
 
Discourse coalition A: mayor  
The first coalition consisted of the mayor. The violation of rules for coffee 
shops was problematic in the view of the new mayor, and in need of a strict 
regime of control and sanctions: “My opinion is that coffee shop policies must 
be strict, but fair” (Mayor C - Gemeenteraad, 2011 – translation RP). The 
mayor explicitly pointed at the frequency with which shop owners violated the 
rules, such as by selling drugs to youngsters, or exceeding the stock limit. In 
order to address these problems, the mayor favored a tight regime of control 
and sanctioning of the coffee shops.  
 
Discourse Coalition B: individual coffee shop owners  
The second discourse coalition consisted of a few individual coffee shop 
owners who were not satisfied with the policy interventions of the mayor and 
local authorities. Some of them started a juridical procedure to fight the early 
closing penalty inflicted because they exceeded the maximal amount of stock 
(Gemeente Haarlem, 2009). However, according to the local mayor, these suits 
were all won by the government (Mayor C, interview August 2012). 
Nevertheless, a judge concluded that the local government should create a 
formal policy document that clearly outlines the rules and sanctions to provide 
a basis for fair implementation and clarity for shop owners. 
 
Discourse coalition C: other council members 
When the new coffee shop related policy was eventually discussed in the city 
council in 2009 and again in 2011, various council members strongly critiqued 
the tough stance that had been adopted (Gemeenteraad, 2009/11).  The mayor 
himself acknowledged this criticism: “Many of you [council members] think I 
am way too strict" (Mayor C, Gemeenteraad, 2011 – translation RP).  Council 
members representing the Labour Pary (PvdA), the Socialist Party (SP) and the 
local Action Party (Actiepartij) communicated their preference to return to the 
older, more tolerant approach to coffee shops in Haarlem (ibid).  
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Discourse coalition D: united coffee shop owners  
After the implementation of the formally expanded ‘Policy Plan for Coffee 
shops’ in 2009, local coffee shop owners became more willing to contribute to 
the policy attempts to regulate their businesses. Haarlem’s Association of 
Coffee Shop Owners (Team Haarlemse Coffeeshops) explicitly stated that they 
were making an effort to obey the rules, and that they wished to cooperate with 
the local authorities:  “The coffee shops in Haarlem want to cooperate with 
each other, local authorities and the police, and they do their utmost best to 
obey the rules” (Miss Alphen - Commissie Bestuur, 2011- translation RP). 
This helping hand was offered during a commission meeting at the city hall to 
which coffee shop owners were invited as well.  
 
Overall, this policy debate shows little frame alignment apart from the 
initiation of a dialogue between local authorities and coffee shops owners. 
However, the third round of framing saw a far greater degree of frame bridging 
occurring between the two local discourse collations. Through this process, the 
individual frames of the mayor and the council (coalition A) and the coalition 
of coffee shop owners (coalition D) became more aligned as a result of their 
willingness to engage in dialogue and to cooperate. As explained in the next 
section, this enabled the mayor and coffee shop owners to pool their resources 
and ideas on the regulation of coffee shop in preparation for the subsequent 
establishment of the local ‘quality label’. 
 
Policy frame and discourse institutionalization 
The judge’s verdict in favor of the government eventually resulted in the 
formulation of the new ‘Enforcement Policy for Coffee Shops’ in which the 
tight sanctioning of coffee shops that was already in practice became 
formalized (Gemeente Haarlem, 2009). This document did not describe the 
problem of the drug-related nuisance at all. Instead, it focused solely on the 
prognostic message of the policy frame, which was clearly focused on 
controlling and sanctioning coffee shops: “With the creation and 
announcement of this policy, the mayor is able to unambiguously, persistently 
and consequently address the violations of the policy rules for coffee shops. 
The mayor aims to tighten the local controlling regime to ensure that the rules 
are obeyed by the coffee shops. The policy communicates firm sanctions in 
case of rule violation” (Gemeente Haarlem, 2009 – translation RP). As 
before, a coffee shop would be closed either temporally or permanently as a 
result of rule violation, but the new policy formalized the period of closure that 
would apply for various types of rule violation. In doing so, local authorities 
explicitly demonstrated their new determination to address the drug-related 
nuisance through the previously defined prognostic message of regulating soft 
drugs and coffee shops.  
In comparing this renewed policy frame to the frames presented by 
the discourse coalitions, a process of frame amplification becomes apparent 
during which the frames of the mayor supported by that of the council 
members (coalition A) became formalized or institutionalized. 
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2.3.2 The mayors role on paper and in practice –part 2 
The policy practice in place prior to this formalization continued after. In the 
following sections, we look again at the mayor’s expected role and role in 
practice when addressing the drug-related nuisance after its passing.  
 
Expected role 
According to the formal policy document, the expected role for the mayor in 
this tight regime of control and sanctioning was to exert ‘administrative 
power’
31
 over public buildings as outlined in Section 13b of the Opium Act. 
The mayor was allowed to determine the sanction periods in case of serious 
disturbances of local order, and he could empower the police to physically 
close a coffee shop on his behalf. 
 
Role in practice: Frame enactment through formalization 
Once the new regime towards coffee shops was formalized in a policy 
document the mayor undertook various administrative and operational actions. 
He made a great effort to justify his new policy approach. He informed the 
local council and commission ABZ of the new policy, published the 
'Enforcement Policy for Coffee Shops’ in the local newspaper, issued a press 
statement, and sent a copy of the policy to all shop owners (Commissie ABZ, 
2009; Besluitenlijstlijst N&W, 2009). 
Once the mayor deemed the tightening of the regime to be successful 
in reducing the number of rule violations, he began to personally re-engage in 
dialogue with the shop owners (Gemeenteraad, 2011; Mayor C, interview 
August 2012). This resulted in multiple meetings of the local government, 
police and the association of coffee shop owners in 2010, 2011 and 2012. The 
coffee shop owners were encouraged by the mayor to develop a ‘Quality 
Label’ for coffee shops that he explicitly described as a local alternative to the 
national coffee shop club card (ibid). The mayor can be said to have enacted 
the policy frame to a high degree as it was in effect, a formal 
institutionalization of his individual frame. This might be better described as a 
process of formalization of policy interventions in practice rather than a 
process of frame enactment since the mayor had already introduced the strict 
regime of control and had been sanctioning coffee shops for a significant 
period before such actions were formalized in the official policy documents.  
 
2.3.3 Institutional arrangements 
Various factors salient in the local and national policy arena influenced the 
processes of frame expansion as just described.  
 
Local arena 
The shift was triggered and steered primarily by dynamics in the local policy 
context. The entrance of a new and powerful actor in the local policy network 
altered the normative aspects of local policy practices. Mayor C’ own rather 
intolerant stance (his personal frame) on the nuisance caused by coffee shops 
was mirrored by the tough new policy practices he instated.  A shift in the 
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composition of the local network can thus have huge consequences for policy 
practices, especially when new actors have significant powers to shape local 
agendas and implement policy tools. The tougher new practices were further 
formalized because of the attempt of local coffee shop owners to legally 
dispute them. Thus, regulative aspects in the form of juridical procedures 
within the local policy network brought about the formalization of the 
tightened stance in a new policy for the management of coffee shops. 
 
National arena 
This process of frame hardening was not directly affected by factors of the 
national policy context. However, the tightening of the local policy on coffee 
shops fit the national movement that took place in the late 2000s towards a 
more restrictive approach to soft drugs. These local policy strategies showed a 
bottom up process. Although the local quality label for coffee shops was 
created to address local problems as well to foster greater dialogue between 
local authorities and coffee shop owners, the mayor held additional ambitions 
to present the label as a best practice, or a local alternative to the national 
government policy tool of issuing membership cards to customers of coffee 
shops (Mayor C, interview August 2012). 
2.4 Research findings sub case 1 
Reconstructing the initial process through which the drug-related nuisance was 
framed as a local safety problem, and the two frame shifts that followed 
brought to light several aspects of how frame shifts affect the mayor’s role and 
position in local safety governance.  
First of all it became evident that three major shifts in the local policy 
frame on drug-related nuisances that took place between 1990 and 2010. The 
diagnostic message of the policy strategy was initially confined to nuisances 
caused by coffee shops (1992), but this frame was later expanded to include 
nuisances arising from the usage and trade of hard drugs in public buildings 
(1997). The focus shifted a third time subsequently toward the neglect of rules 
by coffee shop owners (2009). The prognostic message of the policy strategy 
was initially just to regulate coffee shops for the first time (1993), but this was 
later expanded by the mayoral power to close down buildings in case the usage 
of hard drugs created a public nuisance (1997). This expansion of power too 
place mostly on paper, and was hardly used in practice, but the focus 
subsequently shifted towards tighter control and sanctioning of rule violations 
by shop owners (2009). As the frames in the policy debate and strategy 
changed between 1990 and 2010, so did the mayor’s role and position. The 
mayor’s formal powers were expanded with the introduction of new powers to 
close down buildings in the case of drug-related nuisances.  
Secondly, the local policy arena expanded with the introduction of 
many new actors, both those listed in the policy strategies, as well as those 
who were collaborating with the mayor in practice. As a result, the mayor’s 
position changed from that of a solo actor assisted mainly by local government 
actors (1993 - initial frame), to one of close cooperation with many others 
outside of local government. The mayor had to work with many others in order 
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to close down buildings (1997 frame expansion) and control and sanction 
coffee shops (2009 frame shift), including the police, juridical actors, housing 
corporations, residents, and coffee shop owners.  
Thirdly, the mayor’s role has changed over the years from merely one 
of policy formulation and enforcement policy (initial frame) to one of more 
direct involvement in that the mayor had a key role in approving the closure 
and sanctioning of such premises. This expansion in both the policy frame as 
well as the mayor’s position and role in practice can be explained by an 
interplay of actors and factors located in both the local and national policy 
arena. 
Finally, the application of the conceptual model on this very first sub 
case leads us to conclude that the local framing process is triggered and shaped 
by factors from both the local and national policy context. This sub case 
showed in particular that issues in local society as well as national policies 
initiated a local policy process during which the drug-related nuisance was 
framed and (re)framed as a local safety problem.  
In general, national policy ideas affect the interaction and outcome of 
local framing processes involving divergent discourse coalitions. This sub case 
demonstrated that the frames of the local discourse coalitions frequently 
merged with national policy frames. The frames of the local discourse 
coalitions that were in line with national policy strategies ended up dominating 
the local policy debates, and were eventually institutionalized into the local 
policies. This resulted in local policy strategies resembling national policy 
instruments. 
Also, regulative aspects of the national policy became institutionalized 
into the formal policy frame, thereby directly shaping the mayor’s expected 
role. The mayor’s expected role in local safety governance was partially 
shaped by the national policy arena providing new powers for the mayor and 
incentives for a strict policy strategy to coffee shops.  However, while the 
formal policy approach was heavily structured by national rules and 
regulations, the mayor's role in practice was largely affected by dynamics 
within the local policy network. This sub case showed that there can be a 
difference between policies on paper, and how they are enforced in practice. 
The availability of formal powers created by the national government are not 
necessarily implemented in practice, even if these powers are officially 
adopted into local policy. The power to close buildings provides a clear 
example of this.   
Finally, the distribution of powers in the local policy network matters. 
This sub case revealed that actors with formal powers to set the local policy 
agenda and make policy decisions tend to see their problem definitions and 
preferred solutions represented in formal policy documents. Likewise, the 
frame of the most powerful discourse coalition was always enacted in practice. 
The mayor’s actions in practice were always in line with the frames of local 
discourse coalitions consisting of himself and other powerful actors such as the 
police, even when their individual frames contrasted with national and/or other 
local policy frames. This points at a certain a level of freedom for the Dutch 
mayor to implement a local ‘tailor-made’ policy approach that suits his 
personal frame in the process of policy implementation. 
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3 Sub case 2  Domestic violence in Haarlem 
Violence against women has long been a topic of interest for the local 
government in Haarlem. Here follows a short history of this local policy 
domain, followed by a description of the initial policy frame, and the frame 
shifts that followed between 1990 and 2020. 
 Housing the largest number of inhabitants in the region, 
‘Kennemerland’ Haarlem is considered the central city of this region
32
. Being 
the main city in this region comes with specific responsibilities as well as 
monetary resources from the national government to manage a number of 
public services for the region. This included the creation of a regional shelter 
for female victims of domestic violence and their children.  
Long before a formal policy program was first created, multiple 
organizations had been united in a lose network of professional organizations 
to address various social problems, including that of domestic violence. This 
‘Network Against Sexual Violence’ provided shelter and mental health care to 
female victims of sexual violence and included collaborations amongst social 
workers, women’s shelters and the Institute for Ambulant Mental Health Care. 
At the same time, other organizations, such as Youth Care, the Public Health 
Service and the Child Care and Protection Board were united in a regional 
prevention platform dealing with child abuse as well as children who use 
violence against their parents. 
In the early days of Haarlem’s policy approach to domestic violence, 
Mayor B was the mayor. In 1997, Haarlem introduced the policy ‘Violence in 
the Family’, specifically aimed at addressing domestic violence (Gemeente 
Haarlem, 1997), becoming the first city in the Netherlands to do so (Trimbos, 
2005). Haarlem’s initial policy plan described the inclusion of over twenty 
organizations from both the social and safety domains who would cooperate to 
address domestic violence (Gemeente Haarlem, 1997). Examples of such 
organizations are the Public Health Care Service, the public prosecutor and 
social workers.  
This cooperation initiated a big spin off in the local policy domain of 
domestic violence, and many organizations, policy projects and instruments 
were subsequently introduced. For example, informational phone services 
were set up for victims, perpetrators as well as any others who sought to report 
or ask questions about domestic violence. This was followed by a so called 
‘Abused Women Active Response’ (AWARE) system which was introduced 
in the early 2000s. AWARE provides a mobile emergency system by which 
the police are alerted in cases of domestic violence. Other efforts included that 
of a legal aid service for victims, a project studying the cultural and other 
factors contributing to cases of domestic violence, a training program for 
police officers and others to recognize and address domestic violence, and 
platforms for the cooperation of multiple organizations in these matters. Many 
more initiatives followed in the years thereafter (Trimbos, 2005).   
In the late 2000s, the Haarlem's local policy approach to domestic 
violence was formally expanded to encompass the regional policy arena. 
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Representatives of several local municipalities and multiple professional 
organizations signed a formal collaboration agreement (Gemeente Haarlem, 
2010), and as the largest city in the region, Haarlem was assigned the role of 
coordinator (Gemeente Haarlem, 2009/10).  The creation of this regional 
collaboration agreement was triggered by the new policy tool of temporary 
home restrictions to committers of domestic violence as introduced by national 
government in 2009. By adopting the mayoral power of home restrictions into 
the regional policy approach (Gemeente Haarlem, 2009), the mayors in the 
region Kennemerland were for the first time granted formal powers to address 
domestic violence. The mayor of Haarlem at the time was Mayor C.  
 The policy path just described shows at least two key moments when 
the policy frame regarding domestic violence underwent substantial changes. 
The first was in 1997 when Haarlem’s local policy approach, ‘Violence in the 
Family’ first described domestic violence as a policy problem. In doing so, the 
existing focus on domestic violence as an important social problem was 
augmented by a focus on public safety. In terms of framing, there was an 
expansion of the problem from one solely relating to female victims, to one 
that concerned children and perpetrators as well (Gemeente Haarlem, 2007). 
As a result, the existing prognostic message of the policy frame of crisis 
response and help for victims was expanded to include an emphasis on 
prevention and the prosecution of perpetrators.  
The second key moment occurred in the late 2000s when Haarlem’s 
local policy approach was formally expanded to the region. The prognostic 
measures that were accepted regionally included in 2009 the power of the 
mayor to issue temporary home restrictions to offenders of domestic violence. 
Table 11 provides an overview of the shifts that took place in Haarlem’s policy 
frame on domestic violence between 1990 and 2010.  
 
Table 11:  Overview of the policy frames on domestic violence between 1990 
and 2010 in Haarlem 
Time 
period   
Topic policy 
frame 
Policy  frame: diagnostic & prognostic message 
Late 
1990s  
 
 
 
 
Domestic 
violence as a 
policy problem 
 
Diagnostic message:  Various forms of violence are 
considered both a social and a safety problem.  
 
Prognostic message:  Combine shelter and social support 
structures for victims with a dual emphasis on prevention 
as well as a prosecution of committers. 
(Violence in the Family, Gemeente Haarlem, 2007)  
Late 
2000s  
 
 
The mayor's 
power of 
issuing home 
restrictions 
included in the 
regional 
approach 
Diagnostic message:   Various forms of violence 
considered both a social and a safety problem. 
 
Prognostic message:  Regional approach combining 
existing policies and the work of existing organisations 
with new powers, including that of temporary home 
restrictions by the mayor. Coordination by municipality of 
Haarlem.  
(Collabaration Agreement Safety Region Kennemerland, 
Gemeente Haarlem, 2010) 
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3.1 Safety-related perspectives on domestic violence in the late 1990s 
Before 1996, no national policy rules or programs were in place that 
specifically targeted domestic violence. However, a number of widely 
publicized incidents resulting in the death of two former residents of a 
woman’s shelter in 1996 triggered a heightened level of policy attention for 
domestic violence in Haarlem. While Haarlem created its first policy approach 
in this time, the macro study (described in Chapter 7) indicates that the 
national government only started to label domestic violence as a local safety 
problem in 2002.  
 
3.1.1 Initial framing process  
The process was started effectively with a news bulletin that mentioned two 
lethal instances of domestic violence in Haarlem.
33
 Triggered by these 
incidents, the local shelter for females organized a conference on domestic 
violence during which an interdisciplinary working group was formed which 
had the task of putting together their vision for addressing domestic violence in 
Haarlem. A local process of policy debate and design followed, and eventually 
resulted in Haarlem’s first policy document regarding domestic violence being 
accepted by the local triangle consultation as well as the board of mayor and 
aldermen in 1997 (College B&W, 1997). This local policy practice in Haarlem 
inspired the national government as well as other local governments in the 
Netherland to pay attention to domestic violence and create their own policy 
plans. Figure X summarizes the initial framing process which was triggered 
locally, inspired by international policy practices and copied nationally. 
 
                                                 
33   Almost every policy document regarding domestic violence in Haarlem refers to  
the death of two women due to domestic violence in 1996. 
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Figure 14: Initial framing process of the problem of domestic violence in 
Haarlem in the late 1990s 
Local policy network
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Discourse coalitions & frame alignment 
In preparation of the first formal policy ‘Violence in the Family’ (Gemeente 
Haarlem, 1997), various actors expressed their individual frames of domestic 
violence as a policy problem, as well as their views of a suitable policy. 
Looking at the contents of the individual frames, as well as interactions 
between policy actors, two discourse coalitions can be identified, the 
professional pioneers and local authorities. 
 
Discourse coalition A: Alliance of professional pioneers  
After the two lethal incidents of domestic violence in 1996, several 
professionals from different organizations voluntarily joined forces. Key actors 
within this alliance included the head of the local safety department of 
Haarlem, the director of the woman’s shelter, a representative of the Ministry 
of Justice, and someone representing Youth Care and the Public Health 
Service (Gemeente Haarlem, 2003). Together these individuals organized a 
conference as well as multiple meetings which eventually resulted in the 
policy program ‘Violence in the Family’ (Gemeente Haarlem, 1997). Many of 
the interviewees described this group as ‘pioneers’ in the policy domain: “It 
was a matter of the right people being at the right place at the right time [...] 
According to them, domestic violence was not acceptable and government 
  
 
 
148 
 
should do something about it [...] That was an important starting point”  
(employee public health service, interview July 2012 – translation RP).  
 Written correspondence between these pioneers revealed that they 
initiated a working group in which actors from the local government 
(Department of Order and Public Safety), regional organizations (a women’s 
shelter and the Public Health Service) and representatives from the national 
government were invited to participate (Werkgroep geweld in het gezin, 
1996a-d). Although the transcripts of their meetings do not show any 
fundamental disagreement or debates on how the problem of domestic 
violence should be defined, each party appeared to have a different focus in 
their proposed efforts to address domestic violence, each related to their 
particular background. The Child Care and Protection Board focused on 
children, the police focused on female victims, and the Department of Order 
and Public Safety focused on violence in general. Nevertheless, the various 
actors found in each other the common recognition of domestic safety as a 
policy problem with many manifestations.  This coalition was further united by 
their normative standpoint which was to break with the traditional convention 
that governments should not intervene in people’s homes. Overall, the policy 
project was intended to be an “eye opener” and a “conversation starter among 
professional organizations and local politics” (Gemeente Haarlem 1997:2).  
The perspective of domestic violence as a safety problem was inspired 
by foreign policies on this matter: “Domestic violence in the Netherlands is 
hardy considered a safety issue […]  In England as well as in Canada and 
New Zealand, various domestic violence interventions form a key pillar of the 
public safety policy” (Gemeente Haarlem, 1997: 5/6 – translation RP).   The 
head of the safety department of local government was described by multiple 
respondents to this study as a key player in this coalition (employee public 
health service, civil servant 6 and Mayor B – Interviews 2012). He gathered 
international policy examples and proved to be successful in arguing for the 
adoption of a safety perspective on domestic violence that included a 
preventative focus, as well as a combined focus on both victim and 
perpetrators. See the description of the policy frame in the next section 
(Werkgroep geweld in het gezin, 1996 a-d).  
 
Discourse collation B: Local authorities as critical supporters  
Local authorities and providers of public safety critically supported the policy 
ambitions of Coalition B in 1997 by formally approving the policy document 
‘Violence in the Family’ (College van B&W, 1997). However, this approval 
was not without a disclaimer. The mayor, police chef and deputy of justice 
united in the local triangle warned the actors “not to expect miracles from 
criminal prosecutions in this matter” (College van B&W, 1997 – translation 
RP). This implied that the mayor, chief of the regional police and deputy of 
justice were doubtful of this new perspective of domestic violence as a public 
safety issue.  
The strong focus on interventions from a safety and criminal justice 
perspective was also the subject of debate amongst local council members who 
were less critical in their remarks during commission meetings the matter 
(Commissie Welzijn, 1997).  Council members eventually supported the 
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policy program: “I praise this policy approach: we should take action and stop 
talking” (Mr Beenhakker, Commissie Welzijn, 1997  translation RP). They 
also appeared to support the implementation of interventions from a public 
safety perspective: “When it comes to the criminal act, each discipline has its 
own methods which should be taken seriously” (Councillor van Perle, 
Commissie Welzijn, 1997). The majority of the members explicitly supported 
this policy approach by highlighting the importance of prevention and/or help 
in their comments. More importantly however, nobody opposed.  
 
The initial policy debate shows frame alignment between local coalitions as 
well as international policy ideas entering the local policy arena. The frame of 
critical supporters in local coalition B was invigorated by the professional 
pioneers in coalition A. Frame bridging took place when the local professional 
actors learned about existing domestic violence policies in place in England, 
Canada and New Zealand. These international policy ideas were adopted into 
the frames of the local coalitions who now recognized the need to address 
domestic violence as a public safety matter as well.   
 
Local policy frame & discourse institutionalization 
The policy debate eventually resulted in Haarlem’s first policy on domestic 
violence titled ‘Violence in the Family’ being passed in 1997 (Gemeente 
Haarlem, 1997). For the first time, this document expressed the formal policy 
frame of domestic violence being both an individual policy object, and a 
public safety issue. The diagnostic message of the policy frame promotes a 
broad perspective on domestic violence: “By domestic violence we generally 
mean physical violence, sexual abuse, humiliation, isolation and neglect in 
domestic situations. Unequal relationships are a permanent crucial factor. [..] 
The term ‘domestic/family’ does not only refer to married couples, but also to 
other situation on which people live (or used to live) together” (Gemeente 
Haarlem, 1997: 3 – translation RP).  The policy document went further in 
mentioning multiple groups of potential victims, including children, elderly 
people and immigrants. 
 The prognostic message of the policy frame was that the local 
government should intervene in private situations that occur in the confines of 
a home (Gemeente Haarlem, 1997). The frame further pushed for the labeling 
of the domestic violence problem as both a social and safety concern: “There 
is a lot to say for addressing domestic violence not only as a matter of help 
and care, but as a matter of public safety as well. The latter implies that more 
policy instruments aimed at proactive action and prevention should be 
developed. Furthermore, policy interventions should focus on more than the 
reduction of harm to victims. They should be concerned also with the victim’s 
environment and the (potential) perpetrator” (Gemeente Haarlem, 1997: 8 – 
translation RP). The definition of domestic violence as a safety problem thus 
resulted in a policy strategy that combined social (crisis intervention, care of 
victims) and safety (persecution of committers) aspects. The policy frame thus 
implies that the entire ‘safety chain’ of prevention, pro-action, intervention, 
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aftercare and repression has to be activated in the effort to address domestic 
violence (Gemeente Haarlem, 1997).  
 
The policy frame as just described clearly resembles the frame of discourse 
coalition A that was made up of the professional pioneer who singly handedly 
composed the policy strategy. This points to a process of discourse 
institutionalization that included also elements of foreign or international 
policy in the formal policy plans.  
 
3.1.2 The mayor’s role on paper and in practice  
The following sections present empirical clues of the mayor’s expected role 
and role in practice. 
 
Expected role 
The policy document 'Violence in the Family' partially qualified domestic 
violence as a public safety problem, thus making it very much the core 
business of the mayor. Interestingly however, the mayor was not mentioned in 
the policy plan (Gemeente Haarlem, 1997). Neither was he closely involved in 
policy practice. Instead, the alderman of Social Affairs was mentioned as the 
principal of the new policy towards domestic violence, and The Public Health 
Service was listed as being responsible for the daily work of developing the 
new policy approach (College B&W, 1997; Gemeente Haarlem, 1997). 
  
Role in practice: high level of frame enactment by non action 
The policy strategy regarding domestic violence was indeed carried out by the 
Social and Health departments of the municipality of Haarlem. The alderman 
took political responsibility for the policy ‘Violence in the Family’, and he was 
the spokesperson for the plan during local council and commission meetings 
related to social and health issues (Commissie welzijn, 1996).  The mayor was 
involved in the policy process only in his capacity as a member of the board of 
mayor and alderman and as a member of the consultation group who discussed 
and approved the policy. However, mayor B did take an active stance in that 
he promoted Haarlem’s approach to domestic violence as a shining example at 
the national Organization for Dutch Municipalities (VNG). One of his few 
comments on the matter were made in a Haarlem city council meeting when he 
said: “I can announce that tomorrow I will have the pleasure of giving in a 
speech at a conference about domestic violence in Rotterdam. This is the kick 
off by the VNG to present a program for municipalities who are not as 
prepared as Haarlem to deal with the problems of domestic violence” (Mayor 
B, Gemeenteraad, 2003 – translation RP). Nonetheless, his involvement in the 
policy reflected his role as a representative of local government, and not so 
much his responsibility for local order and safety. Thus his low level of 
involvement with the implementation of the policy on domestic violence was 
very much in line with what was outlined in the policy document which 
indicates a high level of frame enactment by low involvement. 
 
  
 
 
151 
 
3.1.3 Institutional arrangements 
Various factors arising at the local, national and even international policy 
arena played a role in the Haarlem’s very first policy process regarding the 
drug-related nuisance as just described.   
 
Local arena  
High impact events in the local policy arena triggered a local framing process 
during which domestic violence was first labeled as a safety matter in 
Haarlem. Two highly cases of domestic violence were deemed so horrible that 
various professionals argued that a policy program was needed in order to 
prevent such incidents from happening again. Moreover, it made them 
reformulate the existing normative position that governments should not 
intervene in matters arising in the privacy of people's homes.  
  
International policy arena 
The content of the local policy frame was inspired by regulative aspects 
(policy strategies) that had been adopted in a number of other countries. 
Although the Dutch national government had not yet labeled domestic 
violence as a public safety problem in the late 1990s, governments in other 
countries had. Foreign policy practices strongly affected the local framing 
process, including strategies from England, Canada, USA and New Zealand 
which were eventually incorporated into the policy adopted in Haarlem. 
International policy practices were thus a major source of inspiration for the 
local professional pioneers in Haarlem whose frame was eventually 
institutionalized into the formal policy strategy of Haarlem in the late 1990s.     
 
National arena  
While the local policy debate and policy frame on domestic violence was not 
modeled on any existing policies from the national policy arena, the 
implementation of the resultant policy was however impacted by several 
crucial interactions between the local and national policy arenas. 
First, a representative from the Ministry of Justice participated (on the 
invitation of local authorities) in the multidisciplinary work group tasked in 
1996 to create a local policy strategy regarding domestic violence (Werkgroep 
geweld in het gezin, 1996 a-d). Subsequently, the head of the Department of 
Order and Public Safety in Haarlem was invited into a national committee 
tasked to supervise a large national research project on domestic violence 
(Intomart, 1997). This created a link between the local policy practices and the 
national government, leading to a cross fertilization of policy development 
efforts in the two arenas. Second, the national government honored a call by 
local authorities in Haarlem to provide additional funding for the 
implementation the new domestic violence policy project (Gemeente Haarlem, 
1997b). Thus to an extent, the national budget enabled the actual 
implementation of the local policy frame. Third, the national government 
created its own policy guidelines on domestic violence by modeling Haarlem’s 
approach. Further, Haarlem’s approach was copied by other Dutch 
municipalities. Local authorities in Haarlem actively engaged in national 
policy processes and Mayor B promoted the local approach among other local 
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governments. This shows the impact local policy frames can have on national 
policy dynamics. Using the terminology of the conceptual model, local 
regulative aspects triggered the national policy practices and were diffused and 
adopted elsewhere in the country.    
3.2 The regional approach of the late 2000s 
Domestic violence was a fully-fledged policy topic in both the local and 
national policy arenas by the end of the 21
st
 century. The national government 
undertook various policy initiatives, amongst which was the policy called 
'Advice and Support Points on Domestic Violence' and the national policy 
program ‘Protected and Empowered’ (Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, 
Welzijn en Sport, 2007). At the same time, it ran various public campaigns and 
published clear guidelines on child abuse, domestic violence and honor 
killings (Openbaar Ministerie, 2010). Most significantly for Haarlem, the 
national government created a new power for Dutch mayors in 2009 to issue 
temporary home restrictions for domestic violence perpetrators. This allowed 
mayors across the Netherlands to restrict the behavior of domestic violence 
perpetrators and keep them from home for ten days or longer as deemed 
necessary (Law on Temporary Home Restrictions).   
 
3.2.1 Frame expansion 
It is within this context that the initial policy frame as reflected in Haarlem’s 
first domestic violence policy document ‘Violence in the Family’ came to be 
expanded. Triggered and steered by new actors in the regional policy arena, it 
saw the introduction of temporary home restrictions (Gemeente Haarlem, 
2009) and further expanded into a regional policy approach covering the 
region of Kennemerland (Gemeente Haarlem, 2010). It is within this expanded 
approach that the mayor of Haarlem became seriously involved with domestic 
violence for the first time. Figure 15 summarizes this policy processes by 
means of the conceptual model. 
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Figure 15: Frame expansion of the problem of domestic violence in Haarlem in 
the late 1990s 
Local policy network
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Discourse coalitions & frame alignment  
Whereas Haarlem pioneered the policy domain of domestic violence in the late 
1990s, ten years later, several policy actors maintain that it still lacks spirit and 
has been limited in its progress. These sentiments were expressed in a local 
policy debate in which several council members, as well as the aldermen 
focused less on the problem definition of domestic violence, and more on the 
policy strategies that have been put in place. 
 
Discourse Coalition B: Critical but supportive council members and Aldermen 
Local council members from the Christian Democratic Party, the party for the 
Elderly, the Labor Party, the Green Left Party  and the Alderman of Social and 
Welfare Affairs formed the first discourse coalition. They found common 
ground in their conviction that the progress brought about by the existing 
policy approach to domestic violence in Haarlem had come to a standstill. A 
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single council member representing the Green Left Party explicitly stated her 
disappointment during a council meeting: “When I read this policy plan, I can 
do nothing but wonder what happened over the past three years. Everything 
mentioned in this plan we already proposed to do before” (councillor de Jong, 
Gemeenteraad, 2008). Another council member stated: “In our view, Haarlem 
has lost its pioneer position in addressing domestic violence” (Councillor 
Koper Gemeenteraad, 2008).  
The policy standstill was recognized as well by the former project 
managers of the GGD (employee public health service, interview July 2012), 
and the Social Department of Haarlem (civil servant 6, interview July 2012). 
According to them, organizational problems such as inactive civil servants and 
those on maternity leaves caused a policy standstill. In 2007, the Christian 
Democratic and Party for the Elderly sought actively to regain political and 
policy attention for domestic violence. During a council meeting, they argued 
that domestic violence was a substantive societal problem and called upon “the 
board of mayor and aldermen to make domestic violence a number one 
priority in their social policy in light of the national policy” (Gemeenteraad, 
2007). This proposal was responded to by the Aldermen for Social Affairs who 
stated that domestic violence was already a priority in Haarlem (ibid).    
Although the council approved the renewed regional policy strategy 
on domestic violence, various aspects of the regional policy approach were 
heavily critiqued. First, it was said that the regional approach would bring 
along the risk of 'free riding municipalities’ (Councillor Pen, Gemeenteraad 
2008), ‘extra expenses for Haarlem because of its role as the central city 
(Councillor Koper, Councillor Heiligers, Gemeenteraad 2008). Concerns were 
raised also that ‘decreasing national budgets’ would endanger proper policy 
interventions (Councillor Pen and Councillor van Zetten, Gemeenteraad 2008). 
Furthermore, a long list of difficulties relating to the coordination of the 
regional approach were discussed. Complaints included that of ‘failing 
coordination’ by the central city of Haarlem, a shortage of shelters for victims 
of domestic violence, a lack of manpower in the police force to support the 
implementation of home restrictions and ‘failing cooperation’, particularly that 
between the police and shelters in particular (Gemeenteraad, 2008/9, 
Commissie, 2010).    
 
The prognostic frame as expressed by discourse coalition B was mostly built 
on criticisms of the existing state of affairs, instead of constructive policy 
advice that could potentially become institutionalized into the formal policy. 
Nonetheless, their criticisms provided fruitful ground for policy change, and 
enabled supra local policy ideas to become institutionalized into the local 
policies.  More specifically, it prompted the adoption of home restrictions into 
both the regional and local policy strategies.  
 
Local policy frame & discourse institutionalization 
The grumblings of dissatisfied council members, a shift in the composition of 
regional policy actors and the introduction of temporary home restrictions by 
the central government eventually triggered a renewed policy strategy: “The 
introduction of the temporary home restrictions by the 1st of January 2009 are 
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the reasons to renew the policy regarding domestic violence. There is a 
window of opportunity to design the policy for a regional scope with the 
municipality of Haarlem as the center city" (Gemeente Haarlem, 2009). This 
new policy strategy was formulated in several regional policy documents. 
Various actors, including the local authorities of Haarlem, formally committed 
themselves to regional cooperation (Gemeente Haarlem, 2009; Gemeente 
Haarlem, 2010). Sixteen professional organizations and ten municipalities
34
 
singed the formal agreement on regional policy ambitions, again reflecting the 
fact that the local domestic violence policies were adopted into the regional 
frame:  “The locally designed approach to domestic violence expanded 
throughout the region of Kennemerland in the late 1990s. Based on 
cooperation between local and regional parties, agreements were made and 
formalized in conventions” (Gemeente Haarlem, 2009: 29 –translation RP). 
The diagnostic message of the policy frame remained more or less the 
same over the years. The regional cooperation agreement defined domestic 
violence as follows: “Domestic violence is violence which is committed by 
someone from the domestic sphere of the victim. By the domestic sphere, we 
mean (ex) partners, family and friends of the family. The term ‘domestic’ does 
not refer to the exact location in which violence takes place, but to the 
relationship between victim and committer.  Domestic violence can be child 
abuse, sexual abuse, violence between (ex) partners in all possible forms, and 
the abuse or neglect of the elderly. Domestic violence can take a physical 
form, such as assault and threatening (stalking). It can also take the form of 
honor killings, victimization by pimps, forced marriage and female genital 
mutilation as well. This implies that domestic violence is a broad policy 
domain which is connected to multiple others” (Gemeente Haarlem, 2010: 4). 
Thus, domestic violence was qualified as both a social and safety problem 
consisting of various types of violence taking place in different types of 
relationships. 
The prognostic message of the policy continued to combine elements 
of care and prosecution (Gemeente Haarlem, 2010). The various activities and 
policies of the large number of organizations involved in the effort were 
somehow harmonized into a single, regional approach to domestic violence. 
This resulted in the structuring of cooperation efforts, and professionalizing of 
their approach with the introduction of the ‘systemic or full approach’. This 
approach focused on the victim, the perpetrator, as well as on their 
environment: “The problem should be approached as a whole, and should 
                                                 
34   Algemeen Maatschappelijk Werk (Stichting Kontext, SMD Midden- 
Kennemerland en Stichting Meerwaarde), Brijder Verslavingszorg, Palier, Bureau 
Jeugdzorg (Noord-Holland en Agglomeratie Amsterdam), GGD, Kennemerland, 
GGZ (Parnassia BavoGroep en GGZ InGeest), Politie Kennemerland, Raad voor 
de Kinderbescherming, Reclassering Nederland regio Alkmaar – Haarlem, 
Slachtofferhulp Nederland, Steunpunt Huiselijk Geweld Kennemerland, 
Vrouwenopvang: Blijf Groep, De Waag, Mee, Lijn 5, Jeugdriagg Noord Holland 
Zuid, Gemeente Beverwijk, Gemeente Bloemendaal, Gemeente Haarlemmerliede 
en Spaarnwoude, Gemeente Haarlem, Gemeente Heemskerk, Gemeente 
Heemstede, Gemeente Uitgeest, Gemeente Velsen, Gemeente Zandvoort. 
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consider the family, the relationship of the partners, and the role of the larger 
family in the case of honor killing. A systemic approach is needed to 
structurally solve the problem. In such an approach, the focus is not only on 
providing help and care, it focuses strongly on prevention as well, by means of 
communication and education, for example”  (Gemeente Haarlem, 2009: 5). A 
completely new element was further added to the prognostic frame, namely 
that of crisis intervention by means of the policy instrument of temporary 
home restrictions. This instrument was meant to “create peace in the family, 
as well as a way to organize help both for the person banned from the home 
and the people who stay behind” (Gemeente Haarlem, 2009:8).  
 
Taken together, this implies that the renewed policy strategy to domestic 
violence was strongly characterized by supra local aspects as the new power of 
home restrictions was directly institutionalized into the regional policy plans, 
and local authorities started formal collaboration with multiple regional 
partners.  
 
3.2.2 The mayor’s role on paper and in practice 
In the following sections the mayor’s expected role and role in practice are 
discussed. 
 
Expected role  
A new element in this regional policy approach is the power for mayors to 
temporarily restrict committers of domestic violence from being at home (Law 
on Temporary Home Restrictions).  The regional policy strategy against 
domestic violence states that the mayor can decide whether or not to give out a 
home restriction, and he is to do so in close cooperation with his regional 
partners. In fact, all mayors in the region Kennemerland decided to partially 
delegate the preparation, implementation and control of these home restriction 
to the police (Gemeente Haarlem, 2009). The police conduct risk assessments 
in cases of domestic violence, and the mayors are then advised whether or not 
to apply a home restriction. The mayors would then have to make their own 
decision of whether to issue a restriction order. The adoption of this new 
power into the regional policy strategies prompted the mayor of Haarlem to get 
involved with the policy approach regarding domestic violence, as the former 
head of Haarlem’s department of local safety and order explained: “In 
Haarlem, domestic violence was long part of the portfolio of the aldermen. 
Only when the temporary home restrictions were introduced, our mayor got 
involved” (Civil servant 4, interview July 2012-translation RP).  
 
Role in practice: full enactment 
With the introduction of the temporary home restrictions in 2009, the mayor of 
Haarlem got involved with domestic violence in a direct and operational 
manner. Mayor C was similarly in favor of home restrictions: “I think home 
restrictions are a good instrument. Before, the police experienced problems 
because there were too few instruments to address the problem. […]  I think it 
good that mayors receive more tools with which to govern. […] people expect 
active involvement by government when there are problems” (Mayor C, 
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Interview August 2012 – translation RP). He enacted his expected role by 
giving out multiple home restrictions during his tenure, all in consultation with 
the police. The way it worked in practice, the mayor had a mobile phone 
application which made it possible for him to respond to requests by the police 
at any time, and to review the risk assessment they had conducted. The mayor 
was known to respond to these requests even at nights and during meetings: 
“It comes down to an app on my phone […] I log on, check the risk assessment 
report and push red in case of ‘no’, an green in case of a ‘yes’ for home 
restriction”  (Mayor C, Interview August 2012 – translation RP). This type of 
involvement in individual cases of domestic violence is in line with the 
expected role of the mayor in the regional policy approach.  
In sum, the mayor’s role in practice is best characterized by his 
structural involvement through the temporal home restrictions, which implies 
operational involvement and full frame enactment. He enacted his expected 
role in collaboration with two key partners, primarily the local Department of 
Social Affairs, and the police who implemented the home restrictions. Other 
aspects of the effort, including policy design and the coordination of the care 
and help structures were generally carried out by others (civil servant 6 and 7, 
employee public health service, police chief 1 and Mayor C – interviews 2012) 
 
3.2.3 Institutional arrangements 
Various factors arising in the local and national policy arena influenced the 
processes of frame expansion as just described.  
 
Local arena 
Dissatisfaction about existing policy strategies and practices among local 
council members fostered the expansion of the domestic violence frame in 
Haarlem. According to various key actors, by the mid-2000s, the local policy 
approach was found not to be running effectively or efficiently. Cognitive 
aspects expressed by local stakeholders cleared the way for participation in 
regional collaboration structures in an attempt to improve local policies and 
embrace new policy tools. 
 
Regional arena  
Haarlem’s participation in the regional policy efforts to address domestic 
violence prompted the mayor of Haarlem to address domestic violence in 
several ways. First, the local implementation of the regional strategy for 
addressing domestic violence created a role for Mayor C, both on paper and in 
practice. Secondly, the mayor’s playing field expanded to include participation 
in regional policy strategies which, thirdly, brought to the fore new partners 
with whom he could collaborate.   
 
National arena 
The introduction of the temporary home restrictions in 2009 triggered the 
expansion of the initial policy frame by adding a new instrument to the 
diagnostic message which promoted active involvement by the mayor. 
Regulative aspects of the national policy context thus brought along a role for 
the mayor in local policies towards domestic violence as formally described in 
  
 
 
158 
 
the regional policy strategies (Gemeente Haarlem, 2009 / 2010).  Adoption of 
the new power activated the mayor to get involved with addressing domestic 
violence in practice.  
3.3 Research findings sub case 2 
In reconstructing the initial framing process of domestic violence, several 
preliminary conclusions can be made about how frame shifts affect the 
mayor’s role and position. First, the sub case analysis points to two major 
frame shifts in the local policy frame regarding domestic violence between 
1990 and 2010. In 1997, domestic violence was defined as an individual policy 
object for the first time and qualified as a both a social as well as a public 
safety problem that manifests itself in many types of violent behavior in the 
domestic sphere. This initial policy frame combined existing help and crisis 
structures for victims with new strategies for the prevention of domestic 
violence, and for the prosecution of perpetrators. In the late 2000s, this policy 
frame was expanded by the introduction of a regional policy against domestic 
violence. A large regional collaboration network uniting local governments 
and many other actors was created, and all mayors in the region were expected 
to implement their new power of temporary home restrictions in a similar 
manner. This meant close collaboration with the police in making risk 
assessments. 
Initially, the policy frame reflecting domestic violence as a matter of 
public safety did not prescribe a major role for the mayors of Haarlem. 
However, this changed when the second framing process took place in the late 
2000s. While the aldermen of Social Affairs and the Public Health 
Organization was initially given formal responsibility for policy development 
and implementation, a fundamental transformation in the mayor’s role took 
place in the late 2000s by the incorporation of home restrictions into the 
regional policy approach. The mayor’s role regarding domestic violence 
changed from a nonexistent one, to one explicitly mentioned in the formal 
policy strategies. The mayors became involved in making decisions on 
individual cases of domestic violence and worked closely with the police and 
the Municipal Department of Social Issues in this regard. 
These changes in both the policy frame as well as the mayor’s role and 
position on paper and in practice can be explained by an interplay between the 
national and local policy arena’s shaping of the process of problem framing 
and role structuration.  The application of the conceptual model on this first 
sub case points to the following research findings: First of all, the framing of 
domestic violence as a local policy problem was triggered by events in the 
local arena (lethal incidents of domestic violence), which brought about a 
cognitive processes during which various discourse coalitions altered their 
perspective. Secondly, regulative aspects of the international and national 
policy arena were incorporated into the initial policy frame (late 1990s) as 
well as the expanded policy frame (late 2000s), such that the local domestic 
violence policy frame comprised a mixture of local and external policy ideas. 
Cross fertilization took place in both a both bottom up as well as top down 
manner as a result of institutional arrangements that promoted the interaction 
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and cooperation of individual actors from the local and national policy arenas. 
Thirdly, local enactment of the initial policy frame was also enabled by 
regulative aspects of the national policy arena, specifically a measure of 
financial support. The resultant local policy strategies in turn affected 
regulative aspects of the national arena and regional policy dynamics. 
Fourthly, in the selection of actors to be responsible for crafting the very first 
policy strategy on domestic violence in the late 1990s, historical policy 
practices far overweighed the outcome of local framing processes. Path 
dependency in the local policy arena explains why the mayor and other safety 
actors were not initially activated, and why the new policy frame placed the 
policy problem of domestic violence clearly outside of their radius of action. 
Instead, actors who more traditionally dealt with victims of violence were held 
responsible for the policy approach. Finally, changes in mayor’s role as 
promoted by the expanded policy frame in the late 2000s can be most clearly 
explained by examining the regulative aspects of the national policy context. A 
rather top down process created a role for the mayor of Haarlem, by which 
powers created by the national government were adopted into regional policy 
practices and implemented by the local government. This sub case 
demonstrated that the mayor was not activated by the safety frame until formal 
powers to take action on it were available.   
4 Sub case 3  Organized crime in Haarlem 
Out of the three sub cases in Haarlem, organized crime is the ‘newest’ public 
safety problem to be addressed by the local government. This section presents 
a short history of this policy domain, followed by a first indication of the 
initial policy frames and potential frame shifts that followed between 1990 and 
2020. It was not until 2005 that the local government in Haarlem got involved 
with addressing severe forms of crime which used to be dealt with by the 
police and Ministry of Justice at the national level. Between 2005 and 2010, 
the mayor and other local authorities in Haarlem developed an expanding set 
of policy instruments and strategies to address multiple manifestations of 
severe criminal behavior.  
The first step towards a local approach to organized crime came with 
the adoption of BIBOB legislation into local policies in Haarlem (College 
B&W, 2005a/b). With the introduction of the BIBOB Act in the Netherlands 
earlier in 2002, local authorities were able to screen applicants for government 
permits for criminal ties and illegal behavior. Local authorities could then 
withdraw or refuse to give out a permit, subsidy or tender when there was 
sufficient grounds to suspect that the applicant may use the permit for illegal 
activities (Law on Enhancing the Integrity of Assessments by the Public 
Administration  BIBOB). Preparations for the adoption of BIBOB in 
Haarlem took place between 2005 and 2006, which were the final years of the 
tenure of Mayor B. Local authorities in Haarlem decided to implement this act 
in stages, first addressing sectors which were deemed most susceptible to 
organized crime, namely gambling houses, hotels, restaurants, bars and coffee 
shops  (College B&W, 2005 a/b; Gemeente Haarlem, 2006). In 2008, this 
initial BIBOB approach was evaluated and slightly adjusted (Gemeente 
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Haarlem, 2008). In 2009, local authorities expanded the reach of the BIBOB 
instrument when they decided to use it in relation to smart and head shops. 
These shops were increasingly being seen as possible venues for organized 
crime related to the production of soft drugs (Gemeente Haarlem, 2010).  
In the late 2000s, the municipality of Haarlem joined a regional 
collaboration structure of government actors that sought to address organized 
crime. In doing so, Haarlem’s local approach to organized crime became more 
or less incorporated into a interregional collaborative network that combined 
administrative, juridical and fiscal interventions. Formalized by a collaboration 
agreement, they aimed to tackle various forms of crime undertaken by criminal 
networks, such as human trafficking, the production and trade of soft drugs, 
fraud and illegal prostitution (Regionaal convenant, 2009). A key component 
of this approach was the pooling of information from the three domains in 
order to improve the likelihood of tracing criminal networks.   
The policy path as just described shows at least two key moments 
when the policy frame regarding domestic violence underwent substantial 
changes. In general, the policy frame expanded from one focused on the need 
for the integrity of local government to be addressed primarily by local 
government itself, to an expanded focus on severe forms of organized crime 
that require cohesive interregional cooperation to be effectively addressed. The 
local government’s policies were first framed by a suspected relationship 
between the legal activities of local authorities in specific sectors, and the 
illegal activities of criminal groups. This problem was to be addressed from 
2006 by the careful screening of applicants seeking municipal permits by the 
application of the BIBOB criteria.  Second, the local policy efforts carried out 
in Haarlem were to be incorporated into a larger collaborative network that 
sought to address a wide variety of criminal activities. The perceived problems 
related to organized crime were broadened in the local policy frame to include 
human trafficking, fraud, and illegal prostitution. The local policy strategy was 
expanded further by a combination of fiscal, administrative and crime related 
intelligence and instruments. Table 12 provides an overview of these shifts in 
Haarlem’s policy frame between 1990 and 2010. 
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Table 12: Overview of the policy frames on organized crime between 1990 
and 2010 in Haarlem 
 
4.1 Preventing unintended governmental support for illegal activities mid-
2000s 
Traditional state actors such as the police and public prosecutor have long held 
a monopoly on the tracking and prosecuting of organized crime. However, in 
the early 1990s, the importance of administrative actions focusing on the 
prevention of unintended governmental support for illegal activities was 
argued in several studies and policy documents (Stuiksma, 1994; PEO, 1995; 
Fijnaut, 2002). Consequently, in the past two decades, a set of policy tools has 
been developed that create a so called ‘administrative approach to organized 
crime’ in which local municipalities are granted an important role (Huisman, 
2010). The most important administrative tool for municipalities is the BIBOB 
Act which aims to protect the government’s integrity. BIBOB was introduced 
in 2002, and allows local authorities to withdraw or refuse to give out a permit, 
subsidy or tender in case of suspicion that the applicant may use the permit for 
illegal activities (Law on Enhancing the Integrity of Assessments by the Public 
Administration  BIBOB).  As a result of this law, local authorities can also 
seek the assistance a national BIBOB office to conduct more extended, 
national-level screenings of applicants seeking local permits.  
 
4.1.1 Initial framing process 
It is within this larger policy context that local authorities in Haarlem decided 
to implement the BIBOB Act in 2005 (College B&W, 2005a/b). This 
implementation resulted in the creation of a local policy approach to aspects of 
organized crime that were manifesting in local society.  This local policy 
Time 
period  
Topic policy 
frame 
Policy  frame: diagnostic & prognostic message 
2005 
 
Unintended 
governmental 
support for 
illegal 
activities    
 
Diagnostic message: Criminals are using governmental services 
for illegal activities. 
 
Prognostic message:  BIBOB screening before giving out 
licenses, permits and tenders in multiple sectors: hotels, bars, 
restaurants, prostitution, gambling houses and coffee shops. 
 
(Toepassing BIBOB-instrument Openbare Orde – Gemeente 
Haarlem, 2010) 
Late 
2010  
 
Criminal 
networks 
Diagnostic message:   Criminal networks are undertaking 
illegal activities such as human trafficking, the illegal 
production of soft drugs and fraud. 
 
Prognostic message: A regional approach is necessary, 
combining information and instruments from local 
administrative, criminal justice and fiscal actors.  
 
(Regionaal Convenant Geïntegreerde Decentralisatie aanpak 
Georganiseerde Misdaad – Regionaal convenant, 2009) 
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framing process took place in a rather top down manner in that the national 
policy ideas were adopted into local policy plans. However, only when local 
actors recognized organized crime as a local policy problem did their frames 
merge with the national policy frames and the way was paved for actual policy 
implementation. Figure 16 summarizes this policy process in terms of the key 
concepts of the conceptual model.  
 
Figure 16: Initial framing process of domestic violence in Haarlem in the mid-
2000s 
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Discourse coalitions & frame alignment 
Various actors in the local policy network expressed their individual frames on 
organized crime during policy discussions surrounding the implementation of 
BIBOB in Haarlem. These frames came along with their own prognostic 
messages. In examining the frames of key individuals, and the interaction 
between policy actors, we can identify several discourse coalitions who made 
their arguments between the start of policy discussions in 2005, and policy 
implementation in 2008.  
 
Discourse Coalition A: mayor sees little organized crime in local society 
The first coalition was a single actor coalition comprising Mayor B.  Although 
the mayor recognized that organized crime was a public safety problem in the 
Netherlands, he deemed its manifestation to be limited or even absent. The 
mayor’s personal frame was that there was no immediate danger, and as such, 
no real reason to adopt BIBOB as a local instrument to address organized 
crime. As he stated in an interview conducted for the purpose of this study: “I 
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knew about crime in Haarlem. There were general reports about it and I 
always received information about the ‘big guys’ in Haarlem. However, this 
was not a big deal and I was not waiting for it [BIBOB instrument]” (Mayor 
B, Interview  August 2012  translation RP).   
 
Discourse Coalition B: Local council supports BIBOB policy  
The second discourse coalition consisted of a majority of local council 
members. They shared a frame or prognostic message that supported the 
adoption of the BIBOB instrument. During the commission meeting, these 
council members asked only questions relating to specific details of the 
BIBOB procedure such as who finances the expenses arising from the checks, 
and whether or not civil servants would be educated on the workings of the act 
(Commissie ABZ, 2005). The absence of a substantive policy debate about 
whether or not to adopt BIBOB demonstrated the local council's support of the 
adoption of this instrument in Haarlem. Both the commission and council 
approved the policy without much debate, with the commission going so far as 
to state:  “The commission expresses her thankfulness for this policy document. 
The members of the commission state that it is sad these measures are needed 
however they deem that it is sensible to do so.” (Commissie ABZ, 2005: 2  
translation RP). During the council meeting in which the BIBOB policy was 
approved, only one council member representing the liberal party (VVD) 
expressed his personal view that the BIBOB policy would be important to 
apply in efforts to address problems present in the prostitution sector 
(Gemeenteraad, 2005). 
 
Discourse coalition C: A new board of mayor and alderman prioritize BIBOB 
Just after the BIBOB policies were formally approved in 2006, a new board of 
Mayor and Aldermen came into office. These actors were united by their 
frame, or their (implicit) recognition that organized crime is a serious concern 
in local society, and their prognostic message, which was “to implement the 
BIBOB Act to sectors of business vulnerable to (organized) crime” 
(Coalitieakkoord 2006: 7  translation RP). The new mayor promoted an 
active use of the BIBOB instrument: “You could have read in the coalition 
agreement that the BIBOB instrument will be implemented in Haarlem. 
Preparations have been made. There is a policy plan called BIBOB, and 
manpower has been allocated. This means that we are actively going to 
implement BIBO” (Mayor C  Gemeenteraad, 2006: 934  translation RP).  
 
Discourse coalition D: Council members wanting to expand BIBOB 
A few years after BIBOB was adopted, representatives of the Liberal Party and 
the Action Party expressed their continued support for the BIBOB instrument 
itself, but criticized the lack of reporting to the city council of details of its 
implementation. They criticized also the absence of a thorough evaluation of 
its effectiveness (Action Party - gemeenteraad 2008/ 2009). Nonetheless, they 
wanted to expand the implementation of BIBOB in general (Action Party  
gemeenteraad 2008; Liberal Party – Gemeenteraad 2009), as well as in relation 
to specific concerns such as prostitution (Action Party  Gemeenteraad, 2007). 
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During the policy debate surrounding the local adoption and implementation of 
the BIBOB instrument, two instances of frame alignment took place. First was 
the alignment between national and local policy frames which occurred when 
council members supported the implementation of the National BIBOB law. 
Second, the new board of mayor and alderman aligned themselves with the 
national frame when they explicitly prioritized BIBOB in their coalition 
agreement. In both cases, local frames were invigorated by national policy 
ideas.  
 
Local policy frame & discourse institutionalization 
Haarlem’s first formal steps towards a local administrative approach to 
organized crime was in the adoption of the BIBOB act. Policy guidelines 
(College B&W, 2005a/b) and implementation rules (Gemeente Haarlem, 2006) 
were issued by the board of mayor and aldermen that mirrored the initial 
policy frame on organized crime.  
The diagnostic message of the policy frame mirrored by these 
documents concentrates on the ‘integrity of local government’. Local 
authorities problematized the potential interconnection between the workings 
of the government and the world of crime: “Just like anywhere else, the 
municipality of Haarlem can be confronted with criminals and criminal 
enterprises. […] They are strongly connected to the municipal context: they 
function as a legal businesses and interact in any possible way with their legal 
context (College B&W, 2005b: 1 translation RP). The government was said 
to risk unintendedly facilitating illegal activities and criminal behavior. For 
instance, when permits are given out by the local government to set up a new 
bar, and the place is used for the drug trade, or money laundering. The policy 
frame problematizes several domains amenable to organized crime, such as the 
bars, coffee shops, gambling houses and real estate (Gemeente Haarlem, 
2006). 
  The prognostic message of the policy frame was to screen applications 
for permits and subsidies in these branches by means of the BIBOB 
instruments. If there was grounds to suspect that governmentally approved 
facilities could be used for illegal and criminal activities, local government 
could withdraw permits, or refuse to issue them. The local authorities in 
Haarlem decided to implement BIBOB in two phases starting with the policy 
sectors most vulnerable to illegal activities (College B&W, 2005). First, 
BIBOB would be applied to applications of new permits in the branches 
deemed most sensitive:  hotels, restaurant, bars, coffee shops, the prostitution 
sector, and gambling houses (Gemeente Haarlem, 2006). Later on, BIBOB 
would be applied to the environmental and real estate sector. The policy frame 
stressed that a BIBOB screening is a ‘severe measure’ that imposes upon the 
'private sphere’ and should therefore be implemented based on the ‘principles 
of good governance’ (Gemeente Haarlem, 2006). A BIBOB screening by the 
nation BIBOB office should therefore only be used as an ultimate remedium: 
“First of all, an internal screening for potential grounds for refusal or 
withdrawal should be conducted by the local municipality. When this offers no 
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solution, one can revert to the national BIBOB office” (College B&W, 2005b 
 translation RP).  
 
The initial framing process resulted in the institutionalization of national 
policy ideas into local policies. The national BIBOB instrument was agreed 
upon and customized for local implementation by local authorities (Coalition 
B and C). This resulted in local policy plans that resembled the national 
BIBOB strategy, and also signaled the initiation of a local administrative 
approach to organized crime.   
 
4.1.2 The mayor’s role on paper and in practice 
In the following sections the mayor’s expected role and role in practice are 
discussed. 
 
Expected role  
As stated in national and local BIBOB policies, the mayor is expected to 
decide upon the implementation of BIBOB in individual cases.  The board of 
mayor and alderman as well as the mayor can decide to withdraw or refuse a 
permit or subsidy either independently, or they can ask the national BIBOB 
office for advice based on their more extensive BIBOB screening (College 
B&W, 2005b; Gemeente Haarlem, 2006).  
 
Role in practice: variation in frame enactment 
Both mayors were involved with policy preparation regarding BIBOB. Policy 
guidelines for a local implementation of the ‘new’ BIBOB was created during 
Mayor B's tenure. Although he formalized local BIBOB policies, he hardly 
used this new power in practice. As he states himself: “I was only involved 
with the policy preparation, I cannot remember any BIBOB case” (Mayor B, 
Interview  August 2012  translation RP). This can be explained by the fact 
that the policy program was ‘under construction' in his time as mayor, and so 
he was not yet able to enact the policy. However, the BIBOB instrument has 
been available to every subsequent Dutch mayor since its formal introduction 
in 2003. It took a few years before local authorities in Haarlem recognized 
BIBOB it as a valuable policy tool and adopted it into their local policy 
approach. 
Mayor Schneider’s was involved with actual implementation of the 
BIBOB instrument. For example, he closed several coffee shops and withdrew 
permits for café’s and bars based on the BIBOB Act (Gemeentraad, 2009) and 
ask for support of the national BIBOB office. Mayor C also made the decision 
to formally expand Haarlem’s BIBOB powers with the introduction of 
exploitation permits for grow shops, which allowed local authorities to subject 
them to BIBOB screenings (Gemeente Haarlem, 2010). Taken together, these 
activities imply full enactment by Mayor C of the role laid out for him in the 
official policy frame.   
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4.1.3 Institutional arrangements 
The initial framing process of organized crime is closely linked to 
developments in the local and national policy arena. 
 
National arena 
This sub case showed a rather top down process of frame alignment during 
which regulative aspects of the national policy arena created awareness and 
actions regarding organized crime in the local policy network. Local 
implementation of the national BIBOB instrument implied a mere adoption of 
the national policy frame regarding an administrative approach to organized 
crime into local policy documents. Facilitated by national policy tools, local 
authorities in Haarlem slowly recognized organized crime as local policy topic 
in Haarlem for the first time. Before, organized crime was only addressed by 
international and national governments.  
 
Local arena  
Several aspects of the local policy arena affected the way in which the national 
policy frame regarding organized crime and BIBOB was enacted upon by local 
authorizes and the mayors themselves. 
The rather late adoption of the BIBOB law in Haarlem can be 
explained by cognitive factors related to powerful actors in the local policy 
arena. It was a few years after the national government introduced BIBOB as 
an instrument for local authorities in 2003 that local authorities in Haarlem 
adopted it into their local approach. It was another year before local actors 
actually enacted upon this frame. Prior to 2005, local authorities in Haarlem 
did not generally consider organized crime as a pertinent local problem in the 
local municipality. This view of the problem as nonexistent explains both the 
delay in adopting the national BIBOB instruments, as well as the low level of 
frame enactment by mayor B. Only when multiple council members started to 
align their frames with national BIBOB legislation did this start to change, and 
BIBOB was formally adopted. Nevertheless, mayor B’s personal frame did not 
recognize organized crime as a pressing problem in local society which 
explains why he did not use this new power in practice. A few years later, a 
new board of mayor and aldermen came to power, and they held a different 
frame that was more aligned with the national BIBOB strategies. They started 
to realize that organized crime did in fact exist in Haarlem, and they made use 
of the BIBOB tool.  
This implies that local frames have to resonate with the national 
policy strategies in order for the national policy tools to be actually implement 
in the local policy networks. More precisely, the frames of powerful policy 
actors who bear significant responsibility for local governance, and who have a 
say in daily policy practices, have to be aligned with the national ideas to some 
extent. Finally, this sub case demonstrated that such a top down process of 
frame alignment between national and local policy frames may often require 
the passage of time. 
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4.2 A regional approach to various forms of organized crime during the 
late 2000s 
 
4.2.1 Frame expansion 
In the late 2000s, the Balkenende IV administration prioritized the problem of 
organized crime and encouraged the Dutch municipalities to play an important 
part in tackling this problem. In the national policy document titled 
‘Administrative Approach to Organized Crime,’ it was argued that organized 
crime manifest themselves in municipalities and local communities: 
“Organized crime has almost always roots on the local level” (Programma 
bestuurlijke aanpak georganiseerde misdaad, 2008:2 –translation RP). This 
national, integral approach to organized crime prioritized specific areas 
including human trafficking, the organized production of soft drugs, and fraud 
in real estate. Within this program, municipalities were granted the role of 
coordinators of the administrative approach (CCV, 2010). A National and 
Regional Center of Information and Expertise were created to support the large 
governance networks bringing together local authorities and many other 
players. Inspired by this national program, the mayor of Haarlem signed a 
regional collaboration agreement between 51 municipalities located in four 
police regions, all of whom agreed to implement this administrative, integral 
approach to organized crime in 2009 (Regionaal Convenant, 2010). In doing 
so, Haarlem’s local ‘BIBOB’ approach to organized crime was now 
incorporated into a regional collaboration network striving to combine 
administrative, juridical and fiscal interventions.   
 The local framing process underlying this policy expansion is best 
summarized again, as a top down process in which the national government 
initiated and facilitated local involvement.  Figure 17 summarizes the process 
of frame expansion.  
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Figure 17: Frame expansion of Organized Crime in Haarlem in the late 2000s 
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Discourse coalitions and frame alignment 
Organized crime became a frequently debated topic in the local policy arena in 
the late 2000s. Several discourse coalitions can be distinguished based on 
actor’s points of view and their interactions.  
 
Discourse coalition A: Growing attention for organized crime among local 
politicians 
Various local political parties expressed their worries about the manifestation 
of organized crime in Haarlem. More specifically, their statements and 
interactions indicate the belief that the problem was brought to Haarlem as a 
result of neighbor municipality Amsterdam implementing a tough program of 
measures restricting such activities within its borders. Council members of the 
Liberal Party, the Christian Democratic Party, the Socialist Party, the Labour 
Party and the Local Action Party warned against the so called ‘water bed 
effect’: “It is evident that the stronger approach taken against organized crime 
in Amsterdam makes criminals and criminal organizations turn to Haarlem” 
(Gemeenteraad, 2007) and, “Everything that was over there [Amsterdam], 
comes over here now (Gemeenteraad, 2008)”.   
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The frames of local political parties met as well in the conviction that 
the local government should undertake action. According to these parties, the 
local administrative approach was deemed not yet effective and efficient and 
they demanded that the local government: ''Keep the bad guys outside of 
Haarlem.'' (Gemeenteraad, 2007  tranlsation RP). Representatives of the 
local parties explicitly argued that this would require more than the existing 
BIBOB tool, and asked that the administrative approach be intensified by 
combining administrative and juridical interventions, and cooperation with 
other governments. In the debates that followed, local parties called upon the 
board of mayor an aldermen to optimize the local government’s information 
position (Christian Democratic and Liberal Party – Gemeentraad, 2006), create 
a detailed policy plan (Action Party – Gemeentraad, 2008), safeguard the 
financing of this effort (Christian Democratic and Liberal Party – 
Gemeentraad,, 2008), as well as create a whistle blowing arrangement (Action 
Party – Gemeentraad, 2008). 
 
Coalition B: Mayor responds to local and national calls  
Within the local policy debate, the mayor responded to the various request 
made by political parties by acknowledging that organized crime is a local 
policy problem in Haarlem. His personal frame regarding organized crime was 
that while it certainly takes place in Haarlem, it is difficult to detect: “Also in 
Haarlem there is severe and organized crime. We do not see it but we have to 
be alert” (Schneiders  Gemeenteraad, 2007). “It is the tip of the ice berg, I 
think that a lot is going on which is not seen or addressed'' (Mayor C, 
Interview August 2012 – translation RP). He supported the regional scale 
administrative approach as well as the policy instruments such as BIBOB and 
RIEC (Commissie Bestuur 2007; Gemeenteraad, 2007).  
Although Mayor C’s personal frame shows a prognostic message 
favoring involvement by the local government in addressing organized crime 
by supporting the adoption of national instruments and regional cooperation he 
held a critical stance towards local government’s role as well: “It starts with an 
criminal justice approach and off course local government should use its 
instruments as well to hinder organized crime. However, nowadays is seems 
like it is the other way around. [..] To me that is the wrong order. It think that 
there should always be a sequence. It is simply is juridical task. Not our 
primary but secondary responsibility” (Mayor C, Interview August 2012 – 
translation RP). 
 
First of all, the frames expressed by local policy parties united in coalition A 
aligned with the mayor’s frame. Mayor C agreed upon the manifestation of 
organized crime in Haarlem, agreed that local authorities should play a role in 
addressing it and pointed at national policy tools to be adopted by local 
government. This implies a process of frame bridging between coalition A and 
B. Moreover, these local frames of both local coalitions were compatible with 
the national policy frame promoting the administrative approach as well. The 
local frames of local policy parties and -later on- the mayor create solid ground 
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for the national ‘administrative approach to organized crime’ to be adopted 
into local governance activities. 
 
Local policy frame & discourse institutionalization 
The expanded policy frame regarding organized crime is expressed in the 
regional collaboration agreement between a large number of municipalities 
divided over four police regions. All parties  expressed the importance of 
“recognizing the need of an integrated approach of organized crime by 
combining administrative, criminal justice and fiscal interventions” (Regional 
Convenant, 2009:4 – translation RP). The diagnostic message of the policy 
frame was ‘inspired’ by the set of priorities listed in the national program 
administrative approach (Programma bestuurlijke aanpak georganiseerde 
criminaliteit, 2008). The regional collaboration agreement defined organized 
crime as the main policy problem to be addressed and agreed to focus on 
several of the activities undertaken by criminal networks including human 
trafficking, the production of soft drugs, fraud in real estate, money laundering 
and other financial crimes as well as other manifestations (Regionaal 
Convenant, 2009).  
The prognostic message of the policy frame was to create an 
‘integrated approach’ in which criminal justice, administrative and fiscal 
resources are combined to address the problem of organized crime (Regionaal 
Convenant, 2009). This implies the cooperation of local government with 
various actors, including the local police, the juridical system and the tax 
collector’s office. Their coordinated activities were to be supported by the 
pooling of their expertise, resources and information. In fact, the pooling of 
information was deemed a key approach to tracking and tracing criminal 
activities and networks. This integrated approach had to take place on a 
interregional level in order to tackle the problem because the region of Noord 
Holland was deemed particularly vulnerable as it housed several ‘risky 
locations’, including the airport at Schiphol and the harbors leading to the 
North Sea (Regionaal Convenant, 2009). The regional approach was deemed 
appropriate and mandatory because confining interventions locally would 
simply push criminals from one place to another and create a 'water bed' effect. 
 
4.2.2 The mayor’s role on paper and in practice 
In the following sections the mayor’s expected role and role in practice are 
discussed. 
 
Expected role  
Collaborative efforts demand a high level of coordination when they involve 
51 municipalities, four police regions, three regional and two national juridical 
departments, one province, multiple divisions of the Tax Collector’s Office 
and others demands.  It is the local Haarlem government's role to serve as the 
coordinator within this large collaboration network, (Regionaal Convenant, 
2009). Because the municipality of Haarlem sits at the center city of its police 
region, Mayor Schneider was formally assigned this role. Together with the 
mayors of Amsterdam, Zaanstad and Alkmaar, Mayor C was made responsible 
for the administrative approach towards organized crime, and he was expected 
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to take the lead in the steering group coordinating the regionally integrated 
effort. The task of this steering group was to steer the regional collaboration as 
well as to set the general objectives and coordinate the process of information 
sharing (Regionaal convenant, 2009). All four mayors assigned this task 
represented a police region in which an ‘information node’ was located, named 
the Regional Information and Expertise Centre. This implies that Mayor C has 
a supporting and mediating role towards the other municipalities in his own 
police region as well.  
 
Role in practice: frame enactment 
The majority of Mayor C’s actions regarding organized crime in the late 2000s 
can be labeled as administrative involvement. The mayor participated in the 
initiation of the regional collaboration structure, and in the signing of the 
collaboration agreement (Regionaal Convenant, 2009). He also chaired the 
steering group of the Regional Centre for Information and Expertise located in 
Haarlem (Mayor C, Interview August 2012; Public Prosecutor 2, Interview 
August 2012), participated in the making of decisions relevant to the strategies 
and priorities of the RIEC (Police Officer 1, Interview August 2012), and 
facilitated the RIEC by providing both the location and manpower for its work 
(Civil servant 8 – Interview June 2012).  Suspicions surrounding the role of 
organized crime and criminal networks were discussed during meeting of the 
local triangle consolation (Public Prosecutor 2, Interview August 2012, Civil 
servant 4 – Interview July 2012) and the mayor closed several shops, houses 
and a sports canteen with ties to organized crime (Police Officer 1, Interview 
August 2012). Taken together, these actions indicate full enactment upon his 
expected role. 
 
4.2.3 Institutional arrangements 
This paragraph provides a summary of the institutional arrangements located 
in the regional, national and local arena that affected the course and content of 
the local framing process.  
 
Regional arena  
Policy practices in the regional arena triggered a local policy debate regarding 
organized crime in Haarlem. The fact that neighboring municipality of 
Amsterdam implemented a tough policy on organized crime was discussed by 
many of the local Haarlem politicians. In particular, they feared that criminals 
and criminal networks would leave Amsterdam and come to Haarlem because 
the local authorities here were less active in addressing organized crime. These 
players thus made a case for intensifying Haarlem’s local policy approach to 
organized crime along the lines of what had been done in Amsterdam. In terms 
of the conceptual model, this implied that policy practices in the regional 
policy arena triggered a local policy debate that subsequently provided solid 
grounds for the adaption of regional and national policy strategies. 
 
National policy context  
The national policy program called the ‘Administrative Approach to 
Organized Crime’ (2008) resulted in a pilot effort at regional collaboration in 
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the province of Noord in Holland. National priorities for addressing organized 
crime as well as the national RIEC structure were adopted into the regional 
policy plans. Haarlem’s participation in this regional collaboration structure 
implied a top down process of frame expansion in which the national policy 
ideas were mediated by regional policy ambitions, which then had the effect of 
expanding the local policy frames and practices. The mayor’s role in 
addressing organized crime was expanded in this process of frame expansion, 
both formally as well as in practice. More specifically, his role in addressing 
local manifestations of organized crime in Haarlem was now incorporated into 
his administrative actions in close collaboration with many others on a 
regional scale.  
 
Local policy network  
Although this sub case shows the influence of multiple factors from the 
national and regional policy arena, local frames were also found to be crucial 
in determining the level of local participation in these regional policy 
programs. The fact that local discourse coalitions A and B prioritized 
organized crime as a local problem and called for an increase in local policy 
involvement provided a solid foundation for the adaption of national policy 
strategies into the regional and local policy practices. Again, the compatibility 
of the local and supra local policy frames proved to be a crucial precondition 
for the enactment of supra local policy frames by actors in the local policy 
arena. The formal position of Mayor C partially in charge of command and 
control of the police also increased his involvement in administrative actions 
on a regional scale. This implies that the formal position of a key local actor, 
specifically the mayor, can affect his expected role in the regional policy 
strategy. 
4.3 Research findings – Sub Case 3  
Reconstructing the initial framing process of organized crime as a public 
safety problem, and the frame expansion which followed points to several 
preliminary conclusions for the case Haarlem. The framing of organized crime 
as a local public safety problem that took place between 2005 and 2010 can be 
described as follows: The diagnostic message of the initial policy frame 
focused on the integrity of the local government (2005). The usage of local 
government services for illegal activities was problematized in the 
municipality of Haarlem. In 2009, the diagnostic message was expanded with 
criminal networks undertaking severe types of organized crime, such as human 
trafficking, fraud in real estate and the production of soft drugs. The prognostic 
message of the policy frame started in 2005 with the local adoption of the 
BIBOB tool. In 2009, this local approach in Haarlem was expanded with the 
participation of local actors in a regional collaboration program combining 
information and instruments from a local administrative, criminal justice and 
fiscal perspective.  
As the frames in the policy debate and strategy changed between 2005 
and 2010, so did the mayor’s role and position. The mayor’s role in addressing 
organized crime in Haarlem expanded from a non-existent one, to one 
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encompassing both formal and practical involvement in the local and regional 
policy strategies to address organized crime. This role change can be tracked 
over three shifts that took place between 2005 and 2010, which covered part of 
the terms of two mayors. Firstly, the introduction of BIBOB changed the level 
of Mayor B's involvement from its previously low levels. However, the mayor 
only formalized BIBOB, and never implemented its new powers. Second, once 
organized crime came to be recognized as a relevant policy topic by local 
policy actors, Mayor C started to implement and expand the BIBOB approach. 
This points to a clear role shift. Third, national policy frames were adopted 
into the regional policy program against organized crime, and this expanded 
the mayor’s ‘playing field’ from the local municipality of Haarlem to the 
(inter)regional level. This implied that the mayor now participated in the local 
as well as regional policy arena when addressing organized crime, both on 
paper and in practice. He now collaborated with various new partners, such as 
mayors from neighboring municipalities, neighboring police forces, the tax-
payers’ office and national juridical actors.  
Following from our conceptual model, the policy frames as well as the 
mayor’s role on paper and in practice can be explained as the outcome of an 
interplay between local framing processes between local discourse coalitions 
on the one hand, and institutional structure as provided by the local, regional 
and national policy network in which these interactions took place on the 
other. These revealed a rather top down process during which national policy 
strategies were adopted by local policy actors in regional and local policy 
plans and were enacted upon in practice. First, the framing of organized crime 
as a local policy topic was triggered by regulative aspects external to the local 
policy arena. The initial framing process was triggered by the introduction of 
the BIBOB tool by national government, which allowed the local government 
to start addressing organized crime. Later on, policy practices in the regional 
policy arena triggered a local policy debate which provided a solid base for 
expanding the local policy frame. Policy strategies from the regional 
collaboration program were adopted, which were in turn strongly based on the 
national policy program, ‘Administrative Approach To Organized Crime’ 
(2008). This implies that the framing and reframing of organized crime as a 
local policy problem in Haarlem was by no means a bottom up and purely 
local process, but was brought about by external triggers. Secondly, this sub 
case shows a high level of discourse institutionalization of national policy 
frames into regional and local policy frames. The content of the local and 
regional policy frames relied heavily on national policy frames. National 
policy priorities and strategies were largely adopted into the local policy plans 
(BIBOB) and practices (RIEC). Thirdly, although the local framing processes 
were both triggered by national policies which also heavily steered their 
outcomes, the frames of powerful policy actors and coalitions in the local 
policy arena enabled frame expansion as well as enactment in practice. 
Fourthly, this sub case showed that the frames of powerful policy actors or 
coalitions in the local arena had to align or at least be compatible with supra 
local policy frames in order for the latter to be institutionalize into local 
policies and be enacted upon by the mayor and others. In other words, 
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cognitive aspects (frames) of the local policy arena affected whether and how 
the mayor and other enacted the new, nationally driven policy frames.  
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Chapter 9: Case study findings Breda 
1 Introduction 
This chapter is the second of two case studies building towards an explanation 
of how the mayor’s role and position in local safety governance has been 
influenced by shifting definitions of safety problems between 1990 and 2010. 
The conceptual model will be applied to the data from Haarlem and Breda to 
answer the fourth sub-question: How have new local safety problems been 
framed in local policy processes and why, how and to what extent did they 
affect the mayor’s position and role in the practice of local safety governance? 
and the fifth sub-question of the research project: Which factors of the local, 
regional and national policy arena affected the course, content and outcome of 
local framing processes as well as the mayor’s position and role in the 
practice of local safety governance?. The following paragraphs provide a 
description of the local framing process, policy strategies and the mayor’s 
actions regarding the three sub cases of drugs-related nuisance, domestic 
violence and organized crime in Breda. 
Before turning to the in-depth case descriptions, some general 
information about the Breda case is provided. Breda is located in the southern 
part of the Netherlands and its population increased from 123,025 in 1990 to 
173,299 in 2010 (CBS). Following the case selection criteria, Breda represents 
a medium-large city which has had three mayors between 1990 and 2010. 
Mayor D (VVD) was the mayor from 1990 to 1995, Mayor E (VVD) took over 
until 2004 and Mayor F (PvdA) has been the mayor of Breda since 2004. 
Drug-related nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime have all been 
subject to local safety policies in Breda between 1990 and 2010. Table 13 
summarizes the policies put in place to address these three issues between 
1990 and 2010. It shows that each policy problem entered the local policy 
approach in Breda at a different moment in time and was reframed along the 
way.   
 
Table 13:  Overview of policy attention paid to the Breda sub cases 
Mayor D D D D D D E E E E E E E E E F F F F F F
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Drugs related nuisance
Domestic violence
Organised crime
initital framing
present in safety policy
frameshift
 
The sub case descriptions that follow provide a detailed account of what these 
framing processes looked like, how the mayors of Breda were expected to 
handle drug related nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime as well 
as how they did in practice. Each sub case analysis is structured according to 
the key concepts of the conceptual model. Firstly, a general case description is 
provided of the local policy developments, outlining the initial policy frames, 
as well as the shifts in frame that followed between 1990 and 2020. Thereafter, 
the conceptual model is applied as a guide for the gathering of all data relevant 
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to the sub cases. This is discussed in the paragraphs that follow. First an 
overview is provided of the framing process including its triggers, context, 
discourse coalitions, processes of frame alignment and institutionalization. 
Thereafter, the mayor’s role on paper as well as in practice is described. This 
entails an indication of the mayor’s expected role as well as the level of frame 
enactment as indicated by his actions or non-action in the practice of local 
safety governance. This is followed by a discussion of the institutional 
arrangements of the local as well as supra local policy arena’s affecting the 
course and outcome of local processes of problem and role structuration. 
Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of the case of Breda. The 
information gathered in this chapter forms the basis for the case analysis that 
presents a preliminary answer to sub questions four and five.   
2 Sub case 4  Drug-related nuisance in Breda 
As in Haarlem, drugs-related nuisance have been addressed by local policy 
interventions in Breda for over twenty years. Since 1986, the local government 
act allowed the mayor of Breda to close public buildings, including coffee 
shops, when they formed a threat to local order and the living climate 
(Gemeente Breda, 1986). A local policy strategy specifically aimed at reducing 
drugs-related nuisance caused by coffee shops officially started in 1991, when 
the first policy document regarding coffee shops was approved by the local 
city council (Gemeente Breda, 1991). This initial policy plan was entitled 
‘Closing Policy Coffee Shops’, and listed various forms of nuisance related to 
coffee shops, from noise and litter to trade of weapons in and around coffee 
shops. These types of nuisance were to be tackled by a regulative and 
restrictive policy approach based on several ‘closing criteria’. Using these 
criteria, local government could close coffee shops until the maximum of 20 
coffee shops was reached. The criteria included endangering local order and 
advertising criminal activities and were a mixture of local and national rules 
regarding coffee shops.  
This initial policy of regulating and limiting the number of local 
coffee shops has been continued and expanded. Over the years, several aspects 
of the policy have been altered. For example, the number of coffee shops 
allowed was decreased from twenty in 1991 to eight in 2005 (Gemeente Breda, 
2005). The closing criteria were expanded (Gemeente Breda 1991; 1997a) and 
the newly introduced opium law was adopted as the formal basis for the 
mayor’s actions on drugs. The controlling regime regarding coffee shops has 
also been enhanced recently (Gemeente Breda, 2005; 2009).  
While the policy regarding soft drugs was further developed, local 
authorities in Breda also expanded their focus on drug-related problems. In the 
late 1990s, the initial focus on coffee shops and soft drugs was expanded as 
Breda’s local authorities aligned their policies with attempts to harmonize and 
coordinate local drugs policies on a regional scale (Gemeente Tilburg, 1997). 
The initial focus on nuisance related to soft drugs in coffee shops was enlarged 
to accommodate other drug-related problems, such as ‘new drugs’ (eco drugs, 
growshops, smartshops) and hard drugs used in house parties, bars and public 
buildings. Meanwhile, the new powers for mayors to close public buildings 
  
 
 
177 
 
because of drug-related nuisance were adopted into local policy plans, inspired 
by regional policy ambitions (Gemeente Breda, 1997a).  
From 2008 onwards, drugs in and around Breda became a topic of 
debate again. A series of regional and national events and trends affected local 
policy strategies regarding drugs in Breda. Its neighboring cities, Roosendaal 
and Bergen op Zoom, abolished their ‘policy of tolerance’ regarding soft 
drugs, triggering a series of studies on drug problems in Brabant (COT, 2009; 
Commissie Fränzel, 2009; Politie en Wetenschap, 2010). The five biggest 
cities in the region scored high on crime indices, which were linked to drug-
related crime (Politie en Wetenschap, 2010). This resulted in the creation of a 
‘Task Force’ in which these cities and the national government aligned their 
forces to ‘combat’ drug-related problems in the region. Meanwhile, the 
Minister of Safety and Justice announced a more restrictive policy regarding 
soft drugs, which was to be implemented in the Brabant region at first 
(Commissie van den Donk, 2009; Tweede Kamer, 2011b).  Altogether, these 
events resulted in an adjustment of Breda’s local approach towards drugs in 
general and a slightly stricter policy regarding local coffee shops (Gemeente 
Breda, 2005; 2005/9). 
 During the past twenty years, various other drug-related issues have 
been topics of policy attention or intervention in the local governance of 
Breda. These included drug tourism, drug addiction and the drug trade by 
criminal networks. However, these issues are outside of the scope of this case 
since they were either not labeled as safety issues or were not connected to any 
drug-related nuisance. Drug tourism never qualified as a pressing topic that 
caused severe nuisance in Breda. This might be explained by the fact that 
various respondents argued that drugs tourism manifested itself only 
marginally in Breda, (civil servant 1, interview August 2012; civil servant 2, 
interview March 2013), especially in comparison to neighboring cities that 
were closer to the Belgian border (Mayor E - Interview June 2013). Drug 
addiction has been the focus of various policy programs over the years, but has 
dominantly been framed as a social or health-related issue (Gemeente 
Haarlem, 1992). Breda has been confronted with severe forms of drug-related 
crime, such as (hard) drugs in bars, criminal networks trading cocaine and 
heroin, drug-related shootings and ripdeals (Civil servant 1 Interview August 
2012; Civil servant 2  Interview March 2013, Mayor D  Interview April 
2013). However, given the violent and organized character, these criminal acts 
were not labeled as drug-related nuisance, but rather as organized crime and 
therefore belong to sub case 6.  
The policy path just described shows at least three key moments when 
the local policy frame regarding drug-related nuisance change substantially. 
First of all, the initial frame during the early 1990s focused strongly on coffee 
shops and soft drugs. The policy frame problematized various types of 
nuisance caused by coffee shops. Mayor D, who was the mayor of Breda 
during this initial period, started to restrict the number of coffee shops and 
regulate their activities through Breda’s first policy document that introduced 
various ‘closing criteria’ (Gemeente Breda, 1991). This initial policy frame 
regarding drug-related nuisance in Breda was expanded in many ways during 
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the past twenty years. First of all, regional drug policies were created in the 
late 1990s. This implied that local authorities in Breda were no longer solely in 
charge of regulating coffee shops, and neither were their activities limited by 
the municipal boundaries of Breda. The regional policy document ‘Dealing 
with drugs in the region’ in 1997 promoted harmonization and coordination of 
local drug policies in the Mid and West Brabant region (Gemeente Tilburg, 
1997). Besides coffee shops, this document listed several new types of drug-
related problems, such as hard drugs in bars and at house parties, new types of 
drugs (eco, grow, smart) as well as the trade of soft drugs in public buildings. 
These problems were to be addressed by local authorities in the region in a 
similar manner. When Breda aligned its local policy with these regional plans 
on handling drugs, a new power for the mayor was included: closing public 
buildings in case of drug-related nuisance (Local Government Act, Section 
174a).  
Second, in the early 2010s, two neighboring cities, Roosendaal and 
Bergen op Zoom, closed all of their coffee shops and the national government 
became less tolerant of soft drugs. This resulted in a revival of the policy 
debate regarding drugs in and around Breda and series of advisory committees, 
research reports and collaboration projects regarding drug-related problems 
followed. Consequently, the local approach to drugs in general was revised 
(Gemeente Breda, 2009), and the local coffee shop policy adopted distance 
criteria and membership card for customers of coffee shops as introduced by 
the national government (Gemeente Breda, 2012). Table 14 provides a general 
overview of these policy frames and the next paragraphs provides an in-depth 
analysis of the framing processes related to them.   
 
  
 
 
179 
 
Table 14: Overview of the policy frames related to the drug-related nuisance in 
Haarlem between 1990 and 2010. 
  
2.1 Coffee shops causing trouble early 1990s 
When local authorities in Breda framed local coffee shops as a policy problem, 
a national ‘policy of tolerance’ regarding soft drugs was in place in the 
Netherlands. Since the 1970s, the Dutch ‘Opium Act’ made a distinction 
between hard drugs and soft drugs (Opium Act, 1976). The former were 
illegal, while the latter were tolerated to some extent. This implied that 
although the trading, production and possession of soft drugs was illegal, their 
consumption was not. The trade of soft drugs in coffee shops was tolerated and 
regulated by means of several formal criteria introduced by the Public 
Prosecutor in 1992 (AHOJ-criteria). These criteria provided detailed 
instructions under which the trade in soft drugs was tolerated, such as the 
amount of soft drugs per costumer and the minimum age of a costumer. This 
created a niche for the existence of many coffee shops in the Netherlands 
including those in Breda. 
 
2.1.1 Initial local framing process  
Between 1987 and 1990, the number of coffee shops in Breda almost doubled 
to 24 (Gemeente Breda, 1991). According to local authorities, these shops 
Time 
period 
Topic policy 
frame 
Policy  frame: diagnostic & prognostic message 
Early 
1990s 
 
 
 
Coffee shops  
causing 
nuisance in  
Breda 
 
Diagnostic message:  An increasing number of coffee shops 
causes various types of drug-related nuisance: parking, 
noise, litter, feelings of unsafety, weapons in shops, health 
risks for youngsters and drugs tourism. 
 
Prognostic message: local government should regulate and 
maximize coffee shops by means of ‘closing criteria’ 
(Closing policy coffee shops 1991 – Gemeente Breda) 
Late 
1990s 
 
 
Soft, hard en  
new drugs 
in the region 
 
Diagnostic message:  various problems related to soft, hard  
and new drugs threaten local order, health and living climate  
in the region Mid and  West Brabant 
 
Prognostic message: regional coordination and  
harmonization of local interventions regarding various types  
of drugs 
(Dealing with Drugs in the region, 1997 –Gemeente  
Tilburg)  (Closing Policy Coffee Shops, 1997 – Gemeente  
Breda)  (Local Drugs Policy, 1997 -  Gemeente Breda) 
Early 
2010s 
 
 
Strengthening  
of local 
drugs policies 
 
Diagnostic message:  party drugs, drugs usage and trade,  
coffee shops, production of soft drugs, drugs tourism,  
criminal networks 
 
Prognostic message: Integral approach to various forms of  
drugs related problems and a more restrictive  policy  
approach to local coffee shop 
(Action Program Drugs,2009 - Gemeente Breda)(Coffee  
Shop Policy 2012 – Gemeente Breda) 
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created a nuisance which had to be reduced and prevented in the future (Mayor 
D- Interview April 2013). However, existing policies were deemed insufficient 
for doing so. This triggered a framing process in which coffee shops and soft 
drugs were problematized and eventually subjected to local policy programs. 
Powerful actors, as the mayor, the police chief and public prosecutor, initiated 
and implemented the first policy program regarding soft drugs in coffee shops, 
entitled ‘Closing Policy Coffee Shops’ (Gemeente Breda, 1991). Figure 18 
provides an overview of this largely locally-driven framing process structured 
by the conceptual model.  
 
Figure 18: Initial framing of the drug-related nuisance in Breda in the early 
1990s
Local policy network
Local policy debate
Policy in practice
Mayor prepares and 
implements policy: 
closing several coffee 
shops
Coalition A
Mayor, Police 
and
Public 
Prosecutor
initiate policy
Policy Strategy
‘Closing Policy for 
Coffee Shops’ 1991
Coalition B
Council agrees 
Alignment
National arena 
National criterea for coffee shops
 
 
Discourse coalitions & frame alignment  
The creation of the very first formal policy regarding drug-related nuisance in 
the early 1990s was not preceded by a substantive policy debate. Nevertheless, 
several local parties expressed their frames regarding coffee shops and drug-
related nuisance.  
Discourse coalition A: Mayor and ‘safety partners’ 
Initiated by the mayor, coffee shops were problematized in Breda. Coffee 
shops were deemed to cause a nuisance and an increase in the number of 
coffee shops would lead to various forms of nuisance. As Mayor D described 
later on: “When I arrived in Breda, I encountered several problems. One of 
them was coffee shops causing nuisance” […] “There was a certain level of 
nuisance which I found unacceptable. This was the case for coffee shops and 
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pleasure houses
35
” (Mayor D - Interview April 2013). This individual frame of 
the mayor was supported by other local actors. Together with his chief of 
cabinet and the juridical advisor in the local government, Mayor D designed a 
local policy for coffee shops. They deliberated and coordinated their policy 
approach with the local police and public prosecutor (Mayor D- Interview 
April 2013; Civil servant 2, interview March 2013). The mayor felt that the 
local government should set norms for coffee shops and proposed a sort of a 
‘license’ for coffee shops based on a set of criteria. As he said: “I was not 
against coffee shops, but against shops in the wrong places and those who 
messed up” (Mayor D- Interview April 2013). According to the head of the 
mayor’s cabinet, Mayor D was a governor who, despite his membership of the 
Liberal Party, choose to set clear rules and follow up on them (Civil servant 2, 
Interview March 2013). This is clearly what the mayor did when introducing 
the local policy of regulating and restricting local coffee shops. The mayor 
himself said that he wanted to support the ‘bourgeoisie and liveliness’ of the 
city center but felt the need to set some general rules and limits to maintain 
local order and safety (Mayor D- Interview April 2013).  
 
Discourse coalition B: Council members approve the policy with little debate 
The records of local council meetings show that council members formally 
approved the initial policy without fundamental debate and critique: “The 
closing policy for coffee shops is duly noted by the commission” (Commissie 
AZ/OO, 1991:4). The lack of a substantial debate by the local council shows 
that drug-related nuisance was not (yet) a ‘hot topic’ for council members and 
city inhabitants. This paved the way for Mayor D to enforce his policy 
ambitions, or as he mentioned himself: “The city council never blocked the 
policy proposals in any way” (Mayor D  Interview April 2013). The fact that 
drug-related nuisance was not a topic of local debate can, according to the 
mayor, be explained by the invisibility of drug-related nuisance and crime for 
many of Breda’s citizens and council members (Mayor D  Interview April 
2013). 
 
During the initial framing process, the frames of local policy actors were 
aligned with each other. When local council members approved the policy on 
coffee shops proposed by the mayor and his safety partners, their individual 
frames were strengthened into a collective policy frame. This points at a 
process of frame amplification during which the individual frames of local 
council members on drug-related nuisance were strengthened by the collective 
frame of the mayor, his civil servants and partners at the police and public 
prosecutor’s office, as reflected in the first policy document.  
 
Local policy frame & discourse institutionalization  
The local policy frame underlying the initial policy document ‘Closing Policy 
Coffee Shops 1991’ reveals the initial diagnostic and prognostic message 
regarding drug-related nuisance. The overall policy problem were the so-called 
                                                 
35   In Dutch: bordelen. 
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‘side effects’ of drug trading in the coffee shops. These included the risk of 
drug addiction, the health risks of using soft drugs, and multiple forms of 
nuisance in and around coffee shops, including (illegal) parking, noise, litter 
on the streets and criminal activities, such as possession of weapons and the 
trade of stolen goods (Gemeente Breda, 1991). All these activities were 
deemed to devalue local order and the living climate. They were also seen to 
be especially harmful for youngsters, in terms of health risks and the exposure 
to criminal activities in coffee shops. The policy summarizes all existing 
policy instruments which, as they conclude, are insufficient for addressing 
these ‘unintended effects’ of soft drugs in coffee shops. The most important 
instrument of closing coffee shops based on local legislation
36
 was deemed to 
be too ‘severe’ for controlling nuisance in and around coffee shops, too 
focused on issues of local order and excluding health aspects, too much work 
for the police, and not specific enough for targeting coffee shops (Gemeente 
Breda, 1991). The ‘Closing Policy for Coffee Shops’ was introduced in 1991 
to fill in this gap: “The growing demand of soft drugs and the lack of effective 
controlling mechanisms […] causes unintended side effects [of trading soft 
drugs] that have hardly been addressed (Gemeente Breda,  1991:1 – 
translation RP). The prognostic message of this policy approach is that local 
government regulates coffee shops by using ‘closing criteria’. These criteria 
aim to regulate existing coffee shops, and to reduce the number of coffee shops 
from 24 to 20. The local policy combines national and local criteria. The 
national criteria set by national Public Prosecutor included these conditions: 
not selling hard drugs, not selling soft drugs to youths below 16, and not 
advertising the trade of soft drugs. The local criteria included: not disturbing 
local order and the living climate, owners not to have any criminal records, 
and specifications on location, such as shops being at a minimum distance 
from schools (Gemeente Breda, 1991). This new policy was to be enforced 
with administrative sanctions available to local government, in collaboration 
with the police and public prosecutor. 
The initial policy frame more or less represented the individual frames 
of coalition A. This points at a process of discourse institutionalization during 
which the frame of the most powerful local discourse coalition was clearly 
represented in the first policy document regarding coffee shops. In practice, 
this meant that the mayor’s frame structured the minor local policy debate as 
well as the local policy strategy. In addition, national guidelines regarding 
coffee shops were incorporated as well. This implies the institutionalization of 
regulative aspects of the national policy arena into the local policy frame. 
However, these rules were mixed with local criteria and formed just a small 
part of the local policy strategy.  
 
2.1.2 The mayor’s role on paper and in practice 
The following sections present empirical clues of the mayor’s expected role 
and role in practice. 
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Expected role  
Although the first formal policy document regarding coffee shops in Breda 
was initiated by the mayor and mirrored his personal framing of drug-related 
nuisance, the mayor was not mentioned in the policy document itself. This 
implies that the mayor was not formally assigned a role in the policy.  
  
Role in practice: full enactment 
The mayor was, as he himself said, very involved with local order and safety 
(Mayor D  Interview April 2013). During his five years as the mayor of 
Breda, the mayor was actively involved with drug-related issues. In close 
cooperation with the local police and the public prosecutor, he designed the 
first formal policy regarding drugs in Breda. On the 19
th
 of February 1991, the 
mayor and the Board of Mayor and Aldermen established the very first policy 
strategy (Gemeente Breda, 1991). Once it was approved by the city council in 
the same year, this policy was implemented. Several respondents described 
this as ‘cleaning up’ the coffee shops in Breda by closing the ones causing 
trouble (Civil servant 1 Interview August 2012; Civil servant 2  Interview 
March 2013). 
 The mayor’s role in practice was initiating, designing and 
implementing certain aspects of the policy. After initiating the policy, he 
closed various coffee shops and participated in planning interventions in local 
bars where drugs were traded or used (Mayor D  Interview April 2013).  The 
mayor closed several shops based on the ‘closing criteria’ and several shops 
decided to close once the new policy was announced (Mayor D  Interview 
April 2013). This indicates the full enactment of the local policy’s frame and 
the mayor’s personal frame. Taken together, the mayor’s role in addressing 
drug-related nuisance can be termed as being a ‘hands-on initiator’ of local 
strategies on drug-related nuisance. 
 
2.1.3 Institutional arrangements  
Both the initial framing process and the mayor’s position and role regarding 
drug-related nuisance were mostly affected by factors in the local policy arena. 
 
Local arena 
The initial framing process was triggered by the increase in the number of 
coffee shops. This was deemed to bring along various forms of nuisance by the 
mayor and other powerful policy actors. In terms of the conceptual model, this 
event points to the cognitive aspects of the local policy arena, which trigger a 
local policy process during which drug-related nuisance was framed as a 
policy topic. The policy debate that followed was marginal and purely local. 
Two local discourse coalitions were apparent, and the policy plans of coalition 
A were approved by coalition B without much debate. In this way, coalition A 
was able to impose its individual frame onto the policy frame. The fact that the 
actors united in coalition A were influential during the policy process can be 
explained by the distribution of policy resources in the local policy network. 
The possession of formal powers to create, propose and implement local 
policies of the member of coalition A (mayor, police, and public prosecutor), 
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combined with the asymmetry of knowledge of the policy problem amongst 
the members of coalition B, resulted in the dominance of coalition A. This 
explains the domination of coalition A’s frames of discourse during the 
process of frame alignment and discourse institutionalization.  
 
National arena 
National criteria regarding coffee shops were combined with criteria 
developed by local authorities in Breda. In terms of the conceptual model, this 
points to the adoption of regulative aspects of the nation policy arena into the 
local policy frame.  
2.2 Soft, hard and new drugs in the region in the late 1990s 
During the late 1990s, local authorities aimed to coordinate their local 
activities regarding drugs on a regional scale. This led to a regional policy 
strategy titled ‘Dealing with Drugs in the Region’ formalized by all mayors 
who were part of the Regional Board of the Police Region Mid-West Brabant
.
 
(Gemeente Tilburg, 1997). Furthermore, a new power for the mayor to close 
buildings in case of drugs was developed by national government and adopted 
into this regional strategy, as well as into local policy documents in Breda 
(Gemeente Breda, 1997a-b). As a result, the local focus on coffee shops 
expanded with attention devoted to policies to deal with hard drugs, new types 
of drugs and the specific forms of drug-related nuisance caused by drug usage 
and trade in houses and drugs tourism. This expansion took place while Mayor 
E was the mayor of Breda. 
  The expansion of the local policy frame was both triggered and 
heavily influenced by the national policy on drugs. In 1996, the national 
parliament approved a National Drugs Policy which paid special attention to 
drug-related nuisance taking place at the municipal level, designer drugs and 
the link between drugs and organized crime (Tweede Kamer, 1995). This 
policy strategy was to be translated into regional and local policy practices in 
the Mid and West Brabant region. A regional working group with mayors from 
several municipalities, the police and the Ministry of Justice was asked to 
come up with recommendations for regional and local drug policies (Gemeente 
Tilburg, 1997). A year later, a new power for mayors was created by the 
national government in 1997 (Local Government Act, Section 174a): all Dutch 
mayors were now allowed to close permanently houses and buildings that were 
open to the public when local order was harmed in such a way that it creates a 
serious nuisance, or fear of it. Examples of such nuisance are trading drugs and 
prostitution. The mayor is supposed to use this power when all other means to 
address the nuisance have been unsuccessful, as he has to warn the inhabitants 
before taking his action (NGB, 2010). 
 
2.2.1 Frame expansion 
It is within this context that the regional approach to drugs in Brabant, which 
expanded the local policy approach to drugs in Breda, was created. The local 
framing process was characterized as a rather top down process of frame 
alignment between the national, regional and local policy frames. Figure 19 
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provides an overview of this framing process, as structured by the conceptual 
model. 
 
Figure 19: Initial framing of the drug-related nuisance in Breda in the late 
1990s 
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Several discourse coalitions consisting of actors from different policy arenas 
interacted during the process of frame expansion.  
Coalition A: Regional, interdisciplinary working group on drugs 
The Regional Board of the Police of Mid-West Brabant installed a working 
group on drugs. This working group consisted of mayors, public prosecutors, 
civil servants and police chiefs. They translated national policy strategies into 
recommendations for regional and local policy practices. They aimed to 
harmonize and coordinate police, juridical and administrative policy strategies 
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on hard, soft and eco drugs (Gemeente Tilburg, 1997). The overall goal was 
regional coordination and harmonization of drugs policies, and the overall 
policy on drugs relied heavily on national guidelines (Tweede Kamer, 1995). 
 
Coalition B: Local authorities Breda expanding local policies 
The second discourse coalition consisted of the board of the mayor and 
aldermen in Breda. They formally proposed to expand local policies on drugs 
inspired by the regional policy strategy proposed by coalition A. The local city 
council approved without much debate. 
 
Frame alignment 
National and regional policy frames were adopted into local policies by local 
policy actors. This points at a top-down process of frame alignment between 
national, regional and local policy frames. First, the national policy frames of 
the national drugs policy (Tweede Kamer, 1995) and the power to close 
buildings in case of drug-related nuisance (Local Government Act, Section 
174a) were adopted into the regional policy strategies (Gemeente Tilburg, 
1997). Second, Breda adjusted its local policy programs to the regional policy 
strategy by introducing a new local drugs policy, which resembled the national 
and regional policy strategy (Gemeente Breda, 1997a-b). 
 
Local policy frame & discourse institutionalization  
The local policy plans titled ‘Closing policy coffee shops’ and ‘ Local Drugs 
Policy (Gemeente Breda, 1997a-b) show the diagnostic and prognostic 
message of the renewed policy frame on drug-related nuisance. Various 
problems related to soft, hard and new drugs that threatened local order, health 
and the living climate were diagnosed as drug-related problems that should be 
addressed by means of regionally aligned interventions by the police, public 
prosecutor and local governments. A result of aligning the local drugs policy 
in Breda to the regional policy was that the local policy frame relating to drugs 
expanded. More specifically, supra local problem definitions and instruments 
institutionalized into the local policy frame. The scope of the initial local 
policy frame was expanded beyond coffee shops by problematizing hard and 
eco drugs as problems, and national policy instruments in terms of closing 
criteria for local coffee shops and the ability of mayors to close buildings by 
the entered the local policy frame (Gemeente Breda, 1997a-b).   
 
2.2.2 The mayor’s role on paper and in practice  
The mayor of Breda was expected to use his new power to close buildings 
open to the public in case of severe drug-related nuisance (Gemeente Breda, 
1997a-b). However according to many respondents, Mayor E was, in sharp 
contrast to Mayor D, involved with governing local order and safety at an 
arm’s length. This was supported by the fact that the mayor appointed a local 
aldermen to take on the responsibilities for ‘integrated safety’. The Aldermen 
of Integral Safety managed all the issues relating to local order and safety, 
although the mayor remained formally responsible for this policy domain. 
Alderman responsible for Integral Safety initiated local, integral safety policies 
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in which drugs problems were listed as a high priority. His ambition was to 
create integrated teams and appoint hands-on professionals to deal with the 
drugs problems in local neighborhoods (Civil servant 3 – Interview March 
2013; Interview Alderman – May 2013). Meanwhile, the mayor used his 
powers to close coffee shops and public buildings related to drug problems, 
initiated and prepared by the aldermen and his crew (Interview Mayor E – 
Interview June; Alderman-Interview May 2013). Taken together, the role of 
Mayor E can be described as governing at arm’s length regarding public order 
and safety in general, and drug-related nuisance more specifically. This 
implies he only had a marginal enactment of the formal policy frame and his 
expected role in it.  
 
2.2.3 Institutional arrangements  
Several factors from the local, regional and national policy arenas affected the 
course and content of the frame expansion process and the mayor’s role.  
 
National arena  
First of all, national drug guidelines, policies and instruments triggered and 
shaped the creation of a regional policy strategy on drugs, which later 
expanded to cover Breda’s local policy frame. In terms of the conceptual 
model, we can conclude that the regulative aspects of the national policy arena 
have institutionalized into the regional and local policy frame.  
 
Regional arena 
Regional collaboration practices between the police, public prosecutor and 
local governments in Mid-West Brabant were a crucial practice for fostering 
and shaping a local process of frame expansion in Breda. This implies that 
regional policy ambitions strongly shaped the diagnostic and prognostic 
message of the new policy frame on drugs as proposed and adopted by local 
authorities in Breda during the late 1990s.  
 
Local policy arena 
The distribution of tasks and responsibilities in the local policy network 
strongly affected the mayor’s role regarding local order and safety. The fact 
that Mayor E appointed an aldermen to be responsible for integrated safety 
policy made the Alderman of Integral Safety instead of the mayor himself 
more closely involved with policy formation and coordination for safeguarding 
local order and safety.  
2.3 Revision of the local drugs policy in the late 2000s 
The policy frame regarding drug-related nuisance had a third and final 
transformation in the late 2000s. This shift in the local policy frame is closely 
related to a series of regional and national trends around drug-related problems 
and policies. It began when the neighboring cities, Roosendaal and Bergen op 
Zoom, abolished their policy of tolerating coffee shops in 2009. This led to the 
closure of all coffee shops in these cities. Local authorities in Breda feared that 
this would increase the level of drug-related nuisance as more people would 
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turn to the coffee shops in Breda. They thus initiated a screening of the local 
and regional drugs scenes (COT, 2009) and put in place an advisory that 
updated the regional drugs policy (Commissie Fränzel, 2009). Meanwhile, 
national drugs policies were adjusted as well (Commissie Van den Donk, 
2009). The Rutte I administration introduced various measures that were more 
restrictive towards coffee shops and drugs in general (Kabinet Rutte, 2010I). 
For example, it announced a ‘distance criterion’ that required coffee shops not 
to be located near schools and required customers of coffee shops to have 
membership cards that could be issued only to Dutch citizens
37
(Tweede 
Kamer, 2011b). 
 
2.3.1 Frame expansion process 
Within this national and regional policy context, the third framing process in 
Breda took place and led to the creation of local action plans regarding drugs 
in general and the reformulation of the existing policy towards coffee shops 
(Gemeente Breda, 2009; 2012).The latter implied that local authorities in 
Breda started to move towards a stricter policy regarding local coffee shops.  
Figure 20 provides an overview of this framing process.  
 
                                                 
37   Abolished by a new national administration in 2012 
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Figure 20: Frame expansion of the drug-related nuisance in Breda in the late 
2000s
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Coalition A: Board of mayor and Aldermen Breda  
A shift in the drug policies in Roosendaal and Bergen op Zoom triggered the 
Board of Mayor and Aldermen in Breda to pay extra attention to the local 
drugs scene in Breda. They feared that the radical policy shift by their 
neighbor cities would lead to a disproportional level of drug-related nuisance 
and drug tourism in Breda. They therefore initiated a study of the local drugs 
scene in Breda (College van B&W, 2009). The board then proposed a new and 
strict policy strategy towards coffee shops in Breda (Gemeente Breda, 2005/9). 
Local council members in coalition C shared their worries regarding drugs and 
approved the intention to participate in regional and national attempts to 
address drug-related nuisance and tighten Breda’s local policy approach to 
coffee shops (Commissie Bestuur, 2009). 
 
Coalition B: Alliance B5 
Local governments of the five largest cities in the region created the so-called 
‘Alliance B5’ to study drug-related nuisance problems in the region and 
proposed regional solutions. The regional board of the Brabant police force, on 
which the mayors of all five cities sat, appointed an advisory committee, and 
assigned it the task of updating the regional policy strategy on drugs 
(Commission Fränzel, 2009). Based on a screening of the local and regional 
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drugs scene, the committee acknowledged that they were confronted with 
criminal networks producing and trading drugs (Commission Fränzel, 2009). 
Consequently, they initiated a collaborative program, in which information, 
manpower and interventions by local government, tax authorities, public 
prosecutor and the police were combined to tackle the criminal networks. This 
program was called ‘Taskforce Brabant’ and mostly focused on networks of 
organized crime that dealt in drugs (see sub case 6). Alongside this, several 
measures on coffee shops and drug-related nuisance were introduced within 
this regional framework. These had implications for Breda’s drugs policy as 
well. To be more precise, the national government introduced more restrictions 
on coffee shops, including membership cards for customers and a minimum 
distance between coffee shops and schools (Kabinet Rutte I, 2010). These 
measures were agreed upon by the alliance B5 and therefore could be 
implemented by local governments in the Brabant region. 
 
Frame alignment  
The third process of reframing shows frame alignment as a sequential process 
of frame bridging between the local and regional discourse coalitions, with the 
latter partly inspired by the national ambition to strengthen the approach to 
coffee shops and soft drugs. The frame of the local Board of Mayor and 
Aldermen in Breda (coalition A) was compatible with other local governments 
in the region that were concerned about drug-related problems (coalition B). 
The frame of regional coalition B also aligned with national policy ideas about 
tightening the Dutch policy of tolerance.  
 
Local policy frame & discourse institutionalization  
While local authorities in Breda adjusted their coffee shop policy in 2009, they 
explicitly chose not to follow the example set by their neighbor cities of 
abolishing their policy of tolerance towards coffee shops: “For a city like 
Breda it is unrealistic to impose a zero tolerance policy on coffee shops. The 
demand for coffee shops will stay. This would lead to an undesired satiation of 
poor controllability, decrease of livability and declining oversight on trade in 
soft drugs. Trade in soft drugs would end up in criminal circuits and merge 
with the tough and criminal hard drugs scene. (Gemeente Breda 2005/9: 11). 
This policy frame did problematize coffee shops as being a nuisance, 
disturbing local order and safety, negatively affecting the local living climate, 
and creating the impression of a lack of safety (Gemeente Breda, 2005/9). The 
new policy tolerated coffee shops but had a more strict approach than before. 
The most substantial shift was freezing the number of shops to the current 
number of eight coffee shops, adopting a membership card for customers, and 
introducing a distance criterion between coffee shops and schools (Gemeente 
Breda, 2005/9). 
Both regional and national policy ideas were institutionalized into the 
local policy frame as described previously. National policy ideas regarding 
drugs and coffee shops were institutionalized into regional policy strategies 
that were later adopted by local authorities in Breda. These came about when 
coalition B united the local governments of the five largest cities in the region, 
and aligned its frame with the national objective to have a stricter policy to soft 
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drugs by being the first region to adopt the membership card and distance 
criterion. 
 
2.3.2 The mayor’s role on paper and in practice 
The following sections present empirical clues of the mayor’s expected role 
and role in practice. 
 
Expected role 
The new policy on coffee shops expected the Mayor of Breda to formulate 
local coffee shop policy after consulting the police and public prosecutor, 
taking the national guidelines for coffee shops into account, and using his 
power to close buildings because of any drug-related nuisance (Gemeente 
Breda, 2005/9).  
 
Role in practice: high enactment 
When Mayor F became mayor of Breda, he ‘abolished’ the mayor’s 
responsibility for integrated safety. He viewed local order and safety as an 
important policy domain, and wanted to address local safety issues by himself. 
Regarding drugs, Mayor F undertook both administrative and operational 
actions. The former indicate participation in the local arena, where he initiated 
studies of the drugs scene and amended local coffee shop policy to required 
coffee shops to have membership cards, in collaboration with the Board of 
Mayor and Aldermen and the local city council (College van B&W, 2009). At 
the regional level, he participated in the Alliance B5 by creating a regional 
policy program on various manifestations of drug-related problems in the 
Brabant region. Finally, he lowered the maximum number of coffee shops 
allowed to eight and closed several coffee shops and public buildings because 
of drug-related nuisance (Gemeente Breda, 2005). Taken together, these 
changes show a high level of frame alignment. They also point out that the 
mayor fulfilled the role of being a connector between local, regional and 
national policy arenas in dealing with drug-related problems in and around 
Breda. 
 
2.3.3 Institutional arrangements  
Several issues from the national, regional and local policy arena affected the 
course and outcome of the local framing process and the mayor’s role. 
 
Regional arena 
A radical shift in policy practices undertaken by municipalities in the regional 
policy arena shifted local attention onto drug-related problems and policies in 
and around Breda. Thereafter, the findings of a study of the regional drugs 
scene influenced Breda’s local policy frame. 
 
Local arena 
The cognitive aspects of key actors in the local policy networks triggered a 
local policy process and allowed the formalization of new policies regarding 
drugs. The fact that the local Board of Mayor and Aldermen was worried by 
the introduction of a zero tolerance policy in neighboring cities triggered both 
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local and regional policy attention onto drug-related issues. The fact that 
council members were concerned about drug-related problems enabled new 
policies to be formalized. The frames of both actors that had agenda-setting 
and decision-making power were aligned with each other and with the supra 
local policy frames, enabling a local frame expansion process.  
 
National arena 
The regulative aspects of the national policy arena slowly institutionalized into 
regional and later local policy frames. The local policy on coffee shops was 
tightened by reducing the maximum number of coffee shops and adopting the 
national policies of membership cards and distance criteria.   
2.4 Findings of sub case 4 
Reconstructing the initial framing process and the two frame shifts that 
followed provides preliminary evidence of the frame shifts that affected the 
mayor’s role and position in local safety governance. The problem definition 
or diagnostic message of the policy strategy was initially formulated as 
nuisance caused by coffee shops (1991), expanded later to include problems 
related to other types of drugs (1997) and finally shifted towards renewed 
policy attention on various regional forms of drugs problems (2009). The 
solution or prognostic message of the local policy was initially limiting and 
regulating coffee shops (1991). This later changed to the harmonization of 
drug policies in the region and the mayor’s power to close buildings (1997), 
and eventually to the expansion and tightening of Breda’s local drugs policy 
(2009). 
At the same time as the policy frames changed between 1990 and 
2010, the mayor’s position and role also changed. First of all, the mayor’s 
formal position expanded with the introduction of several new laws (Local 
Government Act, 174A and Opium Law 13B). Second, the mayor’s playing 
field expanded from the local policy arena to policy actors, strategies and 
actions on the regional and national level as well. As time went by, the mayors 
of Breda had to deal with or act on regional and national policy, and the 
mayor’s position changed from being a local administrator collaborating with 
the local police and public prosecutor to becoming a networker or policy 
broker operating in close cooperation with many other bodies on the regional 
and national level. Third, the mayor’s role in practice differed with each 
individual mayor. Mayor D (1990-1995) had a hands-on style for safety 
problems and initiated local policy plans on drugs. Mayor E (1995-2004) 
governed local safety problems at arm’s length, while Mayor F’s (2004-2013) 
activities on drugs made him a connector between local, regional and national 
trends on drugs. These differences imply a sharp contrast between the mayor’s 
role in practice and in theory. Although Mayor E had more formal powers on 
drugs, he was less involved than Mayor D who did not have these powers. 
Moreover, while Mayors D and F took care of local public order and safety 
themselves, Mayor E left the policy-making part to one of his aldermen.  
 These changes in the policy frames and the mayor’s position and role 
can be explained as the outcome of an interplay between the local framing 
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process among local discourse coalitions and the institutional structure in 
which these interactions take place, as provided by the local, regional and 
national policy network. This sub case demonstrated that Breda’s local policy 
frame regarding drug-related nuisance was strongly characterized by supra 
local policy frames. The frames of powerful actors in the local policy network 
embraced and approved the regulative aspects of the national arena and policy 
ambitions, and policy strategies were created at the regional arena time after 
time. Moreover, both frame expansion processes were, in contrast to the initial 
framing process, triggered by supra local policy programs introduced by the 
national government and regional policy practices. The expansion of the 
mayor’s formal position on drug-related nuisance can be explained as a top-
down process in which new powers for Dutch mayors were adopted into 
regional and local policy strategies in the late 1990s. This sub case depicts a 
strong regional policy arena around drug-related issues which both filtered 
national policy ideas into ready-made strategies for local governments and 
increasingly characterized the mayor’s role in practice over time. The mayor’s 
role in practice showed a high degree of variety which can be explained by the 
distribution of tasks and powers in the local arena as well as the supra local 
policy context in place. Regarding the first, the level of hands-on involvement 
with drug-related nuisance was higher once the mayor was personally involved 
with public safety policy (Mayor D and Mayor F), instead of an Alderman 
(Mayor E). Furthermore, once supra local policy arrangements on drug-related 
issues in the region came into place over time, the mayor of Breda became 
increasingly involved in networking and brokering between the local and supra 
local policy arenas (Mayor F).  
3 Sub case 5  Domestic violence in Breda 
Breda’s policy approach on domestic violence was preceded by a regional 
policy on violence against women for the region of West Brabant. A regional 
collaboration that united many social organizations, juridical actors and local 
governments had been in place since the early 1990s. Breda was appointed as 
the ‘center city’ in the region by the national government and was therefore 
responsible for initiating, designing and coordinating facilities for vulnerable 
groups in society. Using the slogan ‘Can I stay here for a while?’, a program of 
shelter and support was provided to various groups, such as the homeless, 
former psychiatric patients and alcohol addicts (Gemeente Breda, 2002). 
Traditionally, female victims of violence and their children were one of these 
groups. The policy intervention for them and other target groups can be 
characterized as merely reactive, and supply oriented with a strong focus on 
victims.  
In 2003, a two-year long project titled ‘Stop Domestic Violence’ was 
introduced (GGD West Brabant, 2003). This was the first policy document 
specifically labeling domestic violence as a policy problem. It aimed to 
develop an integral, regional policy approach to domestic violence, which was 
seen as both a social and a safety issue. In a formal collaboration agreement, 
23 organizations ranging from municipalities to the police and the child 
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protection agency agreed to adopt the regional policy’s ambitions into their 
regular activities (Convenant SHG, 2003).  
 In 2005, the policy approach to domestic violence was expanded when 
local authorities in Breda used the national budget to create a so called ‘Advise 
and Support Point Domestic Violence’ for the West Brabant region 
(Convenant ASHG, 2005). This was part of a national policy program to 
provide national money and guidelines to centre cities across the country to 
create a national network. The policy ambitions this time were to adopt a so 
called ‘chain approach’ to domestic violence. This implied that prevention, 
repression and everything in between was to be carried out by multiple 
organizations and coordinated by local government (Convenant ASHG, 2005). 
Again, the center city Breda was granted the role of coordinator in this 
approach.  
 In 2008 and 2009, the policy approach to domestic violence was 
professionalized even further. The local government of Breda initiated a 
regional working procedure for the upcoming ‘Law Temporary Home 
Restrictions’ to be given out by the mayor (Handleiding WTHV, 2008). In 
creating a regional strategy for implementing this national power, the mayor 
was given a prominent position in the regional policy approach to domestic 
violence for the first time. Furthermore, a new regional policy on domestic 
violence entitled ‘Dependent and Safe’ was created (Stuurgroep afhankelijk en 
veilig, 2009). The core of this plan was a so called ‘systemic approach’ 
addressing not only the victim, assailant, and the children, but the entire family 
and social system surrounding them. Prevention and early signaling were 
important policy objectives as well. This time, all partner organizations, again 
coordinated by Breda, were aiming to integrate their activities into a program, 
instead of implementing their own part as was the case previously (GGD 
West-Brabant 2003).  
Focusing on the securitization of local issues and the shifts in the 
mayor’s role, this policy had at least two relevant shifts. The first is labeling 
domestic violence as a local policy problem for the first time in 2003. In the 
initial policy frame, domestic violence was partially securitized by qualifying 
it as both a social and safety issue (and in that order). However, it was first of 
all qualified as a social issue and the policy mainly mentioned interventions 
and actors from the policy domain of social issues and welfare. Secondly, this 
initial policy frame was expanded over the years, with the peak being the 
introduction of a systematic approach in 2009. This time, the safety 
perspective was emphasized a bit more since the mayor and other municipal 
actors from the safety domain were brought into the picture, with the 
temporary home restrictions in the regional policy approach (Handleiding 
WTHV, 2008). Table 15 provides a general overview of these policy frames 
and the text that follow provide an in-depth analysis of the framing processes 
surrounding them.   
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Table 15: Overview of the policy frames related to domestic violence in Breda 
between 1990 and 2010. 
 3.1 Initial local framing process of domestic violence as a policy problem 
in the early 2000s 
In 2003, domestic violence was introduced as a local policy issue and partly 
qualified as a safety matter. The initial regional policy frame on domestic 
violence in West Brabant was developed alongside several national policy 
developments on this topic. In 2002, the national government published the 
‘Private Violence, Public Task’ program, where domestic violence was 
explicitly qualified as a public problem for the first time and municipalities 
were activated to address it (Tweede Kamer, 2002). The national policy 
program described, based on several pilot projects, an ‘integral approach’ to 
effectively address and prevent domestic violence. ‘Integral’ was understood 
to mean collaboration between national, regional and local actors to apply an 
inclusive approach to victims, aggressors and their social environment. The 
national government granted “local authorities a special responsibility to 
initiate initiatives for collaboration” (Tweede Kamer, 2002: 12 – translation 
RP), encouraging local government actors and societal organizations to 
address this formerly private matter. 
 While the national government formulated this program and set aside 
funds for local policy initiatives, policy attention on domestic violence at the 
regional level only came about slowly. A regional platform uniting actors from 
Time 
period  
Topic policy 
frame  
Policy  frame: diagnostic and prognostic 
message 
2003 
 
initial frame 
 
Domestic 
violence as a 
policy 
problem in 
the region 
Diagnostic Message: Mental and physical 
violence in family spheres labeled as a social 
and safety issue.  
 
Prognostic Message: Initiation of integral 
collaboration by 23 organization in the region 
of West Brabant coordinated by municipality of 
Breda. 
(Stop Domestic Violence, 2003 – Gemeente 
Breda) 
2009 frame shift 
 
Systemic 
approach 
including 
home 
restrictions  
 
Diagnostic Message: Various forms of violence 
in dependent relationships qualify as both as 
safety and a social matter. 
 
Prognostic Message: Systemic approach 
focusing on entire social system & introducing 
home restrictions by mayor and safety 
authorities. 
(Dependent and Safe, 2009 – Gemeente Breda)   
(Mannual Law Temoperary Home Restrction, 
2008 – Gemeente Breda)  
  
 
 
196 
 
the social policy domain combating sexual violence and child abuse created a 
working group on domestic violence in. This working group studied the 
prevalence of domestic violence in the region and the policy and aid structures 
for it in West Brabant (Gemeente Breda, 2002). The working group created a 
policy plan for domestic violence based on the national policy guidelines 
provided by the ministry of juridical affairs. Meanwhile, local authorities in 
centre city Breda mentioned domestic violence in their policy documents as 
well. All of these policy initiatives eventually came together in the formal 
policy program and collaboratin agreement ‘Stop Domestic Violence’ in 2003 
(GGD West Brabant, 2003).  Figure 21 summarizes the initial framing process 
which is explained in the next few paragraphs.  
 
Figure 21: Initial framing process of the problem of domestic violence in 
Breda in the early 2000s 
 
Local policy network
Policy in practice
No actions by 
mayor
Aldermen 
responsible 
Coalition c
Local 
authorities
Local policy debate 
National arena
Policy ‘Private 
violence – public 
matter ’
1 
st
 Policy strategy
‘Stop Domestic Violence’ 
2003 (regional)
No expected role for the 
mayor
Ccoalition B
Local 
professional 
Regional  arena
 Coalition A
Professionals 
in the region
 
  
 
 
197 
 
 
3.1.1 Inital framing process 
During the initial framing process, domestic violence itself was not really a 
topic of intense policy debate in the local political arena. Policy processes and 
debates concentrated on social care
38
 in general. However, domestic violence 
started to generate more policy attention as it was explicitly mentioned by 
several actors during local council meetings. Based on their interactions, three 
discourse coalitions were apparent.  
 
Coalition A: Professionals in the region  
Various organizations handling youth care, public health care and social care 
have offered shelters and support for women in West Brabant. United in the 
‘Working group on Domestic Violence’, they created the first policy ambitions 
regarding domestic violence as a regional policy problem after studying the 
manifestation of domestic violence in the region and the policies in place in 
2002 (Werkgroep Huiselijk Geweld Regio Breda, 2002) Their report mirrors 
the shared policy frame of the professionals.  
 In defining domestic violence, the professionals literally adopted the 
national government’s description: “violence [mental, physical, sexual] 
committed by someone from the victim’s domestic sphere” (Werkgroep 
Huiselijk Geweld Regio Breda, 2002: 1). This definition is presented as the 
shared and regional working definition of domestic violence. In addressing this 
type of violence, the working group signaled several weaknesses in the policy 
approach in Breda. Collaboration between the multiple organizations and gaps 
in the prevention and aid supply structures were the most important. They 
recommended stronger collaboration between various partners and disciplines, 
the formalizing and coordination of this collaboration, and better information 
exchange between the police, juridical and aid organizations: “The ambition of 
the ’Working Group on Domestic Violence’ is to create a plan to come to an 
integral offer of activities regarding domestic violence by actors involved” 
(Werkgroep Huiselijk Geweld Regio Breda, 2002: 2). The working group 
proposed a detailed plan including preventative measures, information 
campaigns, support for victims, an enhancement of professionalism and a 
registration point. The plan was structured by national policy guidelines as 
provided by the ministry of juridical affairs (Ministerie van Justitie, 2000). 
Taken together, this is supposed to serve the greater goal of “preventing and 
combating domestic violence by means of an integral approach in the region 
of Breda” (Werkgroep Huiselijk Geweld Regio Breda, 2002: 2). 
 
Coalition B:  A pioneering civil servant  
Policy attention to domestic violence at the very local level of the municipality 
in Breda was initiated by a single pioneering civil servant. She paved the way 
for policies in Breda by explicitly mentioning victims of domestic violence as 
an important target group when updating the regional policy strategy for social 
care. This level of attention on domestic violence at the municipal level was, 
according the civil servant herself as well as by others (Civil servant 5 – 
                                                 
38   In Dutch: maatschappelijke opvang. 
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Interview November 2012; Civil servant 4 – Interview August 2012;), inspired 
by the national government’s promotion of the responsibility of local 
authorities in this topic (Tweede Kamer, 2002). Later, she would describe her 
actions as: “I got the policy ‘private violence, a public matter’ by the ministry 
of justice. It stated that they expected a bit more from local government in 
addressing domestic violence. [...]. I thought, if I want to do something with it, 
I have to embed this into policy. Then I mentioned victims of domestic violence 
as an important target group. Then I could rightfully address it” (Civil servant 
5 – Interview November 2012 – translation RP). According to this civil 
servant, domestic violence was to be stopped before women eventually arrived 
in safe houses. In advocating the attention of local policymakers on domestic 
violence, she experienced some resistance among local politicians who showed 
“risk averse behavior and no priority for domestic violence” and fellow civil 
servants who “did not see domestic violence as a municipal task” (Civil 
Servant 5  Interview November 2012 – translation RP).  
 
Discourse coalition C: Local authorities reactively supporting a policy 
approach  
Local authorities in Breda did not exhaustively debate domestic violence. 
However, there has been some outspoken as well as silent support for 
(regional) policy intervention regarding domestic violence.  
While discussing the social care policy in the city council, three 
council members pointed at domestic violence and the need for local policy 
intervention. A council member from the Labor Party expressed his worries 
regarding the growing amount of victims from domestic violence. He asked for 
a policy approach specifically for victims of domestic violence, stating that: “a 
policy approach regarding victims of domestic violence is of huge importance” 
(Councillor Jackson  Gemeenteraad, 2003 – translation RP). His colleague, 
council member Schoenmakers, representing local party Breda ’97, expressed 
the need for domestic violence as well:  “Whatever bad happens behind the 
front door, abuse of both women and children, molestation of elderly people 
and sexual violence, should be firmly addressed and opposed” (Councillor 
Schoenmakers  Gemeenteraad 2003 – translation RP). He favored 
involvement by local authorities by referring to the national policy that 
appointed local governments as the coordinator of policies on domestic 
violence. Moreover, he linked these issues to local government’s responsibility 
for local order and safety. Council Member de Boer, representing local party 
Leefbaar Breda, problematized the growing number of female victims in social 
care programs. According to him, men molesting their wives should be 
restricted from their homes: “not the woman and children should leave the 
house, but the man using violence should” [...] “We hope that this problem is 
tackled by national government, because that is where the solution should 
come from” (Councillor de Boer – Gemeenteraad, 2003 – translation RP). He 
explicitly located the responsibility for creating a policy approach at national 
government.  
Although not actively addressing domestic violence in the local policy 
debate, the local Board of Mayor and Aldermen implicitly recognized the need 
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for policy intervention as well. One aldermen reacted to the remarks of the 
council members by mentioning that he had filed for a national subsidy for a 
local program against domestic violence. The Board of Mayor and Aldermen 
proposed to. Together with the council members, some of whom explicitly 
mentioned their support, they can be seen as reactive (and silent) supporters of 
local policy on domestic violence.  
 
Frame alignment  
The members of coalition A and B found each other recognizing the need to 
create public policy on domestic violence. Meanwhile, the fact that a civil 
servant mentioned domestic violence in a local policy document on social care 
(coalition B) inspired several council members (coalition C) to pay attention to 
domestic violence as well. Moreover, all three coalitions were to some extent 
inspired by national policy ideas for tackling domestic violence. This implies 
frame alignment between national policy ideas and coalitions A, B and C in 
the form of frame amplification. This points to the strengthening of regional 
and local individual frames by national policy ideas.  
 
Local policy frame & discourse institutionalization  
In 2003, a two year project ‘Stop Domestic Violence’ was introduced. This 
project had to initiate and enhance policy collaboration and alignment between 
various parties in the social policy domain to address domestic violence as a 
new policy problem. The overall policy goals was to: “develop an integral 
approach to domestic violence in West-Brabant: to offer a coordinated, 
mutually linked supply of prevention, shelter, help and after care for victims, 
offenders and children” (Convenant SHG, 2003: 1 – translation RP). The 
collaboration agreement formulated a clear problem definition and policy 
solutions which together characterize the policy frame. 
Its diagnostic message was that domestic violence taking place in the 
private sphere and setting was now regarded as a public problem. Domestic 
violence was defined as “violence committed by someone from the private 
sphere” (GGD West Brabant, 2003:7 – translation RP). This violence could be 
mental, physical or sexual, and the private sphere consisted of (former) 
partners, members of the family and friends of the family (ibid). In describing 
this new policy problem, the national definition of domestic violence as posed 
by the Ministry of Juridical Affairs was used. Moreover, domestic violence 
was considered to cross the boundaries of that private sphere, thereby making 
it amenable to government intervention. It was a public problem linked to the 
domain of public health, local order and safety as well as shelter for women 
(Convenant SHG, 2003).  
 
The main objective of the initial policy program was to create a 
collaboration network to address domestic violence. The collaboration 
described ‘integral cooperation’ between 23 organizations in the West Brabant 
region, including the police and public prosecutor and multiple social sector 
organizations: youth care, social care, public health care, women’s shelter, 
council for child protection and many more (Convenant SHG, 2003). 
Together, these organizations aim to prevent and stop the escalation of 
domestic violence as early as possible, by means of collaboration on a regional 
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scale (GGD West Brabant, 2003). Coordinated by local government, these 
activities focus on victims as well as aggressors, and children witnessing and 
or experiencing violence. Although the project aims to initiate regional 
collaboration and align activities in the policy domain of social care and 
shelter, it was a temporary two-year project and all participants are supposed 
adopt their share of policy implementation into their regular activities.  
In terms of discourse institutionalization, the initial policy program 
‘Stop Domestic Violence’ was a mixture of national and local policy ideas.  
The policy answered the national call for local authorities to address domestic 
violence. Breda took up its responsibility as a center city to initiate and 
coordinate policy actions on domestic violence. It adopted the national 
definition of domestic violence. However, the exact content of the policy 
program was given a regional touch as these national policy ideas were to be 
embedded in more or less existing regional collaboration structures in which 
many actors from the social policy domain were already in place.  
 
3.1.2 The mayor’s role on paper and in practice  
The initial framing process resulted in the first regional policy ambitions 
regarding domestic violence. The following sections describe whether and how 
they affected the mayor’s position and role, both on paper as well as in 
practice. During policy preparation and the first year of its implementation, 
Mayor E was in place. 
 
Expected role  
The mayor was not granted any role in the first policy document ‘Stop 
Domestic Violence’ in 2003. The document does not list any tasks or 
responsibilities for the mayor, nor does it address the case of domestic 
violence or administrative activities during the policy process. The aldermen 
for Welfare and Youth, on the other hand, was mentioned as the first 
responsible representative of local government. Administrative coordination of 
the regional project on domestic violence was taken care of by a ‘steering 
group’ preceded by a representative from the social department of the 
municipality of Breda. Implementation of the project was to be led by the 
regional public health service (GGD West Brabant, 2003). 
  
Role in practice: little action, high enactment 
Only one action undertaken by the mayor on domestic violence was mentioned 
in the complete data set on domestic violence in Breda. This was the fact that 
the mayor formally mandated Alderman Heerkens, who was responsible for 
Welfare and Youth, to sign the collaboration agreement and to participate in 
the project ’Stop Domestic Violence’ (Conventant SHG, 2003). Later on, ex-
Mayor E, when asked whether he was involved with the new approach to 
domestic violence in early 2003, would reply: “barely, this was taken care of 
by aldermen Heerkens. […] Every once in a while I learned there was 
domestic violence going somewhere, but that was about it” (Mayor E – 
Interview June 2013 – translation RP). Furthermore, he stated that he regarded 
domestic violence as social and not a safety matter. The aldermen, who was 
responsible for local order and safety during that period, stated that he did not 
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carry out any activities regarding domestic violence during this initial period. 
Only later on, when he replaced the mayor in the late 2000s, did he act by 
including home restrictions (Alderman – Interview May 2013).  
 
Both the expanded role and the mayor’s role in practice are comparable in the 
sense that the mayor was not simply a structural feature in policy and practice 
in the area of domestic violence. The low level of involvement of the mayor 
when the first policy on domestic violence was introduced and implemented 
implies a high level of frame enactment, since he was not provided any formal 
role at all in the plan. 
 
3.1.3 Institutional arrangements in the early 2000s 
Various issues from the national, regional and local policy arena affected the 
course and outcome of the local framing process and the mayor’s role. 
 
National arena 
The emerging national policy on domestic violence affected the local framing 
and the policy process in several ways. The regulative and budgetary aspects 
of the national policy were prominent. The national program ‘Private 
Violence, Public Matter’ (Tweede Kamer, 2002) encouraged local authorities 
to address domestic violence. Moreover, national guidelines structured the 
regional policy on domestic violence (Ministerie van Justitie, 2000), and 
funding from the national government supported the regional activities.  
 
Regional arena  
New plans and activities on domestic violence where prepared and 
implemented with existing policy structures and actors dealing with social care 
and shelter for females in West Brabant. This implied that existing regional 
policy practices structured the new policy to domestic violence.   
 
Local arena 
Breda’s role as the city center in West Brabant provided local government with 
a coordinating role in the regional domestic violence project. The fact that the 
local frames of the pioneering civil servant, local council members, and the 
Board of the Mayor and Alderman were compatible with both regional and 
national policies on domestic violence ensured local participation and adoption 
of the new project ‘Stop Domestic Violence’. More specifically, the single 
actor coalition consisting of a pioneering civil servant fulfilled the role of 
broker by connecting local policy frames with external ones.  This implies that 
cognitive aspects in the local policy network played a crucial role.  
3.2 Mayors and home restrictions in the late 2000s 
During the mid and late 2000s, the national government undertook various 
policy initiatives on domestic violence. These included the introduction of the 
Advice and Support Points Domestic Violence, the introduction of the national 
policy program ‘Protected and Empowered’ (Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, 
Welzijn en Sport, 2007), various other public campaigns, and the publication 
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of guidelines on child abuse, domestic violence and honor killing (Openbaar 
Ministerie, 2010). The national government also empowered Dutch mayors 
with the power to impose temporary home restrictions in 2009- mayors could 
restrict offenders of domestic violence from their homes for ten days or longer 
when deeded necessary (Law temporary home restrictions, 2009).   
 In the regional policy arena of West Brabant, the formal collaboration 
agreement on domestic violence was coming to an end in 2009 (Commissie 
MM, 2009). Local authorities in Breda that wanted to continue the policy 
approach anticipated this by initiating the new program ‘Enforcing Approach 
Domestic Violence’. This program had several objectives, such as improving 
the prevention of violence in dependent relationships and preparing for the 
new temporary home restrictions law (Handleiding WTHV, 2008; College 
B&W, 2009). This confluence of local, regional and national policy 
developments strengthened the wish to further professionalize and the 
recognition of the need to enhance collaboration on domestic violence 
(College B&W 2009). This resulted in a new program ‘Dependent and Safe’ 
that introduced a systemic approach to domestic violence and regional 
guidelines for implementing temporary home. This time, the safety aspects of 
domestic violence were increasingly emphasized, as the mayor and other 
municipal actors from the safety domain enforced temporary home restrictions 
on offenders of domestic violence (Handleiding WTHV, 2008).  Figure 21 
maps the process of frame expansion surrounding the new home restriction 
policy.   
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Figure 22 Frame expansion domestic violence late 2000s, Breda 
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3.2.1 Frame expansion 
An analysis of reports from meetings of councils and commissions and 
interviews with the actors involved does not reveal any pattern of interaction 
and communication between the discourse coalitions that discussed the 
renewed regional policy on domestic violence or the adoption of home 
restrictions in West Brabant. This implies that the frame expansion regarding 
domestic violence was not surrounded by a substantive policy debate. Local 
authorities supported the renewed regional approach since they formally 
approved and adopted it into the local policy arena. This implies that the frame 
expansion process is not characterized by frame alignment between multiple 
discourse coalitions.  
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Local policy frame & discourse institutionalization  
During the late 2000s, a new program for domestic violence titled ‘Dependent 
and Safe’ was created (Stuurgroep afhankelijk en veilig 2009; Convenant 
HGK, 2009; Visiedocument HGK, 2009). In addition, a detailed manual on the 
implementation of the new temporary home restriction scheme was introduced 
(Handleiding WTHV, 2008). Together, these policies mirror the diagnostic and 
prognostic message of the policy frame in Breda at that time.  
The policy frame indicated an intolerant and very broad perspective 
on domestic violence: “Domestic violence and child abuse are never 
unacceptable, whatever the circumstances and against whomever. Character, 
psychiatric problems, financial issues, alcohol- or drugs consumption, religion 
or culture: none of them is an excuse” (Visiedocument HGK, 2009:1). 
Domestic violence is seen as a social problem taking place in private spheres 
in all layers of societies and cultures (Stuurgroep afhankelijk en veilig 2009; 
Visiedocumen HGKt, 2009). Everyone is seen as a potential victim – men, 
women, children, the elderly, people with disabilities – upon whom any form 
of physical, mental, or sexual violence could be inflicted by a member of their 
familiar sphere (Visiedocument HGK, 2009). The aggressor could be a direct 
family member, blood relative or someone socially related to their family 
(Convenant HGK, 2009). Moreover, the physical and mental consequences of 
domestic violence are not limited only to the victim, and include the victim’s 
environment as well (Visiedocument HGK, 2009). Child abuse is now 
frequently mentioned separately along with domestic violence 
(Visiedocument, HGK, 2009; Convenant HGK, 2009).  
The range of solutions for tackling domestic violence is wide and 
inclusive as well. In a general sense, domestic violence is labeled as a safety 
and public health topic for local government (Convenant HGK, 2009). Local 
authorities are responsible for the creation of an integrated approach to 
domestic violence. According to the collaboration agreement, this 
responsibility is based on the municipality’s responsibility for both public 
safety and health (Convenant HGK, 2009). 
 The ‘Dependent and Safe’ policy, in its call for an ‘integral approach 
in the broadest sense’ (Stuurgroep afhankelijk en veilig 2009), clearly aims to 
intensify coordination and collaboration between various organizations in 
West Brabant to address domestic violence. All of these organizations aim to 
adopt a ‘systemic’ approach. This implies they take the whole family as their 
object of their interventions by focusing on the victim, the aggressor, and 
witnesses at the same time. Together, they aim to improve ‘”awareness 
prevention, early signaling, crisis intervention, shelter, help/treatment, 
prosecution and after care” in that order (Stuurgroep afhankelijk en veilig 
2009:1). Prevention and early warnings are crucial to prevent harm and 
repetition and to stop violence. The interests of children are labeled as the 
number one priority in stopping domestic violence (Visiedocument HGK, 
2009). 
 A new policy tool adopted in this regional approach is the use of 
temporary home restrictions. The local adoption of this policy was agreed 
upon by all mayors of the region in the regional board of mayors on 25
th
 of 
September. The implementation of these home restrictions is structured by a 
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regional manual for all mayors to enact in the same manner (Handleiding 
WTHV, 2008). The policy frame of the instructions clearly mirrors a 
preventive focus as well. Home restrictions are supposed to prevent escalation 
in terms of violence or stop violence in the early stages. Finally, local 
authorities in Breda are supposed to coordinate both the new policy program 
and home restrictions in West Brabant (Handleiding WTHV, 2008).  
National policy ideas were institutionalized in the regional policy 
program on domestic violence through the adoption of temporary home 
restrictions and the systemic approach to domestic violence. Whereas home 
restriction were formalized in national law, the systemic approach was 
promoted by national policies on domestic violence from the early 2000s 
onwards (GGD West Brabant, 2003; Stuurgroep afhankelijk en veilig, 2009). 
These were directly adopted into the regional collaboration strategies on 
domestic violence. This link between national policy frames and regional 
policy documents points to a top-down process of discourse 
institutionalization. 
  
3.2.2 The mayor’s role on paper and in practice 
During the frame expansion of the late 2000s, Mayor F was the mayor of 
Breda. With the introduction of home restrictions into the local policy, the 
mayor was now expected to participate in the local and regional approach to 
domestic violence for the first time.  
 
Expected role  
The regional guidelines for implementing home restrictions in West Brabant 
had a formal role for the mayor in addressing domestic violence. All mayors, 
including the mayor of Breda, formally approved a so-called ‘half mandate 
construction’ as proposed in the regional guidelines (Handleiding WTHV, 
2008). Mayors were expected to confirm or reject a home restriction as 
prepared and proposed by the police. The same held for extensions of the 
restriction. Moreover, mayors had to institute home restrictions to create peace 
and initiate assistance and help trajectories.  
Nevertheless, the mayor’s expected role in addressing domestic 
violence was limited to home restrictions, as other local actors were 
responsible for the overall policy approach to domestic violence.  Breda’s 
alderman for Welfare and Youth was formally responsible for this program on 
behalf of the 18 other municipalities in Brabant West. The program was 
supervised by a steering group led by the municipality of Breda (again on 
behalf of the other participating municipalities) and united a wide variety of 
organizations providing social and health care and actors from the criminal law 
community (police, public prosecutor and rehabilitation office) (Stuurgroep 
afhankelijk en veilig, 2009). 
. 
Mayor’s role in practice: full frame enactment 
The mayor’s role in practice came down to several operational as well as 
administrative activities. First, the mayor issued multiple home restrictions. 
During the first year, 35 home restrictions were given out to citizens of Breda, 
which made up 47,3 % of the region (Bureau Queste, 2010). These restrictions 
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were indeed carried out according to the ‘half-mandate construction’, which 
calls for the police to use a checklist to determine whether or not the threat of 
(recurrent) violent behavior was high enough to issue a home restriction. When 
a home restriction is given out, the police officer deliberates with the mayor, 
who usually approves them. Once the police officer signs the mayoral 
decision, the home restriction is in place (Civil servant 2 and 4 – Interviews 
August 2012; Mayor F – Interview May 2013). 
 With these actions, the mayor of Breda became operationally involved 
with domestic violence for the first time. According to many of the actors 
involved, the adoption of home restrictions has activated the mayor’s 
involvement in this policy domain, as they were a “boost which strengthened 
the relationship between the approach to domestic violence and the mayor 
since he has to have an opinion about every case” (Head Advise and Support 
Point Domestic Violence  Interview April 2013  translation RP). As the 
mayor himself described: “I think it became more visible. Before I would not 
know what was going on. Then the police just removed the victim from the 
house. [..] Now cases of domestic violence are presented to me” (Mayor F – 
Interview May 2013  translation RP). The actors involved also mentioned 
that this type of involvement made the mayor’s position vulnerable. Both the 
police and the mayor stated that after each incident of domestic violence, the 
public would look at the municipality and mayor and ask: ‘what have you done 
to prevent this?’ (Police officer 1 – Interview March 2013; Mayor F – 
Interview May 2013). Moreover, the social work organization signaled that 
mayors became hesitant to issue home restrictions, fearing legal obstacles 
(Head of Social Work Organization – Interview April 2013).  
 Besides implementing home restrictions in individual cases of 
domestic violence, the mayor was also involved with domestic violence at the 
administrative level as well. He put the project ‘Enforcing Approach Domestic 
Violence’ on the agenda of the regional police board and asked his fellow 
mayors in the region to discuss it at their municipal Boards of Mayor and 
Aldermen, as he himself did (College B&W, 2009). Furthermore, he attended 
two meeting for mayors in the region to discuss and evaluate the new policy 
tool of temporary home restrictions (Civil servant 4, 5 – Interviews August and 
November 2012; Head Advise and Support Point Domestic Violence  
Interview April 2013). 
 Although the mayor and other safety actors are in place now, the 
aldermen of Welfare and Youth retains responsibility for policies regarding 
domestic violence (Commissie MM, 2009). The ownership of the policy is 
located within the aldermen and the local policy domains of youth and welfare. 
The aldermen signed the collaboration agreement (Convenant HGK, 2009), 
coordinated policies (Commissie MM, 2009) and represented the municipality 
of Breda throughout the entire policy process (Head Advise and Support Point 
Domestic Violence - Interview April 2013). Only the home restrictions were 
handled by the mayor and his staff. Finally, as the mayor came into play, 
actors from the local department of public safety became involved with policy 
intervention regarding domestic violence to handle the home restrictions. 
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In sum, both the mayor’s operational, administrative and political 
activities show a great deal of involvement regarding domestic violence. 
Comparing this role in practice to the expected role as promoted by the policy 
frame, Mayor F fully enacted the policy frame by issuing home restrictions.  
 
3.2.3  Institutional arrangements  
Various aspects of the national and regional policy arena affected the course 
and outcome of the local framing process and the mayor’s role. 
 
National arena  
National policy programs and laws structured the approach to domestic 
violence in several ways. National policy programs both triggered and 
structured regional and local policy attention to domestic violence during the 
early 2000s. Later on, temporary home restrictions activated the mayor to 
become more closely involved in addressing domestic violence. This implies a 
top down process of policy and role structuration by regulative aspects from 
the national policy arena. Furthermore, the national government provided the 
budget for the center city Breda to organize social care, and part of it was used 
to finance regional policy programs for domestic violence national budgets for 
(College B&W, 2010). 
 
Regional arena 
Design and implementation of new policy programs for domestic violence 
were adopted into existing policy practices for providing social care and 
shelter to women in West Brabant. The fact that Breda was the center city 
within this policy domain resulted in aldermen and later on the mayor of Breda 
being responsible for initiating and coordinating regional policies regarding 
domestic violence. This implies that the existing practices of the regional 
policies structured the role of the mayor in this sub case.  
3.3 Findings Sub Case 5 
Reconstructing the frame shifts and the mayor’s role regarding domestic 
violence provided some preliminary research findings. The overall sub case of 
domestic violence showed an expansion of the policy frame regarding 
domestic violence in many ways between the 2002 and 2009.  
The diagnostic message expanded from female victims of violent 
behavior by their partners (Gemeente Breda, 2002) to all forms of violence in 
dependent relationships (Stuurgroep afhankelijk en veilig, 2009). Along the 
way, the focus of the policy program expanded from offenders, children and 
others attached to the social system in which the violence takes place 
(Stuurgroep afhankelijk en veilig, 2009). The prognostic message of the policy 
frame shifted from being reactive and supply-driven, offering shelter and 
support to females (Gemeente Breda, 2002) to a demand-driven chain 
approach aiming to prevent or stop violence. Only as a last resort is shelter 
provided to victims of domestic violence (Stuurgroep afhankelijk en veilig, 
2009). Policy actors began collaborating more intensively as the policy 
programs were further developed and professionalized over the years. This sub 
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case showed a shift from more or less aligned action carried out by individual 
organizations (GGD West Brabant, 2003) to far reaching collaboration and 
integrated actions on a regional scale (Stuurgroep afhankelijk en veilig 2009, 
Handleiding WTHV, 2008). As the policy frame on domestic violence 
expanded and shifted, the mayor’s role did as well, both on paper and in 
practice. The mayor’s role shifted from no involvement to carrying out 
operational and administrative actions on domestic violence. This shift can 
largely be explained as a top-down process in which nationally-created policy 
tools were adopted into the regional policy approach. As soon as temporary 
home restrictions came into the picture, the mayor was activated. He was 
granted a role in the policy programs for giving out home restrictions which he 
fully enacted. In addition, he was actively involved in designing the regional 
policy strategy ‘Dependent and Safe’ and the regional manual for issuing 
home restrictions.   
Based on the conceptual model, we analyzed these changes in both the 
policy frames as well as the mayor’s role and position in practice as the 
outcome of an interplay between local framing process among local discourse 
coalitions and the institutional structure in which these interactions took place. 
Overall, this sub case shows a top down process of policy- and role 
structuration by national policy ambitions and instruments in both framing 
processes during the 21
st
 century. First, the regulative aspects of the national 
policy arena triggered and shaped regional and local policy ambitions and 
practices regarding domestic violence. The initial framing process during 
which domestic violence was labeled as a policy object was triggered by the 
national government promoting the involvement of local government. 
Consequently, national problem definitions and policy goals were adopted into 
regional policy plans. The frame expansion process is characterized by the 
regional and local implementation of the nationally-created policy instrument 
of temporary home restrictions that involved the mayor. This implies a process 
of top-down role structuration for the mayor. Second, that solely labeling 
domestic violence as a matter of safety was not enough to affect the mayor’s 
role on paper and in practice. Although domestic violence was partially 
framed as a safety problem by actors in the local policy arena during the initial 
framing process, the mayor, as the actor responsible for local order and safety, 
was neither granted a role on paper nor actively involved in practice. Only 
when temporary home restrictions were adopted did the mayor and civil 
servants from the policy domain of public order and safety become involved. 
The fact that the mayor was only activated by the time national policy tools in 
the form of home restrictions were introduced implies that framing local issues 
as safety problems needed to be backed up by real-life policy tools to alter an 
actor’s role, at least on paper. Thirdly, national policy ideas and practices 
were adopted into the existing policy structures and practices of the regional 
and local policy arena in the field of social care during the initial policy 
framing process. This indicates path dependency, making it more likely that 
the aldermen and not the mayor were actively involved with domestic violence 
policies in practice.  
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4 Sub case 6  Organized crime in Breda 
This paragraph provides a short summary of Breda’s policy approach to 
organized crime between 1990 and 2010. Local government and the police 
suspected that severe and organized crime was present in local society 
throughout the entire research period starting from 1990 onwards. Multiple 
respondents mentioned their suspicion of criminal networks being linked to 
drugs, local bars, coffee shops, trailer camps, prostitution and specific local 
families (Civil servant 2, Police officer 3, Mayor D and Mayor E – Interviews 
2012/2013). Every once in a while, local government, the police and the public 
prosecutor undertook rather repressive actions by, for example, arresting 
people and closing and confiscating trailers. Despite this, “it remained rather 
difficult to get a grip on organized crime” during the early 1990s, according to 
former Mayor D (Mayor D – Interview April 2013 – translation RP). Existing 
administrative instruments, such as local legislation and local allocation plans, 
were used to follow up on suspicions of organized or severe crime more 
preventatively but on an ad hoc basis (Mayor E, Alderman and Police officer 3 
– Interviews 2013). Furthermore, many respondents mentioned that Mayor D 
received personal threats from local criminals and that civil servants and 
aldermen had been reluctant to tackle severe crime because of a fear of 
repercussions. 
Compared to the other cases, Breda’s policy path on organized crime 
is relatively short. Formal attention on an organized crime policy emerged in 
the late 2000s, with incidental mentions in formal policy plans. Breda’s first 
BIBOB in the 2004 policy referred to the financial and economic aspects of 
organized crime (Gemeente Breda, 2004). This was followed by the regional 
collaboration agreements on cannabis that referred to criminal networks 
behind the production and trade of soft drugs in 2008 (Convenant cannabis, 
2008). In the same year, a regional collaboration agreement regarding the 
problem of so-called ‘free havens’ was created in which Mayor F took an 
initiating and leading role (Convenant vrijplaatsen, 2008).
39
  In 2009, a 
Regional Centre for Information and Expertise (RIEC) was created to support 
information exchange between government actors to enforce a local, 
administrative approach to organized crime (Convenant RIEC, 2010). Finally, 
the regional Brabant Taskforce for Organized Crime was introduced in 2010. 
This taskforce comprised the Minister of Safety and Justice, the mayors of the 
five largest cities in the region, the public prosecutor, the police, and the tax 
authority. They joined forces to combat organized drug-related crime (Tweede 
Kamer, 2011a). This was the first time organized crime in the Brabant region, 
including Breda, had become a central policy objective for local, regional and 
even national actors.  
Taken together, the formal policy approach on organized crime 
developed slowly but steadily in the late 2000s. The initial policy frame on 
organized crime was rather ‘low key’. When the BIBOB law was included as 
                                                 
39   Free havens are locations where local authorties are not (able to) enforce local  
legislation and control activities, thereby providing opportunities for illegal 
behavior.  
  
 
 
210 
 
part of local policies in 2004, the financial and economic aspects of organized 
crime were briefly mentioned in the formal policy strategy. These were to be 
handled by administrative tools implemented by local government in Breda. 
This initial policy frame points at local government’s initial policy ambitions 
regarding organized crime.  A few years later, organized crime was mentioned 
in regional and regional policy plans and programs. Breda participated in a 
regional network on cannabis which was later embedded into the regional 
Brabant Taskforce for Organized Crime (Convenant cannabis, 2008; Tweede 
Kamer, 2011a). This implied participation in a further professionalized and 
integrated policy strategy towards criminal networks that produce and trade 
drugs. Local governments and mayors played a crucial part by implementing 
administrative tools besides juridical and fiscal instruments to prevent or 
discourage organized crime. Overall, organized crime was a new policy 
domain for local governments and only became a substantive policy objective 
with the creation of the taskforce in 2010. Table 16 summarizes the initial and 
expanded policy frames of this policy domain for local governments. 
 
Table 16: Overview of policy frames on organized crime for Breda 
4.1 Local government adopts the first administrative tools on organized 
crime in the early 2000s 
Traditional state actors such as the police and public prosecutor have long held 
a monopoly on the tracking and prosecuting of organized crime. However, in 
the early 1990s, the importance of administrative actions focusing on the 
prevention of unintended governmental support for illegal activities was 
argued in several studies and policy documents (Stuiksma, 1994; PEO, 1995; 
Fijnaut, 2002). Consequently, in the past two decades, a set of policy tools has 
been developed that create a so called ‘administrative approach to organized 
crime’ in which local municipalities are granted an important role (Huisman, 
2010). The most important administrative tool for municipalities is the BIBOB 
Act which aims to protect the government’s integrity. BIBOB was introduced 
in 2002, and allows local authorities to withdraw or refuse to give out a permit, 
subsidy or tender in case of suspicion that the applicant may use the permit for 
Time 
period   
Topic policy 
frame 
Policy  frame: diagnostic & prognostic message 
2004 
 
Administrative 
approach to 
organized  
crime at 
local level 
Diagnostic Message:  usage of legal facilities and services  
provided by local government to create financial gains from  
organized crime  
 
Prognostic Message:  Local governments in Breda became  
involved with the administrative approach to organized  
crime (using BIBOB) 
(Policy Rules Bibob 2004 – Gemeente Breda)  
2009 
 
A regional 
approach to 
criminal  
networks 
Diagnostic Message: invisible criminal networks cause high  
crime rates in the region 
 
Prognostic Message: taskforce combining administrative,  
juridical and fiscal interventions on a regional scale 
(Adressing Organized Crime 2011 - Tweede Kamer) 
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illegal activities (Law on Enhancing the Integrity of Assessments by the Public 
Administration  BIBOB).  As a result of this law, local authorities can also 
seek the assistance a national BIBOB office to conduct more extended, 
national-level screenings of applicants seeking local permits.  
 
4.1.1 Initial local framing process  
It is in this national policy context that local authorities in Breda took their first 
steps into the policy domain of organized crime by adopting the BIBOB tool. 
In 2003, the Board of Mayor and Alderman in Breda installed a local working 
group to prepare BIBOB policies which were eventually formally adopted in 
2004 (Gemeente Breda, 2004). The adoption of the BIBOB instrument locally 
meant that local policy attention on specific aspects of organized crime was 
triggered by national policy tools. Figure 23 summarizes this initial framing 
process. 
 
Figure 23: Initial framing process on organized crime at Breda 
 
Local policy network
Policy in practice
Mayor hardly uses 
BIBOB 
No local policy debate
National arena 
BIBOB Law
 Policy strategy
‘Policy Rules BIBOB’ 2004
Mayor and Board of Mayor 
and Aldermen are expected to 
implement bibob
 
 
A content analysis of local council and commission meetings, as well as 
interviews with local policy actors, indicates that the adoption of the BIBOB 
tool in local plans in 2003 and 2004 was not preceded or followed by any 
policy debate during which frames could potentially align. The absence of 
local policy actors or coalitions expressing their views on organized crime and 
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BIBOB indicates a direct and instrumental adoption of national policy tools in 
the local policy space. 
Local policy frame & discourse institutionalization  
The first policy document in which organized crime was specifically 
mentioned is ‘Policy approach to cafés, bars, prostitution and casinos by 
means of BIBOB’ in 2004 (Gemeente Breda, 2004). This document presents 
the initial policy frame on organized crime in Breda. 
Crime in general, whether organized or not, is problematized in the 
policy guidelines for BIBOB. It focused on the financial and economic aspects 
of crime, which touch upon the legal aspects of (local) government. In their 
diagnostic message local authorities followed the conclusions of the Van Traa 
parliamentary commission that focused on the financial gains from organized 
crime to create positions of economic power (PEO, 1996). These positions 
could ‘infiltrate’ society using legal facilities and services provided by local 
government, such as subsidies and permits. This threatens the integrity of local 
governments since criminal activities may be unintentionally supported by 
local authorities: “Crime, organized crime, does not take place on an island. 
There are many interfaces between crime and what we call the juridical 
environment” (Gemeente Breda, 2004:2 – translation RP). 
When it comes to the diagnostic message, the policy documents 
makes a case for activating local government to address such (organized) 
crime: “For a long time, prevention and repression of crime has been a task 
for solely the police and ministry of justice. Only in the past few years has the 
idea that local government can play a part in this become apparent. After all, 
local is ONE government together with the policy and juridical actors. One 
government that is responsible for setting norms and values. Once these norms 
and values are violated, local government as well has to respond” (Gemeente 
Breda, 2004:1 – translation RP). The interfaces between crime and its legal 
environment offer possibilities for prevention and repression. Administrative 
tools, such as subsidies and permits, should be used for crime prevention. The 
adoption of the national BIBOB law would offer new possibilities for local 
government to prevent unintentional support of criminals and criminal 
organizations by creating new grounds for the refusal or withdrawal of 
municipal permits. Based on national law, the ‘vulnerable sectors’ in which 
this unwanted connection between the ‘under’ and ‘upper’ world may be 
present and should be assessed for include hotels, restaurants, bars, prostitution 
and casinos (Gemeente Breda, 2004). The policy document distinguished 
between a heavy and light BIBOB screening and included guidelines to define 
when the mayor can ask the national BIBOB office for a screening.  
In terms of discourse institutionalization, the initial policy program in 
which local government first displayed its ambitions on crime and organized 
crime was highly affected by national policy ideas. The diagnostic message of 
the policy approach’s focus on financial aspects of organized crime derived 
strongly from the conclusions of national inquiries into crime in the 
Netherlands, which pointed at its financial and economic aspects (PEO, 1996). 
The prognostic message of the approach was heavily structured by the 
inclusion of the BIBOB law into local policy in Breda. This instrument has 
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been more or less literarily copied from the national version into the local 
policy. More generally, the idea of the administrative approach, in which local 
governments use their administrative tools to prevent crime, was introduced 
and encouraged by the national government as well. This implies a voluntary 
process of top-down discourse institutionalization of national policy frames 
into the local policy process  
 
4.1.2 The mayor’s role on paper and in practice  
During the initial framing process, Mayor E was the mayor of Breda. The 
formal BIBOB policy set out several responsibilities and tasks for the mayor. 
The level to which his actions in practice mirrored what was expected of him 
is the level of frame enactment.  
 
Expected role  
In line with the national BIBOB law, the local BIBOB guidelines led to the 
individual mayor and the Board of Mayor and Aldermen being appointed as 
the administrative actors responsible for the local implementation of BIBOB 
policies and for requesting the national BIBOB office to screen a local case 
(Gemeente Breda, 2004).  The mayor of Breda was thus granted a formal role 
in Breda’s first policy approach to organized crime.  
 
Role in practice: low frame enactment 
In practice, however, Mayor E was little involved with the implementation of 
the BIBOB tool, besides formally approving the local BIBOB policy plan 
(Gemeente, 2004). The mayor’s activities regarding BIBOB were limited and 
solely administrative. Together with the aldermen, he formally approved the 
BIBOB policy which was barely implemented. This indicates a lower level of 
frame enactment that can be explained by his personal frame on the policy 
tool, which he expressed in retrospect: “BIBOB was barely used because it 
was too difficult” (Mayor E – Interview June 2013).  
 
4.1.3 Institutional arrangements in the early 2000s 
Several aspects of the national, regional and local policy arena affected the 
course and outcome of the local framing process and the mayor’s role.  
 
National arena 
The initial framing of organized crime as a local policy problem was both 
triggered and heavily structured by the BIBOB tool that was designed and 
introduced by national government. This implies that the regulative aspects of 
the national policy arena triggered and structured local policy attention on 
organized crime, in which the mayor was granted a formal role. 
 
Local arena 
Although the national BIBOB instrument was approved by the local authorities 
in Breda and expanded their collection of local tools, Mayor E did not 
immediately implement it in practice. This might be explained by the fact that 
the personal frame of this dominant actor in the local policy network did not 
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align with the policy frame. This points to the importance of the cognitive 
aspects for the level of enactment by the mayor. 
4.2 Task Force for Organized Crime in the late 2000s  
This section describes the characteristics of the frame expansion process 
during which organized crime became a full-grown policy topic for local 
authorities in Breda. This frame expansion process took place within a national 
policy context of expanding attention on organized crime and the 
encouragement of local authorities to take on a strong role.  
In the late 2000s, the Balkenende IV administration prioritized the 
problem of organized crime and encouraged the Dutch municipalities to play 
an important part in tackling this problem. In the national policy document 
titled ‘Administrative Approach to Organized Crime,’ it was argued that 
organized crime manifest themselves in municipalities and local communities: 
“Organized crime has almost always roots on the local level” (Programma 
bestuurlijke aanpak georganiseerde misdaad, 2008:2 – translation RP). This 
national, integral approach to organized crime prioritized specific areas 
including human trafficking, the organized production of soft drugs, and fraud 
in real estate. Within this program, municipalities were granted the role of 
coordinators of the administrative approach (CCV, 2010). To support these 
large governance networks that brought together local authorities and others 
parties, National and Regional Centers of Information and Expertise were 
created. 
 
4.2.1 Frame expansion 
In the region of Mid-West Brabant, organized crime was subjected to a series 
of regional studies and policy plans. A research report on drug-related 
nuisance pointed to the supra local character of drug-related problems as well 
(COT, 2009). More specifically, it pointed to the production of cannabis and 
trade in amphetamine by criminal networks. These signals were picked up 
local governments in the region, and they created a regional commission led 
by Mayor Fränzel. The commission recommended the creation of a 
programmatic, systematic and integrated approach to organized crime in Mid-
West Brabant, and promoted the participation of local governments in the 
RIEC as information-based governance was deemed crucial (Commissie 
Fränzel, 2009).  
Local governments of the four cities in Mid-West Brabant scored high 
in the municipal safety index
40
 and were worried and requested a scrutinization 
of the causes of these high crime rates. Research revealed that that the high 
crime rates in these large cities were strongly connected to organized crime 
(P&W, 2010).  This report was soon followed by policy developments on 
drug-related organized crime. Triggered by the discontent with the high crime 
rates combined with a series of aggressive incidents
41
, the mayors of the five 
                                                 
40   Den Bosch, Breda, Eindhoven en Tilburg (gemeentelijke veiligheidsindex (COT,   
2009). 
41   Including:  Criminal liquidations and utered threath adressed to mayors  
(Gemeente Breda, 1010, Tweede Kamer, 2010). 
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largest cities expressed their worries and wishes to the Minister of Safety and 
Justice (Tweede kamer, 2010, Mayor F, 2009). This led to the creation of the 
regional Taskforce for Organized Crime. In this taskforce, the mayors of five 
cities, which included Breda, the Minister of Safety and Justice, the public 
prosecutor, the police and the tax authorities joined forces to fight criminal 
networks linked to drugs (Tweede Kamer, 2010). The existing regional 
agreement regarding cannabis was adopted by this task force. Figure 24 
summarizes this process of frame expansion.  
 
Figure 24: frame expansion on organized crime, Breda late 2000s 
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Several discourse coalitions consisting of actors from different policy arenas 
interacted during the processes of frame expansion.  
 
Coalition A: Mayors of the region Mid-West Brabant 
The mayors of the Brabant region collaborated in the regional board of the 
police and expressed their shared understanding of drugs and crime. Their 
common frame relied heavily on the studies they initiated and financed 
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together (Commissie Fränzel, 2009; COT, 2009; P&W, 2010). Following the 
conclusions of the research reports, they problematized the invisible criminal 
structures around cannabis which created the visibly high crime rates in the 
region (Commissie Fränzel, 2010). The acknowledgment of the supra local 
character of drug-related problems went hand-in-hand with the ambition to 
cooperate on a regional scale. More specifically, the mayors pointed to the 
importance of aligning administrative, fiscal and judicial instruments to 
systematically restrict organized crime’s drug-related activities in the region: 
“The benefits of a regional approach include: finding solutions for problems 
manifesting on a region scale. Municipalities can learn from each other in 
designing and implementing policies and prevent individual actions to create a 
water bed effect” (Commissie Fränzel, 2010  translation RP).  
 
Coalition B:  Local authorities in Breda 
Mayor F represented his municipality in regional coalition A. He was also part 
of the local coalition B that united the local authorities of Breda to bring 
regional ambitions and plans to the local arena. In the local policy arena, the 
city council and the Board of Mayor and Aldermen were key players who 
discussed and supported regional policy ambitions on organized crime. The 
Board of Mayor and Aldermen more or less followed the regional policy by 
problematizing the supra local character of drug-related crime and formulated 
the goal to address criminal networks dealing in cannabis in the region 
(College van B&W, 2010). In line with coalition A, they pointed to the scarce 
police capacity and proposed to follow up on the Fränzel commission’s call to 
municipalities to participate in the RIEC and implement the BIBOB for 
matters of organized crime (ibid).  
The mayor himself expressed his worries about the “drugs trade as 
the engine of crime in the region” and pointed to “the tremendous 
criminalization of drugs trade is the largest problem” during a local meeting 
with council members (Commissie Bestuur, 2010:12 – translation RP). He 
recognized the supra local character of the problem and the need to combine 
prevention, enforcement and criminal pursuit as stressed by the COT report 
(Mayor F, 2009). Although Breda is not an island and the problem manifests 
itself in the city, he suspected that the problem was less severe in Breda than in 
other cities. Nevertheless, he supported the taskforce and the regional network: 
“I fully supported the taskforce. It is a catalyst for addressing matters that are 
severe in a better way” (Mayor F – Interview May 2013 – translation RP).  
The frames of the local political parties on organized crime were 
mirrored by the reactions of local council members on the boards to the 
organized crime policies. The Socialist Party saw the ‘emergence of organized 
crime as a concern’ and supported maximal effort on prevention (Commissie 
Bestuur, 2009). The Green Left Party problematized organized crime around 
cannabis which “would not come without nuisance and crime” (Commissie 
Bestuur, 2010:11  transaltion RP). The Labor Party recognized organized 
crime related to cannabis as well and advised coordination of policy 
interventions at the regional level. According to the Christian Democratic 
Party, ”a lot of money circulates in the drugs circuit and criminals would get a 
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growing grip on society through drugs money” (Commissie Bestuur, 2010: 12-
translation RP). They proposed a ‘tough policy’ on this issue. Parties 
Democrats ‘66 and Breda ’97 were annoyed by the restricted police capacity. 
Altogether, this implies that the Board of Mayor and Aldermen, the mayor 
himself and the city council supported the policy ambitions of coalition A. 
 
Discourse coalition C: Minister of Safety and Justice 
The Minister of Safety and Justice, Ivo Opstelten, recognized “organized 
crime in Brabant as a severe and serious problem” and fully supported the 
task force which he described as “an institution which maximally uses all 
administrative, fiscal and criminal justice instruments throughout the region. 
Off course, these efforts have to result into a more structural grounds for a 
collective approach on regional level” (Tweede Kamer 2011a:1 – translation 
RP).  In supporting and facilitating the taskforce with money and manpower, 
the minister managed to squeeze in the national government’s plans regarding 
coffee shops as well. As mentioned in sub case 5 on the drug-related nuisance 
in Breda, the national government introduced memberships cards and distance 
criteria for coffee shops, which were first implemented in the Brabant region: 
“It was agreed that this government’s strengthened policy towards coffee 
shops will be implemented in Brabant” (Tweede Kamer, 2011:1). 
 
During the policy debate, the frames of national, regional and local discourse 
coalitions were in alignment. The process of frame alignment went through 
two phases. Firstly, the collective regional frame recognizing the need of 
collaboration to address drug-related organized crime cascaded to the local 
level of Breda. The mayor of Breda enhanced the process of frame alignment 
by introducing and explaining the regional policy ambitions of coalition A in 
the local policy network, where coalition B was present.  Secondly, the 
regional and local recognition of the need for regional collaboration and extra 
policy capacity was actively communicated to decision-makers in the national 
policy arena in the person of Minister Opstelten (coalition C). During this 
phase, regional policy goals on organized crime aligned with national goals on 
coffee shops in the Netherlands. Altogether, this implies the bridging of 
compatible but formerly unconnected frames from three discourse coalitions 
located in different policy arenas. 
 
Local policy frame & discourse institutionalization  
In the late 2000s, several policies were created to address organized crime with 
an administrative approach. These were the regional collaboration agreements 
on free havens and cannabis and the policy ambitions of the Taskforce on 
Organized Crime. Together, these three policies mirrored the policy frame(s) 
on organized crime as described below.  
The diagnostic message pointed at two phenomena associated with 
organized crime: free havens and cannabis plantations. It started with the 
identification of free havens, which are “locations, groups of persons, 
branches or specific appointed topics where effective government intervention 
is impeded which leads to unwanted situations in society of which structural 
fraud is an important one” (Convenant vrijplaatsen, 2008:2). Such free havens 
  
 
 
218 
 
can manifest themselves in various sectors, such as prostitution, deprived 
neighborhoods, recreational bungalow parks, illegal casinos and real estate. 
Meanwhile, a regional collaboration agreement on cannabis was in place 
(Convenant cannabis, 2008). Cannabis plantations were problematized for 
being illegal and causing a nuisance and being a threat to local order, public 
safety and public health as well as undermining the rule of law. They were 
linked to criminal networks suspected of engaging in the profitable but illegal 
activity of producing soft drugs. In 2010, the cannabis agreement was 
embedded into the Brabant Taskforce for Organized Crime. In their internal 
and external communication, members of the taskforce linked ‘drug-related 
organized crime’ with the ‘organized production of cannabis’ and this form of 
organized crime was described as a ‘severe societal problem’ causing   “a lot 
of nuisance and feelings of in safety among citizens” and being a “creeping 
danger for the integrity of society” (Tweede Kamer, 2011a:1  translation RP). 
  The prognostic message of the taskforce was to take an integrated 
approach on drug-related crime to ‘the next level’ by combining 
administrative, juridical and fiscal interventions  (on an supra regional level 
with strong ties to the national government: “The taskforce, led by the Minister 
of Safety and Justice and the mayor of Tilburg, will initiate all  necessary 
actions together with the largest municipalities in Brabant, the police 
(national and regional), public prosecutor, constabulary and the tax agencies 
(Tweede Kamer, 2010: 1 – translation RP). Based on a pooled information 
supply (RIEC), the strategy of the Taskforce can be divided into three 
objectives: 1: to apprehend the criminal gangs behind the production and trade 
of cannabis, 2: to break down the underlying criminal structures in the region 
and 3: to confiscate criminal possessions (Tweede Kamer, 2010). Mayor 
Noordanus of Tilburg presided over the taskforce, together with the Minister 
of Safety and Justice. 
Both regional and national policy ideas institutionalized into the 
policies on organized crime that were created between 2008 and 2010. The 
policy documents on free havens and cannabis and the Taskforce collaboration 
agreement clearly resemble the regional policy frame that expressed the need 
for a supra local collaborative approach on criminal networks, as introduced by 
coalition A. In turn, this regional policy frame was heavily inspired by 
research findings, pointing out the regional character of drug-related problems 
in the region for the first time (COT, 2009), the presence of organized criminal 
networks and the insufficiency of the existing approach of local governments 
and the police (P&W, 2010). A smaller aspect of the expansion of the regional 
policy frame was the adoption of new national criteria for coffee shops in the 
southern provinces, among which Brabant was the first (Tweede Kamer, 
2011b). When the Minister of Safety and Justice supported the Taskforce with 
funds and manpower, he managed to add national policy ideas to the regional 
program on drug-related crime.  Overall, this points to the discourse 
institutionalization of mainly regional and some national policy ideas into the 
regional policy strategy on organized crime in Brabant.  
 
  
 
 
219 
 
4.2.2 The mayor’s role on paper and in practice  
The following sections describe whether and how the frame expansion affected 
the mayor’s position and role, both on paper as well as in practice.  
 
Expected role  
In the policy programs on free havens and cannabis and in the Taskforce, the 
mayor of Breda was expected to address organized crime. The collaboration 
agreement on free havens granted the mayor of Breda the responsibility for 
administrative coordination of the regional approach. This implied that he had 
to coordinate all practical issues, such as the enlistment of new participants, 
communicating with the public about actual enforcement actions regarding 
free havens, and making sure the agreement was evaluated every two years 
(Convenant vrijplaatsen, 2008). The documents explicitly stated that these 
tasks were to be handled by the mayor’s cabinet under the supervision of the 
mayor himself. The regional cannabis agreement aimed to clear as many 
cannabis plantations as possible, an activity which should be administratively 
handled by the local Boards of Mayor and Aldermen in the region (Evaluatie 
convenant cannabis 2009/11). In 2010, the free haven and cannabis agreements 
were embedded into the Taskforce for Organized Crime. The expected role of 
local governments in the taskforce, which included the mayor of Breda, was to 
close coffee shops and buildings with severe drug-related nuisance, and 
implement the BIBOB tool (Tweede Kamer, 2010). 
 
Role in practice: high frame enactment 
The mayor of Breda carried out administrative as well as operational activities 
relating to organized crime in the late 2000s. In 2008, the mayor signed the 
regional collaboration agreement on free havens and cannabis (Convenant 
cannbasi 2008; Convenant vrijplaatsen, 2008). The latter implied that by the 
power of the local Board of Mayor and Aldermen of Breda, multiple cannabis 
productions were cleared, decreasing the total number from 88 in 2009 to 59 in 
2010 (Evaluatie convenant cannabis 2009/11). In 2009, the Mayor of Breda 
requested Minister Opstelten not to further reduce police capacity in the 
region, referring to a research report demonstrating the supra local level of the 
problem (Mayor F, 2009). A year later, the mayor acted as substitute police 
chief when signing the letter to the Minister of Safety and Justice in which the 
safeguarding of police capacity on organized crime related to cannabis was 
again proposed (Mayor F, 2010).  In general, the mayor’s local partners 
described his role in addressing organized crime as decisive (Public 
Prosecutor, Interview May 2013) strongly oriented on free havens (Employee 
Tax Collectors Office – Interview August 2013 ) and inclined to collaborate at 
a regional scale (Civil servant 6 – Interview August 2012). 
On the 7
th
 of December, the mayor of Breda attended an instant 
meeting between the mayors of the five biggest cities and the Minister of 
Safety and Justice to discuss the problem of drug-related crime in the region 
(Tweede Kamer, 2010). This eventually led to the creation of the Brabant 
Taskforce for Organized Crime (Tweede Kamer 2010/2011a). According to 
almost all of the respondents, Mayor F’s  role within the taskforce was merely 
an administrative one Public Prosecutor, Interview May 2013; Employee Tax 
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Collectors Office –Interview August 2013 ; Civil servant 6 – Interview August 
2012). He was a member of the steering committee that brought together 
mayors, police chiefs, public prosecutors and the Minister of Safety and 
Justice and met four times a year to set the priorities of the task force and 
monitor its progress . The mayor described his own role in the Task Force as 
“participating constructively and being supportive, although Tilburg was 
leading and one has to know his role” (Mayor F – Interview May 2013  
translation RP). 
The mayor’s administrative activities on organized crime were 
connected to the local policy arena in Breda as well. A few days after the 
meeting between the mayors and the minister, the mayor informed the local 
city council about the Task Force and its ambitions (Gemeente Breda, 2010). 
The implementation and progress of the free haven agreement and the task 
force were discussed in the local triangle consolation (Public Prosecutor, 
Interview May 2013; Employee Task Force B5 – Interview April 2013). 
Overall, the mayor’s administrative activities at the supra local and 
local levels show a high level of frame enactment of the policy frames set out 
by the agreements on free havens, cannabis and the Taskforce. Nevertheless, it 
is important to emphasize that these were only the first steps that local 
government took to address organized crime. Although the taskforce gave a 
boost to the actual implementation of the administrative approach in Breda and 
the other cities in the region in 2010, this resulted in the creation of formal 
arrangements and the formulation of shared ambitions between participating 
organizations in the Taskforce (Head RIEC – Interview May 2013). Only later 
did the Taskforce became operational and addressed actual cases of organized 
crime, including some in Breda (Employee Task Force B5 – Interview April 
2013).
42
 
 
4.2.3 Institutional arrangements in the late 2000s 
Various aspects of the regional, national and local policy arenas affected the 
course and outcome of the local framing process as well as the mayor’s role. 
 
Regional arena  
Regional governing bodies and collaboration structures initiated and structured 
the way in which organized crime was framed and addressed in and around 
Breda. The regional board of the police initiated and funded research on drug-
related organized crime in the region and made a case for intensifying 
integrated regional collaboration. The mayors of the five largest cities in 
Brabant placed organized crime on the national policy agenda and in doing so, 
triggered the creation of the Brabant Taskforce for Organized Crime. These 
regional policy dynamics structured the regional collaboration agreements on 
free havens, cannabis and the Taskforce, in which the local Breda authorities 
participated.  
 
National arena 
                                                 
42   These events are beyond the research period (1990 to 2010). 
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The encouragement of the participation of local and regional authorities was 
shaped by the Balkenende IV administration and Rutte I administration, which 
prioritized the problem of organized crime and offered support in terms of 
money, manpower and commitment. These facilitated the creation of the 
regional Taskforce for Organized Crime. Moreover, the nationally-created 
Regional Information and Expertise Centers supported the taskforce’s 
ambitions, and national policies on coffee shops partially shaped the regional 
policy frame of the Taskforce in terms of dealing with soft drugs. This implies 
that regulative aspects in the form of policy plans on organized crime and soft 
drugs and the national budget affected regional policy plans and practices.  
 
Local arena 
The mayor of Breda participated in the initiation, creation and implementation 
of regional policy strategies on organized crime. This active involvement in 
the regional policy arena and his ongoing attempts to make a case for regional 
policy ambitions among local stakeholders can be explained by his personal 
frame and professional experience. The mayor was strongly rooted in the 
region where he was born and valued the regional tradition of supra local 
collaboration between local governments (Civil servant 6 – Interview August 
2012).  Moreover, he has been the mayor of Bergen op Zoom, Nieuw- 
Ginneken and Rosmalen, which are all located in the Brabant region. This 
gave him knowledge of the policy dynamics and a large professional network 
in the regional arena. This implies that cognitive aspects were shaped by the 
personal and professional experiences of the mayor as a key player in the local 
governance network. This enhanced Breda’s participation in the overall 
regional approach to organized crime.  
4.3 Findings of sub case 6 
Reconstructing the frame shifts and the mayor’s role on organized crime 
provided some preliminary research findings. First, the diagnostic message on 
organized crime shifted from being non-existent to modest policy attention for 
the financial and economic aspects of organized crime and free havens during 
the initial framing process in 2004. In the late 2000s, the diagnostic message 
expanded with a full focus on drug-related organized crime and criminal 
networks. The prognostic message initially focused on the local 
implementation of the BIBOB tool in 2004. The local administrative approach 
to organized crime expanded with the growth of regional collaboration 
combining administrative, fiscal and criminal justice instruments in the form 
of the Taskforce for Organized Crime that was supported and partially 
financed by the national government in 2010. Second, as the policy frame on 
organized crime expanded, the mayor’s role did as well. His expected role as 
described in the policy documents shifted from having no role, because 
organized crime was not a key topic of local public policies (Mayor D), to 
deploying the BIBOB instrument to administratively address the financial and 
economic gains obtained through organized crime (Mayors E and F). Later on, 
the mayor was eventually granted an administrative role to jointly choose and 
monitor the priorities of the regional taskforce on organized crime (Mayor F).  
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Overall, the mayors of Breda enacted their expected roles, although 
some did so more than others. Consequently, the mayor’s role in practice 
shifted from incidental participation in repressive actions by police and 
criminal justice actors regarding organized crime (Mayor D) to preparing 
BIBOB instruments in the local arena (Mayor E) and participating in regional 
collaboration with the police, public prosecutor, tax authorities and the 
Minister of Safety and Justice (Mayor F). These actions of the various mayors 
expanded their policy network in terms of size and number of actors.
 
The 
mayors’ activities expanded from local to regional and the supra regional level. 
In doing so, his role shifted from a rather isolated actor implementing his 
administrative tools and powers within the boundaries of his municipality to 
pooling these instruments with juridical, fiscal and other actors on a regional 
scale.   
Based on this sub case, we found several explanatory mechanisms 
which reveal an interesting interplay between national, regional and local 
policy arenas in shaping the cognitive process of framing new local safety 
problems and the mayor’s role in addressing these problems. 
Firstly, local policy history affected the speed and extent of adopting 
regional and national policy plans and tools in the local policy arena. 
Organized crime had not been a traditional issue for local government actors. 
Therefore, it took a while before BIBOB was adopted and implemented in the 
local arena.  This explains why actors, including the mayor, needed some time 
to shift their attitude from passively following national policy trends during the 
initial framing process (BIBOB) to actively initiating policy expansion later on 
(through the Taskforce).  
 Secondly, frame expansion was triggered by administrative actors 
from the regional policy arena, that is, the mayors. Only when they framed 
organized crime as a policy problem occurring in their region and expressed 
the need for serious policy interventions did local governments become 
actively involved in addressing organized crime. Their shared frames, heavily 
relying on several research reports, were a prerequisite for this shift from the 
passive to active involvement of the mayor of Breda and other (administrative) 
actors in the region. This implies that the cognitive aspects (frames) of the 
regional policy arena are important for local governments to engage with when 
addressing criminal networks.  
 Thirdly, various aspects of the national policy arena affected the 
content of regional and local framing processes. In general, the content of the 
local and regional policy plans was strongly shaped by national policy ideas 
(administrative approach to organized crime) and tools (BIBOB). Moreover, 
the implementation of the first full-grown policy strategy in which local 
authorities actively addressed organized crime (the Taskforce) was enabled by 
means of national funds, manpower and symbolic support.  
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Part V – Analysis 
How have definitions of local safety problems changed and how, to what 
extent and why has this affected the mayor’s position and role in local safety 
governance in the Netherlands between 1990 and 2010? This central question 
structures the entire research project. A theoretical answer was formulated in 
part II of the book by the introduction of a conceptual model explaining the 
power of problem definitions in shaping actors' roles and positions in 
governance networks. Part III outlined in detail how the conceptual model was 
applied to data collection and analysis (research design). Part IV presented the 
findings of both the macro study and the three case studies.  
In the fifth part of the book, the theoretical and empirical findings as 
presented in Part II and IV are combined to provide a more substantive answer 
to the central research question. Chapters 10 and 11 present within case 
analyses of Haarlem and Breda. The similarities and differences between the 
sub cases are identified and explained for each key concept of the conceptual 
model in order to answer sub question four: How have new local safety 
problems been framed in local policy processes and how does this affect the 
mayors' role in and position in policy and practice? and sub question five: 
Which (f)actors of the local, regional and national policy arena affected the 
content, course and outcome of these framing processes? This is followed by a 
cross case analysis that outlines the similarities and differences between the 
case studies in Chapter 12. The main purpose of this cross case comparison is 
to refine the conceptual model and outline the theoretical implications of the 
case studies.  
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Chapter 10: Within case comparison of Haarlem 
1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a within case analysis of how the mayors of Haarlem 
addressed the drug related nuisance, increasing domestic violence and 
organized crime in the years between 1990 and 2010. The mayor’s position 
and role in local governance structures is compared across the three separate 
problems of drugs related nuisances, domestic violence and organized crime. It 
is hoped that such a comparison will advance our understanding of how 
shifting definitions of local safety problems affected the mayor’s role and 
position in local governance practices over time. These similarities and 
differences are interpreted by means of a conceptual model that helps us to 
map out the impact of frame shifts on the mayor's position and roles in the 
network settings.  
This chapter is structured by the conceptual model. Section two 
focuses on the process of problem framing in local policy networks during 
which discourse coalitions vie for dominance. These fames may then get 
aligned with the frames of other key actors, and be institutionalized into a 
formal policy. Section three focuses on the mayors' role on paper and in 
practice, and whether and how this reflects the policy frame. The fourth 
paragraph focuses on the institutional arrangements affecting these local policy 
processes. The fifth and final paragraph summarizes the research findings by 
providing a preliminary answer to sub question 4 and 5 based on the findings 
from Haarlem. 
2 Problem framing in the local policy network  
This paragraph focuses on the course and outcome of framing process within 
the local policy networks. The conceptual model stresses that the impact of 
shifting definitions of safety problems on the mayor’s position and role in 
governance networks can be understood as the outcome of the framing 
processes that occur in the local policy network. During such local policy 
debates, several discourse coalitions (each holding their own perspective) 
interact in order to create policy strategies to be executed by the mayor and 
others. This interaction is expected to enhance frame alignment and create a 
shared understanding of the policy problem, as well as bring to light the most 
favorable solution. Discourse institutionalization takes place when such a 
common frame is formalized into policy plans. The following sections show 
how each of these aspects of the local framing process manifested themselves 
in all three sub cases in Haarlem. The sections also show the similarities and 
differences in the problem triggers, coalitions, level of frame alignment and 
process of discourse institutionalization between the sub cases.  
2.1 Triggers 
New safety issues arising in Haarlem were subjected to the framing process 
during the time span of this study. The triggers for the various problems 
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differed from each other, and over time. Table 17 provides an overview of 
these various triggers. 
 
Table 17: Triggers Haarlem 
 
 Drug-related 
Nuisances 
Domestic Violence Organized Crime 
Trigger initial 
framing process 
The number of 
coffee shops causing 
drug-related 
nuisances expanded 
too quickly 
according to the 
local government. 
Death of two 
women due to 
domestic violence in 
Haarlem  
National 
government 
introduced the 
BIBOB law  
Trigger 
reframing 
National government 
introduced the power 
to close drug 
buildings  
National 
government 
introduced 
temporary home 
restrictions  
Introduction of a 
regional policy 
program regarding 
organized crime 
A new mayor 
implemented new 
policy interventions 
regarding coffee 
shops 
 
The initial framing processes during which the drug-related nuisance, 
domestic violence and organized crime were labeled as a local safety problems 
was triggered by either local or national-level policy factors. The policy debate 
in preparation of Haarlem’s first policy document regarding coffee shops was 
triggered by dissatisfaction among local authorities with the rising number of 
coffee shops. These coffee shops were thought to make local residents feel 
unsafe. Haarlem’s first policy approach to domestic violence was triggered 
locally as well by the death of two female residents. In contrast, the framing of 
organized crime as a local policy problem was not triggered locally, but at the 
national level by the introduction of a national law authorizing local authorities 
to prevent the unintended governmental support of criminal activities 
(BIBOB). Following the terminology of the conceptual model, the triggers 
were classified as being cognitive interpretations in the local arena, incidents 
in the local arena, and regulative aspects from the national policy arena 
respectively. 
As time went by, all three sub cases were reframed at least once. 
While the initial triggers for their inclusion in the policy framing process 
varied, their reformulation had very similar impetus, in that they were all 
brought about by regulative aspects of the supra local arenas. Another striking 
similarity amongst these frame shifts is that they all entailed a frame 
expansion. Because of a shift in the prognostic message of the policy frame in 
each sub case, the expectations of the mayor's role was dramatically expanded. 
For example, the shift in the policy frame on drug-related nuisances was 
triggered by the introduction of a new formal power for Dutch mayors that was 
created by the national government. The prognostic message of the policy 
frame on domestic violence was expanded when local authorities in Haarlem 
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adopted temporary home restrictions as introduced in national law. The frame 
shift regarding organized crime was triggered by the introduction of a regional 
policy program that encouraged local authorities to collaborate more 
extensively in addressing organized crime.  
Finally, the number of frame shifts differed amongst the sub cases. 
While the policy frame on domestic violence and organized crime was 
expanded once, the frame relating to drug-related nuisances shifted twice. This 
second frame shift was brought about by a change in the composition of the 
local policy network. A new mayor took office, and his strong emphasis on 
addressing the problem of drugs greatly impacted the policy approach. Across 
the three subcases, the changes demonstrate that the longer a problem is the 
topic of policy processes, the more often it is likely to be reframed.  
Taken together, it is clear that frame shifts in Haarlem, both at the 
stage of initial framing and during frame expansion, were brought along by 
different triggers. Attention to new local safety problems was not always 
initiated by local policy actors, or by local policy events. In fact, in a majority 
of frame shifts, local policy attention was fostered more by the introduction of 
national rules and regulations. 
2.2 Discourse coalitions in the local policy debate  
During the local policy debates on drugs, violence and crime, several discourse 
coalitions expressed their frames of the problem at hand along with their most 
favored policy solutions. This section compares the compositions of these 
discourse coalitions across our three sub cases. 
 
Table 18: Discourse coalitions Haarlem 
 
 
 
Drug-related 
Nuisances 
Domestic Violence Organized Crime 
Initial 
framing 
process 
Coalition A  
Actors: mayor, 
council members and 
inhabitants 
 
Frame: coffee shops 
are a safety problem 
that needs to be 
addressed and 
citizens feel unsafe 
 
Coalition B  
Actor: single council 
member 
 
Frame: close all 
coffee shops because 
soft drugs damage 
health  
Coalition A  
Actors: professional 
pioneers 
 
Frame: a safety 
approach for 
addressing domestic 
violence 
 
Coalition B  
Actors: local 
authorities 
 
Frame: critical 
supporters 
Coalition A  
Actor: mayor 
 
Frame: little organized 
crime in Haarlem 
 
Coalition B  
Actors: council members 
 
Frame: support BIBOB 
 
Coalition C  
Actors: new board M&A 
 
Frame: BIBOB is 
priority 
 
Coalition D  
Actors: council members 
 
Frame: expanding 
BIBOB 
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Frame shift  
1 
Little policy debate. 
 
Coalition A  
Actors: police, mayor 
and council members  
 
Frame: drugs in 
houses is not a safety 
problem that is 
widely faced in 
Haarlem 
Coalition A  
Actors: council 
members and 
aldermen: 
 
Frame: critical 
supporters of the new 
policy 
Coalition A  
Actors:  local politicians  
 
Frame: pay attention to 
organized crime 
 
Coalition B  
Actor: mayor  
Frame: response to the 
local and national call  
Frame shift  
2 
Coalition A  
Actors: mayor and 
council members 
 
Frame: control coffee 
shops and sanction 
rule violation 
 
Coalition B  
Actors: shop owners 
 
Frame: dissatisfaction 
with renewed policy 
actions 
 
Coalition C  
Actors: council 
members 
 
Frame: turn to the 
older, loser approach 
to coffee shops  
 
Coalition D 
Actors: united coffee 
shop owners 
 
Frame: cooperate 
with authorities 
  
  
Drug-related nuisances 
The policy strategy on drug-related nuisances was (re)framed twice between 
1990 and 2010. In two of these three times, the shifts in frame were preceded 
by a substantive policy debate in which several discourse coalitions expressed 
their views. The first policy debate was dominated by local authorities, citizens 
and coffee shop owners interacting in the early 1990s. A coalition consisting 
of the mayor and a majority of council members claimed that coffee shops 
were a safety problem to be addressed by a policy of tolerance (coalition A). In 
doing so, the coalition conflicted with the views of citizens who were 
expressing their feelings of being unsafe in relation to drugs and the coffee 
shops. A ‘single actor coalition’ (coalition B) consisting of a council member 
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opposed these policy ambitions of the mayor and council by pointing out that 
coffee shops damage public health and should therefore be closed.  
The second frame shift was not preceded by a substantive policy 
debate. In the mid-1990s the policy frame was expanded to cover the presence 
of hard drugs in public buildings as a result of the local adoption of the 
nationally created power to close drugs houses. Surprisingly, neither the 
mayor, the city council, nor the police saw drugs houses as a severe problem in 
Haarlem (coalition A).  
In the second reframing, local discourse coalitions debated the 
renewed policy practices of the mayor in the late 2000s. A coalition consisting 
of the new mayor and local council members introduced a tight regime focused 
on rule violations by coffee shop owners (coalition A). First, a coalition of 
coffee shops owners expressed their dissatisfaction with the renewed policy 
actions (coalition B). Then, a second coalition of council members further 
opposed the practices by favoring the former, loser approach to the governance 
of coffee shops (coalition C). Despite the opposition, local authorities were 
able to formalize their regime in the form of an official policy. Their success 
came about in part through their efforts to engage in dialogue with a coalition 
of united coffee shop owners who were subsequently prepared to collaborate 
with local authorities to address the drug-related nuisance (coalition D).  
 
Domestic violence 
The local policy debates preceding the two policy frames in relation to 
domestic violence were dominated by a number of local actors. During the 
initial framing process that took place in 1996/7, local authorities debated with 
each other, and with professionals in the policy domains of both social and 
safety matters. Although all the key actors in this debate were from the local 
policy arena, some of their frames relied heavily on international policy ideas. 
The initial framing process took place toward the end of the 1990s, fuelled by 
a discourse coalition consisting of local professionals from the safety and 
social policy domain (coalition A). These professional pioneers introduced a 
new perspective on domestic violence, and made a case for adopting a safety 
approach into the local policy framework. Their frame was supported by a 
coalition of local authorities, the mayor, the police and the public prosecutor 
who questioned the power of local authorities to appropriately prosecute 
domestic violence perpetrators (coalition B).  
This initial frame was expanded in 2009 with the adoption of 
temporary home restrictions and regional collaboration. During this latest 
policy debate, the local coalition of policy parties (coalition A) expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the ‘policy standstill’ that had arisen in relation to 
domestic violence, and they opposed coalition B who were critically 
supporting the policy expansion.  
 
Organized crime 
The policy frames regarding organized crime were once again debated among 
local authorities united in different discourse coalitions. During the initial 
framing process in the mid 2000s, a coalition comprising the mayor and 
several civil servants prepared BIBOB policies (coalition A). A coalition of 
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council members supported this first approach to organized crime in Haarlem 
(coalition B). However, the mayor’s frame did not fully embrace this policy 
topic as he was of the view that here was very little actual organized crime in 
Haarlem. Only when a new board of mayor and aldermen that included Mayor 
C came into town did BIBOB get prioritized and promoted in the local policy 
arena (coalition C). This development was supported by a discourse coalition 
comprising local council members favoring the expansion of BIBOB practices 
(coalition D).  
Towards the late 2000s, a coalition of local politicians started to pay 
attention to organized crime in Haarlem (Coalition A), and they asked their 
board of mayor and alderman to address it more actively. A coalition that 
comprised the mayor and local council members (coalition D) responded to 
this local call by adopting the national policy strategies to organized crime, 
and incorporating this into Haarlem’s policy approach. This implied an 
expansion of the initial policy frame on organized crime.  
 
Comparison 
When comparing the composition of local discourse coalitions across the three 
safety concerns, it becomes clear that local authorities such as the mayor, 
council members and civil servants were constantly present in the local 
debates. Although they occasionally interacted with other actors outside local 
government and sometimes even shared their frames with these  ‘external 
actors’, the local authorities were most frequently present in the local 
discourse coalitions. More than other actors, local authorities put forth their 
frames of new local safety problems in each sub case. This can be explained 
by the formal, institutional structures that exist in local policy networks for 
local politics and policy making. The institutionalized democratic procedures 
for local policy decision-making put these local authorities forward as key 
actors in charge of decision- and policy making. 
Along with the dominance of local authorities, the Haarlem cases also 
show differences in the manifestation and timing of the local policy debates. 
While the majority of shifts in the policy frame were either preceded or 
followed by a local policy debate, there were two instances of frame expansion 
concerning the drugs-related nuisances. The first frame expansion was not 
preceded by extensive policy debate, and was created by directly adopting into 
local policies a new mayoral power to close drug-related buildings. After the 
policy was implemented, local public safety providers were noted making 
statements indicating a lack of understanding of the problem that this policy 
tool was created to target. The lack of policy debate can thus be explained by a 
lack of recognition of the policy problem among local stakeholders, and the 
instrumental adoption of central policy tools. The second frame expansion 
regarding drugs was different in that it was in fact actively debated, but this 
debate only manifested itself once the policy adopted was altered in practice. 
These modified practices were critically discussed and subsequently 
formalized into policy plans. This implies that local governance processes in 
the same municipal context can take different shapes and forms, and they do 
not always follow the classic order of debate, decision, design and implement. 
More specifically, local policy debates in which discourse coalitions express 
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their frames are not always the starting point of shifts in policy frames and 
practices. Instead, they are often either absent or triggered subsequently by 
issues arising during policy implementation.  
2.3 Frame alignment  
When discourse coalitions interact during local policy debates, some of their 
frames merge with one another, or even with ‘external’ policy frames. This 
paragraph discusses the processes of frame alignment in Haarlem.  
 
Table 19: Frame alignment Haarlem 
 
 
 
Drug-related 
Nuisances 
Domestic Violence Organized Crime 
Initial 
framing 
process 
 
The frame of the 
local coalition 
comprising the 
mayor, council and 
citizens was 
amplified by the 
national policy 
frame 
The frame of the 
coalition of 
professional pioneers 
was aligned with 
international policy 
frames. Subsequently, 
frame bridging took 
place between coalition 
pioneers and local 
authorities 
Frame bridging took 
place between 
national policy 
frames, and local 
coalitions uniting 
local authorities 
Frame shift 1 No alignment No clear alignment. 
Local frames were only 
receptive to national 
policy ideas 
Frame bridging 
between local 
politicians and the 
mayor of Haarlem. 
Local frames were 
receptive to the 
national policy ideas  
Frame shift 2 Frame bridging took 
place between the 
coalition consisting 
of the mayor and 
council members, 
and that of the 
coalition consisting 
of local coffee shop 
owners 
  
 
Drug-related nuisance 
An analysis of the sub case of drug-related nuisances shows two processes of 
frame alignment. During the initial framing process, local authorities embraced 
the citizens' perceived feelings of being unsafe. In doing so, they formed a 
discourse coalition whose frame was amplified by the national policy frame in 
favor of regulating of soft drugs. As a result, the alternative frame presented by 
the third local discourse coalition (comprising of a single council member) was 
ruled out. Subsequently, there was little local policy debate during the frame 
expansion process. The absence of a debate meant that little frame alignment 
took place amongst the discourse coalitions, and the national policy ideas were 
directly institutionalized into local policies. The third round of framing was 
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characterized by frame bridging that took place between two local discourse 
collations. This bridging united the individual frames of the mayor and council 
with that of the united collation of coffee shop owners, as took place largely 
because both parties were willing to engage in dialogue and cooperate.  
 
Domestic violence 
The sub case of domestic violence demonstrated a slightly different process of 
frame alignment, incorporating external policy frames into the local policy 
arena. During the initial framing process, an alliance of local professionals 
embraced international policy ideas regarding domestic violence. Local 
authorities eventually aligned with this new and internationally inspired frame 
by supporting the proposed policies of the professional pioneers whilst 
retaining a critical stance. During the frame expansion phase a few years later, 
a single local coalition expressed its frame regarding the domestic violence 
policies. Local political parties problematized a local ‘policy stand still’ and 
various council member supported this regional approach which provided solid 
ground for local authorities to expand their policy strategy. The cognitive 
aspect of dissatisfaction with the former policy practice thus enabled this 
frame expansion. 
 
Organized crime 
The subcase of organized crime can be best described as a process in which 
national policy frames of the local mayor and the national policy program 
aligned. However, it took a while before local authorities embraced national 
policy frames during the initial framing process. During the reframing process 
a new board of mayor and aldermen recognized organized crime as a local 
issue and consequently the frames of local authorities merged with the national 
policy ideas regarding the matter. This was when supra local policy tools were 
implemented. A discourse collation of local political parties clearly recognized 
organized crime as a policy topic and the mayor was willing to respond to 
national calls inviting local authorities to engage in fighting it. The national 
policy frame on organized crime extended the frames of these two local 
discourse collations into a mixture of local and national policy ideas 
dominated by the latter.  
 
Comparison 
In each subcase, the frames of the various local discourse coalitions merged 
with each other as well as with frames presented in the supra local policy. 
However, the level to which local, powerful frames aligned with these external 
policy frames differed across the subcases we studied in Haarlem. Two 
mechanisms were observed: 
First, we saw a bottom up process of frame alignment during which 
local authorities expanded their frames using external ideas as mediated by 
professionals in the policy domain. During the initial framing process, local 
coalitions involved in addressing issues of domestic violence looked explicitly 
for supra local policy frames to structure Haarlem’s local policy strategy. 
Second, in the case of drugs (minor) and organized crime (major) we saw a top 
down process of frame alignment during which local coalitions eventually 
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embraced policy frames from the national policy arena. In these subcases, 
local discourse coalitions whose frames resonated with that of the external 
policy ideas were most likely to survive and shape policy than coalitions with 
less compatible ideas.  
Over time, local safety governance in Haarlem became more and more 
networked, and the government collaborated with many other parties external 
to the local governance network. Consequently, local discourse coalitions 
merged more frequently with supra local policy frames (international, national, 
and regional). The relatively ‘younger’ sub cases of domestic violence and 
organized crime were more likely to adopt the supra local policy ideas. This 
implies that local authorities in Haarlem appeared to become more responsive 
to the problem frames of others over the years.  
2.4 Discourse institutionalization into the local policy frame 
As a result of frame alignment, ‘supra local’ policy ideas merged with local 
frames. Consequently, a mixture of local, regional, national and even 
international frames ended up in Haarlem’s formal policy documents regarding 
drugs, violence and crime. Table 20 summarizes these processes of discourse 
institutionalization in Haarlem.  
 
Table 20: Discourse institutionalization Haarlem 
 
 
 
Drug-related 
Nuisance 
Domestic Violence Organized Crime 
Initial framing 
process 
National policy frame 
(policy of tolerance) 
institutionalized into 
the local policy 
approach through 
frame alignment with 
local authorities 
International policy 
frames 
institutionalized into 
local policy strategies 
through frame 
alignment with local 
professionals and 
local authorities 
National policy frame 
institutionalized into 
the local policy 
approach (BIBOB) 
Frame shift 1 National policy frame 
was adopted into 
local policy (power 
to close buildings in 
cases of drug-related 
nuisance) 
National policy ideas 
institutionalized into 
regional and local 
policy plans 
 
National policy 
frames 
institutionalized into 
a regional and local 
policy approach 
Frame shift 2 Local policy frames 
institutionalized into 
local policy strategy 
  
 
The initial policy frame for drug-related nuisances shows a combination of 
local policy frames and the national policy of tolerance towards soft drugs. 
The subsequent expansion in the late 1990s of the local frame to include the 
power to close drug-related buildings shows an even greater 
institutionalization of national policy ideas into local policy frames. In 
contrast, when a new policy frame regarding coffee shops was created in the 
late 2000s, local policy ideas and practices that had already been previously 
implemented were institutionalized into the local policy frame. In the second 
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sub case of domestic violence, international policy ideas labelling domestic 
violence as a safety problem were institutionalized into the initial policy frame 
regarding domestic violence. Subsequently, national and regional policy plans 
shaped local policy strategies. Likewise, the policy frame regarding organized 
crime was also strongly affected by external policy ideas as well. The policy 
ideas behind the BIBOB law and the administrative approach to organized 
crime were both created by the national government and institutionalized into 
Haarlem’s local policy approach resulting in a new local policy frame.  
In sum, all three sub cases show a substantial number of supra local 
or external policy ideas being institutionalized into the local policy frames. 
The policy strategies or formal powers created by the national government 
heavily structured local policy frames. Examples of this include the powers for 
the mayor that were introduced by the national government (closing public 
buildings in case of drugs, home restrictions in case of domestic violence, and 
BIBOB in case of organized crime), as well as national policy programs (the 
national policy of tolerance regarding soft drugs, and the administrative 
approach to organized crime). Besides national policy ideas, local frames also 
influenced by policy frames from the regional policy arena (e.g. temporary 
home restrictions), and from the international policy domain (e.g. approach to 
domestic violence).  
When we compare the content of local policy frames to the frames of 
the various discourse coalitions present in the debate, it becomes clear that the 
coalitions who were successful in setting the frame were those in which the 
majority of local council members and the boards of mayor and aldermen were 
represented. Along the way, the contrasting frames of citizens, single council 
members and coffee shop owners were either incorporated or ruled out. From a 
network perspective, this implies that variations in the level of 
institutionalization of a coalition’s policy frame into formal policy plans can 
be understood as variations in the different coalitions' resources and powers in 
the local policy network. In other words, the distribution of crucial resources in 
the local policy arena affected the level of a coalition’s influence during the 
frame alignment and institutionalization processes. The dominance of local 
authorities in such processes can be explained by their agenda setting- and 
decision making power in local policy processes. This explains why their ideas 
were formalized into policies.  
Moreover it points at the dependency of other coalitions on them for a 
chance to see their frames mirrored in public policy. Only when local 
authorities embraced the idea of citizens feeling unsafe near coffee shops, 
when they recognized the value of professional advice on how to combat 
domestic violence, and when they began to see national policy ideas on how to 
address organize crime as relevant, did these issues get institutionalized into 
the local policy frame. Nonetheless, the local policy networks can be said to be 
relatively open to ideas and resources from other policy levels. In the Haarlem 
case, although all discourse coalitions were composed of local actors, their 
frames were partially structured by supra local policy ideas. Paragraph four 
looks at the supra local institutional arrangements that had the biggest role in 
shaping the local policy process.  
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3 The mayor’s role on paper and in practice 
Local policy strategies are structured by a certain policy frame which shapes 
the local policy approach, including the mayor’s expected role. Table 21 
summarizes the policy frames that were dominant in Haarlem. These frames 
consist of a problem definition (diagnostic message) and solution (prognostic 
message). In the following section, the mayor’s role on paper and in practice 
are summarized briefly, and subject to comparison across the three sub cases. 
This allows us to observe the extent to which the mayors of Haarlem acted in 
accordance with their expected role, also known as their level of frame 
enactment. 
 
Table 21: Policy frames Haarlem 
 
 Drug-related 
Nuisance 
Domestic Violence Organized Crime 
Initial frame DM: coffee shops 
cause a nuisance and 
endanger local order  
 
PM: regulate and 
close coffee shops 
DM: various forms of 
violence in domestic 
spheres are both a 
social and safety 
problem 
 
PM: combine the 
availability of crisis 
response teams with 
specific steps that help 
victims prevent further 
violence, and ease the 
way for efforts to 
prosecute the 
perpetrator 
DM: unintended 
government support 
for criminal behavior  
 
PM: BIBOB 
screenings to be 
conducted before the 
issuance of permits, 
tenders and subsidies 
in risky sectors 
Frame shift 1 DM: the use and trade 
of drugs in residential 
houses creates a 
public nuisance and 
attracts crime to 
residential 
neighborhoods 
 
PM: mayor to have 
the power to close 
such buildings 
DM: various forms of 
violence in the 
domestic sphere are 
both a social and safety 
problem 
 
PM: regional approach 
including temporary 
home restrictions 
DM: criminal 
networks undertaking 
illegal activities 
 
PM: combine 
administrative, 
juridical and fiscal 
interventions on a 
regional scale 
Frame shift 2 DM: rule violation by 
coffee shop owners 
 
PM: tight regime of 
control and 
sanctioning of coffee 
shops 
  
DM: diagnostic message PM: prognostic message 
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3.1 Mayor's expected role on paper 
The policy frame entails an expected role for the mayor which is either enacted 
or not enacted in practice. Table 22 summarizes the mayor’s expected role in 
each Haarlem sub case. 
 
Table 22: Roles expected of the mayors in Haarlem 
 
 Drugs-related 
Nuisance 
Domestic Violence Organized Crime 
Initial frame Implementing new 
coffee shop policy by 
closing coffee shops 
when needed 
None. Alderman of 
social affairs and 
public health service 
are expected to 
coordinate and 
implement policies 
Withdrawal or refuse 
permits and subsidies 
as well as requesting 
national BIBOB 
screenings 
Frame shift 1 Deciding whether or 
not to close a public 
building and for what 
period  
Giving out home 
restrictions when 
needed 
 
Coordinating 
regional 
collaboration and set 
objectives 
Frame shift 2 Deciding whether or 
not to close a public 
building and for what 
period 
  
 
The case study of Haarlem demonstrates two clear similarities in the mayor’s 
formal position in the local policy strategy. Firstly, the sub cases show a 
recurring pattern of expansion of the mayor’s formal powers to address local 
safety problems. The introduction of new powers for the Dutch mayors in all 
three subcases gave the mayors' new options and tools by which to address the 
safety problems in local safety governance. These powers either expanded the 
mayor’s formal role in addressing traditional public safety problems (closing 
buildings in the case of drugs), or they facilitated the mayors' involvement 
with new safety problems (domestic violence, organized crime).  
Secondly, a process of frame expansion took place which expanded 
the mayors' playing field beyond the local policy arena. In each case, the 
mayor was accompanied in his efforts to address local safety problems by a 
growing number of public and semi-public actors from the local, regional and 
national level. In two out of the three sub cases (domestic violence and 
organized crime), the mayor’s ‘playing field’ expanded from the local policy 
arena to the regional arena, both on paper and in practice. His partners in the 
creation and implementation of local policy strategy expanded to include 
regional and national actors from both governmental and societal spheres. In 
the third case (drugs), the mayor’s playing field remained rather local. 
Nevertheless, his position shifted from a rather individualistic position, to one 
of close collaboration with many actors from outside local government, such 
as the police, residents, shop owners and housing corporations. In general thus, 
it appears that as the mayor was confronted with new safety problems, his 
policy tools and range of partners expanded. 
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Moreover, across the three sub cases, there was a striking difference in 
the mayor’s expected role. In labeling drugs and organized crime as a safety 
matter, the mayor had a clear role according to the local policy documents as 
he is responsible for local order and safety. However, the explicit qualification 
of domestic violence as a safety problem did not immediately yield a role for 
the mayor in the local policy strategy. In this sub case, the alderman of social 
affairs was appointed as the actor responsible for dealing with domestic 
violence. This can be explained as a matter of historical precedent, as it has 
traditionally been the aldermen who deals with matters of violence against 
women. Moreover, the mayor did not yet have any formal powers to structure 
this prognostic part of the policy frame qualifying domestic violence as a local 
safety issue. From this case, it appears that the securitizing of local policy 
problems does not necessarily empower or place additional responsibility on 
the mayor. 
3.2 Mayor's actual role in practice  
New types of drug-related problems, domestic violence and organized crime 
all eventually triggered administrative and operational actions on the part of 
the mayors of Haarlem. Table 23 summarizes the mayor’s actions in practice 
and indicates what these actions implied for the level of enactment on the 
mayor’s expected role as stated by the formal policy frame. 
 
Table 23: Role of the mayors of Haarlem as it was practiced & level of frame 
enactment 
 
 Drugs-related 
Nuisance 
Domestic Violence Organized Crime 
Initial frame Mayor A 
Administrative 
actions: preparing 
policy 
 
Operational actions: 
closing coffee shops 
 
high frame 
enactment 
Mayor B 
None. Mayor not 
involved. 
 
high frame 
enactment 
Mayor B 
Administrative 
actions: Policy 
preparation  
 
 low frame 
enactment 
 
Mayor C 
Administrative & 
Operational: 
Policy expansion and 
implementation  
 
high frame 
enactment 
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Frame shift 1 Mayor B 
Mayor hardly used 
power 
 
 low frame 
enactment 
Mayor C 
Operational actions: 
mayor issued many 
home restrictions 
 
high frame 
enactment 
Mayor C 
Administrative 
actions: on the local 
and inter-regional 
level 
 
Operational actions: 
implementation of 
BIBOB 
 
frame enactmen 
Frame shift 2 Mayor C 
Administrative 
actions: formalizing 
new approach to 
coffee shops, re-
engaging in dialogue 
with coffee shop 
owners  
 
Operational actions: 
(temporary) closing 
coffee shops 
 
 High frame 
enactment 
  
 
 
The case study of Haarlem shows that the mayor does not necessarily enact his 
new role exactly as expected from the formal policy frame.  The level of frame 
enactment differed greatly, not only between sub cases, but also between 
mayors in each sub case. In the sub case of the drug-related nuisance, Mayor 
A enacted the policy frame firmly by closing several coffee shops. 
Subsequently, Mayor B’s actions reflected a lower level of frame enactment, 
as he rarely used his power to close drugs buildings. Nonetheless, Mayor B 
benefitted from the previous mayor's enacted practice of intensifying the 
regime of control and sanctions that applied to coffee shops that were 
subsequently formalized into a policy strategy. 
In the sub case of domestic violence, the mayors of Haarlem both 
showed a high level of frame enactment, however, their behaviors were very 
different in practice. During Mayor B's tenure, domestic violence was first 
presented as a local safety issue. The formal policy document that resulted did 
not assign any role to the mayor, but instead placed responsibility at the feet of 
the alderman of social affairs. This explained both Mayor B's limited 
administrative and practical actions, as well as the conclusion that he exhibited 
a high level of frame enactment. Mayor Schneider’s subsequently 
implemented his powers of temporary home restriction, and this was viewed 
also as a high level of frame enactment, specifically in relation to the expanded 
policy frame.  
In relation to organized crime, Mayor B showed a low level of frame 
alignment in that he did not implement the BIBOB law. In contrast, Mayor 
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Schneider’s reign saw a high level of frame enactment resulting from his more 
faithful implementation of the same strategies. Mayor Schneider’s further 
enacted upon the subsequently expanded policy frame by participating in the 
regional policy program regarding organized crime.  
 
Comparison 
Variations in the level of frame alignment can be explained by several 
practicalities. The progress from the stage of (re)framing policy strategies on 
paper, to the enactment stage takes time. This time factor partially explains the 
variation in the level of enactment amongst the mayors of Haarlem of the same 
policy problem. It explains to an extent why Mayor B did not enact his brand 
new BIBOB role, and why Mayor C subsequently did. The expected role did 
not change, but it took some time before the role of the mayor as prescribed by 
the new policies was institutionalized into local policy practices.  
Furthermore, we can derive a pattern out of these three sub cases 
which points to the idea that frame alignment between the mayor’s frame and 
the policy frame is a precondition for enactment. There was a high level of 
frame enactment when the policy frame was compatible with the mayor’s 
individual frame as expressed during the local policy debate and/or when the 
framing process was triggered locally. A low level of frame enactment was 
detected when discourse collations including the mayor held a different frame 
(no alignment) and therefore did not recognize the new policy problem. Any 
differentiation between the policy and personal frame resulted in a low(er) 
level of enactment. In other words, the mayor enacted upon the policy frame 
when it was compatible to his own. The fact that the mayor is able to enact on 
his very personal frame – which may or may not be in line with the policy 
frame – is enabled by his individual responsibility for local order and safety as 
well as his possession of key resources. This makes him the most powerful 
actors in the local policy networks during policy implementation. In the end, it 
is the mayor who decides to act and whether or not to implement his powers.  
 
4 Institutional arrangements in local policy networks and the supra local 
policy arenas 
This paragraphs is devoted to the various aspects from the local policy network 
and supra local policy arenas that affected the course and outcome of local 
policy processes in Haarlem. Table 24 provides a summary of all institutional 
arrangements in place and the following sections compare these arrangements 
between sub cases per policy level . 
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Table 24: Summary of local and supra local institutional arrangements 
Haarlem 
 
 Drug-related Nuisance Domestic Violence Organized Crime 
Local policy 
network 
Cognitive factors arising 
from the local policy 
arena triggered the initial 
framing process 
 
Shifts in composition of 
actors in the local arena 
triggered frame 
expansion, along with 
the introduction of a new 
mayor 
 
Division of powers 
between actors in the 
local policy arena 
explains why contrasting 
frames disappeared 
 
Local policy practice 
triggered new policy 
debates and an expansion 
of the policy frame: new 
actors entered the 
network with different 
normative standpoints 
 
Regulative events in the 
local arena triggered 
policy formalization 
(juridical procedures) 
 
Cognitive aspects of 
powerful actors affect 
level of frame enactment 
Incidents in the local 
policy arena 
triggered the initial 
framing process 
 
Cognitive aspects of 
the local arena 
(dissatisfaction with 
policy practice) 
provided solid 
ground for frame 
expansion 
 
 
Not present 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regional 
arena 
 
 
Participation in the 
regional 
collaboration 
structure for 
implementing 
temporary home 
restrictions shaped 
the mayor's expected 
role  
Practical aspects of 
the regional policy 
arena triggered 
policy debate and 
impacted practice.  
 
Amsterdam's 
regional policy 
approach triggered 
frame expansion and 
regional 
collaboration and 
agreement 
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National 
arena 
Regulative aspects of the 
national policy approach 
triggered frame 
expansion: closing 
buildings 
 
Regulative aspects of 
national policy arena 
shaped local policy 
frame: closing buildings 
 
Tight regime fits the 
tightening national 
debate, and local 
alternatives to the 
national policies are 
presented (quality label) 
Regulative aspect of 
national policy arena 
triggered frame 
expansion: 
temporary home 
restrictions  
 
Regulative aspect of 
national arena 
activated the mayor 
in relation to 
domestic violence  
 
Various aspects 
enabled local policy 
implementation 
including budget, 
and manpower, 
 
Haarlem’s local 
innovative approach 
had national spin off 
Regulative aspects 
of national policy 
arena trigger and 
shaped the local 
policy frame: 
BIBOB law 
 
Regulative aspects 
of national policy 
arena shaped the 
local policy frame: 
Administrative 
approach, RIEC and 
funding  
International 
arena 
Not present 
 
 
Practical aspects of 
the international 
policy arena shaped 
local policy frame 
Not present 
 
 
 
Local policy arena 
Multiple aspects from the local policy arena affected the course and outcome 
of local policy processes in two out of three sub cases in Haarlem. The setting 
of the initial drug-related frame, as well as two subsequent processes of frame 
expansion was heavily influenced by a wide range of local factors, amongst 
which were cognitive, practical and regulative aspects, including the local 
division of resources. The policy dynamics surrounding the sub case of drug-
related nuisance was thus most anchored in the local policy arena. In the sub 
case of domestic violence, two lethal cases of violence triggered the initial 
policy frame, and led to the labeling of domestic violence as a safety matter. 
Later on, the frames of local discourse coalitions in which local authorities 
were represented provided solid ground for frame expansion. The sub case of 
organized crime was not triggered or dominantly shaped by local factors.  
 
Regional policy arena 
Influences from the regional policy arena were again present in two out of 
three sub cases, specifically domestic violence and organized crime. The 
creation of a regional collaboration agreement eventually resulted in a process 
of frame expansion affecting the local policy process regarding domestic 
violence in Haarlem. In the sub case of organized crime, regional policy 
practices triggered a local policy debate eventually leading to local policies 
and strategies. Policy practices in the regional arena thus triggered local 
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involvement. The sub case of drug-related nuisance was not triggered or 
shaped by regional factors.  
 
National policy arena 
The national policy context clearly triggered and shaped policy processes in all 
three sub cases. The initial policy frame regarding coffee shops reflected the 
national policy of tolerance towards soft drugs. Subsequent frame expansion 
was triggered by the introduction of the power to close drugs houses. This 
points to the role of regulative arrangements from the central government in 
both triggering and shaping local drug policies. In the sub case of domestic 
violence, the introduction of home restrictions triggered frame expansion and 
activated the mayor of Haarlem to get involved with this policy problem. 
Along with these regulative aspects, resources in the form of money and 
manpower enabled the design and implementation of Haarlem’s initial policy 
strategy regarding domestic violence. Later on, the national government 
promoted this approach as a best practice, and encouraged other Dutch 
municipalities to adopt it. The sub case of organized crime was dominated 
solely by regulations from the national policy arena. The introduction of the 
BIBOB law triggered an initial framing process, and heavily structured the 
local policy frame. Subsequently, the national policy program that promoted 
the administrative approach to organized crime, and that provided the funding 
for regional and local governments shaped local policy practices as well.  
 
International policy arena  
The international policy arena has played a modest role in the case of Haarlem, 
and only manifested itself in the sub case of domestic violence. As local 
authorities in Haarlem pioneered the design of a public safety approach to 
domestic violence in the Netherlands, they found inspiration from far beyond 
their region and nation. Consequently, the international policy practices around 
domestic violence as a matter of public safety became institutionalized into the 
local policy frame in Haarlem.  
 
Overall institutional arrangements  
In each sub case in Haarlem, the local framing processes were triggered and 
shaped by a mixture of institutional factors from at least two different policy 
arenas. The course and content of the local framing processes in Haarlem were 
thus strongly connected to institutional aspects of the supra local policy arenas. 
The most striking similarity is that regulative aspects of the national policy 
arena strongly affected the (expansion) of the policy frames in all sub cases. 
An important difference between sub cases is the level of local versus supra 
local influences that shaped the policy and roles in local safety governance. In 
other words, sub cases differed in the extent to which local processes were 
affected by the institutional arrangements of ‘external’ policy arenas.  
The sub cases of drug-related nuisance and domestic violence were 
both shaped by a mixture of local and external factors. This implies a high 
sense of urgency and of involvement among local actors. The sub case of 
organized crime seems to be more removed from the local policy arena as it 
was entirely structured by supra local aspects. This can be explained by the 
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fact that organized crime is a relatively new problem in the local policy arena. 
In some local policy processes, the influence appears to be bidirectional. While 
local authorities took their cue from the regional and national policy arenas, at 
the same time, locally designed policy practices were picked up by actors in 
the supra local policy arena and presented as best practices or guiding 
examples. This happened during Haarlem’s pioneering of domestic violence 
policy in the early 1990s, and with the introduction of a quality label for coffee 
shops in the late 2000s. 
5 Conclusions case Haarlem 
This within case comparison leads to a preliminary answer to sub question 4 
and 5 based on the findings from Haarlem. 
5.1 Preliminary answer to sub question four 
This case comparison points to several preliminary research findings relevant 
to sub question four: How have new local safety problems been framed in local 
policy processes, and how does this framing affect the mayor’s role and 
position in policy and practice? The general answer is that the drug-related 
nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime were all framed as local 
safety problems in the years between 1990 and 2010. Our review of the 
Haarlem case demonstrated that frames are not static, and that the same issue 
could be defined in many ways. Two of our three policy frames were expanded 
once, and the third, drug-related nuisance, was expanded twice. This particular 
problem may have seen more revision because it was both the first, and longest 
running topic of local safety in Haarlem. We can perhaps conclude that the 
longer a problem is the topic of policy processes, the more often it is reframed. 
More importantly,  in each sub case such a securitization and expansion of 
local policy frames affected the position and role of the mayors of Haarlem in 
several ways. The mayors' role was expanded in terms of his powers, the extent 
of his playing field, and the range of policy partners he could engage to 
address the new local safety problems. This shift in the mayors' position can in 
most cases be seen as the outcome of the adoption of powers and policy 
strategies created by the national government. This shows a top down process 
of role structuration brought about by the adoption of regulations from the 
national policy arena.  
Second, the degree to which a formal role is adopted as a result of the 
local policy strategy differed from mayor to mayor in Haarlem. Framing a 
local issue as a safety problem did not automatically lead to the establishment 
of a formal role for the mayor. For example, describing domestic violence as a 
local safety problem did not immediately imply that the mayor had a clear role 
in the policy program. The mayor was 'activated' only a few years later when 
the national government introduced special mayoral powers targeting domestic 
violence. This is in sharp contrast to the sub cases of drug-related nuisance and 
organized crime in which the mayor was immediately activated. This implies 
that the ‘safety frame’ does not guarantee a role for the mayor in the policy 
strategy. This finding stands in contrast to the assumption of the conceptual 
model that local safety problems will activate local safety actors, particularly 
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the mayor. Variations in the level of the mayors’ involvement in newly framed 
safety problems can be explained by the concept of path dependency. Whereas 
issues such as crime and drugs have traditionally been a part of the mayor’s 
domain of local order and safety, domestic violence is not (yet) completely. 
The policy path in this area was paved by other actors, and the historical 
guardians of this domain continued to play an active role after the 
securitization. The finding implies that mayors are likely to continue operating 
as they did as long as key actors in the policy network fail to recognize their 
new roles, or as long as their new roles are not formally laid out in the policy 
documents.  
Third, the level of frame enactment differed over time, between 
mayors and between sub cases. A shift in the mayor's expected role as a 
resulted of changes in the policy documents, and a shift in the availability of 
powers and policy resources does not automatically mean that the mayor will 
use these in practice. The practical argument that it takes time for policy 
frames to be enacted only partially explains the variations in the level of frame 
enactment. Moreover, the extent to which the mayor’s personal frame is 
compatible with the policy frame (including his expected role) explains his 
level of enactment. This was found to be true in every sub case. As long as he 
recognized the problem as serious, and agreed with the favored solution, the 
mayor of Haarlem carried out his expected role. This implies that Haarlem’s 
mayors were not passive puppets of national government, but that they had a 
big role in shaping their own policy actions. In more theoretical terms, this 
implies that the mayor’s frame has to align with (national) policy frames for 
these to be enacted in practice.  
5.2 Preliminary answer to sub question five 
This case comparison provides several preliminary research findings that are 
relevant to sub question five: Which (f)actors of the local, regional and 
national policy arena affected the content, course and outcome of these 
framing processes? Our application of the conceptual model showed an 
interplay between the cognitive framing process, and institutional influences 
arising from several policy arenas. A look at the policy strategies in Haarlem 
showed that the establishment of the local policy frames regarding new safety 
problems was by no means a strictly local endeavor. Various processes of 
discourse institutionalization resulted in a mixture of local and external policy 
ideas being adopted into the local policy strategies. Each of the Haarlem sub 
cases was subject to significant supra local policy influences. In particular, the 
sub case of organized crime was almost entirely shaped by supra local 
arrangements. It is striking that in each sub case, frame expansion was brought 
along by regulative aspects of the supra local level. These regulative aspects 
shaped Haarlem’s policy frame at some point in time (policy of tolerance, 
power to close drug buildings, temporary home restrictions, BIBOB). When 
national frames were nonexistent, such as during the initial framing process of 
domestic violence, the international policy arena became relevant and provided 
structure to the local policy approach. 
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Finally, the overall dynamics of the Haarlem case can be summarized 
as follows: National policy strategies and powers served to bring attention to 
problems of public safety, as well as provided the resources to address them. 
Local authorities adopted these national policy ideas and tools into their policy 
frames. Although international, national and regional policy strategies reached 
the local policy arena, local policy implementation still remained a local 
decision. Whether or not, as well as how new policy frames were enacted by 
the mayors was strongly affected by the mayors’ local frames, and that of the 
most powerful discourse coalitions in the local policy network. Taken together, 
we can conclude that the local policy frames and the mayor’s formal position 
are strongly shaped by national policy ideas. However, the level and form of 
enactment of these policies by the mayor is very much dependent on the 
dynamics of the local policy arena. We conclude that both local framing 
processes and the mayor’s position and role are affected by various policy 
arenas which are connected, and where networked actors exchange policy 
ideas, practices and resources. 
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Chapter 11 Within case comparison: Breda 
1 Introduction 
The overall objective of the case study is to understand how the role and 
position of mayors has been affected as the definitions of local safety problems 
have changed. This chapter presents the within-case analysis of how the 
mayors of Breda addressed drugs-related nuisance, domestic violence and 
organized crime between 1990 and 2010. This within-case analysis aims to 
uncover any similarities or differences in the local framing and policy 
processes across the three sub cases within the context of the city of Breda. 
This will help clarify the impact of frame shifts on the positions and roles of 
actors in networks.  
This chapter is structured by the theoretical building blocks of the 
conceptual model. Sections two and three cover the framing process and the 
mayor’s position and role in the local policy arena. Section two focuses on the 
process of problem framing in local policy networks during which discourse 
coalitions align their frames that may institutionalize into formal policies. 
Section three focuses on the mayor’s role on paper and in practice and whether 
and how this reflects the policy frame. The fourth section focuses on the 
institutional arrangements affecting these local policy processes. The fifth and 
final paragraph summarizes the research findings by providing a preliminary 
answer to sub question 4 and 5 based on cases set in Breda. 
2 Problem framing in the local policy network  
This paragraph focuses on the course and outcome of the framing process 
within the local policy networks. The conceptual model stresses that the 
impact of shifting definitions of safety problems on the mayor’s position and 
role in governance networks can be understood as the outcome of framing 
processes in the local policy network. During local policy debates, discourse 
coalitions with their own perspective on the problem and solution interact to 
create strategies to be executed by the mayor and others. This interaction is 
expected to enhance frame alignment and create a shared understanding of the 
policy problem as well as the most favorable solution. Discourse 
institutionalization takes place when such a common frame is formalized into 
policy plans. The following sections show how each of these aspects of the 
local framing process manifested themselves in all three sub cases in Breda. 
The similarities and differences on the triggers, coalitions, level of frame 
alignment and process of discourse institutionalization between the sub cases 
are presented and interpreted. Together, these aspects reflect phase one and 
two of the conceptual model as explained in Chapter 6.  
2.1 Triggers 
In all three sub cases in Breda, new issues were subjected to a local framing 
process during which they partially or entirely qualified as safety problems at 
some point in time between 1990 and 2010. The trigger initiating the 
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(re)formulation of local policy frames on differed between the sub cases and 
over time. Table 25 provides an overview of these various triggers. 
 
Table 25: Triggers Breda 
 
 
The initial framing processes during which drugs, domestic violence and 
organized crime were partially or completely labeled as a local safety issues 
were triggered by different aspects in the local and national policy arena. 
Breda’s first policy document on coffee shops was triggered by a new mayor 
problematizing the expanding number of coffee shops. In the sub case on 
domestic violence, national policy documents triggered regional and local 
policy attention for domestic violence as a safety matter. The sub case of 
organized crime showed how the adoption of the national BIBOB tool 
triggered initial remarks about organized crime in local society. In terms of the 
conceptual model, this implies that the initial framing processes were triggered 
by cognitive aspects in the local policy arena in the sub case of drug-related 
nuisance and by regulative aspects of national policy in the sub cases of 
domestic violence and organized crime. 
As time went by, all three sub cases showed a process of reframing 
triggered by aspects of the local, regional or national policy arena. Moreover, 
the number of frame shifts differed between the sub- cases. The framing on 
drug-related nuisance shifted twice, whereas the policy frame on domestic 
violence and organized crime were each expanded once. The first adjustment 
to the policy frame on drug-related nuisance was triggered by national policy 
programs that allowed mayors to close buildings in case of severe drug-related 
nuisance. This policy frame was expanded once more when it was triggered by 
a radical shift in the policy strategy of two neighboring cities to adopt a zero-
tolerance policy on coffee shops. In terms of the conceptual model, frame 
 Drug-Related 
Nuisance 
Domestic Violence Organized Crime 
Trigger 
initial 
framing 
process 
Actors in local 
governance network 
problematized 
expanding number of 
coffee shops causing a 
nuisance 
National policy plans 
affect professionals in 
the regional arena and 
local civil servant 
Breda to generate 
policy attention to 
domestic violence 
Introduction of 
BIBOB law by 
national government 
 
Trigger 
reframing 
process 
National policy 
programs triggered 
harmonization of 
regional and local 
polices 
Local policy cycle in 
combination with 
national policy ideas 
Regional crime rates 
lead to a series of 
screenings and reports 
about criminal 
networks in the region 
which together with 
several incidents 
triggered frame 
expansion 
 
Radical shift in policy 
strategies of two 
neighboring cities was 
deemed to generate 
problematic 
consequences in 
Breda 
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expansion in the sub case of drug-related nuisance took place following 
regulative aspects from the national policy arena and policy practices in the 
regional policy arena. Expansion of the policy framework on domestic 
violence was triggered by local policy cycles arriving at a point of policy 
renewal as the existing policy strategy was coming to an end. This provided an 
opportunity to anticipate the introduction of a nationally-created policy tool for 
mayors: home restrictions. In this case, frame expansion was triggered by a 
combination of regulative aspects from the local and national policy arenas. 
The frame on organized crime changed because of regional crime rates, 
triggering a scrutinization of the causes of crime and eventually leading to a 
policy expansion process. In other words, incidents and cognitive aspects in 
the regional policy arena triggered frame expansion processes on organized 
crime.  
Overall, the case of Breda shows that a variety of triggers from 
multiple policy areas initiated local framing processes. This implies that policy 
attention for new safety problems in the local policy arena was not always 
triggered by local policy actors or local policy events. More often, local policy 
attention was fostered by incidents, practices and policy tools that diffused 
from regional and national policy arenas. Furthermore, the longer the problem 
was a topic of local governance, the more often it was reframed as triggered by 
of supra local (f)actors.  
2.2 Discourse coalitions in local policy debate 
During local policy debates on drugs, violence and crime, several discourse 
coalitions expressed their frames on the problem at hand and their most 
favorable policy solutions. This section compares the compositions of these 
discourse coalitions between the sub cases before summarizing the similarities 
and differences. 
 
Table 26: Discourse coalitions Breda  
 
 Drug-related nuisance Domestic Violence Organized Crime 
Initial 
framing 
process 
Coalition A  
Actors:  Mayor, Police 
and Public Prosecutor 
 
Frame: initiate local 
policy 
 
Coalition B  
 Actors: local city 
council 
 
Frame: agrees on 
Breda’s first policy 
document on coffee 
shops 
Coalition A  
Actors: Professionals in 
the region 
 
Frame: initiate a policy 
plan on domestic 
violence 
 
Coalition B  
Actors: local 
professionals 
  
Frame: initiate local 
policy attention 
 
 
 
Hardly any debate 
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Drug-related nuisance 
The framing of drug-related nuisance took place when the discourse coalitions 
from the local, regional and national policy actors interacted. The initial policy 
frame on drug-related nuisance was created during a modest debate between 
solely local actors in Breda. Coalition A consisted of the mayor who proposed 
Coalition C  
Actors: local authorities 
 
Frame: reactive 
supporters 
Frame 
shift 1  
Coalition A  
Actors: regional 
working group 
 
Frame: recommends 
adjustment of local and 
regional drugs policies 
 
Coalition B  
Actors: Board of Mayor 
and Aldermen Breda 
and local city council 
Breda 
 
Frame: local adoption 
of regional policy 
ambitions 
 
 
Hardly any debate  Coalition A  
Actors: mayors of the 
region 
 
Frame: persistent 
problems require 
supra local approach 
 
Coalition B  
Actors: local 
authorities 
 
frame: supportive 
adopters of regional 
policy ambitions 
 
Coalition C  
 Actor: Minister of 
Safety and Justice 
 
Frame: supporter of 
regional policy 
ambitions and favors 
strict coffee shop 
policy 
Frame 
shift 2 
Coalition A  
Actors: Alliance B5 
 
Frame: initiate 
collaboration and 
screenings 
 
Coalition B  
Actors: Board of Mayor 
and Aldermen Breda 
and City Council 
 
Frame: worried about 
potential increase of 
drug-related nuisance 
and approves new and 
strict approach to coffee 
shops  
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the initial policy program on coffee shops in consultation with the chief of the 
local police and the public prosecutor. Members of the local city council 
united in coalition B and agreed with this policy.  
The first process of frame expansion was debated among three 
discourse coalitions including actors from the supra local policy arenas. 
Coalition A was a regional working group that united professionals from local 
government, the police and the public prosecutor. It recommended 
coordination and the expansion of local policy approaches on drugs in the 
region. Coalition B consisted of the local Board of Mayor and Aldermen and 
proposed the local implementation of the regional policy ambitions that were 
later approved by the council members.  
The second process of frame expansion in the case of drug-related 
nuisance was characterized by interaction between regional, local and national 
coalitions. Coalition A consisted of the local governments of the five largest 
cities in the region who were worried about drugs related crime. Together, they 
studied the drug problems and proposed common regional solutions. Coalition 
B consisted of Breda’s Board of Mayor and Aldermen and expressed their 
worries about the increase in drug-related nuisance as a result of the 
announced zero tolerance policy on coffees shops in the neighboring 
municipalities, Bergen op Zoom and Roosendaal. Their perspective was 
similar to the other three coalitions. They were supported by local council 
members having worries on drugs and approving regional and national 
attempts to further address drug-related nuisance.  
 
Domestic violence 
The local policy debate preceding the initial policy frame on domestic violence 
occurred between three discourse coalitions. Coalition A consisted of various 
professionals operating on a regional scale in Mid-West Brabant, who had 
been working on various societal problems for a long time. Inspired by 
national policy ideas that promoted local intervention in cases of domestic 
violence, they initiated the first regional policy plan on domestic violence. 
Meanwhile, a civil servant in the local policy arena was inspired by the 
national call for local government to deal with domestic violence. This crucial 
local actor included domestic violence in the updated policy plan for societal 
care shelters (coalition B). The local authorities in Breda united in coalition C 
were more reactive and supported these regional and local initiatives. 
The expansion of this initial policy frame took place without any 
policy debate. The home restrictions as designed and formalized by national 
government were adopted into regional and local policies without any 
discussion between local policy actors in Breda.  
 
Organized crime 
Similar to the domestic violence sub case, the organized crime sub case 
demonstrated the formalization of a new local policy frame that was preceded 
by little debate. The initial framing process during which the financial aspects 
of organized crime were mentioned as a local policy problem occurred when 
the local government adopted the national BIBOB tool without a substantive 
discussion between local policy actors. 
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On the contrary, the process of frame expansion a few years later was 
preceded by an intense policy debate between four coalitions representing 
actors from the local, regional and national policy arenas. Coalition A 
consisted of the mayors of the five largest cities in the region. They 
problematized the supra local character of organized crime behind drugs 
production and trade which required a coordinated approach. The local 
authorities in Breda united in coalition B and supported this frame. The 
Minister of Safety and Justice supported their policy ambitions as well. On top 
of that, he introduced the national policy plan to tighten the rules on coffee 
shops into the policy debate (coalition C). Finally, Mayor F, who was part of 
both coalition A and B, acted as a policy broker to align the local policy frame 
of coalition B with the policy ambitions of coalition A and C. 
 
Comparison 
When comparing the composition of the discourse coalitions between the three 
sub cases, it becomes clear that there was variation in the level of policy 
debate surrounding the processes of initial framing and frame expansion in 
Breda. While some framing processes required a modest or even substantial 
policy debate, others were mere formal expansions of policy frames without a 
substantial discussion between stakeholders. All framing processes within the 
drug-related nuisance sub case were debated, whereas the domestic violence 
and organized crime sub cases both showed a framing process that was 
debated and one that was not debated. In the domestic violence and organized 
crime sub case, there was no policy debate when national policy tools were 
directly adopted into local policy strategies. Instead of extensively debating or 
modifying such optional, not compulsory, policy tools, local authorities 
implicitly embraced them by directly formalizing them into local policy plans, 
which were to be executed by the mayor himself or in close cooperation with 
the local Board of Mayor and Aldermen. This implies that supra local policy 
tools can directly affect the mayor’s position in local policy strategies without 
any local debate.  
When discourse coalitions expressed their frames during policy 
debates, actors from multiple policy arenas interacted. Local authorities, such 
as the mayor, council members and civil servants, were constantly present in 
these local debates. Although they occasionally interacted with other actors in- 
and outside the local policy network, local authorities were most frequently 
present in discourse coalitions expressing their frames on new local safety 
problems in each sub case. This can be explained by the formal, institutional 
structures for local politics and policy-making in local policy networks. The 
institutional layout of the democratic procedures for local policy and decision 
making placed these local authorities as formal key actors in charge of policy 
making.  
Besides an almost entirely local policy debate during the initial 
framing process on drug-related nuisance in the early 1990s, local policy 
frames were later on given form and shape during the interaction between local 
government actors as well as between professionals and administrative actors 
from the regional arena in each sub case. The actual participation of regional 
policy actors and their frames in local policy networks in Breda can be 
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explained by means of path dependency. The Breda region has a tradition of 
regional collaboration between public and private actors in various policy 
domains. As regional policy practices have been in place before and in other 
policy domains, local safety issues were picked up in this way as well. In 
theoretical terms, this can be seen as an empirical manifestation of path 
dependency in policy processes.  
2.3 Frame alignment  
While discourse coalitions interacted during local policy debates, some of their 
frames merged with one another while others were ruled out. This paragraph 
discusses and compares these processes of frame alignment.  This section first 
recapitulates frame alignment for each sub case, followed by a comparison.  
 
Table 27: Frame alignment Breda 
 
Drug-related nuisance 
The initial framing process on drug-related nuisance shows a process of frame 
amplification between two local discourse coalitions. The frame of the city 
councillors (coalition B) was strengthened by the frame of Mayor D and his 
local partners when the local council approved Breda’s first policy on coffee 
shops proposed by the mayor and his partners. The latter were able to pioneer 
and design their own policies since drug-related problems were classic matters 
of local governance and supra local policy networks and guidelines were 
(barely) in place during the early 1990s. Moreover, these were powerful actors 
given their powers to set the local agenda and together had good information 
on drugs and crime in Breda. Local discourse collations were strongly and 
solely represented during this initial framing processes.  
 Drug-related 
nuisance 
Domestic Violence Organized Crime 
Initial 
framing 
process 
 
Frames of mayor, 
board and council 
align 
Frame alignment 
between national policy 
ideas and regional 
professional  as well as 
local professionals and 
authorities in the form 
of frame amplification  
No alignment 
Frame 
shift 1 
Frame of regional and 
local actors aligned 
with national policy 
guidelines and powers 
No alignment Regional frames 
connected with national 
policy ideas, both of 
which both were which 
is approved by local 
authorities 
Frame 
shift 2 
Sequential process of 
frame bridging 
between local and 
regional discourse 
coalitions of which 
the latter was partly 
inspired by the 
national policy 
ambitions 
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Frame expansion during the late 1990s was preceded by a process of 
frame alignment in which regional actors expanded the policy frame (coalition 
A) which was adopted into local policy strategy by the Board of Mayor and 
Aldermen (coalition B) and approved by the local council Breda (coalition C). 
This implies a top down process of frame alignment between national, 
regional, and local policy frames in that order. The strong presence of the 
regional discourse coalition can be explained by the close ties between public 
actors in the region of Brabant. During this frame expansion process, they 
were united by the Franzel Commission, which aimed to align drugs policies 
in the region. This which turned out to be a powerful discourse coalition 
closely related to local government of Breda which followed their advice. 
The second process of frame expansion in the late 2000s was a 
mixture of local, regional and national frames. However, this frame alignment 
process was not as top down as during the late 1990. This time, a sequential 
process of frame bridging took place between local and regional discourse 
coalitions, which were both worried about drug-related problems in the region 
and favored an integrated approach proposed by the mayors of the five largest 
cities in Brabant. The latter were partly inspired by the national policy 
ambition to strengthen the approach to coffee shops and soft drugs. This 
mixture of frames was eventually approved by the local councillors of Breda.  
 
Domestic violence 
The domestic violence sub case showed a two-step process of frame 
alignment. First of all, regional professionals (coalition A) and a pioneering 
local civil servant (coalition B) aligned when they almost simultaneously 
adopted national policy frames on domestic violence into their policy plans. 
Regional policy actors were able to successfully participate in the policy 
debates surrounding domestic violence, as this new topic was adopted into the 
existing regional policy structures that provided social care for vulnerable 
females in the Brabant region. This points to a process of path dependency that 
legitimized regional actors as key actors in the policy process. Secondly, 
mediated by a modest local policy debate, local authorities (coalition C) 
reactively supported the proposed policy plans on domestic violence as a 
safety matter and thereby aligned with local and regional policy frames.  
The process of frame expansion was hardly surrounded by any local 
policy debate which explains the absence of frame alignment and shows a 
direct process of top down structuration of local policies by supra local policy 
tools (home restrictions).  
 
Organized crime 
The organized crime sub case shows a framing process without frame 
alignment as well. The initial policy frame on organized crime as a local safety 
issue came about by adopting the national BIBOB tool in local policies. This 
adoption was not debated by any discourse coalition and therefore was a 
process of top-down policy structuration. 
The frame expansion process, in contrast, was highly debated. 
Regional policy frames asking for supra local policy interventions (coalition 
A) were supported by the mayor of Breda, who acted as a policy broker. He 
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aligned the regional policy frame with the local authorities in Breda (coalition 
B). Meanwhile, coalition A contacted the Minister of Safety and Justice 
(coalition C) who aligned his frame and added national policy ambitions on 
coffee shops to the policy mix. This resulted in frame alignment between three 
formerly disconnected but compatible frames from multiple policy arenas.  
The impact of regional actors in the organized crime sub case can be 
explained by the strong ties in the region. Once local governments recognized 
their shared problem of drug-related crime, they began collaborating. 
Meanwhile, the national government promoted an administrative approach to 
organized crime at a regional level. The fact that national policy actors were 
successful in structuring the expansion of the regional policy frame can be 
explained by resource dependency. The local administrations needed support 
from the national government as they did not possess enough resources to 
address organized crime. This provided an opportunity for the minister to 
implement the new policies of the national government on coffee shops in this 
region. 
 
Comparison 
Taken together, the majority of the shifts in policy frames in Breda were 
preceded by some level of policy debate. In these policy debates, discourse 
coalitions that united local and regional actors interacted. This resulted in a 
process of frame alignment in which local and regional coalitions were able to 
successfully merge their personal frames into a shared frame. Moreover, 
national policy ideas were added to this shared frame as either local or/and 
regional coalitions incorporated them into their own frames.  Eventually, this 
resulted in a common frame characterized by a mixture of local, regional and 
sometimes national policy ideas.  
From a network perspective, the composition of this mix can be 
explained by the distribution of resources and power in the local policy 
network. Local coalitions were able to impose their frames during the frame 
alignment processes because they possessed agenda-setting- and decision-
making powers. One way or another, local actors have to embrace and approve 
policy strategies on local safety issues. The dominance of frames from regional 
coalitions can be explained by the strong ties in the Brabant region and the 
long tradition of regional collaboration within and beyond the policy domain 
of local order and safety. This regional context affects the local policy network 
around safety issues to a large extent. Furthermore, national policy ideas 
aligned with those of local and regional coalitions as a result of resource 
dependency, as both local and regional actors depended on national 
commitment in terms of policy priorities, policy tools and financial means to 
address drug-related nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime.  
The few framing processes which were hardly subjected to policy 
debate showed policy processes during which supra local policy ideas were 
directly adopted into local policy strategies.  This implies that local 
governance processes in the same municipal context took different shapes and 
forms, some of which did not follow the classic ‘debate, design, implement’ 
structure. More specifically, local policy debates in which discourse coalitions 
expressed their frames were not always the starting point of frames shifts in 
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policies and practices. Whether debated or not, the fact that local policy frames 
were to some extent affected by external policy frames brings us to the next 
section that discusses the processes of discourse institutionalization in further 
detail. 
2.4 Discourse institutionalization into local policy frame 
Regardless of the extent to which they underwent a process of frame 
alignment, local policy strategies on the drugs, violence and organized crime 
sub cases entailed a mixture of local and supra local frames. This implies that 
the various frames eventually institutionalized into formal policy strategies. 
Table 28 provides an overview. 
 
Table 28: Discourse institutionalization Breda 
 
Drug-related nuisance 
The initial policy frame on drug-related nuisance shows a mixture of frames 
from local dominant discourse coalitions and national policy guidelines. The 
policy frame of the mayor and other key actors in the policy domain of local 
order and safety was institutionalized into the local policy. Their policy frame 
was partially inspired by national guidelines on soft drugs in the Netherlands. 
This implies that local cognitive aspects of the most powerful policy coalition 
and national regulative aspects were institutionalized into Breda’s initial policy 
frame. 
The expanded policy frame in the late 1990s shows a mix of national 
and regional policy ideas again. The frame proposed by coalition A to create a 
regional coalition to enhance and harmonize local drugs policies, which was 
heavily structured by national policy plans on various new types of drugs, was 
adopted into local policy plans. The same holds for the national power to close 
public buildings in case of any drug-related nuisance. This implies that 
 Drug-related nuisance Domestic Violence Organized Crime 
Initial 
framing 
process 
 
Mixture of frames of 
local coalitions and 
national guidelines 
adopted into policy 
strategy 
National policy 
programs in existing 
regional policy 
structures of the social 
policy domain 
National policy tool 
institutionalized in local 
policy approach 
 
Frame 
shift 1 
National policy strategy 
and power structured 
regional and local 
policy plans 
National policy ideas 
institutionalized into 
regional and local 
policy arena  
 
Combination of regional 
and national policy 
ideas institutionalized in 
regional task force 
Frame 
shift 2 
Recommendations from 
regional research 
reports  and new 
national rules on coffee 
shops were adopted into 
local policy strategy 
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regulative aspects of the national and regional policy arena institutionalized 
into local policies as these were adopted and translated into policy strategies.  
The frame expansion during the late 2000s was characterized by 
national and regional policy ideas as well. National policy ambitions on coffee 
shops and recommendations from regional research reports institutionalized 
into the local policy approach on drugs. This implies, again, a process of top 
down policy structuration by regulative aspects of the national and regional 
policy arena.  
 
Domestic violence 
Both the initial and expanded policy frames on domestic violence show a high 
level of national policy ideas on structuring the regional and thereby local 
policy approach to domestic violence. The initial policy frame on domestic 
violence is characterized by national policy ideas picked up by the regional 
and local discourse coalitions. These ideas were more or less institutionalized 
into local policy plans and practices while local government actors of the 
Breda municipality both participated in and were responsible for the regional 
approach to domestic violence. While national policy ideas were filtered by the 
frames of regional and local discourse coalitions during the initial framing 
process, the frame expansion process that followed was characterized by a 
process of top-down institutionalization of national policy ideas. This time, the 
policy tool of home restrictions as introduced by national government was 
adopted directly into regional and local policies without substantive local 
policy debate.  
 
Organized crime 
The local policy frame on organized crime was highly affected by regulative 
aspects of supra local policy arenas. During the initial framing process, the 
BIBOB tool was adopted almost literarily into regional and local policies 
without any local debate. This points to an institutionalization process where 
national policy ideas structured local policies directly. The frame expansion 
process that followed was a matter of regional and national coalitions aligning 
their frames, which thereafter institutionalized into the Taskforce initiative. 
The regulative aspects towards organized crime from the regional and national 
policy arena were institutionalized into Breda’s local policy arena as local 
authorities triggered and participated in this regional collaboration project. 
 
Comparison 
Taken together, the three sub cases in Breda show a high level of ‘supra local’ 
or ‘external’ policy frames becoming institutionalized in local policy frames. 
National policy ambitions and tools and regional research reports and policy 
ambitions affected Breda’s local policy frames on drugs, violence and 
organized crime. None of the framing processes resulted in a purely local 
policy frame.  
Generally, the regulative aspects of supra local policy arenas 
structured local policy frames. This implies that the formal policy strategy and 
the mayor’s position were shaped by a mixture of local, regional and national 
policy frames. Over the years, external discourse coalitions and supra local 
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policy ideas entered the local policy debate more frequently. Sometimes, 
regional and national policy frames were even completely and directly adopted 
into local policy plans without any policy debate. This resulted in local policy 
frames which were almost entirely characterized by supra local policy ideas. 
This shows that local safety governance in Breda became increasingly 
intertwined with actors and frames of supra local policy arenas over time.  
When we compare the exact content of local policy frames with the 
frames of discourse coalitions, it becomes clear that the two types of coalitions 
saw their ideas most represented in local policy strategies: a) coalitions made 
up of the majority of local council members and the Board of Mayor and 
Aldermen, and b) coalitions representing members of public authorities in the 
Brabant region. From a network perspective, the differentiation of the level of 
institutionalization of a coalition’s policy frame can be explained by their 
resources and powers in the local policy network. The overall presence of 
local authorities can be seen as a result of their agenda-setting and decision-
making power in local policy processes. Other coalitions, such as civil servants 
stressing the importance of domestic violence and Ministers planning to 
tighten local coffee shop policies, depended on the acceptance and formal 
approval of the local city council and Board of Alderman to become 
institutionalized into local policies.  
However, the role and impact of local government actors shifted over 
the years. In the drug-related nuisance case, local coalitions were able to 
design and formalize their own policy ideas into Breda’s first policy plan to a 
large extent. In contrast to their initiating role during the early drugs policies, 
local policy actors were more willing to adopt supra local policy ideas on 
drugs, domestic violence and organized crime into local policy strategies. 
When new safety problems were introduced in the local policy arena by 
external policy arenas, local policy actors took up a more distant role as 
(critical) followers and participants. Nevertheless, in order for external policy 
actors and ideas to affect policies, formal approval by local council and board 
was necessary.  
The strong influence of regional coalitions on local policy frames can 
be explained by the wider context in the Brabant region having a long tradition 
of regional collaboration within and beyond the policy domain of local order 
and safety. Local governments have long attempted to increase their 
effectiveness in addressing a variety of policy issues by pooling resources, 
such as information, money and policy instruments.  This explains why the 
policy frames of local and regional coalitions merged frequently and were 
formalized into policies.  
Furthermore, the Breda sub cases showed national policy ideas 
becoming institutionalized in local policy frames in each sub case. This can be 
described as a process in which regional and local coalitions adopted national 
policy ideas and tools, often without a substantive policy debate. From a 
network perspective, this can be explained by the reciprocal relationship of 
local policy networks with their external policy arrangements. Section four 
further compares the supra local institutional arrangements that shaped public 
safety governance in Breda. 
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 Finally, the mayor of Breda acted like a policy broker in connecting 
the frames, resources and powers of regional and supra local coalitions in 
specific sub cases. The personal perspectives and experiences of this powerful 
player, who had responsibilities and controlled resources and policy tools in 
local safety networks, fostered a tendency towards regional collaboration. 
3 The mayor’s role on paper and in practice 
Local policy strategies are structured by a certain policy frame which shapes 
the local policy approach including the mayor’s expected role. Table 29 
summarizes the policy frames of case in Breda, and consists of a problem 
definition (diagnostic message) and a solution (prognostic message). In the 
following paragraphs, the mayor’s role on paper and in practice are 
summarized before they are compared across the three sub cases. In this way, 
we are able to indicate the extent to which the mayors of Breda enacted their 
expected role and compare the level of frame enactment. 
 
Table 29: Policy frames Breda 
 
 Drug-related 
nuisance 
Domestic Violence Organized Crime 
Initial 
frame 
DM: coffee shops 
cause nuisance 
 
PM:  local 
government  should 
regulate and limit 
the number of 
coffee shops   
DM: Mental and 
physical violence 
were labeled a social 
and safety issue 
 
PM: regional 
collaboration between 
various actors and 
organizations within 
the policy domain of 
social care 
DM: Financial and 
economic aspects of 
organized crime were 
labeled a local safety 
problem 
 
PM: administrative 
approach involving local 
government 
implementing the BIBOB 
tool 
Frame 
shift 1 
DM: Various 
problems related to 
soft, hard and new 
drugs threaten local 
order, health and 
living climate 
 
PM: regional 
coordination and 
harmonization of 
local interventions 
on drugs 
DM: various forms of 
violence in dependent 
relationships were 
labeled a social and a 
safety issue  
 
PM: a systemic 
approach including 
home restrictions 
issued by the mayor. 
 
DM: criminal networks 
causing high crime rates 
in region (drug-related) 
 
PM: combining 
administrative, juridical 
and fiscal interventions 
on a regional scale  
Frame 
shift 2 
DM: party drugs, 
drugs usage and 
trade in coffee 
shops, production of 
drugs, drugs tourism 
and criminal 
networks 
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DM: Diagnostic message PM: Prognostic message 
3.1 Mayor’s expected role  
The policy frame entails the role the mayor was expected to play, which may 
or may not be enacted in practice.  Table 30 summarizes the mayor’s expected 
role in each sub case in Breda. 
 
Table 30: Roles expected of mayors of Breda 
DM: diagnostic message PM: prognostic message 
 
The sub cases of Breda show two similarities when it comes to the expected 
role of the mayor. First of all, the mayor was eventually granted a role on each 
sub case at some point in time. This implies that labeling drugs, domestic 
violence and organized crime as local safety issues did eventually affect the 
mayor’s role, at least on paper. Secondly, the mayor’s expected role on new 
safety issues was expanded by the adoption of new formal powers in each sub 
case. These were, respectively, the power to close buildings in case of drug-
related nuisance, the power of temporarily restrict offenders of domestic 
violence from being at home, and the BIBOB law granting the mayor the 
power to install BIB screening and reject or withdraw subsidies and permits.  
The comparison of the three sub cases shows several differences 
between the expected role of the mayor as described in the policy documents 
as well. First of all, the level of attention paid to the mayor’s role differs from 
the formal policy plans. The mayor’s role in tackling drug-related nuisance is 
not explicitly mentioned in policy documents on coffee shops. There is a more 
or less implicit policy assumption among local stakeholders, built upon the 
PM: Integrated 
approach to various 
forms of drug-
related issues and a 
stricter coffee shop 
policy 
 Drug-related 
nuisance 
Domestic Violence Organized Crime 
Initial 
frame 
Not explicitly 
mentioned  in first  
policy on coffee shops  
None on paper Implementation of 
BIBOB 
Frame 
shift 1 
Closing buildings in 
case of drug-related 
nuisance or fear 
thereof 
 
 
 
Implement his power to 
issue home restrictions 
to offenders of domestic 
violence 
Coordinate free haven 
approach, participate in 
cannabis agreement,  
and be responsible for  
administrative 
interventions by local 
government in 
Taskforce for 
Organized Crime 
Frame 
shift 2 
Enact administrative 
power on drugs 
houses  & formulation 
of coffee shop criteria 
  
  
 
 
261 
 
major’s responsibility for local order and safety. His expected roles on 
organized crime and later on domestic violence, however, have been literally 
mentioned in various agreements, policy ambitions and guidelines. A practical 
explanation can be the novelty of the local safety problem. Whereas drugs are 
a traditional safety issue in the Netherlands and immediately fall under the 
purview of the mayor, issues such as domestic violence and organized crime 
are new topics for local government. They required explicit policy plans for 
selecting the responsible actors and led to an explicit formulation of the 
expected role that should be undertaken by the mayor.  
Furthermore, in each case, the mayor was not immediately granted a 
role on paper when a new ‘safety problem’ entered the local policy agenda. 
The sub case of domestic violence demonstrates that labeling something as a 
local safety problem did not immediately imply that the mayor was put 
forward as the first responsible actor in formal policy strategies. The initial 
policy frame on domestic violence appointed an alderman and not the mayor 
as the responsible actor from local government. The mayor was not given any 
formal role during the initial framing process on domestic violence, since the 
new safety issue was included within existing social care policies, where an 
alderman was responsible, not the mayor. Again, this can be explained a 
matter of path dependency when new issues are embedded in traditional policy 
paths and ongoing practices. 
3.2 Mayor’s role in practice  
The local governance practices in each sub case shows that the mayor sooner 
or later became involved with new safety problems in all three cases. New 
types of drugs related problems, domestic violence and organized crime were 
all subjected to administrative and even operational actions undertaken by the 
mayors of Breda at some point in time. Table 31 summarizes the Mayors’ 
actions in practice. 
 
Table 31:  Role of the mayors of Breda as it was practiced & level of frame 
enactment 
 Drugs-related 
Nuisance 
Domestic Violence Organized Crime 
Initial 
frame 
Mayor D 
Administrative 
actions: initiating and 
designing policy 
Breda 
 
Operational actions: 
closing coffee shops 
 
 High enactment 
Mayor E 
No actions on domestic 
violence 
 
 High enactment 
 
 
Mayor E 
Administrative actions: 
approving BIBOB as part 
of mayor and aldermen 
 
 Low enactment 
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The actions undertaken by the mayors of Breda are characterized by so called 
‘administrative’ and ‘operational’ actions in each sub case. The former imply 
actions on public policy including policy preparation and formalization. The 
latter are interventions in real-life cases of drugs, violence and crime. The 
mayor’s traditional administrative and political role was expanded with 
‘operational’ activities on specific problems. As the mayors implemented their 
new formal powers on drugs, violence and crime, their operational 
involvement expanded besides their traditional role of safeguarding the quality 
and coordination of local safety policies. The implementation of the mayor’s 
new powers resulted in actions towards concrete, individual instances of 
resolving local safety problems, such as closing a house, issuing a home 
restriction to a citizen or refusing a permit for example.  
The mayor’s role in practice differed in terms of activities on the 
supra local policy level and collaboration with external partners. The drug-
related nuisance in Breda, even when national and regional policy ideas 
institutionalized into local policies, was addressed by the mayor in cooperation 
with his traditional partners that were focused on local drug problems. 
Domestic violence and organized crime, however, were tackled by the mayor 
participating in regional collaboration structures, including new partners 
addressing these problems on a more regional scale. This implies that the 
Frame 
shift 1 
 
Mayor E 
Mayor at arm’s length 
 
 Low enactment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mayor F 
Administrative actions: 
regional coordination 
and  local adoption 
home restrictions 
 
Operational actions:   
issuing home 
restrictions 
 
 High enactment 
 
Mayor F 
Administrative actions: 
signing free haven and 
cannabis agreement, 
requesting police capacity, 
informing local authorities 
about the taskforce, 
initiating the taskforce, 
being a member of the 
steering committee for the 
taskforce 
 
Operational actions: 
administrative clearance of 
cannabis farms 
 
 High enactment 
Frame 
shift 2 
Mayor F 
Administrative 
actions: alter 
maximum amount of 
coffee shops and 
connector between 
local and supra local 
policy initiatives 
 
Operational actions:  
closing two illegal 
sites of drugs trade 
 
 High enactment 
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mayor is participating in multiple policy arenas together with regional and 
national policy actors.  
Moreover, it was mostly Mayor F who expanded his playing field in 
terms of supra local policy arenas and partners to address these non-traditional 
safety problems. His personal perspective and experiences fostered these 
mainly regional activities. Mayor F himself, as well as many of his partners, 
mentioned the great emphasis he put on tackling policy problems together with 
his regional partners. Mayor F had strong personal and professional ties to the 
region as he was born in Bergen op Zoom and used to be the mayor of several 
municipalities in the region before he came to Breda. This indicates the 
receptiveness of powerful actors of the local policy arena to policy trends in 
the regional policy arena. 
However, actual involvement in local safety governance does not 
necessarily mean that the mayor enacted upon his expected role as prescribed 
by the formal policy frame. Comparison of the mayor’s role in practice with 
his expected role in the policy strategy results in a level of frame enactment for 
the mayor on each sub case.  The overall picture is that the mayors of Breda 
enacted their expected role on drugs, domestic violence and organized crime 
and that this enactment mostly manifested itself in administrative and 
operational actions. However, there were some exceptions to this overall 
conclusion in either the form or level of frame enactment between sub cases 
and mayors. In the sub case of domestic violence, the absence of mayoral 
actions implied a high level of frame enactment as the policy document did not 
grant the mayor any role. The fact that Mayor E did not undertake any action 
on domestic violence during the early 2000s implied full enactment of the 
policy frame. Furthermore, a low level of frame enactment was discerned 
during the initial framing process in the sub case of organized crime.  
Although the mayor’s expected role was to implement the BIBOB tool, the 
mayor did not execute this instrument because he believed it was too 
complicated.  
A pattern on frame enactment can be derived from these three sub 
cases. The case of Breda showed that frame alignment between the mayor’s 
personal frame and the policy frame was followed by a high level of frame 
enactment and the other way around. There was a high level of frame 
enactment when the policy frame was compatible with the mayor’s individual 
frame as expressed during the local policy debate and/or when the framing 
process was triggered locally. A low level of frame enactment was detected 
when discourse coalitions including the mayor did not recognize the new 
policy problem and thus held a different frame. Any differentiation between 
the policy and the mayor’s personal frame resulted in a low(er) level of 
enactment and the mayors only enacted the policy frame when it was 
comparable to their own. The mayor’s ability to enact his personal frame, 
which may or may not have been in line with the policy frame, is due to his 
individual responsibility for local order and safety as well as his control over 
resources. This makes him the most powerful actor in local policy networks 
during policy implementation. In the end, it is the mayor who decides to act 
and whether or not to implement his powers. 
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4 Institutional arrangements in local policy networks and supra local 
policy arenas 
The conceptual model explicitly adopted a network perspective to local policy 
processes around new safety issues. The relatively openness of policy 
networks towards external actors and ideas and resources shifts our attention to 
the supra local arrangements that affect local policy processes, such as 
problem definitions and differences between expected (on paper) and enacted 
(in practice) roles. The previous paragraphs mentioned several aspects that 
shape local policy processes. This paragraph compares how the course and 
content of local framing processes and the mayor’s position and role in local 
safety governance in Breda were affected by these institutional arrangements. 
Table 32 provides an overall summary.  
 
Table 32: Summary of local and supra local institutional arrangements Breda 
 
 Drug-related 
nuisance 
Domestic Violence Organized Crime 
Local 
arena 
Cognitive aspects in 
local policy network 
triggered initial 
framing process 
 
Distribution of 
powers and 
resources in local 
network foster 
discourse 
institutionalization 
of frame coalition A 
during initial 
framing process  
 
Distribution of tasks 
and responsibilities 
in local policy 
network affect 
mayor’s role 
 
Cognitive aspects of 
key actors in the 
local policy 
networks both 
triggered a local 
policy process and 
allowed 
formalization of new 
policies 
Local civil servant 
pioneered and 
brokered interaction 
between external 
and local policy 
arenas during the 
initial framing 
process of domestic 
violence as a safety 
issue 
 
Cognitive aspects shaped 
by personal and 
professional experience of 
the mayor affected Breda’s 
participation in the 
regional approach to 
organized crime 
Regional 
arena  
Policy practices in 
region arena trigger 
frame expansion 
process  
 
Existing policy 
structures and 
practices in region 
shaped policy 
practice on domestic 
Regional governing bodies 
and collaboration 
structures initiated and 
structured process of frame 
expansion.  
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Local policy arena 
Multiple aspects of the local policy arena affected the local framing process in 
each sub case. The initial framing process around drug-related nuisance was 
structured by local actors signaling drug-related nuisance and the mayor being 
able to institutionalize his personal frame into formal policy. This implies that 
mostly cognitive aspects and the distribution of powers in the local network 
were in place. Moreover, the practical distribution of tasks and responsibilities 
in the local policy network mattered. Given the extraordinary division of labor 
in the Board of Mayor and Aldermen, an ‘aldermen of local safety’ responsible 
for the creation and implementation of local safety policies was set up during 
the late 1990s. This explains why the mayor’s role in practice was 
characterized during that time by little administrative as well as operational 
activities on drug-related nuisance.  
Local aspects were also present in the sub case of domestic violence. 
A pioneering local civil servant introduced the national policy frame on 
domestic violence into the local arena during the initial framing process. In 
doing so, this servant connected supra local and local policy ambitions on 
domestic violence as a safety problem. This points to the effects of individual 
local actors behaving like policy brokers.  
In contrast to the sub cases of drug-related nuisance and domestic 
violence, the sub case of organized crime only modestly included aspects of 
the local arena. Also in this sub case, the cognitive aspects of the powerful 
actor in the local policy network mattered. Since Mayor E did not embrace the 
BIBOB tool, it was hardly implemented in the local policy arena when it was 
Regional ambition to 
harmonize drugs 
policies structures 
local policies 
 
Regional research 
reports affect 
content of regional 
and local policy 
frames 
violence during both 
framing processes  
 
Regional policy 
cycle fostered policy 
expansion   
 
 
National 
arena 
Regulative aspects 
of national policy 
network triggered 
harmonization of 
local and regional 
policy during frame 
expansion  
 
Regulative aspects 
affected content of 
national arena were 
adopted into local 
policy frame during 
both the initial and 
frame expansion 
processes 
Regulative aspects 
of national arena   
institutionalized into 
regional and local 
policy plans during 
both framing 
processes  
 
 
 
Regulative aspects of 
national arena triggered 
and shaped local policy 
frame during initial policy 
process 
 
Regulative aspects 
proposed by minister of 
Safety and Justice partially 
shaped frame expansion  
 
National support, 
manpower and money 
enabled implementation 
Task Force  
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first adopted in local policy plans. In contrast, the personal frame and 
professional experience of Mayor F enhanced Breda’s participation in the 
overall regional approach to organized crime later on.  
 
Regional policy arena 
The regional arena has been of great importance for local safety policies and 
the mayor’s role in Breda. In case of drug-related nuisance, the 
unconventional policy strategies of neighbor cities triggered frame expansion 
in Breda. Moreover, regional policy ambitions on this topic as expressed by 
regional committees and reports were institutionalized into local policy frames. 
In the sub case of domestic violence, the safety aspects of domestic violence 
were addressed by existing policy practices in the field of social care. Later on, 
the regional policy cycle fostered the frame expansion process when the 
adoption of home restrictions was anticipated during the updating of the 
regional policy. In the sub case of organized crime, the mayors of the largest 
cities in the region initiated several research reports that structured and 
institutionalized their policy frames, as well as initiating national commitment 
and resources to implement this policy on a regional level. 
 This implies that actors, policy practices and the existing policy 
structures in the regional arena initiated and shaped the policy frames and the 
mayor’s role. Each sub case shows some level of regional coordination or 
collaboration. The emphasis on regional collaboration shaped local policies, 
practices as well as the mayor’s role in practice and can be explained by the 
strong ties between local and regional government actors in Brabant. As 
regional policy practices have been in place before and in other policy 
domains, local safety issues are handled in the same way. In more theoretical 
terms, this can be seen as an empirical manifestation of path dependency in 
regional policy processes. Moreover, the manifestation of powerful actors in 
the local policy arena supporting this tradition of regional collaboration, such 
as Mayor F, explains the mayor’s investments in regional collaboration in all 
three sub cases, as well as his role as a policy broker between regional policy 
ambitions on the one hand and local or national policy dynamics on the other 
during the late 2000s.  
 
National policy arena 
Regulative aspects from the national policy arena were strongly present in 
each sub case. National policy criteria and powers on drugs were 
institutionalized into the initial policy frame on coffee shops, and triggered and 
structured the two processes of frame expansion that followed. In the sub case 
of domestic violence, the national policy ambitions of local governments on 
domestic violence triggered and structured the initial framing process in Breda. 
Moreover, national budgets and arrangements shaped local policy practices in 
general and temporal home restrictions structured the mayor’s formal role on 
paper as well as in practice. In the sub case of organized crime, the BIBOB 
law triggered local policy attention for the matter and national policy plans 
were institutionalized into regional and local policy plans, thereby creating 
local involvement. Furthermore, national support, manpower and funds 
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enabled regional local policy practices to address various forms of organized 
crime.  
 
Overall, local policy processes in all three Breda sub cases were more or less 
characterized by a mixture of institutional arrangements from multiple policy 
arenas. This implies that local frames and the mayor’s role and position on the 
new safety problems were mediated and characterized by local, regional and 
national policy ideas, guidelines and powers. The presence of supra local 
arrangements can be explained as the outcome of both direct and indirect 
processes of top-down policy and role structuration by supra local powers, 
policy ambitions and resources.  
 5 Conclusions  case Breda 
In this within-case comparison, the findings based on the three Breda sub cases 
were compared to each other. Together, these research findings offer us 
several preliminary answers to sub-questions four and five.  
5.1 Preliminary answer to sub-question four 
Sub-question four was: How have new local safety problems been framed in 
local policy processes and how does this affect the mayor’s role and position 
in policy and practice? The general answer to this sub-question is that the sub 
cases of drug-related nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime were 
sooner or later framed as local safety problems, in some cases more explicitly 
than others. Nevertheless, by securitizing these issues, they immediately 
belonged to the policy domain of local order and safety for which the mayor is 
traditionally held responsible.  
The Breda case analysis showed that the mayors of Breda had an expected 
role in the local policy strategies on these newly securitized issues as their 
formal powers expanded in each sub case. Moreover, the mayors enacted their 
expected roles as promoted by the policy strategy in mostof the sub cases.
 43
 In 
more theoretical terms, the mayors’ actions showed a high level of enactment 
of their expected role as characterized by the policy frame. This implies that 
both the mayor’s role on paper as well as his actions in practice were affected 
by the introduction of new local safety problems into local safety governance. 
More specifically, the analysis of the mayor’s role in practice showed that his 
‘operational’ actions on local safety problems were emphasized. With the 
implementation of new powers, such as closing buildings, issuing temporal 
home restrictions, and using the BIBOB tools, mayors intervened in concrete 
and individual cases of public safety. The implementation of new powers thus 
enhanced their operational and hands-on involvement in local safety 
governance.  
Moreover, the mayors’ actions, both administrative as well as operational, 
were (to be) carried out at the local and supra local levels. The sub cases of 
non-traditional and nationally triggered problems of domestic violence and 
                                                 
43   Only Mayor E did not fully enact the policy frame on organized crime during the  
early 2000s. 
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organized crime showed a high level of supra local activities undertaken by the 
mayor. This implied that the mayor was active in multiple policy arenas and 
fulfilled the role of policy broker between them. While acting in regional and 
sometimes even national policy arenas, the number and type of the mayors’ 
partners in public safety governance increased as well. Over time, the mayors 
of Breda became more dependent on supra local actors and their resources to 
solve local safety problems effectively. 
However, the Breda case showed some exceptions to the overall 
expansion of the mayor’s expected and practical role. The mayor was not 
devoted to any role or did not undertake action in two specific local policy 
processes around the new safety problems of domestic violence and organized 
crime. These can be explained by the processes of path dependency- granting 
an alderman instead of the mayor responsibility for domestic violence - and a 
low level of frame alignment between the mayor’s personal frame and the 
policy frame on the policy tool of BIBOB. More in general, these exceptions 
took place during the initial framing processes of non-traditional safety 
problems in local safety governance, indicating that it took some time before 
the mayors became actively involved with domestic violence and organized 
crime, which were traditionally dealt with by other actors from the local and 
national policy arenas respectively.  
5.2 Preliminary answer to sub question five 
The application of the conceptual model showed an interplay between framing 
processes, the mayor’s role and institutional aspects from several policy 
arenas. This results in several preliminary research findings for sub-question 
five: Which (f)actors of the local, regional and national policy arena affected 
the content, course and outcome of these framing processes? The overall 
dynamics of the Breda case show a high level of ‘supra local’, regulative 
aspects institutionalizing into local policy strategies and shaping the mayor’s 
role both on paper as well as in practice. As mentioned above, these supra 
local elements in the local policy strategy expanded the mayor’s role in many 
ways. We can explain this by means of several mechanisms which characterize 
the interplay between (f)actors from the local, regional and national policy 
domains in the Breda case. 
First, the Breda case has shown two types of top-down policy and role 
structuration. During such processes, regulative aspects (powers, reports, 
policy programs) of supra local policy arenas shaped local policies including 
the mayor’s position and role. The sub cases showed both direct and indirect 
cases of structuration. The distinction lies in variation in the level of policy 
debate. In the case of direct policy and role structuration, a local debate did not 
take place. National policy tools were directly adopted into local policy plans. 
Indirect policy and role structuration refer to framing processes during which 
regional and national policy frames aligned with local frames during policy 
debates. The majority of the framing processes were surrounded by some level 
of policy debate during which local, regional and national discourse coalitions 
presented their policy frames. This resulted into the institutionalization of a 
mixture of local and supra local frames into local policy strategies. During 
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indirect policy structuration, the local policy debate during which local, 
regional and national policy discourse coalitions interacted and aligned their 
frames formed a ‘filter’ through which supra local policy ideas were processed 
into suitable policy strategies for local governance. 
Second, these top-down processes of policy and role structuration 
were mostly present in the sub cases of domestic violence and organized crime 
and to a lesser extent in the sub case of drug-related nuisance (only late 
2000s). This implies that local authorities in Breda fell back on existing policy 
structures in the domain of public safety and order when a ‘traditional’ 
problem as drugs came along. However, when their actions on non-traditional 
safety issues as domestic violence and organized crime were initiated by supra 
local actors, they had to develop new policy plans and practices for which they 
relied heavily on supra local partners and guidelines and tools. This explains 
the high level of regulative aspects from national and regional policy arenas 
that became institutionalized into local policy strategies. It also explains why 
the mayor participated with new actors on supra local policy arenas more 
often.  
Third, in the mixture of local, regional and national policy frames as 
shown by these two mechanisms, especially regional policy actors, frames, 
tools and practices are very important for the local policy approach to new 
local safety problems. Especially the tradition and tendency to collaborate on a 
regional scale structured: 1) the local policy frame and the mayor’s role in 
practice on domestic violence, 2) supported the administrative approach to 
organized crime on a regional level and 3) enabled the execution of regional 
policy ambitions on drug-related nuisance in Breda. In theoretical terms, this 
can be seen as an empirical manifestation of path dependency in policy 
processes as well as the expanding multi-level character of public safety 
governance. Moreover, mayor F’s perspectives and experiences on regional 
collaboration fostered these regional activities as well.  
Fourth, a single bottom-up process of policy and role structuration 
was present as well. In the sub case of organized crime, the policy initiatives of 
mayors of five cities in the region were embraced and facilitated by national 
government. In this case, local actors collaborated in the regional policy arena 
and successfully invigorated the frame of national policy actors to generate 
national support for their policy ambitions. Meanwhile, this led to policy 
expansion by adopting some national policy ambitions as well. 
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Chapter 12 Cross case comparison 
1 Introduction 
This chapter compares the findings from cases Haarlem and Breda to further 
our understanding of how the mayor’s role and position in local governance 
has been affected by shifting definitions of local safety problems. Moreover, 
case study findings are related to our conceptual model that provides a 
generalizable framework of this process. The comparison is structured 
according to the main components of the conceptual model. The next section 
compares the framing processes in Haarlem and Breda during which the sub 
cases of drug-related nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime were 
labeled as local safety problems by their relevant discourse coalitions. The 
effects of securitization on  the mayor’s position and role in local safety 
governance networks will then be compared across the two cases. The fourth 
section compares the institutional arrangements that affected the local policy 
process that defined the mayors' role and position. Sub questions four and five 
are addressed in each section before the implications of the overall case study 
findings for the conceptual model are discussed in the final section.  
2 How new safety problems were framed in local policy networks 
This section compares the local policy debates in Haarlem and Breda during 
which discourse coalitions defined local safety problems and formalized them 
into formal policy strategies. Table 33 summarizes how drug-related nuisance, 
domestic violence and organized crime ended up as formal policy topics as 
well as how formal policy frames shifted over time in both cities. 
  
Table 33: Comparison of the local framing processes resulting in formal policy 
frames in Haarlem and Breda 
 
Drug-related  
nuisance 
Haarlem Breda 
Initial framing 
process 
Process: frames of local coalitions 
aligned with supra local policy 
ideas and became  institutionalized 
in local policies  
 
Policy frame: local authorities 
regulate and/or closing coffee 
shops that were causing nuisance  
Process: frames of local 
coalitions aligned with supra 
local policy ideas and became  
institutionalized in local policies  
 
Policy frame:  local authorities 
regulate and closing coffee shops 
that were causing nuisance  
Frame shift 1 Process: no debate took place, 
resulting in the direct 
institutionalization of supra local 
policy tools into local policies  
 
Policy frame: mayor closes drugs 
buildings as last resort against 
drug-related nuisance  
Process: the frames of the local 
and regional coalitions aligned 
with each other and  with supra 
local policy ideas, and were 
subsequently institutionalized in 
the local policies  
 
Policy frame:  harmonization of 
regional and local interventions 
to soft, hard and new types of 
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drugs 
Frame shift 2 Process: frames of local coalitions 
aligned during local policy debate 
and were formalized into local 
policies  
 
Policy frame: tight regime of local 
authorities controlling and 
sanctioning rule violations by 
coffee shop owners 
Process: frames of local and 
regional and national coalitions 
aligned with each other and 
institutionalized in local policies  
 
Policy frame: integral approach 
to various drug-related problems 
and a strengthening of policies 
relating to coffee shops 
Domestic 
violence 
Haarlem Breda 
Initial framing 
process 
Process: frames of local coalitions 
aligned with supra local policy 
ideas and became institutionalized 
in local policies  
 
 
Policy frame: crisis response to 
victims combined with the 
prevention and prosecution of 
offenders of various forms of 
domestic violence 
Process: frames of local and 
regional coalitions  aligned with 
supra local policy ideas and 
became  institutionalized in local 
policies  
 
Policy frame:  regional 
collaboration amongst various 
actors from the social care 
services to address the problem of 
domestic violence  
Frame shift 1 Process: hardly any policy debate 
took place, leading to the direct 
institutionalization of supra local 
policy tools  into the local policy 
plans 
 
Policy frame: regional 
collaboration strategy to support 
mayors in implementing their 
power of temporal home 
restrictions 
Process: no debate thus direct 
institutionalization of the supra 
local policy tools into local 
polices  
 
 
Policy frame:  home restrictions 
given out by the mayor as part of 
systematic approach to various 
forms of domestic violence  
Organized 
crime 
Haarlem Breda 
Initial framing 
process 
Process: little local debate, leading 
to the direct institutionalization of 
supra local policy tools in the local 
policy plans 
 
Policy frame:  BIBOB as a means 
of preventing unintended support 
for criminal activities 
 
Process: no debate took place, 
leading to a  direct 
institutionalization of supra local 
policy tools into the local policy 
plans  
 
Policy frame:  an administrative 
approach was taken to the 
financial and economic aspects of 
organized crime by the local 
government in their 
implementation of the BIBOB 
tool 
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Frame shift 1 Process: frames of local coalitions 
were aligned with supra local 
policy ideas, and  institutionalized 
in local policies  
 
 
Policy frame: administrative, 
juridical and fiscal interventions 
were implemented on a  
regional scale 
Process: frames of the local, 
regional and national coalitions  
aligned with each other and 
became institutionalized in local 
policies  
 
Policy frame: regional 
collaboration to allow for unified 
actions including administrative, 
juridical and fiscal interventions  
 
The cross case comparison leads to several conclusions relevant to the first 
part of the fourth sub question: How have new local safety problems been 
framed in the local policy processes […]?  First, all six sub cases show 
successful efforts at securitization as the three problems of the drug-related 
nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime all ended up becoming 
policy objects in the local safety policies in both Haarlem and Brede at some 
point between 1990 and 2010. In both settings, the  contents of these policy 
frames was dynamic. After they were successfully securitized as local safety 
problems, their initial frames altered at least once. The policy frames in fact 
shifted twice in the sub case of drugs which was introduced as a policy 
objective in the early 1990s. Domestic violence and organized crime are more 
recent concerns that manifested in the 21st century. It can be concluded 
therefore, that across the two municipalities, the longer a safety problem is 
subject to local governance, the more frequently its policy frames shift. 
 Secondly, in both Haarlem and Breda, some discourse coalitions saw 
their frames become formalized in policy, and others did not. Overall, three 
types of discourse coalitions can be distinguished in the policy debates. These 
range from the individually dominant, to coalitions that are dependent on 
others. Both cases showed in particular that it were the discourse coalitions 
that united a majority of local authorities who had the most impact in 
translating their frames into public policy. The dominance of these coalitions 
be explained by the high level of formal agenda setting and decision making 
powers they held in comparison to other coalitions in the policy network. 
Furthermore, in both cases, coalitions composed of civil servants were 
repeatedly successful in shaping specific aspects of the local policy frames. 
The sub case of domestic violence in Haarlem and Beda both show the 
important role of coalitions of professionals who successfully pioneered efforts 
in relation to domestic violence and successfully presented it as a safety issue. 
Although these professionals were as much dependent on local authorities for 
formalizing their frames into local policies, their chances of affecting the local 
policy frame were increased by a local incident in the form of a death caused 
by domestic violence that served to highlight the problem. Their case was 
bolstered also by the supra local policy (powers for the mayor, international 
policy practices) that provided a ready course of action that could be modeled 
locally.  
Thirdly, non-government actors participated in local policy debates 
every once in a while, such as citizens, and coffee shop owners. They were the 
least effective in directly shaping the local policy frame. Haarlem and Breda. 
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These actors communicated their interests during the initial stages of the local 
policy debates but they were either ruled out, or incorporated by coalitions 
with more formal decision-making powers. At best, they were able to set the 
agenda of the debate itself and saw their frames represented by other powerful 
actors in the local network. Taken together, each coalition's level of formal 
agenda setting and decision making power in the local policy processes 
strongly affected its  chance of formalizing its perspectives on the problem and 
solution in the formal policy frame, regardless of the level of interests that was 
at stake. 
Finally, the level of policy debate preceding the institutionalization of 
our three public safety problems was variable across Haarlem and Breda. In 
contrast to the prediction of the conceptual model, local policy debates during 
which coalitions aligned their frames were not always present each time a 
policy frame was initiated or reframed. This implies that shifts in local policy 
frames were brought about by actors other than local discourse coalitions.  In 
other words, the framing of local safety problems and policies was by no 
means a purely local endeavor. Even when local policy debate was active, 
local actors embraced supra local policy ideas. In both Haarlem and Breda, the 
framing processes were all characterized by a mixture of local and supra local 
policy actors, goals and tools. Overall, the more recent the framing process and 
the less traditional the safety issue, the greater the supra local influence in local 
policies. This points to the importance of the Zeitgeist and current 
constellations of institutional arrangements in shaping the processes of 
problem farming and role structuration. This is discussed further in Section 4. 
3 How new definitions affected the mayor’s role on paper and in practice 
According to the conceptual model, the securitization of local issues affects the 
mayor’s role and position in local safety governance. Table 34 provides an 
overview of the case study results on how new definitions of local safety 
problems affected the mayor’s role on paper as well in practice. The former is 
referred to as the mayors expected role as mentioned in the formal policy 
strategy. The latter is the mayor’s role in practice as characterized by his actual 
actions or lack thereof. In the next sections, the similarities and differences 
between the two the mayors identified and explained. 
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Table 34: Comparison of mayor’s role on paper and in practice 
 
Drug-
related 
nuisance 
 
Haarlem Breda 
Expected role  Role in practice Expected role Role in practice 
Initial 
framing 
process 
implementation 
of new coffee 
shop policy by 
closing coffee 
shops   
 
creation and 
formalization of 
policy and the 
closing several 
coffee shops  
 
high 
enactment 
local 
government 
regulates coffee 
shops, mayor  
not explicitly 
mentioned 
Initiation and 
designing policy 
and  closing 
coffee shops  
 full 
enactment 
Frame shift 
1 
new power to 
decide whether 
or not to close a 
public building, 
and for what 
period  
power hardly 
implemented  
 
low 
enactment 
 
new power to 
close buildings 
in case of drug-
related nuisance, 
or fear thereof 
mayor at arm’s 
length 
 low 
enactment 
Frame shift 
2 
deciding 
whether or not 
to close a public 
building and for 
what period 
introduction and 
implementation 
of restrictive 
approach  
 full 
enactment in 
reversed order 
closing 
buildings in case 
of drug- related 
nuisance or fear 
thereof, and the 
formulation of 
rules for coffee 
shops owners 
altered 
maximum 
amount of 
coffee shops, 
connected local 
and supra local 
policy initiatives 
and  closed two 
illegal sites of 
drugs trade 
 
 high 
enactment 
Domestic 
violence 
 
Haarlem Breda 
Expected role  Role in practice Expected role Role in practice 
Initial 
framing 
process 
none 
 
no actions  
 high 
enactment 
 none 
 
no actions  
 
 high 
enactment 
Frame shift 
1 
Implementation 
of new power to 
implement home 
restrictions 
 
issuing of home 
restrictions 
 
  high 
enactment 
  
Implementation 
of home 
restrictions for 
offenders of 
domestic 
violence, and the 
coordination of 
a regional 
approach 
implementing 
home 
restrictions 
 
 high 
enactment 
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Organized 
crime 
 
Haarlem Breda 
Expected role  Role in practice Expected role Role in practice 
Initial 
framing 
process 
implementation 
of new powers 
from the BIBOB 
law  allowing 
the  withdrawal 
and refusal of 
permit, and 
facilitating 
BIBOB 
screening 
policy 
preparation by 
Mayor B, no 
implementation 
of BIBOB tool 
 low 
enactment 
Policy 
expansion and 
implementation 
of BIBOB tool 
by mayor C  
 high 
enactment  
new BIBOB 
power adopted 
no 
implementation 
of BIBOB  
 low 
enactment 
Frame shift 
1 
Coordination of 
regional 
collaboration 
and set 
objectives 
 administrative 
actions on local 
and 
interregional 
level and 
implementation 
of BIBOB 
 
 enactment 
Coordination of 
free the haven 
approach, 
participate in 
cannabis 
agreements and  
and responsible 
for  
administrative 
interventions  by 
the local 
government in 
Task Force 
organized Crime 
administrative 
and partially 
operational 
actions in the 
local, regional 
and national 
arena  
 high, mainly 
administrative 
enactment 
3.1 Drug-related nuisance 
The securitization of the drug-related nuisance affected the mayors in Breda 
and Haarlem in two very similar ways. First, both mayors were called upon to 
design and implement the first policy on coffee shops. They took 
administrative action during the policy formation process, and they took 
operational actions in closing coffee shops that flouted the new policy. This 
activation can be explained as the outcome of local framing processes during 
which local policy actors (including the mayors themselves) problematized the 
expanding number of coffee shops and called for an intervention by the local 
government. Second, although the new power to close drug buildings in case 
of the drug-related nuisance was adopted into local policies, it was minimally 
implemented by the mayors in both municipalities. This points at a gap 
between the mayors’ expected role as stated in local policy plans and their role 
in practice. This gap can be explained by low frame alignment between the 
formal policy frame on the one hand, and the mayor’s individual frame on 
either drug-related problems or public safety governance in general on the 
other hand. The mayor of Haarlem did not explicitly recognize the drug-related 
nuisance as a pressing one. This is demonstrated by the absence of a local 
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policy debate on drugs in the late 1990s. The mayor of Breda’s personal view 
on local safety governance was that an integrated safety policy can and should 
be dealt with by a local alderman, and this view explains his low involvement 
in the policy matter.   
The mayor’s involvement at supra local policy arenas relevant to the 
drug-related nuisance differed between the two municipalities from the mid-
1990s onwards. The mayors of Haarlem tackled drugs in collaboration with 
traditional partners from or closely related to the local policy arena. Mayors in 
Breda, however, were firmly embedded in regional collaboration structures 
regarding drugs in which public problems were assumed to belong to policy 
domains other than public safety. The high level of supra local policy actions 
and the great number of partners involved in efforts to tackle the drug 
problems in Breda can therefore be explained as a matter of path dependency 
in regional and local policy practices.  
3.2 Domestic violence 
The sub case of domestic violence shows a striking similarity across both 
cases. Partially framing domestic violence as a local safety problem did not 
immediately affect the mayors' position and role in local governance. This is in 
sharp contrast to the expectation of the conceptual model that defining 
something as a local safety problem will clearly impact the mayor’s role and 
position. This unexpected finding is another manifestation of path dependency 
and can be explained by the power of historical and existing policy practices. 
Before it was securitized, domestic violence in both cases had long been a 
policy topic in the social welfare policy domain for which an alderman was 
responsible. In line with this traditional role, the alderman rather than the 
mayor was responsible for domestic violence when it was first was labeled as a 
safety matter.  
However, it was not long before both mayors became active in 
addressing domestic violence. Both were granted the power to issue home 
restrictions through the adoption of this into local policy plans. Not only were 
the mayors now expected to address domestic violence as laid down in formal 
policy documents, they both frequently gave out home restrictions to offenders 
of domestic violence in their local society. Personal frame alignment came into 
play as in both cases as the mayors came to recognize the problem of domestic 
violence as a serious one and they exhibited a high level of enactment of the 
formal policy frame.  
Despite these similarities, the mayors differed as well in the way in 
which they addressed domestic violence. In both cases, local governments 
started to collaborate with other municipalities in order to harmonize the way 
in which mayors implement temporal home restrictions. However, the extent 
to which mayors were involved in this administrative processes in the regional 
policy arena differed. Whereas the mayor of Haarlem delegated the 
administrative coordination of home restrictions to a colleague in the region, 
the mayor of Breda fulfilled this job himself. This difference in the mayors’ 
behavior can be explained by their personal frames on domestic violence. 
Whereas C described it as an important matter that sits at the edge of the 
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public safety domain (Interview August 2012), Mayor F argued that domestic 
violence was a matter of high importance, and one that he had long been 
addressing as mayor of several municipalities in Brabant (Interview May 
2013).  
3.3 Organized crime 
Framing organized crime as a local safety issue affected the mayors in Breda 
and Haarlem in similar ways, primarily in that it resulted in an expansion of 
their role in this regard.  This overall expansion of  can be explained as the 
outcome of the adoption of the national BIBOB law in local policies in both 
cases.    
The mayors’ role in practice eventually showed activities regarding 
organized crime. However, it took a while before mayors became actively 
involved as both mayors solely administratively approved the new BIBOB 
power as part of local policies without actually implementing it during its early 
days. This low level of enactment can be explained by low level of personal 
alignment as mayors simply held the opinion that organized crime did not take 
place in their local society. Later on, both municipalities had new mayors who 
became actively involved with addressing organized crime. They did this 
operationally by implementing BIBOB and using it in relation to local cases, 
as well as administratively by participating in and coordinating regional 
collaboration structures set up to tackle various forms of organized crime.  
This shift in the mayor’s role in practice from a rather inactive one to 
one demonstrating active involvement can again be explained by the individual 
mayors' level of personal alignment. New mayors entered the scene in both 
cases, and these mayors had personal frames that more greatly acknowledged 
the need for local administrative interventions targeted at severe forms of 
crime. Time played a role as well, as the introduction of organized crime as a 
nontraditional safety issue in the local policy arena took time to be embraced 
by key actors in the local public safety and order domain, including the local 
mayor. 
Although mayors in both cases became actively involved in 
addressing organized crime, they differed slightly in their level of involvement 
and type of actions. The mayor of Haarlem responded actively to the national 
ambition by supporting the creation of a regional policy structure once this was 
introduced and promoted by the national government. The mayor of Breda, 
however, took it a step further by initiating and promoting interventions 
regarding free havens and drug-related crime at the local, regional and national 
level. Whereas the mayor of Haarlem was an early adopter and active 
supporter, the mayor of Breda is better described as an initiator and co-
designer of the administrative approach to organized crime. This difference 
might be explained by the collaboration structures that were put in place. The 
fact that Mayor F took up this role can be explained in part by his participation 
in close regional collaboration structures regarding public safety, and in other 
policy domains. This reason was less prominent in the case of mayor C who 
attempted to encourage the active involvement of other stakeholders in the 
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region to create a regional collaboration structure for common interventions 
regarding organized crime. 
3.4 Overall findings 
Similarities and differences that arise in the cases of Haarlem and Breda 
provide an overall answer to the second part of sub question four: […] to what 
extent, how and why did they [new local safety problems] affect the mayor’s 
position and role in the practice of local safety governance? Overall, the case 
study findings demonstrate that the mayor’s expected role and his behavior in 
practice were indeed affected by the securitization of new issues. The in-depth 
analysis of the process of securitization and the creation of new policies in 
Haarlem and Breda affected the mayor’s role and position in at least five ways: 
 
1) Expansion of the mayor’s expected role ‘on paper’ as described in the local 
policy strategy. The mayors were eventually granted a role in local policy 
plans in all six sub cases. More specifically, the mayors' position was 
expanded by the adoption of a new power introduced by national government. 
These powers formalized the mayors’ responsibilities, specified their expected 
course of action and provided them with extra tools to address the new safety 
problems of the drug-related nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime. 
 
2) Mayors got involved with addressing the new safety issues through 
administrative as well as operational activities. The former refers to preparing 
and formalizing policies, while the latter points to more hands on involvement 
such as closing shops, giving out restrictions and allowing BIBOB screenings. 
The implementation of new powers led in particular to an increase in the 
mayor’s operational involvement with individual, real life cases in local safety 
governance. 
 
3) The mayor’s ‘playing field’ expanded with the involvement of new partners 
from local as well as regional, national and sometimes even international 
policy arenas. The securitization of ‘nontraditional’
44
 safety issues expanded 
the mayor’s role in practice this way. As result mayors became actively 
involved in various collaborative structures set up at the supra local policy 
level, and they started to tailor their local interventions according to the input 
of new actors including the tax authorities and the Minister of Safety and 
Justice. At the same, this led to an increasing level of dependency on others to 
effectively address local issues. 
 
4) The cross case comparison showed that expanding the mayor’s expected 
role did not automatically lead to an alteration in his actions in practice. 
Mayors differed in the extent to which they enacted their expected role as 
portrayed in the formal policy strategies. While the mayors of Breda were 
found to enact upon their expected role in six out of seven times, the mayors of 
Haarlem showed a lower level of frame enactment. Such variation in the level 
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of enactment can be explained by a level of disagreement between personal 
and policy frame. The case studies show that the mayor’s personal frame had 
to align with the policy frame for his expected role to be carried out in 
practice. Whereas the mayor’s expected role might have affected the 
securitization of local issues in local policy plans, it was not immediately 
implied that the mayor’s role in practice would be shaped by new problems 
definitions as well.  
 
5) Both cases showed one similar exception to which conclusions 1  4 do not 
fully apply. The fact that the partial securitization of domestic violence did not 
immediately lead to the creation of an expected role for the mayor in the local 
policy strategy makes this sub case different from the other ones. The initial 
framing processes of domestic violence in both Haarlem and Breda contrasted 
with the theoretical assumption that the securitization of local problems would 
affect the mayor. Although domestic violence was partially labeled as a safety 
problem, both mayors were not granted a role in addressing this new safety 
problem in the initial framing process. Instead an aldermen responsible for 
social care was appointed as the one responsible for the policy approach to 
domestic violence. Not until the national power of temporary home restrictions 
was adopted in the frame expansion processes were the mayors activated in 
both municipalities. The fact that the securitization of domestic violence 
initially (re)activated the aldermen instead of the mayor can be explained as 
being the result of path dependency.  
4 How institutional arrangements affected local policy processes 
This paragraph deals with how institutional arrangements from multiple policy 
arenas affected the course and outcome of local processes of problem framing 
and role structuration. Local governance in the Netherlands is closely impacted 
by actors and resources from other policy arenas. Case studies demonstrated 
how local problem frames and the roles of police actors in local policy 
networks were affected by policy dynamics in the regional, national and the 
international policy arena. In the terminology of the conceptual model, these 
are supra local institutional arrangements affecting local processes of problem 
framing and role structuration on paper and in practice. Table 35 provides an 
overview of the institutional arrangements located in the local and supra local 
policy arenas affecting local policy processes regarding the securitized issues 
of the drug-related nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime. In the 
next sections, the similarities and differences between the cases in terms of 
these institutional arrangements will be detected and explained for each policy 
arena. This provides an overall answer to sub question five: Which factors of 
the local, regional and national policy arena affected the course, content and 
outcome of local framing processes as well as the mayor’s position and role in 
the practice of local safety governance? 
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Table 35: Comparison of institutional arrangements present in Haarlem and 
Breda 
 
 Haarlem Breda 
Local arena Drug-related Nuisance 
Sub case 1 Sub case 4 
Local policy debate 
 
Cognitive aspects of the local 
policy arena triggered the initial 
framing process 
 
Shift in the composition of 
actors in the local arena (new 
mayor) triggered frame 
expansion 
 
The division of power between 
actors in the local policy arena 
explains why contrasting frames 
disappeared 
 
Local policy practices triggered 
a policy debate and an 
expansion of the policy frame to 
include new actors with 
different normative standpoints 
 
Regulative events in local arena 
triggered policy formalization  
 
Cognitive aspects or the 
individual frames of powerful 
actors affected level of frame 
enactment 
Local Policy debate  
 
Cognitive aspects in local policy 
network triggered initial framing 
process 
 
Distribution of powers and 
resources in local network 
fostered the institutionalization of 
the frame of Discourse Coalition 
A.  
 
Distribution of tasks and 
responsibilities in local policy 
network affected the mayor’s role 
 
Cognitive aspects of key actors in 
the local policy networks both 
triggered a local policy process 
and allowed for a formalization of 
new policies 
Domestic Violence 
Sub case 2 
 
Sub case 5 
Modest local policy debate 
 
Incidents in the local policy 
arena triggered the initial 
framing process 
 
Cognitive aspects in the local 
arena (dissatisfaction with 
policy practice) provided solid 
ground for frame expansion 
Local civil servant pioneered and 
brokered between the external and 
local policy arena during the 
initial framing process of 
domestic violence as a safety 
issue 
 
The frame expansion process went 
ahead without local policy debate 
Organized Crime 
Sub case 3 Sub case 6 
Local Policy debate Initial framing process lacked a 
substantive local policy debate 
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Cognitive aspects shaped by the 
personal and professional 
experience of the mayor affected 
Breda’s participation in the 
overall regional approach to 
organized crime 
Regional arena Drug-related Nuisance 
Sub case 1 Sub case 4 
 Policy practices in the regional 
arena triggered the frame 
expansion process  
 
The regional ambition to 
harmonize drug policies 
structured local policies 
 
Regional research reports affected 
the content of both regional and 
local policy frames 
Domestic Violence 
Sub case 2 Sub case 5 
Participation in the regional 
collaboration structure for 
implementing temporary home 
restrictions shaped the mayor's 
expected role 
Existing policy structures and 
practices in the region shaped 
policy practice regarding domestic 
violence during the framing 
processes  
 
The regional policy cycle fostered 
policy expansion   
Organized Crime 
Sub case 3 Sub case 3 
Practical aspects of regional 
policy arena triggered policy 
debate around policy practice in 
Amsterdam  
 
Regulative aspects of the 
regional policy approach 
triggered frame expansion and 
resulted in a regional 
collaboration agreement 
Regional governing bodies and 
collaboration structures initiated 
and structured the process of 
frame expansion 
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National arena Drug-related Nuisance 
Sub case 1 Sub case 4 
Regulative aspects of the 
national policy approach 
triggered frame expansion and 
resulted in the policy of closing 
buildings 
 
Regulative aspects of the 
national policy arena shaped the 
local policy frame, specifically 
closing buildings 
 
The tight regime fit the 
tightening national debate and 
practice, and a  local alternative 
was presented 
Regulative aspects of the national 
policy network triggered a 
harmonization of local and 
regional policy during frame 
expansion  
 
Regulative aspects from the 
national arena were adopted into 
the local policy frame during both 
the initial and frame expansion 
processes. 
Domestic Violence 
Sub case 2 Sub case 2 
Regulative aspect of the national 
policy arena triggered frame 
expansion and resulted in the 
implementation of temporary 
home restrictions  
 
Regulative aspect of the national 
arena activated the mayor 
regarding domestic violence  
 
Various aspects enabled local 
policy implementation: budget, 
manpower 
 
Haarlem’s local innovative 
approach had a national spin off 
Regulative aspects of the national 
arena   were institutionalized into 
the regional and local policy plans 
during both framing processes  
 
 
Organized Crime 
Sub case 3 Sub case 3 
Regulative aspects of the 
national policy arena triggered 
the initial framing process and 
the adoption of the BIBOB Law 
 
Regulative aspects of national 
policy arena triggered and 
shaped local policy frame: 
BIBOB law 
 
Regulative aspects of the 
national policy arena shaped 
local policy frame: dministrative 
approach, RIEC and funding 
Regulative aspects of the national 
arena triggered and shaped the 
local policy frame in the initial 
policy process.  
 
Regulative aspects proposed by 
the Minister of Safety and Justice 
partially shaped the frame 
expansion  
 
National support, manpower and 
money enabled the 
implementation of the task force 
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International 
arena 
Domestic Violence 
Sub case 2 Sub case 5 
Practical aspects of international 
policy arena shaped the local 
policy frame 
 
4.1 Local arena  
All three sub cases were eventually labeled as a safety concerns worthy of 
specific local policy strategies in both Haarlem and Breda in a clear process of 
securitization. While these certainly affected the mayor’s role on paper and in 
practice, the local processes of problem framing and role structuration were 
also shaped by various (f)actors in the local policy arena. 
Both cases showed several local triggers that initiated the local policy 
process.  These triggers include the problematization of local issues by local 
stakeholders (cognitive aspects), incidents in local society, informal policy 
practices that generated policy debate, as well as the pioneering work of civil 
servants to generate policy attention for new problems. Both cases were 
strikingly similar in that new policy frames were frequently preceded by local 
policy debates in which discourse coalitions consisting of local authorities 
successfully managed to institutionalize their frames. This led to the creation 
of custom-made approaches in local policy. The coalitions that were successful 
in framing issues usually consisted of local authorities who had formal agenda 
setting and decision making power. Other actors from the local or supra local 
arena had to align their frames with that of the local authorities or risk being 
excluded or ruled out. From a network perspective, the possession of formal 
powers for agenda setting and decision-making, or having close connections 
with such actors greatly affected a discourse coalition’s chances of 
institutionalizing its frame into local policy plans.  
However, the extent to which local authorities affected the course and 
outcome of the framing process varied between Haarlem and Breda. This 
difference can be explained by differences in the level of local policy debate 
observed in each municipality. Whereas each sub case in Haarlem featured a 
local debate in which several discourse coalitions expressed their frames and 
their desired solutions, this was not the case in Breda. The frame expansion 
process for domestic violence and the initial framing process for organized 
crime in Breda was not preceded by a substantive local policy debate. The 
policy frames in Breda were a little less influenced by the frames of local 
discourse coalitions, and a little more influenced by the frame of supra local 
policy coalitions from the regional and national arena as explained in the 
following sections.  
4.2 Regional arena 
Over time, both cases were characterized by the expanding influence of 
regional policy actors, ambitions, practices and resources. This can be 
explained by a national trend of ‘scaling up’ local safety governance that took 
place across the Netherlands in the 2000s. Local authorities were encouraged 
  
 
 
285 
 
by the national government and the police to collaborate with many others 
actors from the public, private and social welfare spheres in order to increase 
their problem solving capacities (see chapter two on integral policy ambitions 
in public safety governance). As these so called ‘integral strategies’ to tackle 
contemporary safety problems were picked up in both Haarlem and Breda, 
local safety governance became less of a local endeavor over the years and the 
playing field for the mayors aiming to address new local safety problems 
expanded to the regional policy arena as well. 
Nevertheless, the largest difference across Haarlem and Breda had to 
do with the composition of the local and regional elements. Compared to 
Haarlem, institutional arrangements from the regional arena shaped local 
policy frames and practices more greatly in Breda. This was especially visible 
in the sub case of the drug-related nuisance which was dominated by local 
actors and policies in Haarlem, but more deeply affected by regional 
collaboration structures in Breda. This trend started in the mid-1990s when 
drugs first entered the policy domain, and continues until today. This 
difference can be explained by a strong tradition of regional collaboration in 
Brabant which enabled regional actors and policy ambitions to have a more 
ready influence on the structure of Breda’s policies practices and the actions of 
its mayors. Given their tradition of regional collaboration, there was a basic 
level of familiarity and trust between partners in the region that naturally 
allowed for the new public safety problems to be addressed on a regional scale.  
4.3 National arena 
Local policies and practices in Haarlem and Breda were strongly influenced by 
regulative aspects of the national policy arena, including national policy 
programs and powers which shaped the local policy strategies, including the 
mayor’s expected role. National budget and manpower facilitated regional and 
local policy implementation. In all six sub cases new powers regarding drugs, 
violence and crime were adopted into local policy strategies somewhere 
between 1990 and 2010. These powers gave the mayors of Haarlem and Breda 
tools and responsibilities to address these safety issues that they either held 
themselves, or that they shared with the board and council. This similarity can 
largely be explained by the influence of the Dutch national governmental 
system which formalized these tools by law and therefore made them 
uniformly applicable to every mayor in the Netherlands. Together, this points 
at a top down process of policy structuration during which institutional 
arrangements from the national policy arena triggered attention to new safety 
problems, shaped local policy strategies (including the mayor’s expected role), 
and enabled the local implementation of new policy frames.  
Although both cases adopted these regulative and facilitative aspects 
from the national policy arena, the case of Haarlem differed from Breda in that 
Haarlem's local policy initiatives (themselves inspired by international policy 
practices) had a supra local spin off in that it was adopted in the national 
sphere, and subsequently also influenced the local polices in other 
municipalities. Haarlem’s local ‘innovations’ for addressing domestic violence 
were picked up and adopted by policy actors at the regional and national 
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policy arena. This bottom up mechanism can be explained by the fact that 
Haarlem was dealing with domestic violence by taking a public safety 
perspective well before other public actors in the Netherlands did.  
4.4 International arena 
The international arena's main influence in Haarlem was in the 
institutionalization of foreign policy practices in its local policies on domestic 
violence. Professional groups in Haarlem had to turn to international policy for 
a framework for their first safety oriented approach to domestic violence as 
there were none to model closer to home. This points to the importance of the 
timing of local policy processes in relation to the supra local policy context.    
4.5 Mixture of institutional arrangements  
Both cases demonstrated that the framing of local problems as safety issues 
was indeed a multi-level governance activity which blended aspects of several 
policy arenas and affected the local policy frame as well as the mayors' role. A 
mixture of institutional arrangements shaped ‘local’ processes of problem 
framing and role structuration in both cases. Regulative aspects of the national 
policy arena structured local framing processes by introducing new policy 
topics and/or policy ambitions to be carried out by local governments. The 
new powers created in the national arena also structured the mayor’s role on 
paper as well as in practice in Haarlem and Breda.  
Although both cases are characterized by a mixture of institutional 
arrangements from multiple policy arenas, Haarlem and Breda differed in the 
specific compositions of local and supra local elements that defined both the 
local policy and the mayors' role. The difference lies in the manifestation of 
regional influences on local policies. Whereas Breda knows a strong tradition 
of regional collaboration, regional actors, reports and policy ambitions were of 
less influence in structuring local policies and roles in Haarlem. Therefore 
local actors in Haarlem dominated local policies and practices to a higher 
degree that those in Breda. Taken together, the case Breda is characterized by 
a relatively higher level of supra local institutional arrangements compared to 
Haarlem. Nevertheless, Haarlem’s local policy frames and practices were 
characterized by supra local arrangements and it even adopted some 
international policy ideas regarding domestic violence. 
5 Implications for the conceptual model 
This cross case comparison resulted in the identification of several similarities 
and differences between Haarlem and Breda that have implications for the 
conceptual model. As explained in the research design presented in Chapter 6, 
the case studies were selected for their analytical generalizability. They aimed 
to refine the theoretical expectations of the conceptual model. This section 
deals with the question of whether or not the empirical findings matched the 
theoretical expectations of the conceptual model, and presents the theoretical 
implications of our case study findings. This is the first step towards 
establishing the theoretical implications of study as presented in the 
conclusions. 
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5.1 Securitization of local issues does indeed affect the mayor’s position 
and role  
The conceptual model combined several concepts from the literature on policy 
dynamics, framing and networked governance, mapping out how problem 
definitions were expected to influence the role and position of actors in a 
policy network. Both case studies supported the general assumption that 
shifting definitions of local safety policy problems affect the mayor’s role in 
local safety governance. The conclusion we draw from the cases is that the 
mayors of Breda got more formal powers and expanded their administrative 
and operational activities to address new local safety problems. This points at 
an expansion of both the mayor’s expected role as well as his role in practice 
(c.f. van Doorn and Lammers, 1976). In other words, securitization of new 
issues granted the mayor an expected role in local policy strategies and 
encouraged him to undertake both administrative and operational actions. 
Moreover, mayors got involved in cooperation with many new policy actors 
from supra local policy arenas. The latter implies that shifting problem 
definitions altered the composition of the policy venue (Baumgartner and 
Jones, 1993), locating the mayor in multi actor and multi-level collaboration 
networks (c.f. multi-level governance Bekkers and Fenger, 2007). 
5.2 Three mechanisms of multi-level problem and role structuration 
The case studies point to three distinct mechanisms of so called ‘policy and 
role structuration’ during which a mixture of institutional arrangements from 
the local, regional, national and international arena shaped local safety policies 
and the mayor’s role in it:  
 
1) Top down policy and role structuration occurred when supra local policy 
ideas become directly institutionalized into the local policy strategies. 
International, national and/or regional policy ideas were directly adopted into 
the local policy strategies. A substantive policy debate in which local 
stakeholders expressed their worries and wishes regarding the matter did not 
manifest itself in the local policy arena. Local authorities simply copied 
nationally created powers and regional policy ambitions into local policy plans 
without much fuss. The fact that supra local policy frames were directly 
institutionalized into local policy documents implies that they shape local 
strategies and the mayors' expected role to a large extent. Whether or not this 
affected the mayor’s behavior in practice depended on the level of personal 
alignment as explained in Section 5.4. This type of policy and role 
structuration was mostly present during the initial framing processes of 
nontraditional safety problems.   
 
2) Mediated policy and role structuration refers to process during which local 
discourse coalitions aligned their frames with supra local policy ideas, thereby 
creating a shared policy frame. During the local policy debates, the frames of 
local coalitions became aligned with supra local policy ideas present at the 
international, national and regional policy arenas. The local debate creates a 
‘filter’ through which supra local policy ideas are processed into suitable 
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policy strategies for local governance. Once institutionalized into formal 
policy plans, this customized frame represents a mixture of local and supra 
local policy ideas structuring the overall policy strategy including the mayor’s 
expected role in it. Mediated processes of policy and role structuration were 
triggered by both local and supra local factors and flourished when local 
stakeholders were heavily engaged with the problem at hand, and when they 
strove publicly to gain prominence for their favored problem definitions and 
solutions. This type of direct policy and role structuring reflects the multi-level 
character of local safety governance in the Netherlands, and was most 
commonly present in both cases. 
 
3) Bottom up policy and role structuration: This occurs when new practices in 
the local policy networks get adopted in the supra local policy arenas. Case 
studies demonstrated that locally developed policy frames and practices were 
sometimes picked up by other municipalities as well as facilitated and actively 
promoted by national governments. In this way, local initiatives by the mayor 
and his partners became a guiding example for others. This type of policy and 
role structuration took place when supra local policy ideas, tools and structures 
were absent. This fostered a purely local process of frame alignment, 
institutionalization and enactment, leading to local policy innovations being 
necessary means of dealing with new safety problems. This type of policy and 
role structuration was dominant in the early days of local safety governance 
when supra local policy programs, tools and structures were not yet in place.    
5.3 Local debate is a sufficient condition for discourse institutionalization 
In contrast to the expectations of the conceptual model, the two case studies 
have shown that the institutionalization of new policy frames is not necessarily 
preceded by local policy debates during which local discourse coalitions frame 
new safety problems (Hajer, 1989; 1993). Supra local policy frames can 
directly structure local policy, including the mayor’s expected role, according 
to the mechanism of ‘direct problem and role structuration’. This implies that 
local policy debates in which discourse coalitions interact and align their frame 
(one of the three phases outlined by the conceptual model) are a sufficient, but 
not vital condition for shifts in local policy frames. However, the case studies 
also revealed that such processes of direct policy and role structuration were 
followed by the lowest levels of frame enactment by the mayors in practice. 
This points at variations in the extent to which the mayors' expected role and 
role in practice are structured by newly securitized issues as further explained 
in the next section. 
5.4 Personal alignment is a vital condition for frame enactment 
The conceptual model stressed the importance of frame alignment between 
discourse coalitions as a crucial step towards the creation of a shared policy 
frame. Such a shared frame was conceived as being more likely to become 
institutionalize into formal policy plans, and more likely also to shape the 
mayors' role on paper and in practice. However, frame alignment (Snow et al., 
1986) proved to be a crucial element during the policy implementation phase 
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as well.  The case studies showed that the mayors' held a certain level of 
‘freedom to act’ in the practice of local safety governance. The mayor’s role in 
practice mirrored his personal frame. His actions did not immediately follow 
the policy frame. Mayors only enacted upon the policy frame once their 
personal frames were compatible with the diagnostic and prognostic message 
of the policy. The level of alignment between the mayor’s individual frame 
and the policy frame explained whether a new or shifted policy frame would 
affect the mayor’s role in practice. In other words, ‘personal frame alignment’ 
was a vital or necessary condition for complete role structuration in newly 
securitized issues. While role structuration proved to be possible on paper 
without such personal alignment, 'personal alignment’ is a prerequisite if new 
policy frames are to affect the mayors' actions in practice as well. 
5.5 Time affects the local framing process in multiple ways 
Our historical analysis of the local governance processes demonstrates four 
striking ways in which time affected local policy. Time's first impact came 
from the fact that local actors needed a period to adjust their frames of the new 
safety problems and align them with that of key others before their new shared 
problem frames could be institutionalized into formal policy strategies, and 
before they could actually enact these new problem frames in practice. 
Especially when concern over new safety problems was triggered by supra 
local factors, or when the newly securitized issues were traditionally managed 
under a different policy domain, local actors needed time to embrace the new 
policy frames and make the new policy topic and approach their own.  
Secondly, and quite literally as well, the passing of time reveals frame 
shifts. Historical analysis revealed that initial policy frames in all six sub cases 
changed (expanded) at least once or twice over our 20-year time frame.  The 
longer security related issues were subject to local policies, the more often the 
policy frame shifted. This confirms the expectation that problem definitions 
are not static, but that they are constantly challenged and shift over time 
(Weiss, 1989). 
 Thirdly, ‘timing’ or ‘Zeitgeist’ affected what the local processes of 
securitization looked like.   ‘Bottom up’ mechanisms flourished in times when 
the policy domain of local safety governance was not yet closely regulated or 
professionalized in the early 1990s. National and regional frameworks for 
addressing new types of safety problem were not yet widely present and their 
absence left room for local experiments. In contrast, the local safety policy 
processes taking place currently tend to be more highly professionalized, 
regulated and regionalized. The policy domain of local safety governance is 
now more frequently characterized by direct and mediated processes of policy 
and role structuration, with supra local policy ideas, actors and tools entering 
the local policy arena.  
Fourthly, time matters in the sense that policy history matters. The 
practice of local safety governance is inevitably characterized by the policy 
context and history of the municipality (c.f. Pierson, 2000) and its institutions 
(Powell and DiMaggio, 1991 Scott, 1995). The case studies indicate that 
historically developed policy practices affected the extent, speed and way in 
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which the securitization of news issues affected local policy strategies and 
practices. Examples of this include the existing policy practice of organizing 
social care on a regional scale, the long-standing division of labor in the policy 
domain of local order and safety between the mayor and alderman, as well as 
the local tradition of participating in regional collaboration structures in order 
to effectively address commonly shared problems. 
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Part VI Conclusions 
This final section of the book details the overall conclusions of the study and 
its theoretical and practical implications. The findings of the macro study and 
the multiple case studies are integrated to answer the sub-questions and central 
research question of the study.  
 
 
  
 
 
292 
 
  
 
 
293 
 
Chapter 13 Conclusion 
1 Introduction 
This research project started by posing the central research objective: to 
describe, analyze and understand how the position and role of mayors within 
local safety governance has been affected by shifting definitions of local public 
safety problems between 1990 and 2010 in the Netherlands. This was followed 
by a literature review on the concepts of policy dynamics, problem framing 
and governance networks in part two of the book. Thereafter, theoretical 
expectations were combined into a conceptual model and the research design 
was presented in part three. Part four of the book presented the findings. First, 
the findings of the macro study on changes in the definition of local safety 
problems in the Netherlands between 1990 and 2010 were presented. This was 
followed by the analysis and comparison of the six sub cases that explained 
how Dutch mayors addressed several new local safety problems. In this final 
chapter, the long-term macro study findings and in-depth case study results are 
combined to answer the central research question of this research project: 
 
How have definitions of local safety problems changed and how, to what 
extent and why has this affected the position and role of mayors in local safety 
governance in the Netherlands between 1990 and 2010? 
 
In the following paragraphs, the sub questions and central research question 
will be answered. Next, the theoretical and practical implications of the 
research project are discussed.  
2 Answers to sub-questions 
The answers to the various sub questions were detailed in the separate chapters 
on the macro study and sub case studies, and are summarized in this section. 
This will help to integrate them so as to surface the overall conclusions of the 
research project. The first sub question focused on the empirical context of the 
research project: 
 
1. How did the policy domain regarding local public safety evolve between 
1990 and 2010 in the Netherlands and what has been the mayor’s formal 
position in it?  
 
The domain of local public safety governance is understood as the collective of 
policies, practices and actors that address public safety problems within the 
boundaries of a municipality. The domain of local policies focusing on local 
safety issues emerged between 1990 and 2010 in the Netherlands. The rapid 
expansion of safety problems since the mid-1980s, both quantitatively and 
qualitatively, forced Dutch governments to make choices and formulate policy 
ambitions regarding local safety for the first time. Choices were deemed 
necessary as crime rates increased and new types of safety problems came 
forward. This growing attention for public safety has brought along a growing 
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trend of issues being framed in terms of threats to local order and safety 
thereby calling for government action. Such a process is called securitization 
(Buzan et al., 1998). 
The report of the Roethoff committee in 1984 was the first in a series of 
reports and policy programs in which policy ambitions on an expanding range 
of crimes and other safety issues were formulated. The committee stated that 
public safety was to be tackled by local governments in close collaboration 
with partners from the public, private and societal sectors. Consequently, the 
national government and the police encouraged local governments to take up a 
leading role in the practice of local safety governance. Local governments 
were expected to initiate preventative interventions regarding safety 
(administrative prevention - Roethof, 1994), collaborate with others (Integral 
Safety Report, 1993; Integral Safety Program 1999), formulate local safety 
policies (Pubic Safety Policy 1995-1998; Towards a Safer Society, 2002) and 
coordinate and direct the ambitions and activities of all partners involved. 
Today, governing local safety is daily business for local governments in the 
Netherlands. Almost all of the over 400 municipalities have a local safety 
policy which relies on the policy ambitions of this integrated approach. 
The emergence of the policy domain of local safety governance in the 
Netherlands is strongly characterized by the introduction and 
professionalization of this integrated policy strategy. The concept of integrated 
safety was introduced during the early 1990s and can be best explained by its 
five objectives: 
 
 combining technical and administrative interventions;  
 addressing safety as an encompassing concept;  
 a cross-sectorial approach;  
 governing safety by ‘chained’- or ‘joined-up’ management;  
 new alliances among providers of safety.  
 
The last objective has had a strong impact on policy practices in local 
safety governance in the past 25 years (Prins and Cachet, 2011). It led to the 
creation of various forms of alliances and networks in which government 
actors collaborated increasingly with actors from the public, private and 
societal sectors, including citizens, private companies and housing 
corporations. Local authorities were granted the task of coordinating policy 
design and implementation in close cooperation with their many partners. 
Overall, local government has been given an important role in governing a 
wide variety of local safety problems over the past two decades.  
Meanwhile, Dutch mayors, who are formally responsible for local order 
and safety since the municipal law in 1851, obtained greater powers. The 
national government has introduced multiple formal powers for Dutch mayors 
to address specific local safety problems over the last 15 years. Examples 
include ordering preventive body searches for weapons, issuing temporary 
home restrictions in case of domestic violence, and mandating area restrictions 
because of the high risk of severe nuisance in public spaces. This expansion of 
the formal powers of the mayors mirrors the growing importance of their 
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responsibly for local order and safety over the past decades. In fact, this 
change was marked as the largest change in the formal position of mayors in 
local safety governance, and has been highly debated in Dutch society (Mein, 
2010; Sackers 2010a/b; Bandell in van der Zwan, 2007; CCV, 2010). 
The second sub question was about theoretical expectations of the ability 
of problem definitions to shape the position and role of government actors in 
governance networks: 
 
2. What is the expected role of problem definitions during policy processes and 
how are they expected to affect the position and role of individual actors in a 
policy network?  
A problem definition is more than just a simple description of an undesired 
situation according to many scholars of agenda-setting and policy dynamics. 
Problem definitions are social constructions of reality that portray one of many 
possible perspectives on a public problem (Dery, 1984 Schneider, 1985; 
Bulmer, 1971). Therefore, the adoption of a specific problem definition in 
public policy has far-reaching consequences for the design and implementation 
of policies. By presenting a specific perspective on a public problem, problem 
definitions make a certain selection of policy tools a well as a distribution of 
responsibilities more amenable while downplaying others (Cobb and Elder, 
1993; Weiss, 1989; Schneider and Ingram, 1993; Baumgartner and Jones, 
2009). In other words, the problem definition shapes how a problem is seen 
and addressed and by whom.  
This so-called ‘power of problem definitions’ can be further 
understood through the concept of ‘frames’. Frames are images of reality 
providing a perspective on the problem at hand, as well as on the most suitable 
solution (Burr, 1995). Policy problems are mediated by these frames that 
structure a policy program according to their diagnostic (what is going on?) 
and prognostic (what should be done about it?) messages (Snow and Benford, 
1988). In short, definitions of public problems subject to public policy, that is 
“policy problems”, are expected to shape several key aspects of the policy 
strategy, including the roles and positions of the actors involved.  
The influence of problem frames on the position and role of actors in 
policy networks can be understood as the outcome of interaction between 
groups of actors in a policy network. Many scholars have argued that 
contemporary public problems, such as public safety issues, are characterized 
by a high level of complexity and wickedness (Rittel and Weber, 1973; Hoppe, 
1989), which require the orchestrated action of multiple policy actors united in 
governance networks (Rhodes, 1996; Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004). It is in such 
collective and more-or-less horizontal policy networks that public problems 
are framed, and actors take up certain roles and positions during policy 
processes.  
A combination of the literature on agenda-setting, policy dynamics, 
framing and governance networks resulted in a conceptual model mapping out 
three interchangeable phases during which problem frames are expected to 
shape local policy strategies, including actors’ roles. Although presented in 
this order, the three phases do not necessarily evolve in the ‘classic’ or 
‘rational’ order of agenda setting, policy design and policy implementation. 
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First, once an undesired issue pops up in (local) society, its definition 
is debated among actors, each holding their individual perspective or frame on 
the issue at hand. During local policy processes, these actors strategically align 
in discourse coalitions (Hajer, 1993), striving for their favorable definitions 
and solution. Interaction between groups of actors will eventually result in a 
common frame embraced by key actors in the policy domain. The process 
through which individual frames meet and merge, resulting in the 
establishment of a collective frame, is called frame alignment (Snow, 
Rochford, Worden and Benford, 1986) or discourse structuration (Hajer, 
1993).  
Second, this shared or common frame is most likely to be formalized 
into local safety policy documents; this process is called discourse 
institutionalization (Hajer, 1993). This formal policy frame then shapes the 
policy strategy by stressing a specific perspective on: a policy problem and the 
policy approach that shapes the formal position of the policy actors 
characterized in terms of tasks, responsibilities and instruments.  
Third, an actor’s role in the policy practice takes shape during the 
daily implementation processes. Although the formal policy strategy is the 
starting point for such policy intervention, policies on paper are not necessarily 
line with and practice. The mayor’s role in practice is therefore first of all 
constituted by the actions he did and did not undertake. The level of role 
fulfillment or frame enactment indicates the extent to which the mayor’s 
policy actions are in line with his expected role, as specified by the formal 
policy frame. 
In sum, the outcome of this three-staged problem framing process is a 
specific problem definition that structures the position and role of actors 
involved. This is not a fixed or static outcome, since problem frames are not a 
static state of mind and policy. Existing policy frames and practices are 
challenged by cognitive and institutional aspects located in local and supra 
local policy arenas at all times. As a result, frames in local policy debates, 
documents and practices can alter and even shift over time, which may 
significantly affect policy strategies and actors’ roles.  
Furthermore, changes in problem definitions and solutions that shape 
the mayor’s role and position in policy and practice are shaped by more than 
the cognitive process of problem framing. Public problems are framed and 
roles and positions are created during local policy processes in local policy 
networks that are located in the larger context of a policy domain. Local policy 
networks bring along a framework for action (Sørensen and Torfing, 2007) and 
the larger policy context provides institutional arrangements that set the 
boundaries for the local processes of problem framing and role structuration 
(Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 1995). This expands the study’s scope 
from the local policy arena to the institutional arrangements, such as rules, 
regulation and resources, of policy arenas at the regional, national and even 
international policy levels as well. This implies a multi-level perspective on 
governing local safety problems to truly understand local governance 
processes. 
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 After exploring both the empirical and theoretical context of the 
research project, sub question three pointed out the first step of gathering and 
analyzing empirical data: 
 
3. Which safety problems have been listed for local safety governance in the 
Netherlands and what shifts have taken place between 1990 and 2010?  
 
The macro study explored the empirical manifestation of securitizing issues as 
‘threats’ to the ‘referent object’ of local safety and order in the Netherlands 
between 1990 and 2010 (c.f. Buzan et al., 1998). This longitudinal analysis of 
the definitions of local safety problems indicated that the perspective on public 
safety changed drastically in the Netherlands. The Dutch perspective on local 
safety showed a move from crime and disasters, to more and unconventional 
safety issues, such as small annoyances (like illegal parking) and severe 
problems, such as as organized crime, that used to be handled by national 
government actors. More specifically, the macro study showed three main 
shifts in the definitions of local safety problems over the past twenty years.  
First, we identified a drastic expansion of the frequency of issues 
labelled as a local safety problem. The absolute number of references to the 
definitions of safety problems that should be addressed by local government 
grew from 4 in 1990 to 175 in 2010. This implies that the so-called ‘issue 
presence’ of local safety problems in national policy documents expanded 
tremendously over the years.  
Second, there was a substantive expansion in the variety of issues 
defined as local safety problems. The variation in ‘safety categories’ increased 
from 2 in 1990 to 33 in 2010. Classic local safety problems, labelled as ‘crime’ 
or ‘disasters’, were accompanied by over thirty new categories of local safety 
problems. Examples of new categories are public nuisance (1995), traffic 
(1999), social integration (2003) and organized crime (2007). This shows a 
process of ‘issue expansion’ which implies that the national policy frame on 
local safety became more inclusive in the Netherlands over the past twenty 
years. 
Third, some types of safety problems were mentioned more often than 
others, demonstrating a trend of ‘issue dominance’. Local safety problems 
categorized as nuisance, drugs, youth, violence, small annoyances, and 
organized crime dominated the agenda for local safety governance in the past 
twenty years. These categories represent a shift in local safety problems at 
various points in time between 1990 and 2010. Therefore, three definitions 
belonging to these dominant categories were selected to be studied for their 
implications on the role and position of mayors in local safety governance by 
means of detailed case studies. These were the definitions of: drug-related 
nuisance (early 1990s), domestic violence (around 2000) and organized crime 
(late 2000s). This brings us to the fourth sub-question: 
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4. How have new local safety problems been framed in local policy processes 
and how and to what extent and why did they affect the position and role of 
mayors in the practice of local safety governance? 
 
Multiple, embedded case studies provided the answers to sub questions four 
and five. The following is a step-by-step presentation of the case study 
findings to fully answer sub question four. 
 First, knowledge of how new safety problems were framed in local 
safety governance networks was gained. The embedded case studies showed 
that drug-related nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime, each 
representing a dominant shift in the definition of local safety problems, were 
all framed as local safety problems in Haarlem and Breda. This affected the 
role and position of the mayors in local safety governance, both on paper and 
in practice.  
 Second, the case studies analyzed how these new local safety 
problems affected the mayor’s position and role. Both the mayor’s expected 
role in policy plans and his role in practice changed to tackle new local safety 
problems. Mayors were given a formal role in local policy strategies to address 
drug-related nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime in both cases. 
This expected role for the mayor was strongly shaped by the adoption of 
national powers that provided the mayors with new tools and responsibilities 
for these safety problems. In the majority of the sub cases, the mayors enacted 
these roles in practice. This implies that the mayor’s role on paper as well as 
his actions in practice were shaped by the securitization of local issues. 
Overall, this implies that the mayor’s role in practice was expanded to tackle 
new safety problems. More specifically, the mayor’s operational and hands-on 
involvement in public safety problems increased, he collaborated with new 
types of actors and increased his involvement in supra local policy arenas as 
well. 
Third, cases studies assessed the extent to which the mayor’s role and 
position were affected by new local safety problems. It turned out that the 
mayors did not enact their expected role as described in the local policy plan 
each and every time. They did not enact or acted differently when their 
personal frames did not align with the policy frame that promoted a certain 
role for them. This gap indicates variation in the extent to which new 
definitions of public safety problems affected the mayor’s role in local safety 
governance. Whereas his expected role was in each sub case expanded by new 
policy frames, his role in practice only altered once he personally 
acknowledged the new problem and the proposed course of action.  
 Fourth, the case studies explained why new local safety problems 
affected the position and role of the mayor. By securitizing new issues as a 
threat to local order and safety, sooner or later, they belonged to the policy 
domain of local order and safety, for which the mayor is traditionally and 
formally held responsible (Local Government Act, Section 172). As a result, 
the mayor was now directly responsible for these new safety problems, his 
expected role in local policy plans was expanded by the introduction of new 
powers, and he eventually actively addressed the new safety problems of drug-
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related nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime  in local policy 
practices.  
 
5. Which factors of the local, regional and national policy arena affected the 
course, content and outcome of local framing processes, and the mayor’s 
position and role in the practice of local safety governance?  
The case studies demonstrated that local safety governance was by no means a 
purely local and isolated policy process. They indicated that institutional 
arrangements provided by local, regional, national and even international 
policy arenas affected policy dynamics in local safety networks. This implies 
that local processes of problem framing and role structuration were indeed 
shaped by a mixture of multi-level, institutional arrangements. Given the 
wealth and variation in their manifestations, it would be impossible to discuss 
all institutional arrangements of the local, and supra local level which 
manifested themselves in the sub cases (please see Table 33 in Chapter 12 for 
an overall summary). However, it is worth noticing especially that regulative 
aspects from the national policy arena shaped local framing processes in all 
six sub cases by either introducing new policy topics or policy tools to the 
local policy arena. For the mayors, regulative aspects in the form of new 
powers created in the national arena structured their role on paper and in 
policy practice in Haarlem and Breda. This observation points to a reciprocal 
relationship between local and national government, both of which were 
involved with local safety governance as further explained in Section 4.2. The 
cross-case comparison resulted in the uncovering of three mechanisms that 
structured local policies and roles and were affected by a specific constellation 
of local and supra institutional arrangements (Chapter 12, Section 5.2 for a 
detailed description of these mechanisms and see Section 4.2 of this chapter 
for their theoretical implications).  
3 Answer to the central question  
The central question of the research project is: How have definitions of local 
safety problems changed and how, to what extent and why has this affected the 
position and role of mayors in local safety governance in the Netherlands 
between 1990 and 2010? This question will be answered by breaking it down 
into its components.  
How have definitions of local safety problems changed?  The macros study 
demonstrated that definitions of local safety problems have changed 
tremendously during the past twenty years. An analysis of the agenda for local 
safety governance in the Netherlands showed three important trends between 
1990 and 2010: 
 
 Growing issue presence pointing to a drastic increase of the frequency 
of prioritizing public safety problems for local safety governance. 
 Issue expansion indicating a substantial expansion in the variety of 
issues defined as local safety problems. Traditional problems of crime 
and disaster are now accompanied by many new definitions of local 
safety problems, such as sex, foreigners and football.  
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 Issue dominance some of these new definitions dominated the policy 
agenda. Dominant definitions belonged to the categories of nuisance; 
drugs; youth; violence; small annoyances; and organized crime. 
 
Together, they characterize the expansion of the agenda for local safety 
governance over the past two decades. In other words, these issues best 
represent the local trends of securitization in the Netherlands between 1990 
and 2010. 
 
How did new definitions of local safety problems affect the position and role of 
mayors? The formal position of Dutch mayors was strengthened by the 
introduction of various new powers to tackle a wide range of new safety 
problems. The case study analysis of the mayors’ roles in handling drug-
related nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime, three exemplars for 
the expansion of the agenda for local safety governance, showed that 
securitization affected the mayor’s role in practice. The implementation of new 
formal powers forced mayors to become involved with individual, real life 
cases. This fostered operational activities and hands-on involvement with 
concrete safety problems in local society, besides their administrative and 
political actions in governing local order and safety. Furthermore, tackling new 
safety problems led to greater emphasis on the mayor’s role as policy broker 
(Kingdon, 1984) between local and supra local policy arenas to tackle new and 
nontraditional safety problems. After all, the multi-level character of local 
safety governance implied that mayors became more dependent on multiple 
actors and their resources from local and supra local policy arenas for solving 
local safety problems (c.f. multi-level governance Bekkers and Fenger, 2007). 
 
To what extent did new definitions of local safety problems affect the position 
and role of mayors?  The case studies demonstrated that although the mayor’s 
formal position was expanded by new policy frames in all cases, his role in 
practice only altered once he personally acknowledged the new safety problem 
and the proposed course of action. This gap between the mayor’s expected and 
practical role points to a classic distinction between the policy on paper and in 
practice. More important, it implies variation in the extent to which shifting 
policy frames affected concrete actions in local safety governance explained 
by the level of alignment between the policy frame and the mayor’s personal 
frame (Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford, 1986). The reach of the impact 
of new policy frames on the mayor’s formal position and expected role on 
paper and his behavior in practice depended on this level of ‘personal 
alignment’. 
 
Why did new definitions of local safety problems affect the mayor’s position 
and role? The combined research findings of the macro study and case studies 
indicate that the changing perspective on local safety problems did not remain 
without consequences for Dutch mayors. The conclusion that the mayors were 
affected by this changing perspective on public safety in the Netherlands can 
be explained by the institutional fact that they are responsible for local order 
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and safety as formally stated in the local government act of 1851. The 
individual core task for the mayor as an independent body of local government 
now covers a wide variety of new safety problems. The mayor’s expected role 
as described in policy plans as well as his actual actions in local safety 
governance expanded in several ways to address new local safety problems 
representing dominant shifts in defining public safety between 1990 and 2010.  
 
Taken together, these literal answers to the central research question imply that 
a changing perspective on local safety in the Netherlands coincided with 
several shifts in the mayor’s position and role between 1990 and 2010. While 
the mayor’s formal task of maintaining local order and safety remained 
unchanged, the agenda for local safety governance expanded substantially 
between 1990 and 2010. Over the years, the definitions of local safety 
problems were mentioned more frequently and the variation in safety problems 
expanded tremendously. For Dutch mayors, this implied that their task of 
maintaining local order and safety was stretched out over more and more 
issues over time. To address these new safety issues, such as domestic 
violence, weapons and youngsters causing nuisance, the national government 
formalized multiple new powers for Dutch mayors into formal laws. In-depth 
case analysis has shown that these general trends in the field of local safety 
governance, as indicated by the macro study, had several far-reaching 
consequences for the mayors of Haarlem and Breda.  
First, the mayor’s position in local safety governance changed from a 
rather solitary actor to a participant in collaborative arrangements in multiple 
supra local policy arenas. Over time, mayors increasingly collaborated with 
public, societal and sometimes private partners from supra local policy arenas, 
such as other mayors in the region, representatives of the regional tax offices 
and national ministers. These collaborative engagements were a necessary 
attempt to effectively pool resources, such as money, manpower and tools, to 
address contemporary complex safety problems. While attempting to increase 
their grasp on local safety and order in this way, mayors became more 
dependent on other actors and their resources to address new safety problems 
occurring in their locality. Second, in-depth case analysis demonstrated that 
these multi-actor and multi-level aspects of contemporary ‘local’ safety 
networks fostered the importance of the mayor’s role as ‘external role’ as 
‘connecter’ over the years (Cachet et al., 2009). The Dutch case of local safety 
governance indeed confirmed the claim of Greasley and Stroker (2008) that 
local leadership in contemporary, fragmented local governance emphasizes the 
facilitative leadership style, which is strongly focused on bringing it all 
together in terms of actors, resources, goals (Steyvers et al., 2009). Third, the 
expansion of the mayor’s formal powers increased the mayor’s operational 
actions in local safety governance. Besides their traditional administrative and 
political activities, they were now frequently taking hands-on decisions and 
actions in specific cases of unsafety as well, such as issuing home restriction 
orders to offenders of domestic violence or closing houses where drugs were 
used and traded.  
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4 Theoretical implications  
Besides an answer to the central question the research project provided 
multiple theoretical insights. This section presents the theoretical implications 
of both the macro study and the case studies.  
4.1 Implications of the macro study 
The macro study explored the empirical manifestation of the concept of 
securitization in local safety governance in the Netherlands. The securitization 
literature is closely related to the body of knowledge called ‘security studies’ 
and ‘international relations’ and has a strong focus on supra local security 
dynamics (Grey, 2009). Consequently, the securitization literature points to the 
securitization of issues at the nation-state level and above, such as water as a 
source of conflict in Spain, Egypt and Sudan (Stetter, Herschinger, Teichler 
and Albert, 2013); the environment in South East Asia (Hameiri and Jones, 
2013), climate change on global level (Mason, 2013); natural gas resources in 
the Middle East (Christou and Adamides, 2013); national development policies 
in UK (Pugh, Gabay, Alison and Williams, 2013) and labeling migration as a 
security threat to national societies (Karyotis, 2013) as well as to European 
community (Huysmans, 2000; Weaver, 1996; loader, 2002). 
This research project demonstrated that the widening of the concept of 
security, as widely proclaimed by scholars of securitization (Buzan et al., 
1998), is not exclusively limited to such a supra local governance level. The 
macro study indicated that a substantive widening of the safety agenda 
manifested itself at the most local level of public administration in the 
Netherlands. In other words, local manifestations of securitization proved to be 
present. In the case of the Netherlands, the speech act of securitization was 
successfully conducted as more and a greater variety of issues ended up on the 
local policy agenda or local safety governance. Issues belonging to the 
categories of nuisance; drugs; youth; violence; small annoyances; and 
organized crime mirror this local trend of securitization in the Netherlands as 
these were most often successfully securitized as threats to the referent object 
of local safety and order between 1990 and 2010. 
After indicating the outcomes of a local variant of securitization, the 
follow-up question would be: where are security dynamics located and what 
do security dynamics look like if one drops focus on nation state? At least, that 
is the fundamental question behind securitization as framework for analysis 
(Buzan et al., 1998). The case studies, whose theoretical implications are 
discussed in depth below, showed that safety networks composed of public, 
private and societal actors from local, regional and national levels collaborated 
in policy networks. In terms of securitization, we found empirical 
manifestation of so-called ‘heterogeneous complexes’ integrating different 
types of actors interacting across sectors, instead of isolated, sector bound 
‘homogenous complexes’ dominated by nation states (c.f. Buzan et al., 1998). 
This research project demonstrated that is what the security complexes look 
like in the case of local safety governance in the Netherlands between 1990 
and 2010.  
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4.2 Implications of case studies 
The application of the conceptual model in the in-depth case analysis and 
cross-case comparison provided several implications for the agenda setting 
literature, the framing literature and the literature on state actors in governance 
networks. The implications for the conceptual model itself have been 
discussed in Chapter 12 (Paragraph 5) and here, they are related to the 
theoretical backgrounds on which the conceptual model was built. 
 
Agenda setting literature 
The research project appeals to the international body of knowledge regarding 
agenda setting. Multiple scholars argued that problem definitions are a crucial 
aspect of public policy since they structure public policy by making a specific 
selection of policy goals, instruments, and distribution of responsibilities most 
amenable (Weiss, 1989; Schneider and Ingram, 1993; Baumgartner and Jones, 
2009; Stone 1989, 2002). On a theoretical level, the way in which a problem 
definition was expected to shape local policy strategies and practices was 
conceptualized as a process during which (f)actors located in multiple arenas 
shape processes of problem framing and role structuration. This model 
conceptualized the power of local safety problems as an interplay between 
cognitive and institutional aspects of the local policy network and supra local 
policy arenas, shaping which perspective on the problem and solution 
dominated the local policy process (see the answer to sub question two for a 
summary of the conceptual model and Paragraph five of Chapter 12 for its 
refinements based on the findings of the case study).  
Applying this conceptual model to real life cases of local safety 
governance provided empirical insights into the manifestation of the power of 
problem definitions. More specifically, the application of the model on 
multiple case studies resulted in the identification of three mechanisms: ‘top 
down’, ‘mediated’ and ‘bottom up’ policy and role structuration. These three 
mechanisms explain how a specific mixture of local and supra local 
arrangements affected the policy practice of local safety governance. First, 
direct policy and role structuration is the purest form of supra local policy 
ideas that directly institutionalize local policy strategies. National and/or 
regional policy frames were directly adopted into local policy documents and 
shaped local policy strategies including the mayor’s expected role to a large 
extent. Second, mediated policy and role structuration refers to processes 
during which supra local policy ideas aligned with local discourse coalitions, 
thereby creating a shared policy frame. International, national and regional 
policy ideas were mediated by local policy debates before (partially) 
institutionalizing into local policy strategies. The local policy debate created a 
‘filter’ through which supra local policy ideas are processed into suitable 
policy strategies for local governance. Third, bottom up policy- and role 
structuration during which local innovations created by the mayor and his 
partners became guiding examples for others located at supra local policy 
arenas. Locally triggered frame shifts led to local pioneering with a spin-off at 
the supra local policy arenas. It is through these three mechanisms that one can 
understand how a specific problem definition made way for specific strategies, 
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tools, actors and practices over others during operational policy processes in 
local public safety governance in the Netherlands.  
Furthermore, the historical perspective of the case studies 
demonstrated that time is an important factor for the manifestation of these 
mechanisms. It took some time before local actors embraced new safety 
frames and made them their own, as well as implemented them in practice. 
Once this happened, the longer a new securitized issue was subjected to local 
safety governance, the higher the chances the initial frame was reframed. 
Moreover, the exact manifestation of the mechanisms for policy and role 
structuration depended on the ‘Zeitgeist’ as it was shaped by the constellation 
of current institutional arrangements in multiple interlinked policy arenas. 
Bottom-up mechanisms flourished during the early 1990s, when the policy 
domain of local safety governance was not yet well-regulated or 
professionalized. Thereafter, direct and mediated processes of policy and role 
structuration took place more frequently as multi-level governance structures 
emerged in the policy domain of local safety governance over the years. 
Furthermore, historically grown policy practices affected the speed and extent 
of local securitization processes as well, which points to the importance of 
path dependency in the functioning of these mechanisms. 
 
Framing literature 
The power of problem definitions was understood by looking at the image a 
problem definition put forward. This image was conceptualized as a frame. As 
argued in the framing literature, a frame gives direction to a problem definition 
in the sense that it puts forward a certain perspective of the problem and the 
most suitable solution (Bur, 1993). The research project, more specifically the 
conceptual model, was partially built upon framing literature. Applying the 
conceptual model on the aspects of the mayor’s role in handling newly 
securitized issues refined our expectations on the links between shared policy 
frames and the behavior of individual policy actors in collective policy 
settings, at least in the field of public safety governance on municipal level in 
the Netherlands. 
The case studies showed that personal frame alignment with the 
policy frame is a necessary condition for affecting an actor’s role in collective 
policy practices. Problem frames indeed structured actors’ roles, but the sub 
cases differed in the extent to which behavior in practice was actually affected. 
While the new policy frames always structured the mayor’ expected roles as 
described in the policy program, an extra step proved necessary for the mayor 
to enact this policy frame and thus actually alter his behavior. Only when his 
personal frame aligned with both the diagnostic and prognostic message of the 
commonly shared policy frame would the mayor’s actions in practice be 
affected by the new policy frames. The case studies proved that it is much 
easier to affect an actor’s formal and expected role in local policy plans than 
change the individual actions of policy actors in practice. For the specific case 
of Dutch mayors in local safety governance, this implied that these policy 
actors were not simply subjected to the courses of action that new policy 
frames put forward. They were independent and critical actors, deciding 
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whether or not to embrace the new and expanded policy frames in their daily 
actions.   
Whereas personal alignment is a vital condition for policy frames to 
affect an actor’s behavior, in practice, frame alignment between discourse 
coalitions proved to be a sufficient condition for policy and role structuration 
by new policy frames. In contrast to the expectation of the conceptual model 
that local actors needed to somehow align their frames to ‘customize’ new 
problem frames before subjecting them to local polices and practice (c.f. 
Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford, 1986; Hajer, 1993), case studies 
showed some frame processes lacking such a policy debate while altering the 
mayor’s expected role as described by an new policy frame. The case studies 
demonstrated that policy frames can shift without policy debates. This implies 
that supra local policy frames may directly institutionalize into local policy 
strategies and structure the expected roles of local policy actors. Whether or 
not these expected roles were enacted in practice still depended on the level of 
personal alignment.  
 
State actors in networked safety governance  
A key question frequently raised in both the literature on fragmented 
governance (Peters and Pierre,1998; Rhodes, 1996) and the pluralization of 
policing (Dupont, 2004; Crawford and Lister, 2005) is whether state actors in 
horizontal, networked forms of governance hold extraordinary positions or 
became one of many in multi-actor governance arrangements. This project 
provides useful insights into the specific case of Dutch mayors as the foremost 
representative of local government in integral safety networks.  
The case studies have shown that the increasingly fragmented 
character of public safety governance has affected Dutch mayors in multiple 
ways. Dutch mayors changed from individual actors closely collaborating with 
police and public prosecutor as their traditional partners to participants in 
multi-actor and multi-level alliances called ‘integrated safety networks’. This 
implied that the mayor’s dependency on actors from the public, private and 
societal sectors increased. Taking care of local safety problems forced the 
mayor to function as a ‘policy broker’ (Kingdon, 1984) between local and 
supra local actors, resources and tools. However, Dutch mayors in local safety 
networks were clearly not just one of many actors. Although their dependency 
on others actors increased, they distinguished themselves from their partners 
by coordinating local safety policies and governance
.. 
Although attempts to 
formalize this task in law failed, this task is generally recognized as one for 
local government in general and the mayor specifically by professionals and 
scholars in the field of public safety governance. Another aspect that separates 
mayors from their partners are their powers for addressing specific local safety 
problems. National governments granted Dutch mayors more policy 
instruments to handle specific safety problems, thereby separating the mayor 
from other actors in the policy network as a powerful player. The case studies 
indicated that the expansion of these powers enforced their formal position and 
enhanced their hands-on involvement in local policy practice.  
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5 Implications for practice 
The practice of local safety governance in the Netherlands is characterized by 
several stakeholders expressing their wishes and worries regarding the 
changing role of the Dutch mayor and the expansion of the mayor’s powers. 
The findings provide multiple implications for the practice of local governance 
of public safety problems as thematically discussed in this section. 
 
The implications of local processes of securitization  
The macro study indicated an increasing trend of securitizing a wide variety of 
issues as local safety problems. It was concluded that safety issues belonging 
to the categories of nuisance; drugs; youth; violence; small annoyances; and 
organized crime represented the encompassing perspective on public safety, as 
promoted by the integrated approach to public safety emerging between 1990 
and 2010.  
The case studies demonstrated that specific new safety problems 
selected from the macro study were indeed subjected to policy strategies and 
affected the behavior of policy actors in practice. In other words, this research 
project demonstrated that framing local issues in terms of safety problems had 
consequences for both government and citizen. Successfully labeling issues as 
safety problems gave them a specific prominence and a sense of urgency – 
‘safety first!’  and activated actors and justified policy instruments from the 
policy domain of local order and safety. In terms of government responses, this 
implies the activation and legitimization of the actors, which in the case of 
local governance, were the mayor, police and public prosecutor as the local 
providers of safety and order. For citizens of municipalities, this implied that 
these providers of public safety were allowed to take sometimes far-reaching 
measures to address anything that was considered a threat to local order and 
safety. The securitization of local issues thus called for extraordinary measures 
with far-reaching consequences including surveillance cameras, preventative 
body searches, area restrictions and home restrictions, being part of the new 
powers of Dutch mayors. Many policy measures allowed local providers of 
public safety to intervene into the public living space of citizens and even their 
private homes. It was because of these far reaching implications of the speech 
act of securitization that the Copenhagen School considered securitization to 
be a failure of dealing with public issues by normal political means. They were 
worried about presenting security as a ‘good and desired thing to which all 
reaction should move’ and were in favor of ‘desecuritizing’ public issues 
whenever possible (Buzan et al., 2008). 
 
New powers created by central government matter in local policy practices 
Existing knowledge on Dutch mayors focuses strongly on the institutional 
characteristics of the mayor’s position in local (safety) governance, and 
scholars have only roughly sketched the empirical implications for mayors and 
other actors involved (Muller, Rogier, Kummeling, Dammen, Bron, Woltjer 
and. Kalkhoven, 2007; Sackers 2010a; Mein, 2010). This research project 
showed how shifts in the institutional, formal characteristics of local 
leadership in the form of Dutch mayors altered their role in policy and 
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practice. This effect was most clearly visible in the expansion of the mayors’ 
powers to maintain local order and safety that can be characterized as the 
largest shift in their formal position in the past decades. The case studies 
showed that these powers were adopted into local policies, thereby expanding 
the mayor’s expected role in local safety governance. Moreover, the case 
studies indicated as well that these powers were regularly implemented in 
practice, thereby affecting the mayor’s daily actions as well. The fact that local 
authorities adopted these new powers introduced by central government 
implies that national policy instruments, whether initiated by mayors or 
national ministers, mattered in local safety networks. The local implementation 
of supra local policy tools contrasts with the fears that central government 
would provide instruments which made no sense, would not work, and were 
not desired in the local arena (c.f. Prins et al., 2013) and that mayors would 
become ‘puppets’ of national government. Rather, this points to a reciprocal 
relationship between national and local governments in which the former aims 
to facilitate and the latter critically decides whether or not to go along. 
National governments facilitated local authorities by creating formal powers 
for each and every Dutch Mayor.  
However, these national policy tools only made their way down to 
local policy practices once local actors – including the mayor – recognized the 
problem they attempt to address as a pressing issue in local society and the 
new power as the most desirable solution. Moreover, this process evolved in a 
rather ad hoc fashion. Once local authorities were confronted with a specific 
problem, they took the power from the shelves (c.f. garbage can, Cohen, 
March, Olson, 1972). A power which indeed was lying on the local shelf as 
local authorities formally adopted new powers into their local policy approach, 
although they were not immediately implemented in practice as there was no 
personal alignment or local recognition of the problem.  
 
Dutch mayors as local sheriffs? 
As the mayor’s task of ensuring local order and safety became more prominent 
during the past twenty years, mayors, administrators and scholars expressed 
their wishes and worries regarding the matter. Mayors, policy makers and 
scholars feared that the expansion of the mayor’s formal powers would make 
contemporary Dutch mayors ‘local sheriffs’ that were tough on crime and any 
other threat to local order and safety. Their prominent position in the policy 
domain of local order and safety would overshadow their successful 
fulfillment of their ‘softer roles’ of shepherds and symbols of the local 
community. This research project demonstrated that safety indeed manifested 
itself as a major topic in the daily operations of mayors of large municipalities 
and that they took far-reaching decisions to intervene in people’s lives, such as 
issuing home restrictions in case of domestic violence and closing houses in 
case of drugs-related nuisances. However, they did not become solo actors 
‘firing with big guns at everything they do not like'. Today, their expanded 
powers and activities in the policy domain of local safety are, in practice, 
counterbalanced by new dependencies and supra local influences in local 
safety networks (c.f. paradox Korsten, 2009a/b). In fact, the mutual resource 
dependency and multi-level aspect of contemporary public safety governance 
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calls for a local leadership style as connector, broker and facilitator, instead of 
more authoritative, directive leadership (Greasly and Stroker, 2008; Steyvers 
et al., 2008) .  
6 Reflections  
Now the central question has been answered, conclusions have been drawn and 
their theoretical and practical implications discussed, this paragraph offers 
some thoughts on the topic of local safety governance and the research design 
that do not easily fit the overall conclusions. 
6.1 Research object of local safety governance 
The policy domain of local safety governance is constantly changing, 
professionalizing and expanding. Politicians, administrator and citizens 
prioritize new safety problems every day. These days, cybercrime and 
pedophiles retuning to local society after finishing their prison sentence are 
deemed important safety problems in local society. Furthermore, new policy 
tools, partnerships and organizational structures continue to be introduced. 
Consider the recent substitution of the regional police force by a national 
police organization in the Netherlands , for example. This dynamic character 
of the research object of public safety governance implies that the case study 
findings provide ‘snapshots’ of local governance processes regarding new 
safety problems. Nevertheless, their historical perspective and selection criteria 
of the case study design made sure these were representative snapshots of 
governance processes regarding new and dominant definitions of local safety 
problems (sub cases) in medium to large municipalities (cases) at crucial 
moments in time between 1990 and 2010.  
Furthermore, this research project implicitly pointed out several 
practical and moral dilemmas in local safety governance. From a practical 
perspective, the empirical trend of the local processes of securitization as 
indicated by the macro study may eventually reach the boundaries of the 
governing capacity of the local providers of public safety. Including more and 
more issues in the policy domain of local order and safety may lead to 
overloading the mayor, police, public prosecutor and their partners, who 
together only posses a scarce amount of time, money and policy tools. From a 
psychosocial perspective, this may also downplay the sense of urgency that 
comes along with labeling something as a threat to local order and safety. 
After all, if almost everything is a threat to local safety and order requiring 
extraordinary and immediate intervention by providers of local policing, the 
exclusiveness of this policy domain breaks down and the ‘red button effect’ of 
escalating public issues into matters of public safety fades away. From a 
normative perspective, framing a local issue as a safety problem  
securitization – is a powerful act which raises high expectations. After all, it 
appeals to the most fundamental task of government that is to provide 
‘securitas’ or public safety. Securitization is thus about promising safety, 
which might also be qualified as an everlasting or even false promise. Since 
100% safety does not exist, labeling an issue in terms of safety may be a 
tactical act of ultimate (self) legitimization. More neutrally expressed, this 
  
 
 
309 
 
points to the strategic component of labeling a public problem in terms of 
safety, calling for safety actors to implement their safety powers and tools. 
Finally, this research project encountered a potential democratic 
deficit in ‘local’ safety governance by focusing on the multi level aspects of 
safety networks. This multi level context in which contemporary mayors 
operate fosters questions about democratic accountability. The case studies 
demonstrated how mayors became increasingly engaged in supra local policy 
initiatives to effectively address local safety problems. At the same time, they 
are held responsible by their local city council. Such traditional checks and 
balances of power and accountability may become less effective due to an 
upward shift in the mayor’s activities by participating in supra local policy 
arenas to increase local governance capacity (c.f. Kersbergen and Van 
Waarden, 2004). This could result in a blurring of the distinction between 
governance arenas, raising the question of how the mayor’s individual 
accountability in multi-actor and multi-level collaboration networks should be 
managed (c.f. Friedrichson, 2005; Cachet and Prins, 2009). Are local councils 
able to effectively monitor and judge the mayor’s supra local actions? Is the 
local arena still the most suitable place for the mayor to justify his actions? 
These questions become even more prominent in the light of the far-reaching 
powers applied to securitized issues by Dutch mayors in contemporary safety 
governance. The increasing multi level and multi-actor aspects of local safety 
governance in the integrated networks in which Dutch mayors operate should 
be subjected to further empirical research and scrutinized for such potential 
democratic deficits.  
6.2  Research design  
This research project was built on a twofold research design combining 
historical desk research with multiple, embedded case studies. Designing this 
as well as any other research project implicates making choices which enable 
and limit at the same time. The macro study proved to be a necessary and 
useful first step to indicate shifts in defining local safety problems, of which 
some could be selected for in-depth case studies. These case studies proved to 
be a suitable research strategy to analyze how and why new definitions of local 
safety problems affected the mayor’s position and role in local governance 
networks. They allowed an in-depth analysis of the composition of discourse 
coalitions, the institutionalization of policy frames, and the level of frame 
enactment by the mayors. Moreover, the case studies showed the local and 
supra local contextual arrangements in which these processes of problem and 
role structuration were embedded. Nevertheless, the multiple, embedded case 
study design had some limitations as well.  
A multiple case study design of two cases and six sub cases allowed 
us to compare results to build compelling conclusions. However, the initial 
research design consisted of a 3 x 3 case study design; three cases each 
consisting of three sub cases. As the research project was carried out between 
2010 and 2013, the third case was dropped. This decision was made in favor of 
providing more room for in-depth analysis of the first two cases, but at the cost 
of more generic research findings, was motivated by three reasons. Firstly, a 
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case study is a time-consuming activity especially when it requires historical 
analysis over twenty years. Moreover, case studies were preceded by a large 
time spent on desk research, which took up time and space in this research 
project as well. Secondly, the number of cases was decreased to invest in the 
quality of the analysis of the six sub cases. Studying the processes of framing 
and social construction required in-depth analysis and thick description. Only 
by limiting the research scope from nine to six sub cases would the research 
objective of understanding the course and outcome of local framing processes 
be met. Thirdly, the alternative option of more case studies would only allow a 
more generic approach to the case studies which most likely would not result 
in the desired level of thoroughness of the case studies as referred to in the 
previous argument.    
Furthermore, the historical aspect of the case studies brought along 
some limitations in terms of both validity and practicalities. The further the 
case analysis went back in time, the more limited the possibilities there were 
for gathering data by means of interviewing. This was because the mayors and 
other actors involved were no longer working in their roles, untraceable, or 
uninterested in the topic of interest. This implies a lack of accessibility of 
informants and documents, which were the main data sources for the more 
historical sub cases. For more recent sub cases, however, the triangulation of 
data sources was possible by combining interviews and documents as 
complementary data. Nevertheless, the historical aspect of long-term case 
study analysis affected the validity of the case study findings. The further back 
in history the manifestation of the public safety problems to be studied lay, the 
more challenging it was to gather enough data to provide reliable insights. 
Vice versa, the more recent the governance network studied, the more valid the 
case study results are.  
Finally, the possibility of analytical generalization of research findings 
of a small number of exploratory case studies remains rather limited. The 
refinements of the conceptual model and related implications for theory must 
at this point be qualified as suggestions to be subjected to large-scale empirical 
testing.  
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Appendix A: List of documents macro study 
 
Explanatory memoranda of the annual budget of the Ministry of Justice 1990-
2010 
 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1989-1990, 21 300 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 
[time period: 1990] 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1990-1991, 21 800 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 
[time period: 1991] 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1991-1992, 22 300 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 
[time period: 1992] 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1992-1993, 22 800 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 
[time period: 1993] 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1993-1994, 23 400 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 
[time period: 1994] 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1994-1995, 23 900 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 
[time period: 1995] 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1995-1996, 24 400 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 
[time period: 1996] 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1996-1997, 25 000 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 
[time period: 1997] 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1997-1998, 25 600 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 
[time period: 1998] 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1998–1999, 26 200 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 
[time period: 1999] 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1999-2000, 26 800 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 
[time period: 2000] 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2000-2001, 27 400 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 
[time period: 2001] 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2001-2002, 28 000 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 
[time period: 2002] 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2002-2003, 28 600 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 
[time period: 2003] 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2003-2004, 29 200 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 
[time period: 2004] 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2004-2005, 29 800 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 
[time period: 2005] 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2005-2006, 30 300 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 
[time period: 2006] 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2006-2007, 30 800 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 
[time period: 2007] 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2007-2008, 31 200 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 
[time period: 2008] 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2008-2009, 31 700 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 
[time period: 2009] 
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 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2009-2010, 32 123 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 
[time period: 2010] 
 
Explanatory memoranda of the annual budget of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs 1990-2010 
 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1989-1990, 21 300 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2 
[time period: 1990] 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1990-1991, 21 800 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2 
[time period: 1991] 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1991-1992, 22 300 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2 
[time period: 1992] 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1992-1993, 22 800 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2 
[time period: 1993] 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1993-1994, 23400 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2 
[time period: 1994] 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1994-1995, 23 900 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2 
[time period: 1995] 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1995-1996, 24 400 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2 
[time period: 1996] 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1996-1997, 25 000 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2 
[time period: 1997] 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1997-1998, 25 600 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2 
[time period: 1998] 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1998-1999, 26 200 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2 
[time period: 1999] 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1999-2000, 26 800 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2 
[time period: 2000] 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2000-2001, 27 400 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2 
[time period: 2001] 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2001-2002, 28 000 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2 
[time period: 2002] 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2002-2003, 28 600 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2 
[time period: 2003] 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2003-2004, 29 200 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2 
[time period: 2004] 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2004-2005, 29 800 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2 
[time period: 2005] 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2005-2006, 30 300 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2 
[time period: 2006] 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2006-2007, 30 800 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2 
[time period: 2007] 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2007-2008, 31 200 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2 
[time period: 2008] 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2008-2009, 31 700 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2 
[time period: 2009] 
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 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2009-2010, 32 123 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2 
[time period: 2010] 
 
National policy documents regarding public safety between 1990-2010 
 
 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1992-1993, 23096, Integrale 
veiligheidsrapportage 1993. [time period:1993] 
 Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken (1995) Nota Veiligheidsbeleid 
1995-1998, Veiligheid door Samenwerking. [time period: 1995-1998] 
 Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties (1999) 
Integraal Veiligheidsprogramma. [time period:1999-2002] 
 Ministerie van Justitie, Ministerie van Justitie en Ministerie van 
Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties (2002) Naar een Veiliger 
Samenleving. [time period: 2002-2007] 
 Ministerie van Justitie, Directoraat-Generaal Rechtspleging en 
Rechtshandhaving, (2007) Veiligheid begint bij voorkomen. Brief aan 
voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal.  
5513871/07/VbbV/6 november [time period: 2007-2010] 
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Appendix B: Macro study protocol 
This document provides the approach for data collection and analysis of the 
macro study. This way, all relevant data is gathered according to the same 
criteria and each document is analysis in a likewise manner.  The next sections 
summarize the main characteristics of the macro study, the protocols for data 
collection and -analysis and an detailed coding scheme for content analysis is 
provided. 
 
Main characteristics of the macro study 
 
Macro study 
objective 
To indicate shifts in definitions of local safety problems in the 
Netherlands between 1990 and 2010 by means of historical desk 
research 
Macro study question Which problems have been listed for local safety governance in 
the Netherlands and what shifts have taken place between 1990-
2010? (sub question three). 
Research strategy Historical desk research 
Unit of analysis Agenda for local public safety governance in the Netherlands 
between 1990-2010. 
Units of observation Definitions of safety problems to be addressed by local, 
municipal authorities 
 
Data collection procedures 
Type of data: existing material in the form of policy documents 
Criteria for data selection:  
 Policy documents providing information on safety problems to  be 
addressed by local authorities at the local, municipal level 
 Policy documents setting the agenda for local governance in each 
municipality in the Netherlands.  
 Policy documents covering the entire research period of 1990-2010  
 
Data sources: 
 Explanatory memoranda of the budgets the budgets of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Justice’s 1990-2010 (appear 
annually) 
 Explanatory memoranda of the budgets the budgets of the Ministry of 
Justice’s 1990-2010 (appear annually) 
 National safety policies  provided of  requested by the ruling coalition 
between 1990 and 2010 (appear every four years, or more often in 
case a coalition doesn’t make it’s term) 
 
Data analysis procedures 
Overall method of analysis: content analysis by means of techniques of 
coding, clustering and counting. 
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Phase 1: coding individual documents  
Reading the content of each document in order to sort out relevant data for the 
search project according to the following steps:  
 Select chapters covering public safety  
 Select  relevant sections referring to safety governance at local level 
and assig general code LSP (Local Safey Prolicy) 
 Double check by means of digital search using key words: veilig, 
veiligheid, orde, openbare orde, lokaal lokale, burgemeester, 
gemeente, lokaal bestuur, .. 
 
Phase 2: clustering and counting  
Analyzing each relevant section in order to indicate definitions of local safety 
problems by means of clustering by means of the following steps: 
 Select issues mentioned as a safety problem to be addressed by local 
authorities 
 Assign this problem definition a categorical code named after the 
overall theme of the section 
 
Indicate shifts in defining local safety problems by means of counting 
according to the following steps: 
 Count the total number of references to all categories per year  
 Count number of references to each individual category per year 
 Calculate the average number of reference that each category would 
have received in a single year when all categories would have 
received the same amount of attention.  
 A category qualifies as a dominant in a single year if it received more 
than the average amount of references in that year 
 A category qualifies as overall dominant if it was dominant in over 50 
% of the years since the first time a category was mentioned  
 
Phase 3: second round of analysis & reliability check 
The macro study findings are to be checked, refined and validated by means of 
two additional steps: 
 Repeating phase one and two by first coder 
 Check for randomly selected documents by second coder 
 
Coding scheme 
 
Code Explanation 
LSG  - General code standing for ‘Local Safety Governance’ 
- Attach to text parts describe aspects of local safety governance 
PD - Categorical code standing for ‘Problem Definition’ 
- Attach to description of issues prioritized for local safety governance 
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Appendix C: Case selection 
 
Municipality Year Number of  
inhabitants  
(CBS) 
Potential case 
based on 
number of 
inhabitants? 
Turnover 
mayors 
Accessible 
for 
research? 
Almere 1990 71,086 No     
Almere 2010 188,160       
Amersfoort 1990 99,403 No     
Amersfoort 2010 144,862       
Amsterdam 1990 695,162 No     
Amsterdam 2010 767,457       
Apeldoorn 1990 147,586 Yes Medium   
Apeldoorn 2010 155,726       
Arnhem 1990 130,220 Yes Low No 
Arnhem 2010 147,018       
Breda 1990 123,025 Yes Low Yes 
Breda 2010 173,299       
Dordrecht 1990 109,285 Yes Low No 
Dordrecht 2010 118,480       
Ede 1990 93,377 No     
Ede 2010 107,756       
Eindhoven 1990 191,467 Yes Medium   
Eindhoven 2010 213,809       
Emmen 1990 92,807 No     
Emmen 2010 109,491       
Enschede 1990 146,010 Yes Low No 
Enschede 2010 157,052       
's-Gravenhage  1990 441,506 No     
's-Gravenhage  2010 488,553       
Groningen  1990 167,872 Yes Medium  
Groningen  2010 187,298       
Haarlem 1990 149,269 Yes Low High 
Haarlem 2010 149,579       
Haarlemmermeer 1990 95,782 No     
Haarlemmermeer 2010 142,788       
's-Hertogenbosch 1990 91,113 No     
's-Hertogenbosch 2010 139,607       
Leiden 1990 110,423 Yes Medium  
Leiden 2010 117,123       
Maastricht 1990 117,008 Yes Medium  
Maastricht 2010 118,533       
Nijmegen 1990 144,748 Yes Low No 
Nijmegen 2010 162,963       
Rotterdam 1990 579,179 No     
Rotterdam 2010 593,049       
Tilburg 1990 156,421 Yes High  
Tilburg 2010 204,853       
  
 
 
334 
 
Utrecht  1990 230,358 No     
Utrecht  2010 307,081       
Venlo 1990 63,918 No     
Venlo 2010 100,301       
Zaanstad 1990 130,007 Yes High   
Zaanstad 2010 145,332       
Zoetermeer 1990 96,292 No     
Zoetermeer 2010 121,532       
Zwolle 1990 94,131 No     
Zwolle 2010 119,030       
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Appendix D: List of respondents and documents case studies 
 
CASE HAARLEM 
 
Respondents  
 Civil servant 1  Department of Safety and Order  Interview 4 April 
2012  
 Civil servant 2  Department of Safety and Order  Interview 4 April 
2012  
 Civil servant 3  Department of Safety and Order - Interview 27 June 
2012  
 Civil servant 4  Head of Department of Safety and Order  Interview 
25 July 2012  
 Civil servant 5  Department of Safety and Order   Interview 23 July 
2012  
 Civil servant 6  Policy advisor on welfare and health issues – 
Interviews on 4 April and 21 Augustus 2012  
 Civil servant 7  Manager safety and youth between  Interview 2 
October 2012  
 Civil servant 8  Manager RIEC  Interview 27 June 2012  
 Employee housing corporation  Interview 18 July 2012  
 Employee public health service  Interview July 2012  
 Employee Tax Collector’s Office  responsible for external 
cooperation – Interview 1 August 2012  
 Mayor B, former mayor of Haarlem, 17 August 2012  
 Mayor C, mayor of Haarlem, 20 August 2012  
 Police chief 1  Interview 2 September 2012  
 Police chief 2 – Interview24 September 2012  
 Police Officer 1 –Interview 8 August 2012  
 Police Officer 2 , 17 July 2012  
 Public Prosecutor 1  Interview 11 October 2012  
 Public Prosecutor 2  Interview 17 August 2012  
 
Sub case 1: Documents on Drug-related Nuisance 
 College van Burgemeester en Wethouders (1993) Beleid ten aanzien 
van coffeeshop. Correspondentie aan de Raad der gemeente Haarlem 
 College van Burgemeester en Wethouders (2009) Besluitenlijst 14 
april 2009 
 Commissie Algemene en Bestuurszaken  (2009) Verslag vergadering  
7 mei 2009 
 Commissie Algemene en Bestuurszaken (1993) Verslag vergadering  
6 mei 1993 
 Commissie Algemene en Bestuurszaken (1999) Verslag vergadering  
9 december 1999 
 Commissie Bestuur (2011) Verslag vergadering  14 juli 2011 
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 Commissie Onderwijs, Welzijn, Sport en Recreatie (1999) Verslag 
vergadering  14 juli 1999 
 Commissie van den Donk (2009) Geen deuren maar daden. Nieuwe 
accenten in het Nederlands drugsbeleid 
 Gemeente Haarlem (1993)  Nota Beleid Coffeeshops 
 Gemeente Haarlem (1997) Aanpak drugspanden 
 Gemeente Haarlem (1999) Beleid Coffeeshops 
 Gemeente Haarlem (2000) Criminaliteit Kort en Klein, 
Informatiebrochure 
 Gemeente Haarlem (2009) Handhavingsbeleid Coffeeshops 
 Gemeente Haarlem (2009) Handhavingsbeleid Coffeeshops 
 Gemeenteraad (1993) Verslag vergadering 14 juli 1993 
 Gemeenteraad (2008) Verslag vergadering  3 april 2008 
 Gemeenteraad (2009) Verslag vergadering  3 september 2009 
 Gemeenteraad (2011) Verslag vergadering  juni 2011 
 Kabinet Rutte I (2010) Vrijheid en verantwoordelijkheid, 
Regeerakkoord VVD en CDA 
 Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal (2011) Brief van de Minister van 
Volksgezondheid Welzijn en Sport en Minister van Veiligheid en 
Justitie.  Aan de Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal 
Inzage Drugsbeleid. 3060765 
 
Sub case 2: Documents on Domestic Violence 
 Gemeente Haarlem (1997) Geweld in het Gezin 
 Trimbos (2005) Het Haarlemse Project Geweld in het Gezin. 
Ervaringen van ketenpartners, medewerkers en cliënten. Trimbos 
Instituut door C. de Ruiter en V. Veen 
 Gemeente Haarlem (2010) Een Vuist tegen Huiselijk Geweld in 
Kennemerland. Convenant zorgketen huiselijk geweld: Aanpak 
Huiselijk Geweld in de Veiligheidsregio Kennemerland. 15 juni 2010 
 Gemeente Haarlem (2009) Implementatienota beleid huiselijk geweld 
in de Veiligheidsregio Kennemerland 2009 t/m 2012. Een vuist tegen 
huiselijk geweld. Haarlem, 28 mei 2009 
 College van Burgemeester en Wethouders (1997) Nota voor 
burgemeester en wethouders. Geweld in het gezin: niets aan de hand? 
27-06-1997 
 Gemeente Haarlem (2003) Geweld in het gezin Haarlem. Integraal 
beleid rondom privégeweld. Verslag over de periode 1998-2003 
 Werkgroep geweld in het gezin (1996a) Korte samenvatting 
bijeenkomst 24 juni 1996 
 Werkgroep geweld in het gezin (1996b) Verslag vergadering  
28 oktober 1998 
 Werkgroep geweld in het gezin (1996c) Verslag vergadering  
22 november 1996 
 Werkgroep geweld in het gezin (1996d) Verslag vergadering  
20 december 1996 
  
 
 
337 
 
 Intomart (1997) Brief aan de begeleidingscommissie onderzoek 
‘Huiselijk geweld’ 28 februari 1997 
 Gemeente Haarlem (1997b) Brief aan Ministerie van Justitie  
Subsidieverzoek Geweld in het Gezin. 23 december 1997 
 Ministerie van Volksgezondheid Welzijn en Sport en Ministerie van 
Binnenlandse zaken (2007) Beschermd en weerbaar.  Intensivering 
van de opvang en hulp bij geweld in afhankelijkheidsrelaties 
 Openbaar Ministerie (2010) Aanwijzing huiselijk geweld en 
eergerelateerd geweld. 29 maart 2010 
 Commissie Samenleving (2010) Verslag vergadering  26 augustus 
2010 
 Commissie Welzijn (1997) Verslag vergadering  26 juni 1997 
 Commissie Welzijn (1996) Verslag vergadering  26 juni 1997 
 Gemeenteraad (2003)  Verslag vergadering  19 november 2003 
 Gemeenteraad (2007) Verslag vergadering  18 juni 2007 
 Gemeenteraad (2008) Verslag vergadering  27 november 2008 
 Gemeenteraad (2009) Verslag vergadering  9 november 2009 
 
Sub case 3: Documents on Organized Crime 
 Commissie Algemene en Bestuurszaken (2005) Verslag vergadering  
9 maart 2005 
 Commissie Bestuur (2007) Verslag vergadering  1 november 2007 
 Gemeenteraad (2005) Verslag vergadering  23 maart 2005 
 Gemeenteraad (2006) Verslag vergadering  9 november 2006 
 Gemeenteraad (2007) Verslag vergadering  5 november 2007 
 Gemeenteraad (2008) Verslag vergadering  22 mei 2008 
 Gemeenteraad (2009)Verslag vergadering  15 juni 2009 
 College van Burgemeester en Wethouders (2005 a) B&W Nota 
Implementatie Wet BIBOB  
 College Burgemeester en Wethouders (2005 b) Raadsstuk. 
Implementatie Wet Bibob 22 februari 2005 
 Gemeente Haarlem (2006) Toepassing BIBOB-instrument Openbare 
Orde. Afdeling Handhaving en Toezicht. 1 november 2006. 
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Appendix E: Case study protocol 
This case study protocol was created to ensure all cases and sub cases are 
studied in a similar and structured manner. The case study protocol is based on 
the conceptual model which is operationalized and translated into a coding 
scheme for analyzing interview transcripts and documents. This way, 
theoretical framework provides “a standard agenda for the investigators line of 
inquiry” (Yin, 2009:80) which later on enables analytical generalization of 
case study results.  
 
Main characteristics of the case studies 
 
Case study objective To analyze and understand how and why new definitions of local 
safety problems affect the mayor’s role and position for the 
mayor in local governance networks. 
Case study 
questions 
-How have new local safety problems been framed in local policy 
processes and how, to what extent and why did they affect the 
mayor’s position and role in the practice of local safety 
governance?  
(sub question four) 
-Which factors of the local, regional and national policy arena 
affected the course, content and outcome of local framing 
processes as well as the mayor’s position and role in the practice 
of local safety governance? (sub question five) 
Research strategy Multiple, embedded case studies – two cases each composed of 
three sub cases 
Data sources Various types of documents and interview transcripts 
Unit of analysis Local governance networks addressing public safety problems 
Units of observation 
 
Definitions of public safety problems and the mayor’s position 
and role in governance networks 
 
Data collection procedure for documents 
Documents to be collected have to either address public safety in general or 
the sub case of drug-related nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime 
qualified as a local safety issue.  
 
Criteria for document selection 
Relevant documents provide information about: 
 the course of the local policy debate regarding the sub cases of drug-
related nuisance, domestic violence and/or organized crime between 
1900 and 2010 
 local policy ambitions  regarding the sub cases of drug-related 
nuisance, domestic violence and/or organized crime between 1900 and 
2010 
 the practice of local safety governance between 1990 and 2010 
 the mayor’s actions in local safety governance between 1990 and 2010 
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Data set 
This leads to the following set of documents together providing information 
about the key aspects of the conceptual model. 
 
Topic of interest according Type of document 
Local policy debate: discourse 
coalitions, frames, frame alignment 
- Transcripts of council and committee 
meetings regarding sub cases 
Local policy strategy: policy frame and 
expected role mayor 
- Local policy programs  
- Specific policy programs regarding the 
sub cases  
Policy in practice: actors involved and 
actions of mayor 
- Evaluations of policy programs 
- Internal correspondence  
- Policy documents and evaluation from 
collaborating partners, such as the police 
and public prosecutor 
Supra local policy ambitions and 
practices: supra local institutional 
arrangements  
- Regional, national and international policy 
programs and evaluations 
 
Data collection procedure for interviews 
 
Criteria for selecting respondents: 
A representative from each partner  in the governance network addressing a 
sub case at a particular point in time.  
 Personal involvement with governing related nuisance, domestic 
violence and/or organized crime between 1900 and 2010 
 Personal collaboration with the mayor or well informed about the 
mayor’s actions while governing drug-related nuisance, domestic 
violence and/or organized crime between 1900 and 2010 
 The following actors are to be selected as respondents: 
o Inside municipality: mayors, civil servants advising the mayor 
on public safety matters, council members, as well as civil 
servants from the public safety department of the municipal 
apparatus designing and/or implementing public safety 
policy.  
o Outside municipality:  actors working closely with the mayor 
in addressing the dominant definition of public safety 
problems, such as the local police chef, the public prosecutor 
and actors representing various social organizations. 
 
Topic list interviews 
Introduction 
 General explanation research project & interview 
 Permission to tape interview 
Respondent’s involvement and role regarding sub case 
 Function 
 Time and place of involvement 
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Respondent’s perspective on sub case  (problem definition) 
 Causes and characteristics of safety problem 
 Suitable and favourable solutions 
Respondent’s experience / knowledge of governance practices 
 Policy debate and coalitions 
 Policy strategy and partners 
 Examples, stories about policy in practice 
Description of mayor’s role in practice  
 Mayor’s involvement with policy and problem 
 Examples of mayor’s actions in practice 
 Respondents perspective on how an which mayor takes this role 
Wrap up  
 
Data analysis procedures – documents  
 
Overall method of analysis: content analysis of documents and interview 
transcripts followed by within and cross case comparison.  
 
Step 1: sub case analysis 
Data of each sub case was analyzed by means of the following coding scheme. 
 
Code Concept Description 
PD Problem 
Definition 
Description of issues considered as a threat to / risk for 
local order and safety  
DC Discourse 
coalition 
Group of actors with compatible frames (both in terms 
of content and strategic collaboration) 
IFDM Individual 
Frame – 
Diagnostic 
Message 
Perspective on cause and characteristics of local safety 
problem held by  individual actor 
IFéPM Individual 
Frame – 
Prognostic 
message  
Perspective on preferable solution to local safety 
problem held by  individual actor 
PFDM Policy frame 
– Diagnostic 
Message 
Perspective on cause and characteristics of local safety 
problem held as stated in public policies 
PFPM Policy frame 
– Prognostic 
message 
Perspective solution for local safety problem held as 
stated in public policies 
LPS Policy 
strategy 
 
Formal, local policy strategy describing policy object, 
solutions and solutors regarding safety in general or 
specifically design for addressing a drug-related 
nuisance, domestic violence or organized crime.  
ERM Expected role 
 mayor 
The mayor’s expected behavior in  policy arena and 
regarding safety problem  characterized by task and 
powers attributed to him in local policy strategy 
RIPM Role in 
practice  
mayor 
The mayor actions and non actions regarding local 
safety problem in policy practice 
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LPA 
 
 
 
LPA R 
LPAC 
LPAN 
Local policy 
arena 
Institutional arrangements of local governance network 
regarding drug-related nuisance,  documents violence 
and organized crime  
 
Regulative aspects 
Cognitive aspects 
Normative aspects 
RPA 
 
 
 
RPAR 
NPAC 
NPAN 
Regional 
policy arena  
Institutional arrangements of regional governance 
network regarding drug-related nuisance,  documents 
violence and organized crime 
  
Regulative aspects 
Cognitive aspects 
Normative aspects 
NPA 
 
 
 
NPA R 
NPAC 
NPAN 
National 
policy arena 
Institutional arrangements of national governance 
network regarding drug-related nuisance,  documents 
violence and organized crime  
 
Regulative aspects 
Cognitive aspects 
Normative aspects 
 
Step 2: within case analysis 
Sub case findings were compared on key concepts of conceptual model  within 
each case 
 
 
 
Local Framing Process The mayor’s role 
on paper and in 
practice 
Institutional 
arrangements 
Trig
ger 
Disco
urse 
coaliti
ons  
Fram
e 
align
ment 
Discourse 
institutiona
-lization 
into local 
policy 
frame 
Expected 
role  
mayor 
Mayor’s role 
in practice - 
Level of 
alignment 
Local 
arena 
 
Regiona
l arena 
 
Nation
al 
arena 
 
Sub case 
1 
         
Sub case 
2 
         
Sub case 
3 
         
Similariti
es & 
differenc
es 
         
 
  
 
 
347 
 
Step 3 cross case analysis 
Case study results were compared in order to generate overall research 
findings.  
 
 Municipality Haarlem Municipality Breda 
How new 
safety 
problems 
were 
framed in 
local 
policy 
processes 
(sub 
question 4-
first part) 
 
How new 
definitions 
affect the 
mayor’s 
position 
and role 
on paper 
and in 
practice 
(sub 
question 4-
second 
part) 
How 
institutional 
arrangemen
ts affected 
local policy 
processes 
and 
mayor’s 
position and 
role (sub 
question5) 
 
How new 
safety 
problems 
were 
framed in 
local 
policy 
processes 
(sub 
question 4-
first part) 
 
How new 
definitions 
affect the 
mayor’s 
position 
and role on 
paper and 
in practice 
(sub 
question 4-
second 
part) 
How 
institutional 
arrangements 
affected local 
policy 
processes and 
mayor’s 
position and 
role (sub 
question5) 
 
Sub case 
drug-related 
nuisance 
      
Sub case 
domestic 
violence 
      
Sub case 
organized 
crime 
      
Similarities 
and 
differences 
      
 
All schemes for generating and comparing case study results are based on key 
concept of conceptual model. This way, the conceptual model is confronted 
with empirical data which enables answering sub question four and five as 
well as refinement of the model.  
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Samenvatting (Summary - in Dutch) 
  
Inleiding 
Sinds de eerste gemeentewet uit 1851 zijn Nederlandse burgemeesters 
verantwoordelijk voor de lokale orde. Bewaken van de openbare orde is een 
kerntaak van de burgemeester als zelfstandig orgaan binnen het lokale bestuur. 
Dat geldt eveneens voor het vertegenwoordigen van de lokale gemeenschap en 
het borgen van  de kwaliteit van het lokale bestuur. Daarnaast deelt de 
burgemeester verschillende taken en bevoegdheden met de gemeenteraad en 
het college van burgemeester en wethouders, die eveneens zelfstandige 
bestuursorganen op het lokale bestuursniveau zijn.  
In Nederland is de aandacht voor openbare orde en veiligheid de 
afgelopen 25 jaar enorm toegenomen. Op gemeentelijk bestuursniveau 
ontstond een volwaardig en omvangrijk beleidsterrein rond openbare orde en 
veiligheid. Volwaardig, omdat er veel beleidsprogramma’s en (integrale) 
samenwerkingsstrategieën zijn ontwikkeld om lokale veiligheidsproblemen 
aan te pakken door het gemeentebestuur in samenwerking met lokale, 
regionale en landelijke partners uit de publieke en private sector. Omvangrijk, 
omdat een breed scala aan issues de afgelopen decennia onder de noemer 
veiligheid is gebracht. Daarmee is het begrip openbare orde in de loop der tijd 
opgerekt en wordt het in een adem genoemd met veiligheid en soms zelfs met 
leefbaarheid. Een snelle blik op recente veiligheidsplannen leert dat zowel  
staatverlichting, graffiti, evenementen, brandveiligheid en radicalisering, als 
georganiseerde misdaad tot het beleidsdomein van lokale orde en veiligheid 
zijn gaan behoren. Deze brede kijk op lokale veiligheidsproblemen is 
onlosmakelijk verbonden met het veranderende perspectief op veiligheid en 
risico in de (post)moderne samenleving.  
Voor de burgemeester betekende dit dat zijn eigenstandige 
verantwoordelijkheid voor lokale orde en veiligheid inmiddels een breed palet 
aan zogenoemde veiligheidsproblemen beslaat. Bovendien is zijn 
instrumentarium ter handhaving van de openbare orde en veiligheid flink 
uitgebreid. Gedurende de afgelopen 15 jaar heeft de wetgever verschillende 
nieuwe ´burgemeestersbevoegdheden´ gecreëerd, waaronder de mogelijkheid 
tot aanwijzen van veiligheidsrisicogebieden voor preventief fouilleren 
(gemeentewet 151b), het instellen van een tijdelijk huisverbod inzake huiselijk 
geweld (Wet Tijdelijk Huisverbod), alsook een meldingsplicht en avondklok 
om zware overlast en dreiging daarvan te adresseren (Wet Bestrijding 
Voetbalvandalisme en Zware Overlast).  
 
Probleemstelling 
Vanuit bestuurskundig perspectief is de veranderende definiëring van 
veiligheidsproblemen interessant. Wetenschappelijke literatuur over 
agendavorming en beleidsdynamiek leert ons dat de manier waarop burgers, 
beleidsmakers en politici een publiek probleem definiëren, gevolgen heeft voor 
de wijze waarop het probleem wordt aangepakt  en wiens 
verantwoordelijkheid dat is. Een probleemdefinitie maakt specifieke 
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beleidsinstrumenten en beleidsactoren aannemelijker  dan andere 
oplossingsrichtingen. Een eenvoudig voorbeeld kan deze kracht van 
probleemdefinities duidelijk maken. Wanneer u op een verlaten bankje in een 
park een  man  aantreft die een naald in zijn arm prikt, dan kunt u deze persoon 
definiëren als een verwarde drugsverslaafde met gevaar voor uw veiligheid, 
maar evengoed als iemand met een medische aandoening, namelijk 
suikerziekte. In het eerste geval zou u de politie kunnen bellen terwijl u in het 
tweede geval doorloopt in de veronderstelling dat deze man onder behandeling 
staat van een gediplomeerd arts. Dit voorbeeld toont dat dezelfde situatie op 
uiteenlopende wijze gedefinieerd kan worden en dat de gekozen 
probleemdefinitie implicaties heeft voor de manier waarop we een situatie 
adresseren en wie we daarvoor verantwoordelijk achten. 
Deze kracht van  de probleemdefinities maakt ze tot een fundamenteel 
onderdeel van agenda- en beleidsvorming evenals subject van strijd en 
strategisch gedrag in de politieke- en beleidsarena. Vanuit  bestuurskundig 
perspectief is de veronderstelling dan ook gerechtvaardigd dat veranderende 
definiëring van lokale veiligheid van invloed zal zijn op de positie en rol van 
de eerstverantwoordelijke op het lokale bestuursniveau: de burgemeester. Dit 
leidde tot de volgende onderzoeksvraag:  
 
Hoe zijn de definities van lokale veiligheidsproblemen veranderd en hoe, in 
welke mate en waarom heeft dat de positie en rol van de burgemeester binnen 
de lokale veiligheidszorg beïnvloed in Nederland tussen 1990 en 2010?  
 
Onderzoeksopzet en bevindingen 
 Om deze onderzoeksvraag te beantwoorden zijn verschillende stappen gezet. 
Allereerst is de dynamiek van beleidsagenda voor lokaal veiligheidsbeleid in 
kaart gebracht middels een omvangrijk desk research project. Doel van deze 
zogenoemde macrostudie was na te gaan welke lokale veiligheidsproblemen 
tussen 1990 en 2010 als prioriteiten voor lokaal veiligheidsbeleid werden 
benoemd. De macrostudie beoogde daarmee de zo vaak veronderstelde en 
slechts gedeeltelijk of anekdotisch beschreven veranderingen in het denken 
over lokale veiligheid door empirisch onderzoek gedetailleerd in kaart te 
brengen. De inhoud van 47 landelijke beleidsdocumenten is onderzocht met 
behulp van drie analyserondes, een inductief codeerschema en  controle door 
een tweede codeur. Weloverwogen is gekozen voor inhoudsanalyse van 
landelijke documenten in de vorm van regeringsbeleid en de memories van 
toelichting bij de begrotingen van de ministeries voor Binnenlandse Zaken en  
Justitie tussen 1990 en 2010. Tezamen vormen deze documenten een 
afspiegeling van de lokale veiligheidsagenda in Nederland  omdat ze periodiek 
en jaarlijks onder meer de prioriteiten voor lokaal veiligheidsbeleid benoemen.   
Kernbevindingen van de macrostudie zijn dat de frequentie, de 
variëteit en de dominantie van lokale veiligheidsproblemen op de  landelijke 
agenda voor lokaal veiligheidsbeleid drastisch veranderde tussen 1990 en 
2010. De Macro Studie wees uit dat het totale aantal genoemde 
veiligheidsproblemen op gemeentelijk niveau klom van 4 in 1990 naar 175 in 
2010 (issue presence). Tegelijkertijd steeg het aantal categorieën van door de 
lokale overheden aan te pakken typen veiligheidsproblemen, van 2 in 1990 
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naar 33 in 2010 (issue expansion). De meest genoemde, dus dominante 
categorieën over deze periode zijn overlast, drugs, jeugd, geweld, kleine 
ergernissen en georganiseerde criminaliteit (issue dominance). Daarmee wees 
de Macro Studie uit dat steeds meer en steeds meer verschillende issues als 
lokaal veiligheidsprobleem zijn benoemd. Dit duidt op een toenemend proces 
van securitization  of verveiliging op lokaal niveau waarbij nieuwe zaken 
onder de noemer van veiligheid op de beleidsagenda terecht komen. 
Traditionele veiligheidsproblemen als ordeverstoring en gangbare vormen van 
criminaliteit worden vergezeld  door ‘zachte’ issues als parkeeroverlast en 
rommel op straat. Tegelijkertijd  deed ‘zwaardere’ problematiek, als  
georganiseerde criminaliteit en radicalisering, haar intrede in het 
beleidsdomein lokale orde en veiligheid.  
Uit de macrostudieresultaten is vervolgens een drietal definities van 
lokale veiligheidsproblemen geselecteerd die dominante omslagpunten 
vertegenwoordigen in het perspectief op lokale veiligheid op verschillen 
momenten tussen 1990 en 2010. Allereerst werd drugsoverlast geselecteerd als 
een van de eerste uitbreidingen eind jaren ‘90 van de vorige eeuw. Ten tweede 
is rond de eeuwwisseling gekozen voor huiselijk geweld als omslagpunt in de  
aandacht voor veiligheidsproblemen die zich louter in het publieke domein 
afspelen, naar aandacht voor geweld achter de voordeur. Ten slotte viel de 
keuze op  georganiseerde criminaliteit als een voorheen bovenlokaal 
probleem, naar recentelijk ook een dominant agendapunt voor lokaal 
veiligheidsbeleid. 
De manier waarop deze nieuwe probleemdefinities de positie en rol 
van de Nederlandse burgemeester hebben beïnvloed, is  diepgaand onderzocht 
middels een meervoudige en nested case studie strategie. Binnen twee 
gemeenten  Haarlem en Breda (cases)  is onderzocht wanneer en hoe 
drugsoverlast, huiselijk geweld en georganiseerde criminaliteit (subcases) 
gedefinieerd zijn als veiligheidsproblemen en hoe burgemeesters ermee 
omgingen tussen 1990 en 2010. Dataverzameling vond plaats door middel van 
interviews met burgemeesters en samenwerkingspartners alsook 
inhoudsanalyse van lokale raadstukken en beleidsdocumenten met betrekking 
tot drie subcases voor de periode 1990-2010. Een vergelijking van 
casestudiebevindingen binnen en tussen de cases leidde tot inzicht in de 
manier waarop nieuwe veiligheidsproblemen de positie en rol van de 
burgmeester al dan niet beïnvloedden. 
De in totaal zes subcases zijn geanalyseerd en vergeleken aan de hand 
van een analysemodel. Dit model veronderstelt dat probleemdefinities sociale 
constructies met levensechte beleidsgevolgen zijn. Het model combineert 
literatuur over agenda setting, beleidsdynamiek, framing en networked 
governance om de verwachte invloed van probleemdefinities op posities en 
rollen van actoren in de publieke sector in kaart te brengen. De kern van het 
model is dat de kracht van probleemdefinities in het structureren van posities 
en rollen binnen governance netwerken kan worden begrepen als de uitkomst 
van een lokaal framingproces. Dat framingproces vindt plaats tijdens interactie 
tussen verschillende discours coalities bestaande uit bestuurders, burgers en/of 
bedrijven met min of meer dezelfde overtuigingen die hun frame voor het 
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voetlicht proberen te brengen. Tijdens het beleidsdebat kunnen hun frames 
versmelten, verdwijnen dan wel domineren (frame alignment),wat leidt tot een 
gedeeld frame dat wordt omgezet in formeel beleid (discourse 
institutionalisering). Dit beleidsframe kleurt de verwachte rol van de 
verantwoordelijke beleidsactoren waaronder de burgemeester.  De mate waarin 
dit beleidsframe de rolvervulling door de burgemeesters in de beleidspraktijk 
daadwerkelijk beïnvloedt (frame enactment), hangt af van de mate waarin het 
persoonlijk handelen van de burgemeester in overeenstemming is met het 
beleidsframe. Het analysemodel beschrijft een min of meer cognitief proces 
van debat, framing, alignment en enactment dat verschillende volgorden kan 
aannemen en dat beïnvloed wordt door de institutionele kaders aanwezig in 
omringende lokale en bovenlokale beleidsnetwerken. Bovendien is de 
uitkomst van dit framingproces geen statisch gegeven. Het bestaande 
beleidsframe en de beleidspraktijk worden contant uitgedaagd door 
alternatieve frames en veranderen in de loop van de tijd, met bijbehorende 
implicaties voor de burgemeestersrol. 
De belangrijkste bevindingen van de casusonderzoeken zijn dat in 
beide cases drugsoverlast, huiselijk geweld en georganiseerde criminaliteit 
vroeger of later zijn geframed als lokale veiligheidsproblemen. Dit 
beïnvloedde de rol van de burgemeester zowel op papier als in de praktijk.  De 
burgmeester kreeg in de formele veiligheidsplannen een rol toebedeeld om 
deze nieuwe veiligheidsproblemen aan te pakken. Deze verwachte rol is sterk 
beïnvloed door de adoptie van nieuwe bevoegdheden in lokale beleidsplannen. 
Deze bevoegdheden gelden voor alle Nederlandse burgemeesters en stippelen 
het instrumentarium en de verantwoordelijkheid voor onder meer 
drugsoverlast (sluiten panden), huiselijk geweld (huisverbod) en verwevenheid 
tussen boven en onderwereld (BIBOB) uit. In de meerderheid van de subcases 
hebben burgemeesters daadwerkelijk uitvoering gegeven aan de van hen 
verwachte rol zoals opgeschreven in beleidsplannen. Dit betekent dat ook het 
handelen van de burgemeesters in de lokale beleidspraktijk werd beïnvloed 
door nieuw verveiligde beleidsproblemen en bijbehorende nieuwe 
beleidsinstrumenten. Deze praktijkrol werd bovendien gekenmerkt door 
‘hands-on’ betrokkenheid bij individuele en veiligheidsproblemen, bij 
implementatie van nieuwe bevoegdheden evenals door samenwerking tussen 
burgemeester en uiteenlopende publieke en private partners en dat alles in 
toenemende mate op regionaal en zelfs landelijk niveau.   
Tegelijkertijd wijzen enkele subcases op een verschil tussen 
beleidsplannen en beleidspraktijken. Niet in alle gevallen heeft de 
burgemeester zijn verwachte rol uitgevoerd, wat duidt op het klassieke 
onderscheid tussen beleid op papier en in de uitvoeringspraktijk. Dit verschil 
maakt duidelijk dat beleidsframes kunnen verschillen in reikwijdte, dat wil 
zeggen de mate waarin ze de verwachte rol, dan wel het doen en laten van 
beleidsactoren kenmerken. Casusanalyse en vergelijking wees uit dat de mate 
van frame alignement de reikwijdte van het beleidsframe bepaalt. Met andere 
woorden, hoe meer persoonlijk alignment, des te meer enactment door de 
burgemeester. Burgemeesters zijn geen willoze uitvoerders, maar kritische 
adopters van lokale en landelijke beleidsthema´s  en bevoegdheden.  
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Conclusies en implicaties voor theorie en praktijk 
De combinatie van de macro- en casestudiebevindingen leidt tot de volgende 
overkoepelende conclusies. Hoewel de formele verantwoordelijkheid voor 
lokale orde en veiligheid van de burgemeester – zoals sinds jaar en dag 
vastgelegd in de gemeentewet  niet veranderde, is de definitie van lokale 
veiligheidsproblemen aanzienlijk verbreed. Dit veranderende perspectief op 
lokale veiligheid ging gepaard met verschillende veranderingen in de positie 
en rol van de Nederlandse burgemeester. Nederlandse burgemeesters werden 
eigenstandig verantwoordelijk voor een breed scala aan nieuwe 
veiligheidsproblemen. Tegelijkertijd formaliseerde de nationale overheid 
grofweg 15 nieuwe wettelijke bevoegdheden voor Nederlandse burgemeesters 
voor meerdere van deze nieuwe veiligheidsproblemen. 
Casusonderzoek wijst uit dat de positie van de burgemeesters van 
Haarlem en Breda veranderde van min of meer solistisch opererende actoren 
naar participanten in lokale en bovenlokale samenwerkingsverbanden met 
uiteenlopende partners, zoals de belastingdienst, de GGD en de 
woningbouwvereniging. Terwijl burgemeesters poogden lokale veiligheid zo 
effectief mogen te adresseren door informatie, instrumenten en strategieën af 
te stemmen met hun partners, werden ze tegelijkertijd afhankelijk van vele 
anderen om nieuwe veiligheidsproblemen in hun lokale gemeenschap op 
effectieve wijze aan te pakken. Deze multi-actor en multi-level 
samenwerkingsverbanden stimuleerden vooral de externe burgemeestersrol 
van netwerker en verbinder. Burgemeesters in moderne veiligheidsnetwerken 
vertonen daarmee voornamelijk een faciliterende leiderschapsstijl gericht op 
het samenbrengen van actoren, middelen en doelen om hun 
verantwoordelijkheid voor lokale orde en veiligheid waar te maken. Daarnaast 
werkten nieuwe bevoegdheden ook een nieuwe rol in de hand, namelijk die 
van operationele betrokkenheid. Naast de politieke en bestuurlijke taken op het 
vlak van openbare orde en veiligheid raakten burgemeesters ook in 
operationele zin bij individuele gevallen betrokken door implementatie van 
nieuwe bevoegdheden. Bijvoorbeeld door huisverboden voor daders van 
huiselijk geweld in te stellen, bouwvergunningen in te trekken of drugspanden 
te sluiten.  
De zojuist beschreven onderzoeksresultaten hebben implicaties voor 
theoretische kennisvorming in verschillende onderzoeksgebieden. Allereerst 
draagt de macrostudie bij aan de internationale literatuur over securitization 
die zich voornamelijk richt op veiligheidsproblemen op landelijk niveau en 
daarboven. Deze studie toont dat empirische processen van verbreding van het 
veiligheidsconcept – securitization  ook op lokaal beleidsniveau plaatsvinden. 
Zo zien we dat naast de verveiliging van militaire dreiging, immigratie en 
olievoorraden, ook lokale zaken als rommel op straat en loverboys succesvol 
worden geframed als veiligheidsproblemen en daarmee onder de 
verantwoordelijkheid van lokale veiligheidsactoren, onder wie de 
burgemeester, worden gebracht.  
Ten tweede, door de kracht van probleemdefinities te vangen in een 
conceptueel model, brachten de casestudies nieuwe inzichten mee voor de 
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internationale literatuur over agendavorming. Het model poogt een stap verder 
te gaan dan de reeds veronderstelde kracht van probleemdefinities op cruciale 
beleidskeuzen, door te analyseren op welke manier bepaalde 
oplossingsrichtingen en actoren in de operationele beleidspraktijk naar voren 
worden geschoven. Dit resulteerde in de identificatie van een drietal 
mechanismen die tonen hoe beleidsframes de rollen van actoren structureren. 
Het ‘top-down’ mechanisme laat zien dat beleid en beleidrollen direct 
gestructureerd worden door bovenlokale beleidsframes en daarmee het lokale 
beleid en de burgemeestersrol volledig inkleuren. Het ‘mediated’ mechanisme 
laat een uitgebalanceerde mix zien tussen lokale en bovenlokale beleidsideeën 
en instrumenten. In dit geval versmelten lokale en bovenlokale beleidsframes 
en -instrumenten tot een op maat gemaakte mix, passend bij de lokale situatie. 
Het ‘bottom up’ mechanisme beschrijft lokale beleidsideeën en –praktijken die 
door bovenlokale actoren worden overgenomen, waardoor lokale innovaties en 
pionierschappen breder kunnen worden uitgerold. Al met al blijkt dat lokale 
beleidsprocessen en hun onderliggende framingsprocessen doorgaans geen 
pure lokale aangelegenheid zijn.  Ze worden linksom of rechtsom gekenmerkt 
door een mix van lokale en bovenlokale beleidsideeën en -praktijken. 
Bovendien blijkt tijd een belangrijke factor. In historische zin omdat vroegere 
beleidsprocessen meer ruimte laten voor lokaal pionierschap (bottom up) en 
latere beleidsprocessen gekenmerkt worden door een zekere lokale 
padafhankelijkheid (mediated) alsook in letterlijke zin omdat het simpelweg 
enige tijd vergt voordat bovenlokale zaken lokaal omarmd worden, zeker in de 
uitvoeringspraktijk (top down).  
Ten derde appelleren de casestudieresultaten aan de internationale 
literatuur over framing. Hoewel deze body of knowledge veronderstelt dat 
frames het handelen van individuen beïnvloeden, is nog onbekend of en hoe 
het handelen van beleidsactoren in collectieve settings al dan niet wordt 
gestructureerd door beleidsframes. Het casusonderzoek toont dat de invloed 
van beleidsframes op de rol van beleidsactoren een uiteenlopende reikwijdte 
kent. Waar de formele, gedeelde beleidsframes in alle gevallen de verwachte 
rol van beleidsactoren op papier vormgeven, blijkt dat beleidsframes niet 
zonder meer de acties in de beleidspraktijk van de desbetreffende actor 
beïnvloeden. Persoonlijke alignment met het beleidsframe blijkt een 
noodzakelijke voorwaarde voor het handelen naar het beleidsframe en dus 
rolstructurering van alledaagse handelingen in de beleidspraktijk.  
Ten slotte bieden de casestudies empirische inzichten in de veel 
bediscussieerde rol van klassieke overheidspartijen in governance netwerken. 
Zowel in de internationale veiligheidsliteratuur, als de bestuurskundige 
literatuur over netwerken vragen wetenschappers zich af wat het multi-actor en 
mulit-level karakter van governance netwerken betekent voor de rol en positie 
van overheidspartijen. De casusonderzoeken laten zien dat de burgemeester in 
veiligheidsnetwerken als eerste vertegenwoordiger van de lokale overheid een 
sterke, maar tegelijkertijd afhankelijke partij is. De burgemeester ontleent een 
bijzonder positie aan zijn eigenstandige bevoegdheid voor lokale orde en 
veiligheid en bezit veel en verregaande bevoegdheden met betrekking tot 
specifieke problemen rond lokale orde en veiligheid. Tegelijkertijd wordt zijn 
‘papieren invloed’ en daarmee ‘veronderstelde daadkracht’ in de praktijk 
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afgezwakt door zijn afhankelijkheid van vele anderen op zowel lokaal als 
regionaal en landelijk niveau. Omdat de burgemeester wel 
verantwoordelijkheid voor de coördinatie van lokaal veiligheidsbeleid draagt, 
maar deze niet ondersteunt wordt door formele doorzettingsmacht voor regie 
over lokale veiligheidsnetwerken is hij een belangrijke, maar geen 
allesbepalende speler.  
Naast wetenschappelijke inzichten bracht het onderzoek een aantal 
implicaties voor de beleidspraktijk van lokaal veiligheidsbeleid naar voren. 
Allereerst heeft securitzation van lokale issues vergaande gevolgen voor 
bestuurders en burger met zich meegebracht. Door allerhande zaken aan te 
merken als lokaal veiligheidsprobleem werd een zekere mate van urgentie 
gecreëerd en zijn lokale actoren en maatregelen behorende tot het 
beleidsdomein van openbare orde en veiligheid in stelling gebracht. Voor 
burgemeesters betekende dit dat uiteenlopende zaken die voorheen niet als 
veiligheidsprobleem beschouwd werden  zoals overlast op straat, 
jeugdproblemen en geweld in de huiselijke sfeer  nu ook onder hun 
eigenstandige verantwoordelijkheid voor lokale orde en veiligheid vallen. 
Dientengevolge werden burgemeesters direct verantwoordelijk gesteld voor 
een steeds breder palet aan zware en minder zware ‘veiligheidsproblemen’. 
Tegelijkertijd groeide hun handelingsmogelijkheden met de komst van een 
flink aantal nieuwe bevoegdheden. Dit schepte nieuwe verantwoordelijkheden 
en verwachtingen van het lokale bestuur en burgemeesters in het bijzonder als 
het gaat om de zorg voor lokale veiligheid. Voor de burger betekende een 
lokale trend van securitization inzet van veiligheidsmaatregelen met soms 
verregaande gevolgen voor de gemeenschap als geheel dan wel voor specifieke 
individuen in het bijzonder. Burgemeestersbevoegdheden, waaronder 
preventief fouilleren, sluiten van drugspanden en uitgeven van huisverboden, 
interveniëren in de publieke leefomgeving en reiken soms tot ver achter de 
voordeur.  
Ten tweede wijst de uitbreiding van burgemeestersbevoegdheden op 
een wederkerig samenspel tussen het landelijke en het lokale bestuursniveau. 
Waar in dat verband vaak wordt gevreesd voor landelijk beleid dat slecht of 
zelfs averechts werkt in de lokale beleidspraktijk, laten de casestudies zien dat 
door nationale overheid gecreëerde burgemeestersbevoegdheden in meerdere 
gevallen relevant en nuttig werden geacht. Zij het dat landelijke bevoegdheden 
door burgemeester werden geïmplementeerd op een moment en wijze passend 
bij de lokale situatie. Dat betekent dat landelijk beleid voornamelijk 
faciliterend werkt wanneer lokale bestuurders deze nuttig en nodig achten.  
Tot slot vreesde menig bestuurder, burger en onderzoeker dat 
Nederlandse burgemeesters zouden verworden tot lokale sheriffs die met een 
‘zero tolerance’ attitude eigenhandig de meest verregaande 
beleidsinstrumenten zouden inzetten in de aanpak van criminaliteit en ieder 
ander veiligheidsprobleem dat zich voordeed binnen de lokale gemeenschap. 
Dergelijk handelen zou volgens hen afbreuk doen aan de ‘zachtere’ rol van de 
burgemeester als hoeder van de lokale gemeenschap. Uit casusonderzoeken 
blijkt dat veiligheid inderdaad een kernthema is geworden in het dagelijks 
opereren van burgemeesters en dat ze meer dan eens gebruik maakten van hun 
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nieuwe bevoegdheden. Echter, casusonderzoek liet ook zien dat burgemeesters 
daarmee niet veranderden in solisten die met grof geschut optreden tegen ieder 
mogelijk veiligheidsprobleem. De veronderstelde macht die gepaard zou gaan 
met de uitdijing van veiligheidsproblemen en bevoegdheden wordt in de 
praktijk afgezwakt door nieuwe afhankelijkheden en bovenlokale 
beleidsinvloeden in de lokale veiligheidszorg. Zoals reeds beschreven, 
Nederlandse burgemeesters zijn veelal ‘verbinders’ en ‘facilitators’ in brede 
veiligheidsnetwerken in plaats van ‘solistisch opererende sheriffs´.  
Samenvattend, dit onderzoek toont aan dat de lokale trend van 
verveiliging allerhande zaken tot onderwerp maakte van ‘lokale 
veiligheidsnetwerken’ die allerminst een puur lokale aangelegenheid zijn. 
Lokaal veiligheidsbeleid blijkt voordeel te hebben van regionale 
samenwerkingsverbanden,  landelijk aangereikte instrumenten en zelfs 
inspiratie te putten uit internationale beleidspraktijken. Dit betekent dat 
Nederlandse burgemeesters lokaal veiligheidsbeleid voeren met een multi-
level karakter. Zij functioneren in deze setting eerder als wederzijds 
afhankelijke super-netwerkers en kritische gebruikers van bovenlokale 
instrumenten, dan als de door sommigen gevreesde willoze uitvoerders van 
bovenlokaal beleid, dan wel  lokale sheriffs. 
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